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Title:

Nicholas N. Muraviev, Conqueror of the Black Dragon.

APPROVED BY MEleERS OF THE THESIS

CO~~ITTEE:

The essential objective of this study was to reveal the de
gree to which one man, Nicholas Muraviev, was instrumental in
bringing about Russia's annexation of The Amur basin, as well as
the territory that became the Maritime Province of Siberia.
ductory chapters provide:

Intro

a) a background summary of Muraviev's

education and of his career prior to his service in Siberia, and

..

b) a brief historical survey of the area in which his achievements
raised Russia to the position of a Far Eastern Power.

The main body

of the study comprises an analytical narrative of Muraviev's acti
viti.es during the decade that culminated in the Chinese capitula
tion at Aigun in 1858.

Closing chapters explain the factors that

turned the newly acquired territories into a burden for the

•

Rus~ian

Government until it decided to build the trans-Siberian railway,

"

•

and set forth some conclusions regarding the historical signifi
cance of Muraviev's role as Russia's pro-consul in Eastern Siberia.
Extensive use was made of the prime single source of informa
tion on Muraviev's life, Ivan Barsukov's Graf N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii,
po ego pismam, ofitsialnym dokumentam, razskazam sovremmenikov it .
pechatnym istochnikam (materialy d1ia biografii). Also of signifi
cant assistance was the bibliography contained in J. L. Sullivan's
doctoral dissertation, Count N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii, a full-scale
biography.

Sullivan's dissertation preceded two important works

bearing on the Muraviev period in Siberia and drawn on extensively
in the present study;

R. K. I. Quested's liThe Expansion of Russia

1n East As!a, 1858-1860, and P. I. Kabanov's Amurskii Vopross.
Among other particularly valuable sources was P. V. Schumacher's
long article, ftK istorii priobretenia Amurai. Snoshenia s Kitaem
s 1848 po 18to g ••', contained in Russki Arkhiv, which, together with
Russkaia Starina and Krasny Arkh1v, also contain numerous other docu·
ments, memoirs and contemporary accounts that were consulted. Of
signal value, too, among the special studies, surveys and reference
works consulted was the introductory chapter of Andrew Malozemoff's
Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. A complete selected biblio·

"

graphy is included.
The research undertaken for this study has led to the conclu
.sion that had

i~

not been for Muraviev's imagination and ingenuity,

his willingness, on occasion, to flout authority and his dedication
and extraordinary stamina, the annexation to Eastern Siberia of al- •

•

most 400,000 square miles of territory might never have taken place •
"

---Muraviev was sometimes impatient, perhaps sometimes insuffi
ciently impressed by broader politico-military considerations that
dictated what he regarded as an inexcusably over-cautious attitude
toward Russo-Chinese relations in st. Petersburg.

He also tended

to exaggerate the immediate benefits that would accrue to Russia
once she acted boldly on the Amur.

Yet the salient fact remains

that it was the intensity with which he pursued his idee fixe,
both with words and actions, the years of his methodical prepara
tion, with minimal support from the Russian Government, that made
it possible for that Government to nullify the Treaty of Nerchinsk
and

~o

extend the Russian Empire's realms on the Pacific's shores

down to the Korean frontier.

It took important external factors,

such as the Crimean War, and the resulting replacement of Mura
viev's nemesis, Nesselrode, and his clique, with more capable and'
far sighted officials, to bring Muraviev's plans to fruition.

But

to say this is simply to say that the authorities in St. Peters
burg, viewing the confluence of events on the international scene,
finally recognized that in Muraviev they had the right man at the
right place at the right time.

"

o
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PREFACE
High on a bluff overlooking the Amur River at Khabarovsk, stands
a heroically proportioned statue of Count Nicholas Nikolaevich Muraviev

Amurskii, conqueror of the Heilungchiang, or Black Dragon, as the
Chinese called that river.

Erected in 1891, this memorial dominates

the site to which he pointed, when first defiantly sailing dOl'm that
forbidden waterway, and prophetical!y exclaimed, "There is where a city
will rise!,ll

Today Khabarovsk is but one of a number of flourishing cities
and ports in the Amur basin and the Ussuri maritime area, relinquished
to Russia by the Chinese, with rancor in their hearts and in the hope
ultimately of obtaining revenge.

This territory now figures prominently

in the cold war between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's
Republic.

Lately, on the Amur and that other river sailed by Muraviev,

the Ussuri, clashes have taken place between the armed forces of the:
two

Co~~unis~

empires.

In 1969, the Soviet Government was impelled

to issue a lengthy statement in rebuttal of Chinese irredentist claims
and reciting the history of China's ancient "Dominion of the Northeast"
that passed into Russian possession in the years 1858-1860. 2
IJgtol'icheski Ve§.,tnik, Vol. XXXVI, 1884, p. 646, cited by P. I.
Kabanov in Amursk.!.LY..Qpross (Blagoveschensk, 1959), p. 163.
~oscow News, Supplement No. 25, 1969, p. 21.

vi
Russian acquisition of the area that has now become the subject
of Russian and Chinese polemics was essentially based on the work of
Nicholas Muraviev who, often in the face of indifference or active
hostility in high Russian governmental quarters, succeeded in abro
gating the Treaty of Nerchinsk and annexing thehAmur basin to Eastern
Siberia.

Subsequently, he was largely instrumental in further extend-

Ing the boundaries of Imperial Russia to Korea, gaining, in all, an
area of some 360,000 square miles for his country, which thereby became
a Far Eastern Power.
With the exception of one relatively brief biography3 throughout
which, in the words of its author, the emphasis ,is on the man himsel f,
little has been written in the West concerning NiCholas Muraviev.

The

most complete account in Russian of the politico-military activities of
this man is a two-volume work by Ivan Barsukov, Member of the Imperial
Society of Russian History and Antiquities at the University of Mos
cow. 4 This is, in effect, a large collection of letters, documents
and memoiI's of Muraviev's contemporaries, together with occasional com
mentary by Barsukov.
The present study is based upon a detailed scrutiny of Barsukov's
compendium and an examination of those sources cited by him that were

3J • L. Sullivan, Count ~. N. Muraviev-Amur~~l, doctoral thesis,
Harvard University, 1955.
4 J • P. Barsukov, G;.!L1:l.!~!.Y.y-ra.yi.£.v:'~!!l!.!.rski i..L ..P9_ ~.9.Q-p-!?mam.s_.

on ts t.a~!!Y.l!1--.9o~~melltarr! ,_r(,! z s~~~_m_?£y!fm!lI'}DJJ~L~~h.atny!.ll is !,_ocb!1ik~lJL

!mat~!ialy dl ia b!ogr~fiJ _(Count~_•. N•• Mtl~vi~~:-~ftJQ:rskii,~re'ygaJJ~d
!-h;r9u gh his_..1ette~§..Lin _o.f.fi£iaLQocum~l1t§_L narra1:Jyes_of hili con1.em20 :,
rar..ie§..sDQ...11..1,!bUshecL§ol!!.Cll Lmaterials for a biography!!

vii
available to me, as well as of others.

It is hoped that the resulting

synthesis, not previously undertaken in this form, succeeds in revealing
the degree to which this one man, Nicholas Muraviev, determined the
events of a decisive decade in Siberian history and in accurately
evaluating the aftermath of the doughty countts exploits.

Although

appropriate attention is given here to other aspects of Muraviev's ad
ministration of Eastern Siberia, the main emphasis is on the achievement
that earned him his letters patent of nobility and on an analysis of the
factors that delayed the full exploitation of his bloodless conquest.
All dates in the text are in the Old Style (according to the
Julian calendar, which in the nineteenth century was twelve days behind
the Gregorian

calendar)~

The transliteration system is that of the

Library of Congress, without the diacritical marks and ligatures.
The subject of this thesis was proposed by Dr. Basil Dmytryshyn,
Professor of History, Portland State University.

I am most grateful to

him for his regular encouragement, careful perusal of earlier drafts,
'-.

guidance on sources and suggestions as to organization.
Eric E. Oulashin
Portland state University
May 1, 1971

•
•

CHAPTER I
THE MAKING OF A GOVERNOR-GENERAL
I.

..

EDUCATION AND INITIATION TO WAR AND PEACE

Nicholas Nikolaevich Muraviev was born on August 11, 1809, in St •
Petersburg, of a well known family of the minor nobility, many of whose
members had distinguished themselves as soldiers, diplomats and educators.
His father, N,lcholas Nazarevich, formerly a naval officer, subsequently
Governor of Novgorod, was a State Secretary; he later became a Senator and
Chief of the Personal Chancery of Nicholas I.

His mother, Catherine Niko

laevna, came of ,a famous naval family, the MQrdvinovs.
The Muravievs initially intended that Nicholas should prepare for
entrance to the University of St. Petersburg.

At the untimely death of

his mother in 1819,1 he was sent for that purpose to the Godenius board
ing school.

Alexander I, however, because of his esteem for Muraviev's

father, ordered that Nicholas and his younger brother, Valerian, be en
rolled in the Corps of Pages, the exclusive school for the training of
well-born young men for the military and government service.

At the age

of fourteen, Nicholas was assigned as a page-of-the-chamber and a sergeant
1I.

P.

_

ofitsial'n dokumentam razskazam sovremennikov i
isto
chnikan materialy dlia biografii) (Count N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii, as
revealed throu h his letters in official documents narratives of
contemporaries and published sources materials for a biograph¥ ).
iMoscow, 1891), Vol. I, pp. 8-9. Muraviev's father remarried and even
tually had ten sons and seven daughters, of which three daughters and
three sons survived to adulthood.

.,-",--,,"--

~

2

•

major, one of a group of thirty-nine young aristocrats under the supervi
sion of the Grand Duke Michael.

-.

Thus began Muraviev's career in the sphere

of the elite serving people of the Russian autocr,acy.
Muraviev finished his course of studies in the Imperial Corps of
Pages at the head of his class; for this distinction his name was duly in
scribed on a marble plaque displayed in the school.

He remained in the

Corps, however, for another yearby reason of his extreme youth, and at
the age of seventeen was commissioned a praporshchik 2 in the Finnish Life
"

guard Regiment.

Less than two years later, he saw action during the Russo-

Turkish was of 1828-9, at the seige of Varna, and was cited in despatches
to the Emperor for his "exemplary manliness and fearlessness".3

He fell

ill during the campaign, and at its conclusion was unable to accompany
his regiment back to Russia.

Having been promoted to second lieutenant,

he was assigned as aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Evgenii Alexandro
vich Golovin, who had just been appointed military governor of Varna.
Golovin was a distant relative and good friend of Muraviev's father, a con
nection that proved of considerable value to Nicholas during the earlier
years of his career. 4
In Varna, young Muraviev became intimately involved in the details
of governing the city, thus gaining valuable experience in civil ad
ministration, the field in which he eventually reached the apogee of his
service to the Tsar.

He continued also to see military action, being

2en.... or cornet (there is no exact equivalent in English).
3earsukov,

Opt

cit., I, p. 15.

4v. Struve, ttGraf Muraviev Amurskii" in Russkava Starina, Vol. 33,
(l882), p. 523. Barsukov fails to mention this advantageous circumst~e.

•

3

detailed by General Golovin to assault troops and

pa~ticipating

in the

taking of Sisopol and the bombardment of Akhoil.

He-also fought in the

Nevchinsk Valley, and at Kulevchi and Fort Shumla, where he distinguished
himself by his elan in the storming of strongpoints, for which he was
awarded the Order of St. Ann, Third Class~~
Upon his return to Varna, Muraviev contracted typhus, followed by
another fever common to the area,6 and in the spring of 1830, was sent
on leave to St. Petersburg.

Here, enjoying the imperial favor of the

Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna, whose page-of-the-chamber he had been, he
briefly re-entered the glamorous routines of court life.
In the winter of 1830, Muraviev rejoined his regiment as it was
preparing to take the field against the Polish resurgents.

The in

fluence of his father failed to obtain him an appointment as aide-de-camp
to the Russian commander in Poland, General Dibich-Zabalkanskii, but after
participating as a regimental officer in a number of campaigns, he once
again became aide-de-camp to General Golovin, now commanding an infantry
division.

Near the conclusion of the Polish campaign, having been desig

nated as parlamentor 7 to the Polish rebel leader, General Girolamo Romar
ino, he obtained some first-hand experience at high-level negotiating - 
which, incidentally, as a matter of delicacy and good taste, was carried
out in French. 8
43arsukov t op.·cit., I, p. 19.
6J. S. Curtiss, in The Russian Army Under Nicholas I, 1825-1855,
(Duke university Press, 1965), p. 64, refers to "a sort of plague" that
hit the army in Varna very heavily in 1829, although the mortality was
not great.

!~.
~

7Negotiator bearing a flag of truce.
Bsarsukov, 0D. cit., I, p. 43.

t
r
-~

•

4

•
Continuous field service, and a minor leg wound, earned Muraviev

four months· leave at the end of 1831.

•

He returned to st. Petersburg,

where at first he languished in a state of depres.sion.

In a letter to

his brother, Valerian, he bitterly recounted that, having fought with
distinction through six severe campaigns in four months, he had been ig
nored by his superiors, while many of his brother officers who had exhi
bited less energy and valor had been decorated and promoted over him.
"

His

complaint was premature; a short time later he was thrice decorated, being
made a Knight of the order of St. Vladimir, and receiving the Gold Saber,
inscribed, "For Valor", and the Virtute Militari, Fourth Class (Polish) •
•
Thus reinvigorated, Lieutenant Muraviev returned to Poland in the spring
of 1832.

He resumed his duties under General Golovin, and in that year

was promoted to Staff Captain, but a year later, because of recurrences
of the fevers that had attacked him in Turkey, he was invalided out of the
service. 9
II. THE CAUCASIAN CRUCIBLE
From 1833 to 1837, Muraviev managed a crown estate, "Stokl1shk.i"
in the Vilno guberniya, which had been granted to his father for his life
time by the Tsar.

It was in sadly run-down condition, and what with poor

crops, inadequate fertilizer and depressed market prices, it presented
a challenge for which Muraviev had little enthusiasm. 10 To his great
relief, In March, 1838, through Golovin·s intercession, he received a
civil service appointment to the latter·s staff in Warsaw.
9Ibid ., I, p. 48-49.
10sarsukov,

Ope

cit., I, pp. 52-58.

Shortly after

5
•
wards, Golovin was appointed commander of the Caucasian Corps and civil

governor of the

G~ian

Armenian and Caucasian regions •. Muraviev

thereupon returned to military service in the rank of Major, being assign
ed for special duties to Golovin.

Throughout that year, on the eastern

coast of the Black Sea, he took part in punitive expeditions against
Hadji-Berzek and other Circassian tribal leaders who refused to become
subjects of the Tsar.
6

In the fall of that year, he attained the rank

of Lieutenant Colonel. ll

At this time he was deputized by General Golo

vin to parl ey with elders of the tribes regard ing the government' s cond i -...
tions for peace.
Muraviev evidently carried out his negotiations with considerable
skill and authority.

He made clear to the Caucasian chieftains that as

loyal subjects of Russia, they would be obligated to carry out all orders
of the local Russian authorities, to pay tribute, including all arrears,
to harbor no bandits and to turn them over to the authorities, to use
firearms only on sufferance of the authorities and, in case of provoca
tion, to lodge official complaints and not to resort to armed self-de
fense.

They were to receive all officials sent to them and were to offer

no resistance to their passage through their settlements; and without
delay~

they were to elect four representatives and send them to Tiflis

with a declaration of repentance and a plea for pardon.

It is recorded

that "The elders unanimously undertook to carry out these orders")2
llIn his memoirs, G. I. Filipson, a contemporary of Muraviev's,
relates that when Golovin learned of his recent promotion to Lieutenant
Colonel, he immediately sought and obtained the same for Muraviev.
(Russkii Arkhiv, 1883, Bk. III, p. 350).
~),

l2sobranye Akty Kavkazskoi Archeograficheskoi Kommissii, (Tiflis,
cited by Barsukov, 0p. cit., I, p. 63.

~~

•

•
In the spring of 1839, Muraviev took part in further campaigns in

6

northern Daghestan, culminating in the siege of Akhoulgo, refuge of the
legendary chieftain, Shamil.

Here, during eighty days of fierce and

bloody assaults upon a series of strongpoints, Muraviev was again woun
ded, a rifle bullet shattering bones in his right hand and largely
lyzing it.

para~

This action earned him the Imperial Crown to the Orders of

St. Stanislav and St. Anne of the Second Degree, together with a per
~

sonal commendation from the Emperor. l3 The decimated Russian forces fin
ally took Akhoulgo, but the charismatic Shamil made his escape.
Following a period of enforced inactivity while his wound healed,
Muraviev was assigned in April, 1840, as commander of'the Third Section
of the Black Sea Coast Line, with promotion to the rank of colonel. 14
With headquarters in Bombori, in Abhazia, he was responsible for nine
forts and strongpoints manned by regular line battalions, so that now
at the age of thirty-one, he was exercising independent command over
substantial troop formations.
Though his services in the Caucasus did not go unrecognized or
unrewarded, Muraviev constantly fretted at what he deemed to be the un
sympathetic and uncooperative attitude of his superiors, Golovin, of
course, excepted.

He fumed at what he considered to be the indifference

l3sarsukov, 0p. cit., I, p. 64.
l~ilipson, Ope cit., p. 351, relates that after Muraviev was
woulded in the hand, Golovin attempted to obtain his promotion, but that
his effort elicited only a decoration; he appealed to the Emperor, who
pointed out that Muraviev had been in grade for less than a year, and
ordered the award of a second decoration. When Golovin, evidently at
Muraviev's urging, persisted, pointing out that Filipson had been ad
vanced to the grade of colonel within less than a year after obtaining
his lieutenant-colonelcy, the Emperor gave in. Thus, Filipson observes,
Muraviev was thrice rewarded for the same exploit. Filipson does not
divulge his source.

..<.~~-...j

•

7

•
of General Nicholas Alexandrovitch Raevskii, Commander of the Black Sea
Coast Line, and. of senior staff officers in Tiflis, toward the needs of
his· command and his own activities.

In a letter of June, 1840, he had

this to say to his brother, Valerian:

~

In general, I will say that I find myself in great difficulties,
having no means of communication with my section, and if this
situation does not change, I shall be unable to remain as commander at Bornbori. As commander of the section, I consider it
my~uty either ,to defend my fortifications or to be blown up in
them; but when Raevskii holds on to all the ships, then I can
betake myself nowhere, nor help anyone - - and s~ I have no
intention of subjecting my reputation to obloquy, and shall
leave the service at the first opportunity; I submit that this
would be obligatory for any well-intentioned man when he Iges
that he is not being accorded the means to be of service.
A little later he wrote again to Valerian; who, also evidently
benefiting from family connections, was serving on the Corps staff with
Golovin in Tiflis:
What a man, Raevskii! He has gathered up all his ships and
taken off for the southern Crimea, while here we haven't the
wherewithal even to grow fodder, either in the outlying detachments or in the section itself ••• You might take the occasion
to tell Evgeny Alexandrovich L-Golovin_7 that if measures aren't
taken to bring Raevskii to book and to make him hon~~ his oath
as an officer, I shall be unable to serve with him.
Three months later, he sent General Golovin his own proposed plan for
expeditionary operations in the coming year.

He noted in a letter to

l5Ibid., p. 71. Curtiss, Ope cit., pp. 157-159, points out that many
forts of the Black Sea Coast Line had no connection with Russia proper, because the terribly wild country, torrential mountain streams, and miasmic
swamps presented insurmountable obstacles to the building of supply roads
on the coast. Some of the forts, therefore, had to rely entirely upon
Russian warships and steamers in the Black Sea for supplies and reinforcements.
l6sarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 73. Muraviev obviously relied on the Caucasian Corps commander's affectionate indulgence; another, less well connected officer might have been court-martialed for such a statement.

...".

,-~~

•

8

•

Valerian that "it might be said that I am meddling in what is none of my
business, but I consider it my duty according to my

~onscience,

and I am

.

sending it to him by private mail and do not regret the postalexpense"'.17
Muraviev's frustration and bitterness continued throughout the fol
lowing year, 1841.

His superior officers were either unwilling or unable

to provide him with men and equipment in strength sufficient - - in his
view - - to assure the successful defense of his sector of the Black Sea
"

Coast Line against anticipated attacks by the local tribes.

Barsukov com

ments, without, however, adducing any evidence, that this was to be ex
plained by jealousy of staff officers in higher headquarters and their
unwillingness to give Muraviev further opportunities to distinguish him
self.

,

The fact that Muraviev was the protege

t

of a high ranking general

was presumably not lost on his fellow officers, whose reactions to his
requests and proposals may sometimes have been tinged with malice.

A de

tailed analysis of the military campaigns in the Caucasus and, in particu
lar, of the situation of the Black Sea littoral during the period in ques
tion, might perhaps reveal the accuracy or subjectivity of this view.
That, however, would exceed the stated confines of this study; it should
be noted, though, that at the time Muraviev was writing his complaints,
the Abkhazians and most of the other Circassian tribes in the western Cau
casus, while certainly not utterly subjugated, were not posing the major
threat to the Russians.

That existed farther to the east where Shamil was

entering into his "brilliant epoch".18 It should be kept in mind, too,
l7Ibid ., I, p. 77.

It is not known what became of Muraviev's plan.

18M. V. Nechkina, Ed., Russia in the Nineteenth Century, (J. W.
Edwards, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1959), p. 342, and Lesley Blanch, The Sabres of
Paradise, (Viking Press, New York, 1960), p. 253. Sham!l was at the
apogee of his power during the period 1840-1847. In the spring of 1840,
encouraged by the revival of Shamil's movement, the Circassians mounted

•

9

•

that military commanders are traditionally loathe to concede that they have.
been provided with forces and equipment adequate to cope with the particu
larsituations and contingencies that they face. , Be that as it may, Mura
viev's near obsession with the requirements of his command and the degree
of confidence that he merited was a forecast of the approach with which
he was to carry out his future assignments in the military and governmental
service.
~

It was an attitude of mind that sometimes seemed to border on the

paranoid.
In fairness to Muraviev, it should be noted that during this period,
the Russian High Command in the Caucasus was grievously incompetent, as
well as divided by personal ambitions and jealousies.

Here is what a bio

grapher of Shami1 has to say about the general then in command of the cam
paign in Daghestan (Shami1's base):

"Grabbe was a personal friend of the

Tsar, in whose eyes he could do no wrong.

Again and again during his com

mand, from 1839 to 1842, his blunders were overlooked."

The same writer

also refers to a report by .General Golovin stating that "the suppression
of this terrible despotism {-ShamH t~7 must be our first care".

·'But'·,

comments this writer, "the Russian High Command, equally despotic, was
now weakened by a series of bitter intrigues and quarrels by which the
various generals feuded among themselves and jockeyed for favor with the
19
Tsar".
Just as at an earlier stage of his career, when he unfairly com
p1ained that his services in Poland were being ignored, so while bemoan
ing his lot in the Caucasus, Muraviev learned that General Raevskii, whom
a general uprising and took several forts of the Black Sea Coast Line;
these were soon re-taken, however, and strongly reinforced by the Russians.
See Curtiss, Ope cit., pp. 157-159.
19B1anch,

Ope

cit., pp. 217-219.

,~,,:.
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he despised, had recommended him for promotion.

He recounted in a letter

to Valerian, in February, 1841, that "Raevskii has recommended me for

pr~

motion, although I tried to dissuade him", and went on to say that whether
or not he was promoted, he was determined to leave the caucasus. 20 But
in a later letter to his brother, he said, "No matter how they squeeze me
from all sides, I carry out my responsibilities conscientiously and do
not pity myself".2l
This rather querulous self-righteousness and petulance that some
times permeated Muraviev's letters should be judged with some moderation,
keeping in mind that they were private communications to his own, and
evidently favorite, brother (letters to his other brother, Alexander,
are rarely quoted by Barsukov, and may be presumed to have been much less
frequent, since they had all been made available to Barsukov by Muraviev's
family) •
Despite his self-absorbed grumbling and occasionally insubordinate
attitude, the young colonel was clearly performing his duties with vigor
and flair.

At the conclusion of operations in the spring of 1841, his

commander, Major General Arpen, reported to the headquarters of the Cauca
sian Corps regarding Muraviev's pacification expeditions.

He related

how Muraviev, aware that the belligerent Ubichs were intimidating other,
loyal Circassian tribes, rallied the latter, and with two regiments of
Cossack cavalry and other regular troop detachments, proceeded on a
triumphal tour through the territory of the loyal Dzhigets in a show of
20Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 90. One suspects that his attempt at
dissuasion was limited to a token show of modesty.
2l~., I, p. 91.
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force against some of the Ubichs, who were being sti;red up by Hadji
Berzek.

•

The psychological effect had been overwhelming, and peace had

been preserved.

Arpen, in a report to Corps headquarters, heartily pralsed

Muraviev's forceful activity and efficiency in leading this, the first
Russian troop movement inland from the Black Sea coast at Gagry, and ex
pressed his full confidence in his judgment and capabilities. 22
It was sh9rtly after this expedition that Muraviev, at the age of
thirty-two, was prom9ted to the rank of Major General.

In June, 1841,

he fot.lowed up his earlier success by mobilizing the loyal Dzhigets and
troops of his own in sufficient force to intimidate some of the Ubichs
and those of the Dzhigets who had not yet submitted to Russian rule.
In ceremonial parleys, and with the traditional use of preliminary inter
mediaries, he succeeded in exacting oaths of fealty from leaders of the
tribes and promises that they would keep the peace and remain within
their respective territories. 23
Muraviev's promotion and his success in subjugating the mountain
tribes - - without loss of life - - were not enough for him to resign
himself to his situation in the Caucasus.

He was depressed and discour

aged.by the dismal failures of the High Command and apparently sufficient
ly seriously considering retirement to write Valerian asking him to con
sult with his father and brother, Alexander, regarding the purchase of
a modest property near St. Petersburg where he could settle down.
same time, he speculated

about the possibility of obtaining an appoint

ment as Councilor of State, in recognition of his military
22aarsukov, op. cit., I, p. 94.
23 Ibid., I, p. 96.

At the

ser~ices.
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rancor on the score of his superiors was unabated, and he inveighed against
generals like Arpen, who lived "in luxury in the Crimea, making occasional
inspection trips, as on an excursion", in ships that his, Muraviev's com
mand desperately needed for communications and logistical support. 24
Once again, just as he was plunged into deep gloom because of real
or imagined injustices that he was suffering, he received news from his
brother of yet another commendation from the Tsar that was on its way to
~

him.

His reply to his brother:
Thanks to the Tsar~ Thanks to the Great One for not for
getting us little ones •••Clearly it is undeniable that prayer
to God--and service to the Tsar--are not lost. Of course,
dearer than my general's rank is the ~steem of my Sovereign •••
I can imagine how our old batiushka / father 7 is rejoicing-
and I am sure that except for the two of us,-he is the only
one who sincerely rejoices. But now there lies on me the
heavy obligation of justifying my Soveriegn's words; help me,
Lord, to do so -- that is my constant grayer. God must give
me the necessary wisdom and strength. 2
•
In the summer of 1842, Muraviev saw action again, when the Navaginsk

redoubt was

threatened by a massing of the mountain tribesmen.

On July

29th, Muraviev arrived there with a small force, sending two ships back
along the'Jcoast for further reinforcements.

The following two days saw

an artillery duel between the mountaineers and the defenders of Nava
ginsk under Muraviev's personal command.

The attackers t batteries were

silenced and the mountaineers dispersed.

Regarding this action, General

Arpen reported to the Minister of War as follows:

"I consider it my most

pleasant duty to identify the individual chiefly responsible for this new
exploit.

I have no fear of offending the brave defenders of the Navaginsk
,

24aarsukov, op. cit., I, pp. 97-98.
25~., I, p. 100.

.~,,-
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•
redoubt when I say that with such a commander as General Muraviev, any

troops would do the same.,,26 This, it will be noted, from the same General
Arpen with whom, Muraviev had written his brother, his relations could
never improve, presumably because the general was jealous of Muraviev's
prowess.
In the fall, operations against the Ubichs, only a fraction of
whom Muraviev had earlier subdued, continued.
~

General Arpen moved on

them with a substantial force, with Muraviev in command of the advance
guard.

Muraviev made contact with the enemy at the entrance to the Arug

Valley and vigorously attacked the right bank of the Arug River.

After

a sharp fire fight, the Ubichs withdrew and he occupied the right bank.
The following day saw savage fighting, often hand to hand, with all forces
on both sides fully committed.

The Ubichs were defeated and fled, leav

ing many dead. 27
Following the victory on the Arug River, General Arpen decided to
build additional defenses at the mountaintop Navaginsk redoubt, but when
it came time to move out for that objective, Muraviev and his advance
guard were nowhere to be found.

He had moved forward despite Arpen's

orders, and had proceeded with such speed that the Ubichs had not had
time to regroup to defend the mountain top, which he took without firing a
shot.

Muraviev left his advance guard at Navaginsk and rejoined the main

force, which had just formed another advance guard to move on theobjec
tive he had already taken.

When Arpen demanded an explanation for his

outdistancing the main force, he replied that he moved, "not at a German
26aarsukov, op. cit., I, p. 102.
27Ibid ., I, p. 106.
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but at a Muraviev pace".28

Arpen's force completed the construction of watch towers at Nava
ginsk and prepared to return to the coast and sail back to their bases in
Chernomorie and Savastopol. The time of year, mid-November, posed a pro
blem, however, with respect to transport of some 2,500 horses of the wagon
train, artillery and cavalry.

Apart from the enormous number of trans

ports this would have required, heavy seas would have made the project un
feasible.

Muraviev, knowing that during Ramadan, the

~uslim

tribesmen

~

would not be alert, at night (when they would be breaking their day-long
fast), proposed taking the horses back to Abkhazi along the shoreline at
night.

This plan was carried out, and on November 15, the Black Sea Fleet

at Abkhazi up-anchored.

The year's operations had come to a successful

conclusion, although the Russian forces had not moved deep into the heart
of Ubich territory, a tactic that Muraviev had persistently urged, but
which Arpen rejected because of logistical problems. 29
Wintering back at Abkhazi, although a dull interlude, would normally
at least have offered some prospect of rest and relaxation for Muraviev.
He was periodically suffering, however, from recurrences of fevers he had
contracted in Turkey, and following the conclusion of the active operation
al season, he was granted leave on grounds of ill health, and returned to
St. Petersburg for several months.

In letters to his brother Valerian,

28sarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 108. An interesting remark, considering
that Nicholas I, upon whom Muraviev's future ultimately depended, the
product of German tutors and the son of a German mother, was known for
his rigidly Teutonic outlook.
29Ibid., I, p. 109.

•
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he mentioned his straitened circumstances. 30 With the sole exception of
•
a recital by Franz Liszt, he was denying himself any plays or concerts,
and when he went out he walked, since a carriage was "damnably expensive tt •
His economies extended to his table and he contented himself ,with beer in
place of wine.

His leave was extended throughout the summer since, al

though his health was improving, his doctors advised him not to return to
Abkhazi in the hot season for fear that he might again succumb to the
~

fevers so common there on the humid coast. 3l
While Muraviev was recuperating in St. Petersburg, major changes
were taking place in the Caucasus command.

Following an inspection carried

out there by Count A. I. Chernyshev, Minister of War, Golovin, Muraviev's
longtime benefactor, was replaced by General Alexander Ivanovitch Neid
hardt; General Paul Christoforovitch Grabbe, whose mission had been to
destroy Shamil and who had titally failed, was replaced by General Vladi
mir Josifovich Gurko.

But, comments Barsukov, matters did not improve.

t'These new appointees came to

th~

Caucasus to straighten out matters in

an area of which they knew nothing, to teach others, themselves being un
taught.

They were both prejudiced against everything that had taken place

, in the Caucasus prior to their arrival -- and were totally helpless to im
prove the situation. lt32
30Curtiss, Ope cit., p. 192, states that even in 1860, when the pay
of Russian officers had risen by from ten to twenty percent, a Russian
lieutenant general's pay was little more than one third of that in the
Austrian, Pruss ian or French armies.
3lBarsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 121.

32aarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 126, and Blanch, Ope Cit., p. 219, Ac
cording to Blanch, tlNeidhardt prolonged the series of disasters and blunders
which had so dispirited the Russian army under Grabbe's command. He was
stupid, pedantic and slow, and no one has ever explained why the Tsar chose
him as Supreme Commander", and p. 230: "He was a Gennan pedant, t'only great
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Muraviev returned to Abkhazi in the early fall of 1842, and soon
came down again with fever, while at the same time his wound reopened.

In

February, he requested sick leave in order to go abroad to take the wateTs
at Carlsbad and Teplitz.

While awaiting action on his request, he re

turned to active service, taking part in a number of minor operations,
throughout the spring and summer of 1843.

In a letter to his brother, he

told him that his leave request, he had just learned, had been pigeon
holed in corps headquarters for eight months.

Thoroughly despondent, he

said that unless he left the Caucasus, or at least the Black Sea coast,
he would certainly die.

He added that in accordance with Asiatic custom

he could lay upon his brothers the responsibility for avenging his death,
but that being in his soul a Christian, he would say only, "Forgive them,
for they know not what they do tl • 33
In a later, letter to Valerian, Muraviev praised the fine fall wea
ther in Abkhazi, Ita rare phenomenon, saving more lives than all the doc
tors or medicines", and then summarized his experience in the Caucasus.
In the period 1840-41, he had ttenjoyed the full confidence of his super
iors, the result of which could be found in the official files".

The mid

dIe period, 1842, prior to his return from leave, had been chiefly marked
by his suffering from his wound and his generally poor state of health.
It had not been easy for him to persuade himself to return to Abkhazi,
but he had "unquestioningly obeyed the call of duty".

While en route,

his wound had flared up again, as had his fever, but the hope of making a
in small matters, constitutionally incapable of commanding the Caucasian
fronts. He was indecisive and weighed down by the unrealistic program
outlined for him by the Tsar".
33earsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 126.
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real contribution had bolstered him, and so he had arrived at Kerch to

!r

begin the current phase of his Caucasian service.

t

It did not need much

perception, he wrote, to discern the unfavorable influence on his command,
the Third Sector, of the coming changes in the top echelons.

His orders

had taken him from Kerch to Tiflis, but he had arrived after Golovin's
departure, and it had become plain to him there that the role of his
command did not loom large at headquarters. 34
If Muraviev was not in the thick of the fray with the most important
enemy, he was, nevertheless, doing valuable work for which he was pro
bably not receiving adequate support.

He was clearly convinced of the

desirability and feasibility of achieving a bloodless conquest by per
suading the Caucasian tribes voluntarily to pledge allegiance to the Rus
sian government, and he strove to go about it in a systematic way.

In

Abkhazi, the key port of the Third Sector, he had at the outset culti
vated close relations with Michael Sharvashidze, the local chieftain, and
with Sharvashidze's close associate, one Katso-Margani.
former

~th

He flattered the

special deference, and when Sharvashidze's first son was barn,

he ordered a lOl-gun salute at his headquarters.

Through such tactics he

succeeded in turning this chieftain into a willing and pliable puppet.
Katso-Margani he had found more difficult to manipulate.

However, that

worthy, an intelligent and cunning mountaineer, over sixty years of age,
but robust and energetic, eventually succumbed to Muraviev's blandish
ments and became his devoted agent.

Sharvashidze and Katso-Margani car

ried on negotiations over several months in order to persuade their
neighbors, the Dzhigets, to accept fealty to the Russian Tsar.
34aarsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 129-133.
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the coastal clans finally agreed to pledge their aliegiance,35 a good
example of Muraviev·s adroit policy of peaceful
in the initial period of Muraviev's service in

conquest~

~he

That had been

Caucasus, and his abili

ty in this direction had evidently been noted by his subsequent superiors.
At the end of October, 1843, General Neidhardt sent him, together with
Sharvashidze, to negotiate with the more warlike and obstinate Ubichs at
Navaginsk.

Here, again, following hours of negotiation, Oriental-style,

through initial intermediaries, the Ubichs, under the redoubtable HadjiBerzek, agreed to pledge their allegiance to Russia.

Hadji-Berzek under

took, furthermore, to conclude agreements with two other Circassian
tribes.

This, noted Muraviev, in yet another letter to Valerian, took

place at a time when Shamil's agent, Hadji-Mahomet, was exhorting those
tribes to greater resistance.

It would take three months to conclude

final agreements with the tribes, and since Muraviev

was

anticipating

an extended leave by that time, he hoped that "the foolish niggardU
ness, suspicions, inexperience and obstinacy" of General Neidhardt would
not ruin the outcome.

What Muraviev had mainly in mind when writing this

was the frustration he had encountered in obtaining subsidies for the
loyal tribes. 36
35sarsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 135.

36Ibid., pp. 130-132. During his maneuvers with the loyal Dzhigets
against Hadji-Mahomet, Muraviev had been allowed to disburse six .silver
roubles a head to the mountaineers, but had been required to report for
exactly what intelligence or services he had spent these monies, which he
found unrealistic and impracticable. Also, he had requested authoriza
tion to recruit six hundred native levies, meaning to put them under a
noted Caucasian staff officer, Major Zvanbai, wholwould thus be able to
keep order in the important area of Tsebeldi. Instead, he had been al
lowed to recruit only three hundred, and had been ordered to choose them
from elements of the population which he regarded as the least reliable;
his superiors, moreover, had designated as the levies' commander one of
their ilk from Tiflis. They had not been really effective, but 13,000
rubles had been expended for them; this, however, had been "by the book"
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The noxious climate of the Black Sea coast was again thinning out
the Russian ranks.

Muraviev's orderly, Ivan, died during the fall of

and 'the fever was taking hold of his master again.

l84~t

Muraviev sought per

mission to enter the hospital at Theodosia in the Crimea, but was

persuad~

by Boudberg to remain at his post pending arrival of his replacement. Boud
berg, who evidently saw eye to eye with Muraviev regarding the policy of
peaceful conquest of the tribes, was being sorely tried at this time by
"

the inept directives and orders emanating from Tiflis. 37 Since 1841, Mura
viev had been insisting on the need to subsidizethesDzhigets to the amount
of four thousand silver roubles a year.

Because of local circumstances and,

Ifof course, of General Arpen", this business had been drawn out until Neid
hardt's arrival.

Neidhardt had finally approved a subsidy of 2,100

roubles, and ordered that he be informed of the date of the entry on duty
of Major Zvanbai, at which time the funds could be released.

Zvanbai en

tered on duty at the end of June, 1843, and Muraviev had thereupon ad
vanced him funds against the anticipated transfer from Tiflis.

Fourmontm

later, only half of the funds had been received, the basic agreement was
abrogated, and Muraviev was asked:
of what use are they to us?"

"What do the Dzhigets represent, and

Muraviev wrote his brother that he had sent

a reasonable reply to this query but could not predict the outcome.
and Neidhardt was unperturbed.
Muraviev had later been rebuked for re
cruiting these unreliable levies, but General Boudberg t the new commander
of the Black Sea Coast Line, had intervened, pointing out that the mis
take had been that of the departed Arpen. Characteristically, Muraviev
was convinced that Neidhardt had known of this all along, but had simply
sought to make difficulties for him.
37.Barsukov, Ope

cit., I, p. 132.
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Muraviev was now convinced that "to serve in the Caucasus was not to
serve the Tsar, since in Tiflis they did not understand and, indeed, denied
something that was clear, i.e., the benefit to be derived from assuring the
loyalty of the Caucasian tribes u • 38 Now his mind was made up.

As soon

as he was relieved, he would journey to Bogoroditsk in the Tula Gubernia,
the home of Vasili Ivanovich Muraviev, his cousin and good friend.

There,

he planned to spend his leave and if his wounded hand did not heal, he
"

would at least recover from his malaria and its debilitating after effects.
If he could not obtain another assignment and if he was required to return
to the Caucasus under the present corps commander, he would, within an
appropriate time, request retirement and settle down in Bogoroditsk, where
he thought he could purchase a small house and garden for 2,000 assignat
rubles. 39
In another letter to his brother, after going into some details
about his possible retirement, Muraviev noted the persistent reports that
fifty thousand fresh troops would be sent to assist the Caucasian Corps,
and saw that as an "action of the mighty Tsar, concerned for the benefit
and the glory of his Empire"; but, he said, a heavy doubt weighed down on
his spirit when, recalling all his memories of this region, he was convinc
ed that "even with the mightiest of forces, reverses

~ould

be suffered

through the inexperience of the high commanders and through the misconcep·
tions and impetuosity of leaders preoccupied by their ambitions and thirst
for miH tary glory".

In reflecting on Russian policy and actions in the

Caucasus, he wrote in this same letter:
38x..oc. cit.
39sarsukov,

Ope

cit., pp. 134-135.
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Who would have expected GeneralPullo's winter operations
for collecting arms, money and sheep from those very settle
ments where he had been met with bread and salt? On the first
of January, the commandant of Bladikavkaz mustered a hundred
of our native levies to capture Shamil, hiding with twenty
one men in a hamlet on the border of one of the unconquered
clans, which, however, gave him no assistance or food, for
fear of offending the Russians. A few days later, all of
the conquered Chechen, angered by Pullo's actions invited
Shamil to be their leader against the Russians!40
In the spring of 1844, Muraviev finally obtained his leave and
~

traveled to Bogoroditsk, the provincial town where he knew he could rest
and recover his health.

From there he wrote to Michael Sharvashidze,

chieftain of Abkhazi, who was planning to visit st. Petersburg., He told
him he would not stir from Bogoroditsk until August, inasmuch as the en
tire Imperial family was going abroad until then .. • an inauspicious
period, one gathers, for Muraviev to be seeking a new assignment in the
Caucasus or elsewhere. 41 Accordingly, he advised Sharvashidze not to has
ten to St. Petersburg too early.

Somewhat later, he wrote his brother

Alexander, asking him to cease attempting to obtain an appointment for him
40earsukov, Ope cit., pp. 138-140. with regard to General Pullo,
Blanch, Ope cit., p. 207, has this to say: "For a man to win a reputa
tion for cruelty in the Caucasus betokens a degree of savagery quite un·
imaginable in the West. Yet the Russian General Pullo had achieved this
distinction. He was in command of a number of punitive raids throughout
Avaria and Chechnia in the months following the disappearance of Shamil.
He was unscrupulous and brutal and loathed by the Chechens. But when,
holding down a rising province with too few men, he appointed the rene
gade Tatars as pro-consuls or officers, he was playing directly into
Shamil's hands. These renegades treated the mountaineers with terrible
cruelty and injustice. There was no redress -- nowhere to appeal; but
when it was rumored that the Caucasian provinces were to be disarmed and
converted into peasant communities on the rural Russian pattern, subject
to the same taxes, serfdom and conscription, the whole Caucasus arose,
blazing with revolt and once again Shamil appeared, as a revenant, to
rally the tribesmen around his black standard."
41Barsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 146.
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in Astrakhan; "it is clear", he observed, that the matter is not going

•
well and I assure you that I do not wish any appointment through pres
';;-

J

~
~
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sure". 42 His health had significantly improved and he repeated his de~
sire to resume active service if he were given the means to do some good,
bit' polezny, and not to "vegetate and rot" as he had done for the last
year and a half in the Caucasus.

While still in Bogoroditsk, Muraviev

received the Order of St. Stanislav, First Class, with a commendation
from the Emperor, "for exceptional courage and wise direction in operations
against the mountaineers".43
At the beginning of 1845, Muraviev's father died and he hastened to
l

st. Petersburg.

While there, he learned of the appointment of Count

Michael Vorontsov as Viceroy of the Caucasus and Commander-in-Chief of
troops, in place of the incompetent Neidhardt.

Much was expected of this

appointment, for Vorontsov, scion of one of Russia's most ancient noble
families with a great tradition of loyalty and service to the state, was
held in high esteem as an able soldier and brilliant civil administrator.
Muraviev, encouraged at this news, obtained permission of Prince Chernyshev,
Minister of War, to seek an interview with Vorontsov and went to him to
offer his services in the Caucasus.

Barsukov relates that the Count re-

ceived him warmly and promised to take up the matter with the Minister of
War.

Because of his father's funeral, Muraviev was unable immediately to

report on this conversation to Chernyshev.

Following Vorontsov'sdepar

ture, Muraviev spoke of it to the Adjutant-General, who reported on it to
the Minister.

Chernyshev immediate1 y wrote to Vorontsov to asc'ertain his

42I bid., p. 147.
43r.oc. cit.
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wishes regarding Muraviev's assignment.

"The matter", Barsukov states,

I'dragged on for reasons unknown to us'l

and at the same time Muraviev's

,

heal th deteriorated" aga in, so that he was obliged to seek another extens'ion
of leave.

He received approval to go abroad to take the waters, but was

detained on family matters, so that on April 24, he received an inquiry
from the War Ministry as to whether he had changed his mind regarding his
leave.
~

On the following day Muraviev replied:

It will be essential sooner or later to obtain the mineral
waters treatment for the,~ound in my hand, but over the course
of five years I have postponed this five times, when in each
case I perceived the need to do so because of the Service • •
My feeling of unlimited submission to the will of the Emperor
and devotion to the needs of the Service are unchanged, and
if there should arise any need to give me an active assignment
at this time, I am unreservedly prepared to give up my leave.
To this the Adjutant-General replied:
Je m'empresse de vous avertir, mon general, que vous pouvez
faire vos publications de voyage et vos preparatifs en toute
surete; l'affaire du Caucase est coulee au fond. On dira
que vos blessures s'etant reouvertes, vous avez de~~nde et
recu un semestre pour l'etranger et tout sera dit.
This curious exchange obviously leaves much unsaid.

Certainly, it

seems as though someone in the higher echelons was anxious to leave Mura

t

t

t

l

viev without an assignment and to speed his departure from Russia.
Muraviev went abroad in the spring of 1845 for his medical treatment.
He stayed first at Aix-la-Chapelle, whence he wrote Valerian to be sure to

f
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44Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 150. til hasten to advise you, General,
that you may gazette your travel plans and make firm preparations for
your voyage; the Caucasus matter has run its course. It will be announced
that your wounds, having reopened, you have requested and received six
months leave to go abroad and that will be all there is to it."
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inform the War Ministry of his whereabouts, in case the need should arise
for him to proceed back to the Caucasus.

In June, he wrote again, regard

ing his 'plan to go to Paris for further treatment.

In this letter he al

lowed himself some philosophical musings:

.

Monuments, towers and churches cannot satisfy my curiosity;
paintings, music and landscapes charm me only briefly; but a
passion for delving into the human heart grows within me, the
more I meet new people; a passion to know the behind-the-scenes
reasons for peoples' actions; a passion for reality in all its
nakedness is developing in me more and more, and I am increas
ingly convinced that superficial judgments are always erroneous
and that only experience and observation open for us the ways
of Providence ••• Europe makes a strange impression on me,
an impression totally unexpected and at the same time for me,
a Russian, quite pleasant: at home everything is large, here~
small; here in detail everything is good, convenient, arranged,
smooth, calculated, enumerated, brought into conformity, re
duced to measure and weight; the people know all, it seems
even about that which it is impossible to know, and for that
reason there is no future here. Here everyone lives in the
present; there may be broken hopes and promises, but such things
pass quickly and are submerged in the material. Here they
speak and write of the unknown, l'inconnu, as of a reasoning
out, proving the degree of the development of thought in the
present epoch, of the degree of superiority over the eighteenth
century, but which, in fact, is all words, since here tout est
connu, au moins toute Ie monde tache de prouver qu'il connait
tout; nothing is left to the imagination; I will say more
strongly, nothing is left to the heart, which should enjoy the
unknown. Here they say that les Russes n'ont pas de coeur,
mai qu'ils ont beaucoup d'intelligence; et bien, je crois que
ceux qui Ie disent, promoncent un jugement bien severe sur
eux-memes, c'est qu'ils ne comprennent pa~5ce que est Ie coeur
et que leur intelligence est tres bornee.
III.

GOVERNING IN THE PROVINCES

Upon his return to Russia, Muraviev was detailed in December, 1843,
to the Ministry of the Interior in preparation for assumption of duties as
a military governor.
45aarsukov,

Ope

Barsukov gives no hint of the means whereby Muraviev
cit., p. 153.
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obtained this new assignment.

•

L. A. Perovskii, Minister of the Interior,

however, just as General Golovin, was an old family friend and one may
presume this connection was useful. 46
At the beginning of 1846, Muraviev was assigned to inspect the
gubernia of Novgorod and the Land Court.

His wounded hand was giving him

trouble again and made it difficult to traverse the area over rough roads
in an uncomfortable stage coach, but he pursued his task with energy and
~

submitted a report that drew praise from his superiors.

As a result, on

June 16, 1846, he.was appointed military governor of the city of Tula and
civil governor of the province by that name, retaining his military rank. 47
Following his first tour around his area of responsibility, Muraviev
submitted his initial observations to the Ministry of the Interior.

He

had found that the prisons or jails in all of the towns of the gubernia
were in a sad state of dilapidation, and recommended that they should all
be replaced by new construction.

He pointed out that timber was being cut

extravagantly, with no thought for conservation and replacement, and urged
establishment of regulations to control this practice, which threatened
eventually to plunge the area into economic difficulties; in this connec
tion, he stated that more use should be made of coal deposits in the area
and undertook later to furnish specific details.

He found that develop

ment of trade in the area was inhibited by lack of sufficient water com
munications and recommended construction of wharves in the towns of Odoev
and Novosil, so that cargo could move down the rivers Zusha and Upa,
46J • L. Sullivan, Count N. N. Muraviev-Amursky, doctoral disserta
tion, Harvard University, 1955.
47Barsukov,

Ope

cit., I, pp. 158-159.
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falling into the Oka.

Unitl this was done, he pointed out, the latter
•

river would benefit the area but little, since it flowed along the far
limits of the gubernia.

He had also found that agriculture in the gubernia

was not being developed along rational lines and stated his intention to
revive an earlier proposal that there be established a local Society for
the Rural Economy.
Muraviev's preoccupations at this time extended beyond the responsi
~

bilities of a provincial governor.

Thus, he was the first of all the gover

nors in Russia to !aise the question of freeing the serfs.

He obtained

the signatures of nine prominent landowners to a petition to the Emperor,
seeking the serfs' liberation.

The Emperor had been favorably impressed,

but ordered that the matter be pursued with great caution, and that first
of all a greater number of signatures should be obtained.

This it proved

impossible to do, so that the project had to be dropped. 48
In Tula, Muraviev's outlook was a good deal more cheerful.than it
had been for the previous two or three

years.

This was not only because

of his new success in civil government, but also because the time of his
marriage was approaching.

His betrotheG was Catherine de Richemond, daugh

ter of an aristocratic family from Lorraine.

Muraviev had met her

~e

year

before while in Paris, had fallen in love with her and, as soon as his
uncertain status in the government service had been clarified, had written
her to propose marriage.

She had accepted and came to Russia, the marriage

taking place in Bogoroditsk on January 19, 1847. Barsukov states that ac
cording to those who had known her personally, she was beautiful, intelli
gent and well educated, as well as "even tempered, kind hearted and notably
48sarsukov,

Ope

cit., I, pp. 161-162.
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attached to her new fatherland ... 49

•
-IV.

THE TSAR MAKES HIS CHOICE

The challenges and satisfactions of a provincial governor's life
quickly began to pall on Muraviev and he was soon restlessly seeking
some new field of activity.

In a letter to Valerian written just a year

after taking up his post in Tula, he asked his brother to take some sound
"

ings in St. Petersburg regarding a possible appointment for him.

He

pointed out that having served six years as a general officer, including
two years in the Ministry of the Interior, one of them as a goyernor, it
would be "unseemly" to remain much longer in his present position.

He com

plained, too, that the authorities did not relieve officials of whom he
wished to be rid, nor did they approve his recommendations for promotions
and decorations for those whom he deemed deserving.

In a subsequent let

ter to Valerian, he exhibited a lively interest in the question of a suc
cessor to the discredited Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, William Y.

I

Rupert, removed from his position in the wake of the unfavorable report

,

made by Senator I. N. Tolstoy, following his inspection of Rupert's ad

i

f

!k
f'

f
~

I

t
~

ministration. 50
.Muraviev's inquiry regarding Rupert's successor was clearly inspired
by something more than idle curiosity.

Filipson recounts that on the occa

sion of a visit to Tula, Nicholas I, dining with Muraviev and others, had

~

,

i

V

49aarsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 163.

5OIbid ., I, pp. 164-167. The Tsar ordered that Rupert "request"
to be relieved. Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 68, relates that Rupert, in the
tradition of most of his predecessors, had amassed 500,000 rubles during
his governorship.
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confirmed that Rupert was to be removed, and that during subsequent con
versation, the Emperor had been impressed by Muraviev's knowledge and

'

understanding of the problems of Eastern Siberia,'on which he had evident
ly thoroughly briefed himself. 5l
Soon after he had sent his inquiry to Valerian, Nicholas N. Mura
viev was designated by an imperial prikaz of September 5, 1847, as Gover
nor-General of Irkutsk and commander of troops in Eastern Siberia.
~

In a

letter to Valerian, Muraviev recounted how the Tsar had personally in
formed him of his new appointment, when his train had stopped at Ser
geievsk, during a tour of the provinces:
It was at seven in the morning. The Tsar immediately told
me of my appointment, and spoke of it in the most flattering
terms. Then he questioned me about Tula, and explained that he
had no time to stop either at Tula or Orel, since he had a long
way to go. He ordered me to come to st. Petersburg, where he
would give me his detailed directives, and then excused him
self. Without going into detail about our conversation, I will
say that it moved me to tears. 52

!

I.

t

t

I

Muraviev's appointment as Governor-General of Eastern Siberia
created a sensation.

Many highly placed officials in St. Petersburg re

garded it as scandalous.

And in Omsk, wrote M. I. Veniukov, when the Gov·

ernor-General of Western Siberia, Prince Gorchakov, learned that his oppo
site number would be a young man of thirty-eight, he flew into a pas·
53
sion.
B. V. Struve, another of Muraviev's contemporaries, had this to
say:
51 Filipson, Ope cit., p. 352.
54Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 169.
5~usskaia Starina, 1882, Feb., p. 524.
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The unprecedently rapid, by the standards of the times, ele
vation of Muraviev, was the subject of general conversation in
the capital. After December 14, 1825, the Emperor Nicholas, as
is known, was not very favorably disposed to the Muraviev fam~
ily54 and did not appoint them to the highest administrative
posts ••••There was all kind of speculation, even to the foolish
theory that the authorities had confused his name with that of
General N. N. Muraviev-Karskii, the corps commander. 55

.

There is no readily available specific account of the circumstan
ces that led to Muraviev's appointment.
~

Struve points out that it

should be ascribed in large part to the influence that the Grand Duchess
Elena Pavlovna "exerted in certain instances" on the Emperor Nicholas.

He

observes that the choice of Muraviev for this responsibility had fallen

•

to the Minister of the Interior, L. A. Perovskii; "he brought about this
appointment, jointly conceived of by him and the Grand Duchess Elena
Pavlovna, who had been increasingly well-disposed to Muraviev from the
days when he had been her page-of-the-chamber.

The Grand Duchess, dis

tinguished by an enlightened intellect and a deep understanding of the
contemporary position of Russia, which she loved like a second father
land, perceived in Muraviev just such a worker as he turned out to be... 56
The Emperor's choice of Muraviev, unlike many of his other appoint
ments, was evidently a case where the confluence of exceptional ability
and powerful connections had its logical outcome.

Muraviev had proven

himself on battlefields in Turkey, Poland and the Caucasus, and at the
same time had demonstrated administrative and diplomatic talent, begin
ning with his youthful experience in Varna, and with the Polish rebel
~. Muraviev-Apostol, a member of one branch of the family, had
been a leader of the Decembrists.

55sarsukov, op. cit., I, p. 170.
56 Ibid •

:n
leaders, then through his successful dealings with thee Caucasian mountain
eers, his inspection of the gubernia of Novgorod and his governorship in
Tula.

In all these capacities he had exhibited firmness, energy, re

sourcefulness and integrity - qualities that had rarely, if ever, been
found in candidates for the governorship of the remote vastness of East
ern Siberia.

The patriotic combination of gallant warrior and devoted

civil servant understandably appealed to the Emperor, particularly as it
must have been described to him by such highly placed personages as the
~

Grand Duchess Elena and the respected Perovskii.

If Muraviev possessed

other attributes such as vanity, petulance, arrogance and impatience,
these were no doubt most openly disclosed only to individuals who were
his intimates, such as his brother Valerian, and his fond mentor, Gen
eral Golovin.

If the Tsar was aware of them, he was not disturbed and

probably regarded them merely as concomitants of the more positive traits
that qualified Muraviev for his new responsibilities.

•

•

•
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CHAPTER II

,

!

"SIBERIA, TOO, IS RUSSIAN LAND"
I. "THE RUSSIAN RIVER AMUR"
There was at least as much poetry as truth. in the reference to "the

.

Russian River Amur", made by Nicholas I during Muravlev t s farewell audi
ence.

That the Amur once ran red with Russian blood is highly probable.

In 1658, Onufrii Stepanov, who had waged a five-year campaign against
the Chinese, met his death on that river in a battle in which most of
his cossacks were annihilated.

For the Chinese, this battle was in de

fense of the Celestial Empirets "Dominion of the Northeast" beyond the
Great Wall, acquired in the first half of the fourteenth century, when
the Ming emperors drove the Mongol hordes to the north of the Gobi desert
and

west of the Buir Nor.

One scholar states that this new dominion in

cluded not only the traditionally Chinese territory of Liao-tung, but also
"the whole of the Extra-Liao region south of the Amur".

This region, main

ly a land of the Tungus tribes, was divided, under the Ming dynasty, into
native "Guards" and "Posts" under the control of a high central command
established at the mouth of the Amur River. l
IT. C. Lin, "The Amur Frontier Question Between Russia and China,
l85O-l860 1t , Pacific Historical Review, Vol. III, No.1, p. 1; Lints ref
erence to the region "south of the Amur
though imprecise, would imply
that the Chinese had no claims north of that river. On the other hand, he
refers to a "high central command" at the mouth of the river, which would
indicate a "Chinese River Amur t •• His study is based on a compilation of
Imperial Edicts and government documents published in Peking in 1899. Lin
states that a good summary of Ming rule in the Amur region is to be found
in I. A. Inaba's History of the Development of Manchuria (Tokyo; 1915, in
Japanese).
lt

,
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Over two centuries later, one of the Tungus Guards, Chien Chous, re
volted against Ming rule and made himself overlord of the,Tungus tribes.
The Ming regime, by then fallen into decadence, was powerless before the
tribe of Chien-Chous, later known as the Manchus, who broke into Liao
tung in 1621 and entered Peking in 1644, when the Ch'ing dynasty was estab
lished upon the dragon throne. 2 These events coincided with a period of
greatly accelerated Russian advance to fue Pacific, the genesis and devel
"

opment of which may briefly be traced here.
Russia's move into Asia began with Prince Semeon Kurbski's military
expeditions in 1483 and 1499 across the Pechora and to the Ob River east
of the Urals.

Kurbski returned with furs and prisoners, but his venture

did not result in permanent penetration of Siberia.

It remained for a

clan of traders and industrialists to stimulate Russian acquisition of
territory there: The Novgorodian family of Stroganovs, favored by Mos
cow, thanks to old Luke Stroganov's having ransomed Prince Vasi1i the
Blind, who had been captured by the Khan of Kazan, sent expeditions be
yond the Urals and obtained a succession of royal trants to enormous
tracts of land there.

By a final grant of 1574, the Stroganov domain was

estended to the banks of the Tobol River. 3 The Stroganovs' progress, how
ever, was not uncontested.

The Tatar Khan Kuchum, self-styled "Tsar of

Siberia", had been attacking the Russian settlements and the Stroganov
garrison needed reinforcements. These were provided by Iermak Timofeievich,
2tin, 0p. cit., p. 2.
3A• Lobanov-Rostovski, Russia and Asia (The George Wahr Publish
ing Company, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1951), p. 40.
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leader of some 600 robbing and piratical cossacks 4 who took service with
the Stroganovs in 1579.

In 1589, this force, bolstered by some 300

me~

of the Stroganov garrison, took the field under lermak to secure the
Stroganovs' hold on the land granted

~em

by the charter of 1574.

In the

fall of 1582, lermak drove Kuchum from his capital of Sibir and occupied
it.

The oonquest of Siberia was under way.5
In 1586, the Russians founded the town of Tiumen, the first perma

~

nent Russian settlement beyond the Urals, to be followed, in 1587, by the
town of Tobolsk. 6 A year later, a cossack force re-engaged Tatar forces
and drove them southwards into the steppe.

Kuchum survived for ten years,

however, and to counter his continuing threat, the Russian outpost of Tara
on the Irtysh was established in 1594.7 This outpost, Tiumen and Tobo1sk
were the first in a chain of ostrogs (blockhouses or fortified settlements)

.
4rerence Armstrong, Russian Settlement in the North (Cambridge Uni
versity Press, 1964), pp. 21-22, states: lilt is not easy to determine
just who the Cossacks were. They are first found in the Middle Ages act
ing as a frontier force protecting Kiev and later, Muscovy, from the
south. There were Cossack communities on the Dnieper and the Don and
although independent, they generally allied themselves with the Slavs.
Their origins are obscure. The word itself seems to come from the Turkic
kiz or kez, meaning to wander." Armstrong adds that once in Siberia,
recruitment was open to any local Russians and even in some cases to non
Russians, and that many hunters and traders became cossacks who, during
the advance east, were employed as leaders of pioneer detachments, as
soldiers and as frontier guards. In territory already secured, they
came to act as a kind of police force and later took charge of all com
munications. See also M. A. Czaplicka, "Evolution of the Cossack Com
munities", in Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 5, Part II,
1918.
5tobanov-Rostovski, op. cit., pp. 41-43.
~eorge Alexander Lensen, (Ed.), Russia's Eastward Expansion,
(Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964) p. 21.

7Armstrong, Ope cit., p. 16.
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that eventually secured all of Siberia for Moscow.

The building of these

ostrogs was stimulated primarily by the fur-fever that

se~zed

the Russians,

"much like", observes Fisher, "the gold-fever which possessed the Ameri~
can ·forty-niners· of a later century.

In Siberia, sables worth from 10

to 20 rubles, black foxes worth from 100 to 300 rubles were to be found.
Could a man but obtain a few of them, a single trip would then suffice to
enable him to settle down in comfort for the rest of his life."8

.

The fall of Sibir and the driving south of the remaining Tatars
marked the end of the brief era of extraordinary military exploits began
by Iermak.

The march north and east henceforth met little resistance,
,

for while the Central Asian steppe was held by the warlike Kazakhs and
Turkic peoples, the Siberian forest contained only scattered and weak na
tive tribes. 9 The Russians, furthermore, were by far better acquainted
with

milita~y

techniques, had firearms (whereas their adversaries gener

ally had only bows and arrows and spears), knew how to construct fortifi
cations and, despite the enormous distances involved, were receiving a
flow of support in the form of people, arms and supplies from the homeland. lO

~aymond H. Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade, l550~1~, (University of
California press, 1943), p. 29. He points out that in 1623, two black fox
pelts brought 110 rubles, with which the owner could buy fifty-five acres
of land, erect a good cabin, buy five horses, twenty head of cattle,
twenty sheep, several dozen fowl and still have half his capital left.
9Donald W. Treadgold, The Great Siberian Migration, (Princeton Uni
versity Press, 1957), p. 18, and, as stated inuSibir u , Entsiklopedicheski
Slovar, Vol. 58, p. 801, ttAmong the Samoyeds (and most other tribes)
there was no class distinction. For that reason, conflict with them pre
sented no difficulty for the Russians." Some tribes, notably the Buriats,
Kirghiz and Chukchi, did offer resolute resistance at later stages of ex
pansion into Siberia.
lOIbid.
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The town of Bereznov was founded in 1593 on the lower Ob, and to the
northeast, the town of Surgut in 1594 and Narym in 1596.

These settle

mentsand those to follow were official creations of the Russian govern- . .
ment, following the footsteps of private individuals seeking fortunes in
the fur trade, for now

MOSCOW

realized the value of the region for de

fending the eastern limits of European Russia against the raids of Siber-.
ian peoples, as well as for the establishment of a profitable base for an
advance into Asia. ll
Tobolsk was the first main administrative cente·r for the territory
wrested away from the Siberian tribes.

The movement of cossacks, free

booters and traders, followed by military forces and government officials,
proceeded down the Tobol and also over the Urals by the original route
from the Pechora.

As they proceeded, the native princelings agreed to

pay iassak to them.12 The iassak was rendered to the Moscow government,
which was the chief fur trader.

In addition to collecting this tribute,

the government levied a ten per cent tax on the best furs from the pri
vate traders and trappers.

It also insisted on the right of buying from

merchants and trappers the best furs they obtained.

Furthermore, the

government exercised a monopoly on the sables, black foxes and other fine
furs that constituted the most important single item in the foreign and
llRobert J. Kerner, The Urge to the Sea (University of California
Press), 1946, p. 68.
12Fisher, Ope cit., pp. 49-60, explains the origins of the term
iassak, the fur tribute collected by the Russians from the natives of
Siberia during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the
methods of collecting it. Iassak was tribute paid by the conquered to
the conquerors, and as a sign of subjection it carried with it the im
plication of degradation. It had existed in Siberia long before the ad
vent of the Russians, having been taken over by the peoples of Siberia
from the Mongolian-Tatar conquerors who penetrated to the Urals.

•

36
•
domestic commerce of Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The fur trade paid the Siberian administrative expenses of. the government,
which retained a large surplus, while adding an immense region to the
state. 13
There was a standard pattern in the development of the ostrogs and
townships marking the Russian march eastward. Private individuals did
the initia~ pioneering. 14 Whenever the government learned of the discov
~

ery of profitable fur trading areas, it moved in with a voevoda (military
commander) and troops, together with priests and monks. 15 A monastery
would generally be built and conversion of the natives to the Orthodox
faith would begin.

The churchmen were to some extent a leavening influ

ence on the rough Russian frontiersmen and also served to protect the
natives from annihilation, in part no doubt, because these monks wished
to preserve the evidence of their evangelical zeal.

The Moscow govern

ment, too, was concerned with the preservation of these people, who were
the main suppliers of furs •. Not that the system was a benevolent and
humanitarian one; pious expressions of intent and official government
policy were one thing, the reality quite another.

The influx of Russians

with their "civilizing" and '·Christianizing" mission had its definite
l~erner, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

14Fisher, op. cit., pp. 29-30, distinguishes two types of private
enterprisers, the traders (torgovye liudi) and the promyshlenniks •. The
former included merchants or their agents and small traders, the latter
were men who worked for themselves, exploiting natural resources in a
role similar to the coureurs de bois of Canada.
15A comprehensive study of the early Siberian governmental ad
ministrative apparatus, as well as the organization for remote control
from Moscow, is to be found in George Lantzeff's Siberia in the Seven
teenth Century, (University of California Press, 1943).
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black aspects' of brutality, exploitation and corruption.
•

The movement eastward, while not preconceived in detail or closely
directed from Mowcow, was nonetheless methodical and vigorous.

The cos

sacks and voevods struck out in all directions, using the magnificent
river network of Siberia, based on four vast systems, the Ob, Enisei,
Lena and Amur, the tributaries of which formed an almost perfect unbroken
line of communication from the Urals to the Pacific.

..

The speed of their

progress, considering the immense distances involved, was extraordinary•
Thus, in rapid succession, were formed the towns of Tomsk (1604), Eniseisk.
(1619),

~rasnoiarsk

(1628), Iakutsk (1632), and the ostrog of Okhotsk on

the Pacific in 1648, only sixty-five years after Iermak's first conquest
of Sibir.

Some five years later, cossacks were making initial probes

into the Amur territory.17 The stage was thus set for the conflict be
tween the Russians and the Manchu rulers of Peking.
The first incursion into China's "Dominion of the Northeast lt was
made by Vassili Poiarkov, who penetrated there in 1643 in search of grain
to supplement chronically inadequate supplies in Iakutsk.

He was followed

by Ierofei Khabarov, peasant turned cossack and merchant industrialist.
In 1650, Khabarov reached the Amur River and the walled cities of the
Manchu tribe of Dauria under Prince Lafkai, whom ne routed in a battle at
the town of Albazin.

This became his base and that of his successor,

Onufrii Stepanov, whose forces were annihilated on the Amur below the
18
mouth of the Sungari in 1608.
Stepanov's defeat cleared the cossacks
16Kerner, Ope cit., p. 88 •
. 17F• A. Golder, Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1841-1850 (Glou
chester, Mass.) 1960, pp. 50-01. The easternmost extremity of Siberia,
Kamchatka, was taken by another cossack, Vladimir Atlassov, some fifty
years later.
18
Golder, Ope cit., p. 03.
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from the Amur basin as far as the Nerchinsk area, where they had small
forces in three ostrogs.

In the following year, the Chinese besieged and

captured Albazin and destroyed it.
The quarter of a century following the destruction of Albazin saw
no significant Russo-Chinese confrontation, but Russian forces at Nerchin*
were steadily and substantially augmented during this period, when Irkutsk
was also founded (166l), as well as Selenginsk (1665).19
~

Meanwhile, Alba

zin was rebuilt and fortified by Nikifor Chernigovskii and his band of
cossacks who had fled there after mutinying and killing the veovod of
Iliimsk.

They terrorized the natives in the area and the Chinese pro

tested to the voevod of Nerchinsk who, however, failed to curb Cherni
govskii t S lawlessness.

This, plus the fact 'that the Russians were now

building numerous new ostrogs and interfering with Chinese traders in the
area, goaded the Chinese to take up arms.

In June of 1685, a superior

force of the Chinese army besieged Albazin, which yielded after a few
reportedly because of lack of ammunition.

day~

The garrison was allowed to

return to Nerchinsk, and the Chinese commander once more burned Albazin.
In the following year, the Russians re-entered and refortified Albazin, a
challenge that the Chinese answered by besieging the settlement for eleven
months until the fall of 1687, when a messenger from the Tsar arrived at
Peking asking that the siege be raised, and announcing the despatch of a
Russian plenipotentiary to negotiate the frontier question. 20
The Tsar's envoy, Feodor Golovin, had in fact left Moscow in 1685
19W• A. Douglas Jackson, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands (Van Nostrand,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1962), p. 41. Jackson points out that despite
establishment of these and other posts, the line of supply was too long
for an effective Russian posture along the Amur•.
2OGolder, op. cit., p. 63.

•

39

•
with instructions to conclude a lasting peace with China, and to estab
lish the right to trade.

..

He was to negotiate an agreement fixing the Amur

River as the boundary between the two empires, but was left free, if nec
essary, to give up the Amur as far as the mouth of the Zeia and even to

g~e

up Albazin, which was tantamount to giving up the Amur as a frontier. 21
Golovin's instructions reflected the relatively low level of importance
attached by Russia, at that time, to the strategic and economic.,implica
'.

tions of control of the Amur River.

The Ch'ing regime, on the other

hand, clearly attached a positive value to possession of the Amur basin,
as evinced in the memorial written by Prince Songotu, before departing for,
negotiations with the Russians:
Nepuchin (Nerchinsk) now occupied by Russia, is originally
the pasturage of OUr Mao-ming-an tribe. Yaksa (Albazin) is
the old home of Pei-leoh, Our Dahueur (Daurian?) chieftain.
Neither do these territories belong to the Russians, nor are
they a neutral ground between two borders. The Heilung
(Amur) River is most strategically situated and should not be
regarded with slight. If they descend it they can reach the
Sungari. From the Sungari they can reach the Nonni and the
Kueshan. Facing south they can reach Oula (Kirin) and Ninguta
and the land of the Sibos, Khorchins, Solons and Dahueurs.
Turning back to the mouth of the Heilung River, they can reach
the sea. Into the Heilung River flows the Angun (Argun) and the
Niumang (Bureia) and the Ginchiri (Zeia). Along both sides of
these rivers are our protectorate peoples, the Gorchons, Giliaks
and the Bisars, as well as the land of the Hochen and Feiyako.
If we do not take possession of all of them, Our frontier
people will never enjoy peace. It is our opinion that Nipuchin,
Yaksa, the Heilung River, upper and lower, and all the rivers
and rivulets flowing into it belong to us and none shall be
abandoned to Russia. 22
The parleys at Nerchinsk were protracted but the Chinese had a telling
advantage, in that their negotiators arrived at the scene with a military
21Yuri Semyonov, Siberia (Helicon Press, Baltimore, 1963), p. 115.
22S o-fang Pei-shing (1860), Introd. Vol. VIII, 2, cited by Lin,

0p. cit.
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"escort" far outnumbering that of the Russians.

,- .

It was, furthermore,

reinforced during the course of the negotiations until they had a prepon
derance of ten to one.

This was consistent with the instructions given

by the Chinese Emperor to his envoy, Prince Songotu.

They stated that

the ambassadorial mission should lose no opportunity to flaunt imposing
military power, should circumstances so require. 23
At the first meeting, on August l2,theChinese demanded that "all
~

of Dauria" be recognized as part of the Chinese Empire. 24 This would have
meant cession of lands long settled by the Russians and their withdrawal
to the Lena River. 25 Songotu based his claim on the contentio~ that this
land had been Chinese as early as the time of Alexander of Macedon, and
that later it had become a domain of Genghis Khan, from whom the reigning
Manchu dynasty claimed descent.

Golovin dismissed this as preposterous

and asserted that" the Buriats, Mongols and other peoples living in those
lands had never rendered iassak to the Chinese, whereas they had been
doing so to the Russians.
frontier.

He proposed designating the Amur River as the

The Chinese insisted on their position and the first day's meet-

Ing broke up.

On the following day, Songotu's Jesuit interpreters trans

mitted what appeared to be a veiled threat of force, to which Golovin
gave a.stout reply, saying that Chinese troops did not frighten the
23P. T. Iakovleva, Pervyi Russko-Kitaiskii Dogovor 1689 Goda (Mos
cow, 1908), p. 161.
24"Dauria" is not an exact geographic designation. It may be de
fined generally as e<tending from the Iablonovoi Range to the Valley of
the Argun, and as encompassing a part of the Transbalkal and the Priamur.
(See F. Shperk, Entsiklopediteshki Slovar, Vol. 19, p. 160). The Bol
shala Sovetskaia Entsiklopedi.a,. (Vol. 13, pp. 400-401) places Dauria in
the watersheds of the Shilka, Argun, Zela, Bureia and Sungari.
0
2 p • T. Iakovleva, Ope cit., p. 160 and p. 180.
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Russians, as should be amply evident to the Chinese envoys (a reference
to the fact that the
eleven months).

~-

•

besiegers of Albazin had failed to take it after

If the Chinese sought peace they should refrain t he

said t from threats and, instead, should offer some acceptable proposals
for delimitation of the frontier. 2'

The Chinese then made a proposal

that would have meant Russian renunciation of the entire Priamur t as
well as of a substantial portion of Transbaikalia.

•

Golovin countered

with a proposal that from the River Zeia t the left bank of the Amur
should be Russian and the right bank, Chinese.

The meeting reached an
impasse and broke up with no agreement as to a further meeting • 28

•

During the period August l4-27 t no meetings were held t but propo
sals and counter-proposals were transmitted between the Russian 'and Chin
ese camps by Andrei Bolobotskii for the Russians t and by the Jesuitst
Francis Gerbillon and Thomas Pereira t for the Chinese.

During this period

Nerchinsk came under a virtual state of siege, being surrounded by Chin
ese troops.

On August 16, 2,000 Buriat cavalrymen joined tne Chinese

forces around Nerchinsk t now numbering some l7,Ct:JO men with plentiful
artillery and supplies.

The town had no reserves of grain.

For lack of

fodder, the camels and horses of the Russians died in great numbers.

The

situation of the Russian garrison of 1,500 men, with few cannont dwindling
supplies and protected only by the flimsy earthworks of the town, appeared
26Ibid., p. 168.
27Loc. cit. Iakovleva states that through Mongolian interpreters,
Golovin then ascertained that the Jesuits were misrepresenting the Chinese
position and that they had been instructed to "speak only of the frontier
and had never been told to speak of troops".
28Ibid., pp. 170-171.

r

f

,r

hopeless.

42

.

Golovin weighed the situation and decided to c&l the Chinese

bluff -- if bluff it was -- or to defend the town to the death.

On August

l8,with his personal bodyguard of regular troops and some cossacks,
marched out of the town and prepared to do battle.

ne

The ChiRSe failed to

attack, however, whereupon Golovin sent an emissary to the Chinese camp
to ask why the town was being besieged. 29 The Chinese replied that they
were merely deploying their forces "for their own security".

•

On the same

day they made a proposal that the border follow the Gorbitsa, Shilka and
Argun Rivers.

Golovin rejected this, and proposed instead that the fron

tier should follow the Amur to the Odekon, then along the Argun to Lake
Dalai.

This would have meant Russian retention of Albazin and was cate
gorically refused by Songotu. 3Q The Chinese then made obvious prepara
tions to storm Nerchinsk.

A flotilla of armed junks approached the city

and ground troops moved close to the walls of the town.
Golovin, with no hope of receiving any reinforcements, decided it
was time to make concessions.

He offered to give up Albazin and to dis

cuss a frontier that would follow the Gorbitsa and Argun, then the Stan
ovoi range to the sea.

This meant giving up almost all of the land in

the Amur region, but would preserve for the Russians a region where silver
deposits had been discovered, as well as a salt lake and lands suitable
for agriculture.

Songotu agreed to discussions on this basis, but added

the demand that the Russians recognize Chinese sovereignty over all of
the Mongolian peoples.

This last Golovin rejected on the grounds that

neither party to the negotiations had any authorization to discuss such
29~., pp. 175-176.

30Ibid., p. 176.

•
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a matter. 3l
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Discussions continued on the basis of Golovin's last proposal.

They

were complicated by Chinese demands that the Mongolian Prince Gantimur
and his people, who had, years earlier, defected to the Russians, be given
up to the Chinese, and by Russian requests for generous provisions for
trade.

Negotiations almost broke down once more when Songotu demanded a

frontier bounded by mountain ranges reaching to the "Holy Cape".

It would

have excluded the Russians not only from the Amur region but also from
territories they had settled along the Ud River and the coast of the Sea of
Okhotsk. 32 These demands were again accompanied by threats of force. Gol
•
ovin rejected them and declared that if the Chinese wanted war the Rus
sians would defend themselves.
into some confusion.

After

This vigorous retort threw the Chinese

consulting among themselves, they notified

Golovin that they were prepared to make no disposition in the Treaty of
lands along the Ud and at the mouth of the Amur. 33
On August 27, agreement was finally reached on the terms of the
Treaty of Nerchinsk. 34 The frontier was fixed from the Gorbitsa River (a
left-bank tributary of the Shilka) along the watershed between the basins
of the Lena and the Amur, then along the peaks of the Stanovoi Range; all
streams flowing down the southern slopes of the Range into the Amur were
defined as Chinese, those flowing down "the other slopes", as Russian.
All rivers and lands lying between the Stanovoi Range and the River Ud
31 Ibid., p. 100.
J

r

!,

,

10........

32llli., p. 181.
33Ibid., p. 182.
34The text is contained in Appendix t~ I.
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were to remain

~elimited

•

until such time as the governments of the Rus

sian and Chinese Empires were prepared to discuss them.

The Argun River,

furthermore, was set as a boundary between the two Empires and all Rus
sian buildings and dwellings on the south bank of that river were to be
transferred to the north bank.

Albazin was to be razed to the ground by

the Russians and its inhabitants transported to Russian territory.

De

serters and fugitives who had fled from China or Russia before conclusion

•

of the Treaty would remain where they were, but in future, subjects of
either Empire fleeing to the other should immediately be secured and sent
back.

Commercial relations were to be maintained, merchants of both coun
•
tries being provided with letters of authorization.
The Treaty of Nerchinsk in effect fixed only a small segment of the

Russo-Chinese frontier.

There was no clear delimitation of any part of

the region to the" northeast of Nerchinsk, since that region was simply un
known.

Cahen points out that "The Stony Mountains, -Holy Cape', the

river Ud itself, indeed, at that time were nothing more to either party
than mere vague geographical expressions, the country not yet having been
either traversed in a satisfactory manner, or its bearings recorded on any
map.

The country to the southwest of Nerchinsk, Transbaikailia, and all

the remainder of Siberia were left without delimitation of the frontiers."35
From the Russian standpoint, the only favorable aspect of the Treaty
of Nerchinsk was the provision granting the right for Russian merchants to
travel to China and to trade there.
this gain than sorrow

~

"There was more joy in the Kremlin at
the loss of Albazin", comments Semyonov. 36 This

gain, restricted as it was to a brief and vague statement, did not of
35Gaston Cahen, Earlv Russo-Chinese Relations (Shanghai, 1914) p. 16.
36Semyonov,

Ope

cit., p. 121.

•

45

•

itself create settled conditions for trade with China, something in which
the Chinese had little, if any, interest.
•

China's chief preoccupation was

with keeping the native tribes under control.

Her.long-standing objective

was to maintain a thinly populated belt of buffer states, insulating her
against the outside "barbarian" world.
A succinct summary of Russian and Chinese policies for their border
lands, following the Treaty of Nerchinsk, is provided in Father Sebes'
Introduction to the diary of Father Pereira, a member of the Jesuit Mis
sion in Peking, who had participated in the negotiations at Nerchinsk:
• • •The theory which guided Russ~was formulated by Pete~ the
Great, who saw only two possibilities for Russia in the Far East:
voyevat ili torgovat, "wage war or trade". Since his European
wars kept him too busy for the former, he chose trade. China,
on the other hand, had a completely different conception of her
relations with Russia. She wanted neither trade nor war. She
simply wanted to pacify the territories over which she claimed
suzerainty bY'isolating them from Russian influence. Her prin
cipal aim was to close Mongolia and the Amur region to the Rus
sians and transform these territories into a belt of buffer
states under the exclusive control of China. She agreed to
trade until such a time as ,he could accomplish the pacifica
tion of these territories. 3
Within ten years after the Treaty of Nerchinsk, China had achieved
considerable progress in her campaign of pacification and the transforma
tion of Outer Mongolia into a dependency.

She sought "neither the devel

opment of this second-rate pastureland nor the increase of its population
through colonization".

On the contrary, Father Seves points out, "the
Peking Government took every measure to hinder colonization". 38 It for
bade the Chinese to cross the Mongolian border, to cultivate land there
37Joseph Sebes, S. J., The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of
Nerchinsk (1689) (Rome, 1961) p. 124.
38~., p. 127.

_....t.._.
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or to marry Mongol women.

;-



•

The object was to maintain a closed strategic

buffer state outside China·s own borders, "the less popul,ated the better".
In keeping with this policy, the Chinese forbade,the Mongolian chieftains
to enter into relations with foreign countries and intensified frontier
39
'
control of foreign merchants and couriers.
Russian harboring of Chin
ese derserters and intrigues with native rulers, notably the Chief of the
Ka1mycks, led China to manifest "a certain indifference" to Russian com

•

mercial efforts. 40
The Russians nevertheless persisted in their efforts to increase
their trade, which at that time consisted of imports of low-grade Chinese
silks, cottons, tobacoo, ginger, pepper and sugar, and exports of furs,
41
wool, horses, oxen, glass and swords.
Peter the Great, interested in ex·
panding this commerce, sent emissaries to China, the most notable of which
were the missions of Isbrandt Ides, in 1692, and Lev Ismai10v, in 1719.
Their purpose, in addition to obtaining trading concessions, was to re
solve the constant problem of dealing with border refugees in a manner
satisfactory to both empires, and to gather intelligence. 42 At the same
39Loc. cit.
40Cahen, Ope cit., p. 69.
• 41
Lo-Shu-Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations,
1644, 1820 (University of Arizona Press, 1966), p. 121.
42cahen, Ope cit., pp. 32-38, and pp. 69-77; These were by no means
the first Russian attempts to negotiate with the Chinese in Peking. As
early as 1616, a cossack ataman appeared at the court of the Chinese vas
sal, Altyn Khan, and obtained perm ssion from an envoy of the Chinese Em
peror to arrange for a RUssian mission to proceed to Peking. Two years
later, the Petlin-Mundorff mission actually reached Peking, but achieved
no notable results. In 1654, the Russian ambassador Baikov came to
Peking, but was dismissed from the court because of his refusal to "kow
tow", the bow of servile allegiance to the Chinese Emporor, considered
a part of the court etiquette for admittance of any foreign ambassador.
Subsequent embassies of Perfiliev and Setkul-Ab1in again in 1672, and of
Pershennikov in 1674, and Spathary in 1676, all bore little fruit largely
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time, they-avoided any Chinese efforts to reach agreement on formal bor
der demarcation, particularly from the Transbaikal to the east.
•

Their

efforts bore no fruit, as far as improvement of trade was concerned.
What the Chinese wanted was not trade, but a delimitation of the
Russian-Mongolian border that had been left unsettled by the Treaty of
Nerchinsk, something that Russia had no desire to expedite, since that
would have amounted to recognizing Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia.

.

Almost a century earlier, the Mongolian chieftain, Altyn Khan, had de
c1ared his fealty to the Tsar, thus providing Russia with her own claim
to suzerainty there. 43 At the insistence of the Chinese Emperor, how
ever, and in the hope of preserving whatever trade could be continued,
Russia agreed to a settlement.

This was negotiated by Sava Vladislavich

Raguzinskii, who, following months of inconclusive meetings in Peking
and fifty-eight conferences in the border areas, concluded the Treaty of
Kiakhta in 1728.

A precise frontier was drawn between Siberia and Mon

golia, but from the Iablonovoi Mountains to the Sea of Okhotsk, the border
was left lundefined, as before.
permanent trade centers.

Kiakhta and Nerehinsk were designated as

Trade caravans from Siberia to Peking were per

mitted once every three years.

A Russian Orthodox Mission was given formal

permission to reside in Peking, with a priest and students sent there to
for the same reason. Pemhaps another, equally cogent reason was that
while the Russians were eager for trade, the Chinese authorities were
not interested in this. "They looked down upon merchants and depreciated
the importance of commerce. Being used to receiving only tribute bear
ers, the Chinese court lacked the Western concept of trade." (See
Vincent Chen, Sino-Russian Relations in the Seventeenth Century (The
Hague, 1966) pp. 118-120.
43Sebes, 00. cit., p. 124.

---~:'!~",
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learn Chinese. 44 And, at Raguzinskii's request, it was
stipulated that
correspondence between the two governments should be carried out in the
name of the Russia'n Senate and the Chinese Meng-ku-li-fan-yuan, the
"Office for the Control of the Barbarians of the Mongolian Dominions".
This would prevent the Chinese Emperor's addressing the Tsar in'insult
ingly condescending terms, as had happened when the diplomatic correspon
dence had been conducted as from one Emperor to another. 45

It became the

custom of the Russians and of other western nations to refer to this Office
as the Tribunal.
The Treaty of Kiakhta closed Outer Mongolia to the Russians.

.

Offi

cial caravans could pass through it on their way to Peking, but in general,
Russian trade was limited to the border region, mainly Kiakhta, and the
number of official caravans to Peking decreased. 46
Following, the conclusion of the Treaty of Kiakhta, Raguzinskii sub
mitted a memorial to the Government in Moscow in which he laid down four
conditions for the eventual conquest of the Amur region -- or, possibly an
even greater territory.

These were:

maintenance of peace in Europe, so

that time and money could be devoted to developing Siberia; steady plant
ing of crops in the Transbaikal so as to establish a plentiful food base;
gradual build-up and training of strong military forces in Eastern Siber
ia; and encouragement of the Mongols and other non-Manchu tribes in the
buffer areas to strike for independence. 47 Three years later, evidently
44Semyonov, op. cit., p. 123.
4~. K. I. Quested, The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857 
!§2Q (University of Malaya Press, 1969), pp. 4-5.

46sebes, op. cit., p. 124.
47Ibid ., p. 125-126.
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upon more mature reflection, he prepared another analysis in his report on

•

"The Condition and Strength of the Chinese State":

,.

We may easily conceive of a war with China, but we must take
into consideration the fact that this would not be an easy
undertaking. We would have to concentrate on the border at
least ten regiments of the line and an equal amount of regiments
of irregulars, which would have to face all the Chinese forces
and perhaps the Mongolian as well. The cost of such an under
taking, even assuming that it should be successful, will never
be recovered, even in a hundred years. We would have to build
fortresses, maintain,;strong garrisons there, supply them con
tinuously with food and ammunition. Peace would be menaced
for a long time, trade with China would be interrupted and
the Siberian population would become impoverished. Moreover,
the Chinese would never acknowledge defeat, they would begin
to arm themselv~s to an even greater extent and learn our
military arts. 4
By virtue of this analysis, Raguzinskii is regarded by most scho
lars as the initiator of the status quo policy that guided Russia's rela
tions with China for over a century after the Treaty of Kiakhta.

That

policy was not without its opponents, however, and almost from the date
of the Treaty itself, a recurring irredentism was manifest in some quarters
of Russian officialdom.
The denial of the Amur by the terms of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, con
firmed by the Treaty of

K~akhta,

cut down the impetus of Russian coloni

zation and diverted it to the north-east and across the Pacific.

Under

the circumstances, however, communications with Kamchatka, not to men
tion Alaska, were extremely difficult.

And from the Russian point of view,

the limited trade through the single point of Kiakhta was far from satis
factory.

The considerably less than accurate concept of the warmer climes

and fertile lands of the Amur region -- which had never received any
large-scale testing -- undoubtedly also persisted in the minds of many
48r.oC. cit •
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•
Russians. as did a certain revanchism.

All these considerations nurtured

Nerchinsk "revisionism" at an early date. 49
•

In 1733, Lorenz Lange, a caravan leader who had played an important
role in negotiating the Treaty of Kiakhta, was pressing for

~p10ita

tion of Chinese difficulties with the Ozhungarians to force changes in
the Treaty that would favor Russia. 50 Eight years later, the historian,
G. F. Muller, was stressing that the only practical route to Kamchatka and
the Pacific was down the Amur.
•

He pointed out, in addition, that "the

difficulties of transport between Yakutsk and Okhotsk would be ended •••

f

,!

intentions with regard to Japan and the hoped for discoveries in America

I

would be more easily fulfilled, trade with India could be organized and

.,

trade with China itself, either by sea or up the River Sungari, would be
come easier than hitherto .... 51

He stressed, too, that the Treaty of Ner

chinsk had been concluded under duress, and that it was time to right
this wrong.

Lorenz Lang, by then deputy

Governor~enera1

of Eastern Si

beria, agreed completely with Mul1er. 52
Another Siberian administrator, Governor W. A. Miat1ev, was com
missioned in 1753 to organize a second Bering expedition.

It was to

start from Nerchinsk and reach Japan and the American coast via the Shi1ka
49Semyonov,

Ope

cit., p. 250.

5Orwo years earlier, the Chinese had dispatched envoys to Moscow to
seek Russian neutrality in their planned campaign against tb!')Ozhungars.
The Chinese envoys did not penetrate either to St. Petersburg or to Mos
cow, but they brought back impressive reports regarding the extent and
wealth of Russia. (Quested, Ope cit., p. 2, cites Leontiev's translation
of Puteshestvi Kitaiskogo Poslannika to this effect.
51 Semyonov,
52LoC • cit.

Ope

cit., p. 25.
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51
The Chinese government denied perm,ission f~r navigation on the
Amur, however, and the plan was not carried out. 53 Three years later, the
and Amur.

commandant of Selenginsk, W. Jakobi, recommended assembling troops between
Selenginsk and Nerchinsk and then confronting the Chinese with an ultima
tum.

Catherine II, at the beginning of her riegn, considered this plan

but rejected it because of the heavy demands it would have made on Russian
military resources. 54
The cautious Russian government, unwilling to become embroiled in a
6

military adventure in an area thousands of miles removed from Russia's
basic sources of supply for military manpower and equipment, continued to
reject all the overtures of the revisionists during the first half of the
nineteenth century.55 One such proposal was made in 1805 by the navigator,
I. F. von Krusenstern, who recommended that Russia obtain a stepping
stone to Manchuria by occupying Anniwa Bay in southern Sakhalin; this was
done in the following year by a Lieutenant Khvostoff, who took the bay in
the Emperor's name by distributing medals and proclamations among the na
tive chiefs. This action, however, was disavowed by the government. 56
At the time of the Sakhalin adventure the Russian government was at
tempting to modify

~e

terms of the Treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta

through conciliatory, rather than agressive methods.

In 1805, Count Iuri

53toc. cit.
~

R. K. I. Quested, The Ex ansion of Russia in East Asia 1857
1860, (University of Malaya Press, 1968 , p. 2, and Russkaia Starina,
1881, Vol. 32, pp. 75-91.
55v. P. Vasiliev, Russko-Kitaiskie Traktaty (st. Petersburg, 1860),
cited by Quested, relates that Paul I planned an armed expedition -to pun
ish China', but was murdered before it could take place.
56Ravenstein, The Russians on the Amur (London, 1861), p. 113.
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Golovkin, with a large retinue and costly presents, was dispatched with
orders to negotiate liberalized trade agreements in Peking and to secure
permission for limited Russian navigation on the Amur.

He did not pro-

gress beyond Urga, where endless parleying about ceremonial wore out his
57
patience so that he returned without accomplishing anything.
A member
of Golovkin's party later wrotea

"All the inhabitants of Nerchinsk,

Irkutsk and Transbaikalia think of the land of the Daurs as lost.
r.

Why

should we not build much better ports at the mouth of the Amur than we
have at Okhotsk and miserable Avachinsk (Petropavlovsk).

They would be a

hundred times better and more useful than our silly American possessions
and all those Kuriles and Aleutians ••••• •• 58
Following the conclusion of the abortive Golovkin mission, one of
Golovkin's staff officers undertook a secret reconnaissance of the frontier area from Nerchinsk to Gorbitsa, where he found some frontier posts
with inscriptions in five languages, and where he was told by the natives
that the Tungus tribes on the Amur and in the Nerchinsk area were sympathetic to the Russians.

Although it had been intended to develop 'plans
59
for an expedition on the basis of this information, it was shelved.
The failure of the Golovkin mission did not disturb the placid

relations between Russia and China and in 1810 the Russians arranged a
57Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 253; Quested, Ope cit., pp. 11-12, points
out that Golovkin's main qualifications for appointment as head of this
mission was that he was a relative of the Foreign Minister, Prince
. Chartoryszky, that tfue mission was very badly organized and that it was
found that the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry had lost its
files on China, so that Golovkin had had to start out with inadequate
instructions!
58F. F. Vige1, Zapiski (Moscow, 1928) Vol. I, p. 251, cited by
P. I. Kabanov, Amurskii Vopross (Blagoveschensk, 1958) p. 87.
59Quested, Ope cit., p. 16, citing P. I. Kabanov, Amurskii Vopross
i ego Razreshenie (Moscow, 1947)
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meeting between the Governor of Irkutsk, N. I. Treskin, and Chinese offi
cials at Urga.

These were carried out in very amicable and ,equal manner,
.
.
~
owing in large part to Treskin's care in conforming.to Chinese etiquette.
The meetings failed in their political purpose because, as Quested points
out, "The Chinese had hoped to persuade Russia to send another mission
(to Peking) unconditionally, whereas the Russian Government :wished to make
this dependent upon the sending of a reciprocal Chinese mission to St.

• Petersburg, in order to enlighten China as to the true extent of Russian
power.

It was highly shortsighted of the Chinese and greatly to their sub

sequent disadvantage that they did not entertain this idea, but there

•

would have been too much loss of face involved. 1t61
Some five years after

~Treskin

negotiations, an official of the

Russian-American Company urged occupation of the!·Amur delta and naviga
tion of the river,' pointing out that almost 15,000 pack horses were re
quired annually, at exorbitant expense, for the provisioning of the Rus·
sian settlements on the Sea of Okhotsk. 62 The Russian government, recov
ering from Napoleon's invasion and engrossed in the events leading to his
final downfall, understandably gave this notion short shrift.

It re

I!>

mained unmoved, too, in 1827, when Admiral Nikoloi Mordivinov 63 wrote
Count Nesselrode, Metternich's disciple, saying, "We cannot forget the
60N• I. Treskin, "Zhurnal druzheskogo svidania Irkutskogo grazh
danskogo gubernatora Treskina s Kitaiskim pogranichyym pravitelem Vanom
i Ambanom s 19 feb. po 13 marta 1810,11 Chtenia v imperialisticheskom
. obshestve istorii i drevnostei Rossii pro Moskovskom universitete (Moscow,
1860) Bk. I CSL, 227, p. 9b, cited by Quested, op. cit., p. 16-17.
61 Quested, op. cit., p. 17.
62Ravenstein, op. cit., p. 113.

6~uraviev's maternal grandfather

•

54

•
concessions made by Russia to the Chinese on the boundary from the lablo
novoi Mountains to the Amur.

At the time of making those concessions, we

were enjoying the great expanses of Siberia and disdained the wilderness
of the conceded lands, but now we are suffering because the Amur, the only
river in Siberia leading to the open sea, does not flow within our fron
64
tiers."
A few years later, Siberian officials were listening to the report
•

of an escaped convict, the Staroverets Guri Vasiliev, who had been re
turned to them by Tungus hunters for a reward of three rubles.

Vasiliev

and two companions had periodically roamed the Amur territory for some
•

thirteen years and had drifted down the Amur in a boat to its mouth and
the Sea of Okhotsk.

Governor-General Lavinskii, of Eastern Siberia, was

greatly impressed by Vasiliev's account of the navigability of the Amur
River.

He also noted the returned convict's report that the Chinese

were taking no steps to defend or colonize the area it drained, which at
this time was inhabited by only a few thousand Chinese and Manchus. 65
Lavinskii submitted a plan for the occupation of the Amur region
to the authorities in St. Petersburg.
reports should be tested.

The response was that Vasiliev's

Accordingly a Colonel Ladishenskii was sent on

an extensive ttip on the Amur and subsequently worked out details for a
military expedition into the territory.66 The plan was shelved, however;
the Polish Revolution of 1831-2 had only recently been crushed, the Near
64Archiv Ministerstva Inostrannikh Del f. kanz. za 1827, g_,
d. 7316 11.7-9, cited by Kabanov, Ope cit.
6~. E. Grum-Grchimailo, Opisanie Amurskogo Kraia (St. Petersburg,
1894), Ch. I, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 22.

66Semyonov, op_ cit., p. 255.

•
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Eastern crisis, later to be resolved by the Treaty of Unklar Skelessl,
was fermenting, and the Russian Government presumably had enough to worry'
•

aboot without undertaking military commitments in the southeastern reaches
of the Empire. But even the cautious Nesselrode entertained hopes of
peaceably adjusting the restrictions on trade and removing the prohibition
of Russian navigation of the'Amur.

In 1840, he ordered Liubimov, the

secretary of the ecclesiastical mission to Peking, to initiate talks with

-

the Chinese on the subject of the Amur.

This proved impossible and con·

vinced Nesselrodethat nothing further should be attempted. 67 Interest
in the Amur, however, was revived by the journey of the geogripher, A. T.
von Middendorf, in 1842, which extended, contrary to the instructions of
the Imperial :Academy of Science, along the ill-defined border of China. 68
Count Evfimii Vasilievich Putiatin, perhaps relying on the Emperor's well
known penchant for "military expeditions",69 submitted a proposal in 1843
to

send forces into the area for the purpose of wringing commercial con

cessions from the Chinese.

According to a report by the British Ambassa

dor in st. Petersburg, this was approved initially by Nesselrode, but
judged not worth the outlay by Vronchenko, the Minister of Finance. 70
Even before Muraviev's appointment as Governor-General of Eastern
·67Barsukov, Ope cit., Vol. II, p. 200.

6~usski Arkhiv, 1878, Bk. III, p. 257.
69G• Pushkarev, Rossia v XIX veke, (New York, 1962) footnote 12, p.48.
7OReport from Sir John Crampton to H. M. Secretary of state for For
eign Affairs, Nov. 18, 1860, cited by ~uested, Ope cit., p. 31. The
accuracy of the British intelligence service in st. Petersburg at this
time would be difficult to d.etermine; the report of Nesselrodets initial
acquiescence in Putiatints project certainly seems questionable.
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Siberia, Nicholas I had deter'mined upon exploration of the Amur estuary.
In 1846, ensign Gwrilov, commander of the brig, "Grand Duke Constantine"
in the service of the Russian-American Company, was ordered by the Emperor
"to carry out hydographic investigations" in the Sea of Okhotsk.

He was

instructed to avoid any publicity and enjoined from letting his crew know
where they were sailing. 71

This expedition had evidently been stimulated

by information from the Tunguses, roaming along the shores of the Sea of
Okhotsk, that many Russian vagabonds and refugees from the law had made
their way to the mouth of the Amur and had established settlements there,

much as similar adventurers had earlier done at Albazin.

Gavriloy had

been instructed to maintain the strictest incognito, passing himself off
as a non-Russian fisherman and taking the utmost precautions to carry out

his deception, even to carrying western European, rather than Russian,
tobacco.

In the event of meeting Russian settlers, he was to tell them

that he had learned to speak Russian from Russians on the coast of the Sea
of Okhotsk, where he had been fishing.

Gavrilov encounterod sandbanks and

turnad back and the Russian-American Company reported that the Amur estuary
was not navigable. 72
II. GRmlJING FRO~.rrIER OF EMPIRE

While revanchism. real or imagined climatic and agricultural advan
tages in the "lost" territory, and the need for better coml'nunications with
the P.:lcific settlements underlay continued Russian interest in the Amur,
there was another, more general, contributing factor.

This was the growing

economic development of Siberia and the rcSJ 1 ting increasing awareness
71 Ba l'Sllkov, Q2.:...cit., Vol. I, p. 172.
7~oc. cit.

~7

•

within the government that this vast "realm" was becoming an integral part

•

of Russia, rather than a sort of colonial possession. 73
In addition to mounting agricultural production, mining was becoming
a significant activity in the Transbaikal by the middle of the eighteenth
century.

Silver, lead and copper were smelted there and in Nerchinsk,

plants smelting iron and pig iron were operating.

A main highway crossed

Siberia

..

from Tiumen in the west to Nerchinsk in the east, and was joined
also by roads from the south of Siberia and from the northern regions. 74

The Kiakhta trade, which had languished during the second half of the eigh
teenth century, was revived by the Russo-Chinese Convention of 1792.

In

1797, 34,000 poods 7~ of tea were imported through Kiakhta; 76 by 1824,
this figure had risen to

l~,OOO.

In that year, peltry constituted 50% of

Russian exports to China, and woolen textiles, some 15%. Of the latter,
2,438 arshins 77 ·were of Russian manufacture, and 29~,825 were foreign re
exports.

Some twenty-five years later, peltry constituted a negligible

export item, while textile exports, exclusively of Russian manufacture,
78
had risen to 1,296,93~ arshins.
This was a natural reflection of Russia's
7~arc Raeff, in Speranskii and the Siberian Reforms of 1822, p. 6,
refers to the superficial and erroneous analogy with the colonial possess
ions of England and Spain drawn by Catherine II and her councilors who
referred to Siberia as ~our India, Mexico or Peru".

74M• G. Levin and L. P. Potapov, The Peoples of Siberia, (University
of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 129-30.
~ne pood equals approximately 37 pounds.

76A. N. Radischev, the political writer exiled to Siberia at this
time, noted in his Pismo 0 Kitaeskom Tor e, that this amounted to t of
all imports into Russia; 2 3 of such imports consisted of textiles,
(Semyonov, Ope, cit., p. l2~).
770ne arshin equals 28 inches.
78p. I. Kabanov, Amurskii Vopross (Blagoveschensk, 1959), p. 56.

~8

expanding economy.

The value of manufactured output in Russia during the

second quarter of the
•

.

nineteenth century had risen from 46,524,000 silver

rubles to l59,985,cx:x:> rubles, with textiles accounting for 48% of i.that
figure.

Thus, by Muraviev's time, Kiakhta had become a prime outlet for

Russia's most important export industry. By that time, too, annual tea
imports through this point had risen to over a quarter of a million poods.

•

Almost one fifth of Russia's total customs revenue was now being derived
79
from Kiakhta. Of added significance to the Siberian economy was the dis
covery of gold.

First found toward the end of the 1830's, it was subse

quently uncovered in the taiga of the lenisei and then in the valleys of
the Lena and the Vitium. 80
As the economic importance of Siberia and its trade with China grew,
so did its Russian population.
14,360 in the

~ransbaikal

In 1796, this amounted to 78,450, plus

(almost all in the mines).

By the mid-nine

teenth century, this figure had grown to 1,152,978, with some 350,000 in
81
the Transbaikal.
Forty percent of this population was non-agricultural,
a circumstance that was to become critical in later years.
A small proportion of Siberia's growing population was composed of
82
convicts and political exiles.
Some of the latter, notably the Decem
bri~ts,

exerted a marked influence on Eastern Siberia's cultural and eco

nomic development. The Decembrists contributed greatly to communities
79~., pp. 52-54.
80Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 243.

81Kabanov,op. cit., p. 58.
82Raeff, Ope cit., p. 44, states that not more than 2,000 convicts
entered Siberia in anyone year, and that they remained an insignificant
fraction of the population. The number of other exiles, however, who
were sent to Siberia .- not as punishment, but for purposes of augment
ing the chronically sparse population - far exceeded this figure.
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such as Petrovskii Zavod, Berezov, Narym Surgut, Pelym and lakutsk.

Their

•

dispersal to these and other locations was meant to prevent their close
association.

It had the beneficient effect of spreading an intelligentsia

throughout the area, which until then contained hardly any members of that
stratum of Russian society.
The Decembrists organized schools.

They improved agricultural

methods, through their instruction, the native inhabitants learned to cul
t.

tivate all manner of fruits and vegetables not previously grown in Siberia,
and learned to grow tobacco, rye, buckwheat and barley and to produce hemp
oil.

The Decembrists also organized medical clinics and undertook scienti

fic research.

In some cases they were even able to exercise a constructive

influence on the Siberian governmental authorities. 83 Their activities
were undoubtedly instrumental in spreading the growing consciousness within
Russia that Siberia was in fact a part of the nation itself ("Sibir tozhe
Russkaia zemlia").
Enlightened and progressive

~ough

the Decembrists were, they consti

tuted only a tiny leavening element in Eastern Siberian society, which
differed markedly from the traditional Russian pattern.

The provincial

nobility that played a political role on the local level in European Russia
did not exist in Siberia, whqe the government regarded the other classes
there as too unreliable to be allowed any initiative or autonomy.

The only

social group in Siberia that might have played a political role, vis-a-vis
the governmental bureaucracy, were the merchants, but ever since Peter the
Great, the government had held the Russian merchant class in low esteem.

~

83A. G, Mazour, The First Russian Revolution. 1825, (Stanford Uni
versity Press, 1937), pp. 222-260.
~aeff, Ope cit., p. 7. Peter the Great recognized the importance
of trade for the economy of his realm. He accorded special privileges to

•
Geographic and economic conditions had favorably influenced

to
the

growth and predominance of the merchant class in Siberian .society.

•

It

was trade that had brought Russian settlers to Siberia, which had been dis
covered and conquered by merchants or by freebooters in their pay, while
the Russian nobility, predominantly concerned with agriculture, (based on
serfdom, which did not exist in Siberia),

85

.

found little attraction there.

The stronghold of the Siberian merchants in the mid-nineteenth century
•

was Irkutsk, where they constituted an economic oligarchy, living "in the
world of seventeenth century Muscovy", and thinking .tin terms of privi
lege, monopoly and special rights". 86

•

During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the
merchants of Irkutsk were constantly at odds with the administrative
authorities, who reflected the government's prevauing philosophy of
"benevolent despotism".

Allowed no real role in local self-government,

these commercial entrepreneurs were subject to the nearly absolute rule of
the Governor, who was

the personal and direct appointee of the sover

eign, and was responsible to the monarch alone, and of his appointed offi
cials.

As is invariably the case under conditions of political and economic

the Ru~~ian merchantry and made efforts to bring them into the mainstream
of public life. Following Peter's death, the resentful nobility succeeded
in arrogating to themselves the monopolies and other benefits enjoyed by
the merchants and in relagating them to an inferior status.
85rhat is, of the sort that was prevalent on the estates of land own
ers throughout European Russia. One form of serfdom did exist in Siberia,
i.e., the "enrollment" (prypisanie) of peasants for the rural mines. At
the end of the eighteenth century, there were some 60,000 "enrolled work
ers" of this sort. (See Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 241.)
86Raeff, Ope cit., pp. 13 and 32.
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absolutism, abuses of power were commonplace.

•
The merchants'
only recourse

was to forward complaints and present petitions to the capital - when
•

these could be gotten through.

One such complaint, in 1800,87 spurred

the Russian Senate and the Council of State to an examination of the Sib
erian governmental structure, and persuaded the Emperor that a fundamental
reorganization was required.

It was to take twenty-two years, however,

before such a reorganization, at least on paper, was effected.

•

The first

attempt, under Governor-General Selifontov, resulted only in further ex
panding the powers of the governor general and in multiplying the number
of officials and government bodies in an area already saturated with
bureaucrats.

This, comments Raeff, "considering the widespread corruption
88
among Siberian officials", led "only to more abuses and confusion".
The
situation reached a climax during the administration of Ivan Pestel
(father of the prominent Decembrist) and his ruthless deputy, N. I. Tres
kin, which "became a

fourteen-year long history of clashes and conflicts

between the bureaucracy and.the merchants".
within the government itself.

It also involved a struggle

From the time of Catherine II and

87Raeff, Ope cit., p. 9, cites the eleven major points of this com
plaint byM. Sibiriakov, prominent merchant and mayor of Irkuts~, 1)
Grain prices had been artificially raised; 2) The population was being
distracted from useful work by forcible impressment for road building;
3) The administration had neglected to apportion the required amount of
land for each village; 4) The peasants were compelled to transport
grain to remote places; 5) The Governor-General had forbidden the plant
ing of tobacco in Irkutsk; 6) The mansion of the Governor had been re-.
paired with the help of conscripted labor; 7) Military barracks had
been built in the square in front of the cathedpal; 8) A distribution
point for forced labor had been established at the very gates of the
city, thus making the outskirts of the town unsafe; 9) The barracks of
the police had been transferred to another spot in the city at the ex
pense of the people; 10) The transportation of merchandise over Lake
Baikal had been prohibited and the merchants had been compelled to use a
longer route around the lake; 11) Sibiriakov himself had been deprived
of his office of mayor without any reason.
88Raeff, op~ cit., p. 11.
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•
particularly with the accession to the throne of Alexander I, the central
government had become impressed with the advatages of free
•

basis·for the nation's economic

well-being.

~rade

as a

Within the government, how'"

ever, there were differing interpretations of the manner in which this
should be fostered.

The Ministry of Finance believed that local officials

should be given as little power as possible in economic matters, allowing

•

individual merchants to compete freely for such benefits as were to be
89
derived from dealings with the State.
What the Ministry appeared to
overlook was that the merchants' clamor against bureaucratic interference
largely reflected their determination to obtain a stranglehold ?ver the
economy of the

through their buying monopolies, rather than any
attachment to the principles of an open economy. 90
r~gion

The struggle between Treskin and the merchants of Siberia entailed
the development of a wide range of beneficial economic projects, includ
ing the building of roads, granaries, municipal facilities, and similar
projects, on the one hand, and on the other, the spread of a scandalous
system of bribery and corruption associated with these.

Treskin was an

indefatigable worker and undoubtedly did much to improve the economic
base of Siberia.

His

high-handed methods, however, which were more

suited.to the by-gone Petrine era, and the fact that he was apparently
as guilty of dishonestly lining his pockets 9l as were his unscrupulous
89SuCh dealings included contracting for supplies and materials
required by State-run mines and the then State monopolies of vodka dis
tilling and salt mining.
90IQ!g., p. 30. The combined action of a few powerful merchants
for example, could force down the price that peasants could obtain for
their grain.
9l An activity that he delegated to his wife. An excellent account
of the Pestel-Treskin regime is contained in Chapter II of Raeff's pre
viously cited work.
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•
henchmen, finally caused his downfall.

The mounting desperation of the

Siberian population succeed in 1819, through the usual device of petition
ing the Emperor, in bringing about the dismissal of Pestel (who had spent
most of his governor-generalcy in St. Petersburg) and of Treskin.

In that

year, Michael M. Speranskii (1772-1839) distinguished legislator and states
man. became Governor-General of Siberia.
Speranskii was charged with inspecting and reorganizing the area's

-

entire administrative apparatus.

The result of his efforts reflected the

division within the Russian bureaucracy between those who were determined
upon a policy of strict etatism and bureaucratic

authoritari~nism

and

those who favored the ideas of late-eighteenth century enlightened des
potism, economic liberalism and humanitarianlsm. 92
Speranskii's reforms of 1822 established administrations for Western
and Eastern Sioeria with capitals in Tobolsk and Irkutsk.

The governor

; general of each area was an appointee of the Emperor and responsible to
him personally.

As the lieutenant of the monarch he was head of the Main

Administration, consisting of himself and an Advisory Council, to which
he was to submit certain of his proposed measures for information and ad
vice.

His personal function was that of administrative supervision of

the.execution of all measures, including those issued by the judiciary.
He was responsible for regular inspection of his region and of its var
ious branches of administration; he was to make recommendations for pro
motions and honors and he had a qualified power of appointment, and dis
missal of functionaries.

In case of special need, the governor-general

could issue temporary executive instructions subject to eventual confirma
tion by St. Petersburg.

In all other matters, the governor-general was to

9~aeff, op. cit., p. 13:>.

•

•
work in conjunction with the Council. The Council, however, had only an
advisory opinion that was not binding on the governor-general.
•
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Moreover,

while it exercised general supervision over current administration, re
viewed all matters pertaining to taxation, contractual obligations, sup
plies, recruits, etc., and was consulted regarding execution of legisla
tion, it had no power to implement its decisions.

Its role was thus really

very limited and eventually it deteriorated to an institution for dealing
•

with a limited number of specific matters; it soon completely lost its ori
ginal function af advising the governor-general on matters of general
cy.93

poli~

•
While Speranskii's reforms did little to limit the vlcrroyal peroga

tives of the governors-general, they nevertheless had a significant im
pact on the administration of Siberia and on its economic life.
systematic organizationfof local government was established,
(provinces), okru9s (districts) and volosts (townships).

A more

gubernia

More self-

government was allowed the native populations under their own clan ad
ministrations and .. ~ (parliaments) of the steppe".

The judiciary

was given greater autonomy, but most significantly, a far
of laissez-faire was accorded the economy.

g~eater

degree

The establishment of full free

dom of trade had, indeed, been Speranskii's first concern.

He restricted

interference and participation of officials in economic activities and
abolished most of the detailed regulations of trade which had been for the
most part a facade for bureaucratic tyranny.94

He also instituted positive

measures to encourage various forms of economic activity and to bring the
whole area into closer trade relations jwith European Russia.
9~aeff,

Ope

cit., pp. 74-76.

94!.lli., p. 54.

His measures

•

6~

•
for the promotion and safeguarding of free economic activity were, in

•

fact, his major contributions to the administration of Siberia •

•

.

The application and implementation of Speranskii's new legislation
often faltered and proved inadequate and his successors tended to fall
back into the corrupt practices of the earlier satraps of Siberia.

His

freeing of economic activity, too, sometimes took the perverted form of
facilitating the monopolistic activities of the merchants whom Treskin

..

had hated and distrusted, and ironically, often had the effect of en
couraging collusion between government officials and private entrepre
neurs.

Nevertheless, as Raeff puts it, Speranskii's measures."encouraged

a new outlook and gave new direction to the region's energies and re
sources.

In so doing, the reforms of 1822 helped to open Siberia as the

future agricultural and industrial 'frontier of Russia' ".95 By the midnineteenth century, the need of this new frontier for expanded trade, as
well as Eastern Siberia's potential as a base for further eastward colon
isation, were becoming increasingly clear to the merchants of Irkutsk
as they were to become to Muraviev soon after his arrival there.
he quickly perceived, would be the key to such developments.
95!.!?J...g., p. 131.·

The Amur, .

•

•
•
CHAPTER III
EARLY PROBLEMS AND TACTICS
I _ CHANGES COME TO IRKtrrSK
Muraviev was clearly determined to impress upon the population of

.

Eastern Siberia that his appointment was ushering in an administration
far different from that of his predecessor.

His arrival in Krasnoiarsk

on February 27, 1848, .was awaited with trepidation.

He was met there

only by the city governor, Vasilii Kirilovich Padalka, and except for
him, Muraviev received no one that evening_

At that time, recalls B. V.

Struve, the corrupt practices in the administration of the gold mines
was creating a major scandal.

Particularly notorious was the disposi

tion of the so-called governmental .remnants, being distributed in the
guise of gracious monarchical bestowals on various individuals close to
the throne.

J(

Comments Struve:

This represented the most shameful and outrageous specula
tion. Nowhere had bribery revealed itself in such blatant form
'-and in such large dimensions ••• The most highly placed per
sonages did not shrink from participating_ Entire gangs of
dishonest people were occupied in concocting reasons for in
cluding this or that mine in the category of a ·'governmental
remnant". Today a mine would be so classified and tomorrow
there would already have arrived an application seeking the
Tsar's permission to grant the right to work the mine to some
highly placed person yr to a company in which such persons
were silent partners.
The mine scandals and other instances of collusion between government
lRusski Vestnik, 1888, cited by Barsukov, op. cit., I, p., 175.
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•
officials and private entrepreneurs led Muraviev to undertake a sort of

demonstration before the wealthy inhabitants of the area.
j--

!,~ '

•

He had earlier

promised the Masharovs, a family that had greatly prospered as supply'
contractors to the gold mine operators and purveyors of vodka to their
exploited workmen, that en route from Krasnoiarsk to Irkutsk, he would be
their dinner guest in Kansk, where they owned a luxuriously appointed
home.

•

Now, however,

he decided to make it clear that wealth should not

be accorded any advantages before the law, and gave instructions in Kras
noiarsk that the Masharovs be informed that he would not call UP9n them
in Kansk. 2

•

Barsukov records that after a five-day inspection of the troops
and of municipal and community establishments in Krasnoiarsk, Muraviev
proceeded on to Nizhnii Udinsk, where he stopped for a few hours and
where "certain-irregularities in the administration of the district came
to his attentiontt • 3 Muraviev, states Barsukov, "issued lively and deci
sive orders in order to reinstate confidence in the authorities which of
late had been completely destroyed, and then proceeded to Irkutsk".

It

is a passage of this sort that brings down on Barsukov's head the scorn
of critics like Butsinskii, who was quick to seize upon this rather ludi
crous exaggeration of Muraviev's effectiveness. 4
On the day following his arrival in Irkutsk, Muraviev held a morning
reception.

It was obviously designed to signal the advent of drastic

2Loc. cit.
3Ibid., I, p. 176.
4sutsinski, N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii, Trud I. P. Barsukova. Retzenziia
Professora Kharkovsko90 Universiteta, (St. Petersburg, Imperial Academy
of Sciences, 1895) p. 126.
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changes in the regime.
.~ \

•
All of the notables in the area, military and civil

figures, the merchants, members of the local duma and of the trade corpora
tions, were gathered in the main salon of the Governor-General's resi
dence.

The account of I. V. Vagin, an eyewitness 5 makes it plain that the

proceedings were formal and chilly. Muraviev received the introductions
of the military officers silently, bowing to no one, nor offering his
hand.

•

He coldly listened to the ceremonial address of the Governor of

Irkutsk, A. V. Piatnitzkii, and then silently walked past the row of civi
lians.

Among these stood N. E. Tiumentsev, Councilor of the Main Adminis

tration of Eastern Siberia, who was "red as a lobster".
him by also.

Muraviev passed

He then walked quickly to the next room, received bread and

salt from the city community and immediately returned to the salon.

After

a few moments, he bowed left and right and the reception, which had taken
twenty minutes, -was over, though the senior officials were requested to
remain for a meeting which, Tiumentsev noted In his diary, "was grim and
left everyone with an unpleasant impression".

Vagin comments furthers

For me, a novice to the governor-generals' receptions, the mat
ter of the overall impression was of little moment. What I was
interested in was Muraviev's personality. By its youthfulness
and alertness it constituted a complete contrast with the person
ality of Rupert.
In the evening, little groups gathered in various places to
comment on the reception and to go over its details. It was
said that one of the most militant of the Rupertist officials,
almost the most influential one through his connections, was $0
put out of countenance that in response to some question of
Muraviev's he babbled some utterly foolish answer. But what
interested everyone the most was the Mangazeyev story.
Mangazeyev was the officer in charge of the gold desk in the
Mining Department. In addition to the sort of bribery in which
01. V. Vagin, "Vostochnoe Obozrenie", in Literaturnyi Sbornik,
1885, pp. 277-283, cited by Barsukov, Ope cit., I, pp. 177-179.
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•

officials at that time were involved, he had thought up a
special field for himselfa He indicated to various indivi
duals that the profitable crown-demesne remnants in the
gold fields and helped them to get these away from other appli
cants ••• He had hoped to oblige the inspectors (with Count
Tolstoy) in this way, but his obligingness had hurt him.
"There I stood", Mangazeyev related later, nand beside me
stood Savinski. They introduced him to Muraviev (and the
later said), -I have heard so many good reports about you· ••
•• and he scattered compliments. Then suddenly he asked,
-But where is Mangazayev?- "Well" t I thought, "if he has
praised Savinski, who is only in charge of the salt desk,
so highly, he will embrace me no less." I bowed (and he
said), -I trust you will not be serving with me.- Some
praise:
Although Mangazeyev was in excellent health, Muraviev ordered that
he be given a medical retirement, this being the only way, because of the
Mining Department's procedures, that he could get rid of him.
lost no time, tOOt in

Muraviev

requesting the resignation of Governor Piatnitzki,

who had been notoriously involved in the gold mine scandals.

Further

purges took place soon, and Muraviev's administration began to be staffed
with eager and honest officials to replace those removed.

A new order was

being established, but it was a gradual process; it was not easy to at
tract capable administrators to the remote expanses governed by Muraviev.
Muraviev was appalled by the situation in which Eastern Siberia
found itself because of years of maladministration.

He was determined to

,

bring order into the chaos that faced him, but he had no illusions about

f'

the dimensions of the problem.

~.

He knew that it was essential, if he was

to achieve his ends, that the Tsar be aware of the realities of the situa
tion.

With that in mind, before leaving st. Petersburg, he had obtained

the Emperor's consent to maintain direct correspondence with him on all
matters he deemed to require the Emperor's personal attention. 6 This ar
rangement proved invaluable to Muraviev in the months and years ahead.
6earsukov, op. cit., I, p. 181.
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Matters occupying Muraviev's attention during his first days in
Eastern Siberia included reviewing complaints from various individuals
and from entire communities concerning oppression and extortion of gov- ,
ernment officials.

He was particularly impressed by the petitions of the

natives, the Buriats of the Irkutsk okrug, who waited upon him in crowds.
In addition, there were troop inspections, visits to prisons and a myriad
of other details affecting the administration of the area.

..

The Kiakhta trade soon claimed Muraviev's attention, too.

He had

received a detailed letter, while passing through Moscow, from Muscovite
traders doing business in Kiakhta, who pointed out that governmental
restrictions and interference were crippling commerce there. 7 • Upon his ar
rival in Irkutsk, Muraviev sent his
obtain first-hand information.

aide-de-camp to that border town to

On the basis of his aide's findings, he

wrote a report to the Minister of Finance, T. P. Vronchenko, setting forth
his preliminary view that the archaic regulations governing the Kiakhta
trade might need revision and that control of this trade, so important to
the Russian economy, should not be left in the irresponsible hands of the
8
people who currently monopolized it.
Muraviev's next step was to prepare a report to the

'~peror ~hibh

created a commotion within the St. Petersburg administration.

Wrote hel

7Quested cites M. I. Sladkovskii, Orcherki ekonomicheskikh
otnoshenie, S.S.S.R. s Kitaem (Moscow, 1957), pp. 88-94, to the effect
that the most counter-productive regulation was that which prohibited
trade other than by barter. The Chinese merchants suffered less from
Government interference than the Russians, since the Manchu regime had
allowed its regulations to lapse. Monopolies of Chinese and Russian
merchants within their own countries also tended to stifle commerce.

Be.

V. Struve, "Graf Muraviev-Amurskii. Iz vospominanii
deiatolnosti", Russkaia Starina, Vol. 48, p. 339.
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Gold mining, which only recently has drawn everyone's atten
tion to the inexhaustible riches of Eastern Siberia, is already
tending to diminish. Low yield diggings have been abandoned
because of the excessive cost of labor. the rich mines are being
worked out, but there have been no significant, new strikes. In
all probability, however, one may conclude that gold deposits
in Eastern Siberia are virtually inexhaustible. I don't pre
sume to judge the question as to whether it would be to the
benefit of the realm were private gold mining to expand, but I
am convinced that as long as it exists and is permitted, it is
desirable for your Majesty that these riches be shared more
fairly and correctly than has been the case to the present. At
the saIne time, the existing order facilitates seizure by them
of the claims of others and leads to the ruin of other prospec
tors not possessing rich diggings •
Shortly afterwards, he submitted a proposal to the Emperor calling
for the establishment of a single gold mining company in Eastern Siberia. 9
Another aspect of the Eastern Siberian economy that excited Muraviev's
indignation was that of the practices of the vodka distillers (otkupschiki)
who exercised a monopoly.

They maintained

traktirs (gin mills) near the

gold diggings and on pay days siphoned off the miserable gold miners'
earnings before they reached their dwellings.

Muraviev instituted a sys

tern of "escorting" these men home, keeping them away from these drinking
dens and encouraging them to keep their money for the needs of their hum
ble households. lO He also developed proposals for removing both distill
ing and salt manufacture from the government leasehold system, arguing
that such action would gain significant benefits, both for the government
and for the area in general. 11
Muraviev's concern for the improvement of social and economic con
ditions in Eastern Siberia was reflected in his attitude toward the exiled
Decembrists.
9

It is a reasonable assumption, too, that he preferred their

Barsukov, Ope cit., p. 184.

lOIbid.

ll~.
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• Siberia had to
company to that of the rest of such "society" as Eastern
offer.
•

From the time of his arrival, he established close relations with

a number of them, including Prince Sergei G. Vo1konskii, Prince Sergei '
Trubetskoi, N. A. Bestuzhev, Ivan Gorbachevskii and Dmitri Zava1ishin.
Among the Oecembrists were a number living in small localities in
the vicinity of Irkutsk, but only the Princesses Vo1konskii and Trubetskoi
lived in town, having received the right do do so for the purpose of their

..

children·s education.

All of the 'others had to obtain special permits for

each trip to town, a circumstance that created some hardship in cases of
sickness or other domestic emergencies.
also required special passes.

Travel from one volost'to another

Muraviev quickly put an end to such incon

veniences. 12
Muraviev and his wife became friendly with the Princesses Vo1kinskii
and Trubetskoi who, while they had always been widely respected in Irkutsk
society, enjoyed, according to Barsukov, only a limited social life, since
many of the government offic.ia1s and other prominent individuals feared
the taint of guilt by association. 13 \/ The Muravievs' example encouraged
closer relations of government personnel with the Oecembrists.

It also

prompted a little intrigue of the sort to which Muraviev was more than once
subjected.
Governor Piatnitskii, disgruntled at Muraviev's demand for his resig
nation, sent a report to st. Petersburg in which he depicted in se1f
14Barsukov,

Ope

cit., pp. 185-186.

13rhe Oecembrists had not, evidently, been as isolated a~ Barsukov
implies. A leading Oecembrist's memoirs mention that his brother was
accepted in Governor-General Rupert's home as one of the family and was
also a frequent visitor of Piatnitskii·s. See N. A. Bestuzhev, Zapiski,
g. 1800-1871, Russkaia Starina, Vol. 32, p. 650.
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righteous terms the tlreprehensib1enesslt of the close relations of Mura
viev and his officials with the Decembrists. The report was sent from
•

the Chief of Gendarmes through the Minister of the, Interior, Perovskii,
to Muraviev for appropriate comment.

Muraviev's reply was to the effect

that the Decembrists had expiated the errors of their youth by under
going heavy punishment and that they were among the best subjects of the
Tsar.

.

He held that no punishment should be for life, inasmuch as punish

ment was for the purpose of reforming the individual and that this had
been fully

achieve~

with regard to the Decembrists.

There was no basis,

he wrote, for leaving them isolated forever from society in
which they had

th~

makeup of

right to be included by reason of their education,
moral qualities and present political convictions. 14 On the margin of
t~e

Muraviev's letter, the Emperor Nicholas wrote, "My thanks", and added,
itA man has been found who understands me, who understands that I seek no
personal vengeance on these people, but am only carrying out the require
ments of the State and, having removed the culprits from here, have no
desire to poison their destiny there. u15
Piatnitskii's reward for his inept informing activities was

invo1

untary separation from the service. This incident, as well as similar
ones, prompted Perovskii to write Muraviev in the summer of 1848, as fo1
lows:
You without doubt are sure of my friendly disposition toward
you and know that 1 sincerely wish you well and eesire your
success. It seems to me that complete frankness must be an es·
sentia1 condition in our mutual relations. In this conviction
I shall always tell you what is on my mind and I call upon you
l4Russki Vestnik, 1888, pp. 169-173, cited by Barsukov,
150razhdanin, 1888, No. 301, cited in ~., p. 178 •

.. :t.i.~.

Ope

cit., p.l77.

..
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to do the same with me.
•

!
~

~"

~'

!

(

•

Tales are being spread here regarding your impetuosity. which
allegedly often exceeds acceptable limits; of the haste with
you judge people before you have had time to know them or even
to hear them out, and so forth: There is no doubt that offici
als unfit for the service, from which you have separated them,
are the main source of these remours, but don't lose sight
also of the fact that those who have been dismissed always have,
more or less, supporters who are prepared to chime in with their
clients, l.e., loudly to sympathize over imagined sacrifices
and to complain and create a commotion about them.
I completely understand your position. You dislike wrong
doing which is rife in the area entrusted to you and take it
to heart. At your age, I combated every irregularity and
every injustice and wrongdoing with heat and perseverence ••
I have retained the same perseverence but no longer ha~e the
heat, and it can hardly be said that the latter method is not
better than the former. This leads me to give you a friendly
piece of advice, act as far as possible with more careful
observation" more calmly and quietly, and avoid any pretext
for reproaches or complaints. 16
Perovskii then went on to urge Muraviev to keep him fully informed of
any untoward events or intrigues and stressed that timely information would
make it possible to scotch any libelous rumours.

Fortunate indeed was

Nicholas Muraviev; the early stages of his career had been advanced by the
guidance of the paternal General Golovin and now he was receiving the
mature counsel of the avuncular Perovskii.
A little later in the year Perovskii wrote to Muraviev concerning his
proposals for various economic reforms. One of these entailed dissolution
of the

~odka

distilling monopolies through institution of a new system of

licensing designed to encourage competition.

Perovskii predicted that the

distillers would assure the Minister of Finance that Muraviev's proposals
would have ruinous results, with drastically reduced revenues for the Gov
ernment.

He pointed out that it would be difficult to prove otherwise,

16sarsukov,

Ope

cit., p. 189.

..- ...~~
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•
since Muraviev would probably be unable to gain access to the distiller's
true accounts.
•

He urged Muraviev, nevertheless, to buttress his propo

sals with convincing figures and assured him that his reports would be
read by the Emperor and that the matter might thereby be given "the de
s ired turn".1 7
II. LAYIt¥3 THE GROUNDWORK

.

If questions of trade regulations, gold mining practices, oppres
sion of the native.s and elimination of corruption were very much on Mura- ..
viev's mind, they were nevertheless but the background to the.geo-politi
cal goals that he had constantly before

him, and which had as their pre

condition the "return of the Russian River Amur".

The disappointing re

sult of the Gavrilov expedition had not convinced everyone interested in
the Amur question that there was nothing to be gained by exploring the
river's mouth. Muraviev had been told by the Emperor that, according to
the Russian-American Company, the Amur was only three feet deep at its
mouth, but he was skeptical.

He found that his skepticism was shared by

Captain-Lieutenant Gennadi Nevelskoi, whom he met in St. Petersburg short
ly before proceeding to Irkutsk.

Nevelskoi was on duty in the capital in

connection with the construction of the transport -Baikal", which was to
deliver naval cargoes and supplies to Kamchatka.

He enthusiastically

agreed with Muraviev that the Amur estuary should be further investigated.
At Muravievts suggestion, he undertook to have himself designated as com
mander of the "Baikal" when it sailed to Kamchatka. 1S
17~., pp. 190-191.

lSaarsukov, op. cit., p. 174; G. I. Nevelskoi, in Podvigi Russkikh
Morskikh Ofitserov na Dal'nom Vostoke (2nd Ed., St. Petersburg, 1897,p. 61,

,.....&t...
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When Muraviev departed for Siberia, he was well "aware that the pro
blem of the Amur and the Russo-Chinese frontier, to which the Emperor had
•

pointedly referred, was a most difficult one.

He

~new

that it would be

in connection with that problem that he would be facing the most deter
mined opposition in St. Petersburg, where there were two diametrically
opposed schools. One of these was the Western-oriented group, preoccu
pied with the maintenance of the status quo and anxious to avoid any action
tending to upset the established balance of power.

The leader of this

"

faction was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count K. V. Nesselrode, who
was strongly supported by the Minister of Finance, T. R. Vronchenko.
~

The other group, to which Muraviev attached himself, was that which held
to a "strong Russian policy", advocating avoidance of unduly provocative
acts while at the same time positively asserting Russian national inter
ests.

Among thi9 group were the Naval Minister, Prince A. S. Menshikov,

and the Minister of the Interior, L. A. Perovskii.

The War Ministry, un

der Prince A. I. Chernyshev"and subsequently under Prince V. A. Dolo
goruki, tended to stand aside, limiting itself to its own administrative
field and eschewing both internal and external politics.

Struve commentsl

Between these two currents the Emperor sailed his vessel with
a powerful hand, with extraordinary firmness, rare ability and
discernment • • • • Between these two currents Muraviev, too,
had to maneuver. What saved him was the confidence reposed in
him by the Autocrat, the sponsorship of the Grand Duchess Helena
Pavlovna and the sincerely favorable disposition toward him of
.
the then Minister of the Interior, L. A. Perovskii. 19
While Struve's references to the, Emperor's rare ability and discerncited by Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 126, contends that it was he who had stress
ed the need to,'explore the mouth of the Amur and that Muraviev agreed.
19sarsukov,

Ope

cit., I, pp. 173-174.
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ment may be debatable, it will be seen that insofar as the Amur question
was concerned, Nicholas I did indeed "sail his vessel by a powerful hand",
•

by setting aside, 'pending personal discussion with Muraviev, a number of
recommendations of his Ministers which, if approved, would have spelt
ruin to Muraviev's cause.

And if in the early period of Muraviev's tenure

in Irkutsk, the Emperor temporized, this can be easily understood.

It was

inevitable that his attention should be focused away from, not toward,

•

Siberia, at a time when revolution was in the air in Europe.

After the

suppression of the uprisings in Berlin, Prague and Lombardy in 1848, it
was the Balkan question that claimed priority in Russian foreign policy.
The turmoil of European affairs overshadowed everything taking place in
the Far East, and so Nesselrode's cautious views regarding Russia's tradi
tional policy toward China prevailed.

And yet, ironically for Nesselrode,

it was just the. developments in the Near East, when they exploded into
the Crimean War, that provided the impetus to bring Muraviev's plans to
fruition.
Following Muraviev's departure for Siberia, Nevelskoi succeeded in
being assigned as commander of the transport "Baikal", and pressed for
early completion of construction of that vessel, so that he could bring'it
to Petropavlovsk in the spring of 1849,

unload his cargo there, and spend

the rest of the navigational season cruising in and exploring the south
eastern shores of Siberia and the Amur estuary.

At the same time, he wrote

to Muraviev to tell him that except for his solicitations, there was no
one in St. Petersburg "who even wished to think about the Amur", and that
without instructions, he himself did not dare to act.

Muraviev lost no

time in obtaining an agreement from the Naval Ministry that Nevelskoi
should be instructed to explore the southeastern shores of the Sea of

",...x.
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•
Okhotsk without, however t making any mention of the Amur estuary.
d

At

•

the same time, he saw to it that orders were issued to alert. the four
•

infantry battalions deployed in Eastern Siberia for movement to the
Transbaikal area.

Here was the first step towards achievement of the

first of Muraviev's basic objectives t to break out into the Pacific with
a broad place d'armes. 20
Muraviev well appreciated that the Transbaikal was the stepping

•

stone to the acquisition of additional great expanses to the east and
south. By the time,he had arrived in Eastern Siberia, it was a flourish·
ing granary with an industrious, if still sparse, Russian populption.

As

early as in the reign of Catherine II, it had been recognized that if
Russia was to seize the Amur region, it would be necessary first to streng
then the Russian element in the. contiguous Transbaikal and to improve
economic conditions there in order to create a solid base for further pro
gress.

During Catherine's reign, the Transbaikal was populated by the

undesirables:

Poles, Old Believers, schismatics and others; under Paul,

Russian peasants were sent there to settle in lieu of performing their
military service, and under Alexander I, the area's population was further
increased by the arrival of Ukrainians.

The Transbaikal had been devel

oped slowly but steadily through Russian agriculture and animal husbandry,
road building, a postal service and other elements of methodical coloni
zation. 21 It was to figure largely in Muraviev's future plans and he gave
priority to becoming acquainted with it, as soon as he had obtained a firm
grasp of the problems of his administration in Irkutsk.
20Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 100.
21uAmurskoe Delo i Vlianie ego na Vostochnoyou Sibir i Gosudarstvo",
in Russkaya Starina, 1881, Vol. 32, pp. 75-91.
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At the end of 1848, Muraviev was on an inspection trip through the
gubernias of Eniseisk and Irkutsk, devoting the majority of his time to
•

the Transbaikal, and was gathering data needed to.support a proposal that
he visit Kamchatka, where no other governor of Siberia had ever been.
While on his way back from Tsurukhaita, on the line of Cossack stations
through Kiakhta to Verkhneudinsk, he learned that an Englishman named Aus
tin, ostensibly pursuing geological investigations, had crossed Lake

•

Baikal and proceeded by way of Verkhneudinsk and Chita to NerchinskJ there
he had arranged tO,have a large raft built on which he planned to sail
down the Shilka and the Amur to the mouth of that river, hoping to find
•
a whaler or oth~r vessel on which he could cross the Pacific, or which
would take him straight to Europe.

Muraviev was highly suspicious of

foreigners in his area, particularly of Englishmen, and, convinced that
Austin was a spy; ordered one of his officers back to Nerchinsk to catch
up with Austin and to bring him back to Irkutsk, "dead or allve".22 The
officer brought Austin back to Irkutsk within ten days.

Muraviev imme

diately reported on this incident to St. Petersburg, and in a personal
letter to Perovskii, he held forth on the jeopardy in which the project
of occupying the Amur was placed by uninvited guests who were spying for
the English government. 23 Muraviev seems to have been obsessed with the
idea that the British might suddenly seize Sakhalin, or the mouth of the
Amur, an idea to which he clung for years.
Muraviev's fears, it is true, were shared by others. 24 Thus,
22V. Struve, in Russki Vestnik, cited by Barsukov, Ope cit.,I, p. 192.
23 Ibid., I, p. 190.
24Quested, Ope cit., p. 43, points out, "The only grounds for them
which have come to light in published Russian sources is the fact that
Count E•. V. Putiatin saw some gun-boats assembled at Cherbourg in 1855,
and thought they might be intended for an Amur expedition".

.

.
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PerovskH, in his reply wrote:

"It is not without foundation that you

•

consider it necessary to warn the English, and that the time has cane
•

when this should

not be postponed.

I fully share your view, but Count

Nesselrode is not thinking along these lines.,,25 He went on to point out
that Nesselrode would oppose any decisive measure at the mouth of the
Amur, and would be supported by the Minister of Finance; Nesselrode, he
said, feared any possible rupture of friendly relations with England,

..

while Vronchencko would point to the unfavorable consequences for Russian
commerce and:industry, if there should be a break with China.

He warned

Muraviev that those "upon whom this matter most depends" woul,d accuse
him of being hasty, hairbrained, presumptous and unacquainted with the
area he was administering. They would say that he had not considered
either the difficulties or the consequences of what he was proposing.

Ac

cordingly, Perovskii advised Muraviev to keep the Emperor personally in
formed on the Amur question, stressing the need for action and the unfor
tunate consequences of immobility, and to assemble information to demon
strate that if action was carefully taken, Russia's trade with China would
not suffer; he also advised him to calculate the expenses that his propo
sals would entail, to keep them as moderate as possible, and to, seek to
budget them from local resources. 26
Constant reminder from Perovskii of the need to economize and of the
Russian government's difficult financial situation, spurred Muraviev to
seek out all local potential and to proceed energetically to develop the
economy of the area, as well as to reduce the cost of his own administration.
~

Barsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 192.

26 Ib i d., I, p. 193.
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•
As soon as he took over command of troops in Eastern Siberia, he suspen
ded the thoroughly corrupt senior quarter-master, hailing him before the
•

court's despite the fact that the rascal had influential support in St.
Petersburg.

When it came time to contract for delivery of provisions for

the troops and of grain for the Alexandrovsk distillery, some 60 versts
from Irkutsk, he turned over the responsibility for these activities to
reliable officers of his own choosing.

•

He knew that if he was to have

more troops - - and he was planning on that - - their costs could not be
escalated through d.ishonesty and bribery. 27
Gold, Muraviev knew, would help further his Amur

enterpr~se,

though it of course had all to be shipped to St. Petersburg.
fore maintained a lively interest in producing more of it.

even

He there
He was also

continuously concerned with finding other new mineral deposits, as well
as precious stones; for Siberia itself, he looked for iron.

He modernized

the old Petrovskii Zavod ironworks and began to build engines there for
the steamers he planned to use on the Amur.

28

Sometimes Muraviev·s energetic efforts to exploit the area's poten
tial cost

human sacrifices, largely because, try as he would, he could

not obtain enough capable subordinates to carry out his projects as he
would have them carried out. Thus, for example, the matter of opening up
the rich deposits of gold along the Kara river had unfortunate conse
quences not foreseen by him.

In 1849, he ordered an engineer officer, Ivan

Rasgildeev, to develop production there to the full.

Rasgildeev committed

himself to produce 100 poods 29 of gold there in the summer of 1850.
27.

Barsukov,

28

Semyonov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 193.

Ope

cit., p. 266.

290ne pood equals approximately 37 pounds •
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.30

requisitioned 4,500 workers from the Nerchinsk mines.

.

On Muraviev's

.l

orders, this number of convicts ,and other laborers set out on foot for
•

Kara.

They marched without provisions and without any vehicles, spend-.

ing the nights in the open, subjected to the cold and pouring rains.
At Kara, under Rasgildeev's iron hand, in two l2-hour shifts, they worked
over 25,000 poods of sand a day, out of which they extracted about a pood
of gold.

In the following winter, over 3,000 miners fell ill of typhus

and 568 diedJ over 1,500 suffered from scurvy and 45 of them died.

•

October, 1850, to February, 1851, over 1,000 men died. 3l

From

Production re

sults were excellent, with .quotas being exceed,ed handily each year.

In

•

terms of serving his masters, the "Rasgildeevschina" was a decided person
al triumph for Muraviev, but it also provided ammunitlon for his detractors.
II I. THE OPENING WErGE

f

While Muraviev was diligently following Perovskii's advice

regard

ing development of Eastern Siberian resources, Perovskii was evidently
quietly but effectively supporting Muraviev's views on the Amur situation I
on January 29, 1849, Nicholas ordered the establishment of a committee
charged with considering the Amur problem. 32

The first item of its agenda

• 30Semeevskii, Rabochie na Sibirskikh Solotikh Promishlakh (St. Peters- .
burg, 1898) pp. 315-324, cited in B. V. Danilovskii, Russkoe Zoloto (Mos
cow, 1959) p. 353.
31Nerchinskaya Katorga (Izdatelstvo Politkatorzhan, Moscow, 1933),
p. 56, cited by Danilovskii, Ope cit., p. 353, and Semyonov, Ope cit.,p.265.
32p. V. Schumacher, "Kistorii priobretenia Amura. Snoshenia s
Kitaem s 1848 po 1860 goda." He fails to enumerate the committee's member
ship, as, unaccountably, do Barsukov, Kabanov and Quested. It seems clear,
however, from various references they make to ~e committee's work, that
the members must have been Foreign Minister Nesselrode, Finance Minister
Vronchenko, Interior Minister pcrovskii, Naval Minister Menshikov, War
Minister Chernyshev, and, probably, Privy Counselor Seniavin •

.

~;...

~. . .

c

•

83

•

was the question of a naval expedition to explore the mouth of the Amur.
The Tsar confirmed the committee's position that for fear of alarming and
provoking the Chinese, exploration and navigation,of the Amur should not
take place.

It was agreed, however, that relations should be established

with the Giliaks inhabiting the northern portion of the mouth of the Arnur,
and that the left bank of the Amur and the part of Sakhalin opposite to it
should be denied to any foreign power.
t.

On Nesselrode's proposal it was

agreed that in order to prevent any foreign invasions, while at the same
time avoiding any strain on

Russo~hinese

dition should be sent to the area.
under a

rel~able

relations, a small naval expe

Sailing under some plausible pretext,

officer of good judgment and discretion, the expedition

would carry various articles for trade with the Giliaks and would seek to
bring them under Russian influence.

The Committee also agreed that Rus·

sian naval units should cruise about the area in order to observe any
foreign vessels that might be navigating there; such units would also coop
erate in the maintenance of trade and cementing of relations with the
native population.
In the event of any intrusion by the English or others into-the is
land of Sakhalin, or areas contiguous to the mouth of the Amur, Muraviev
I

was ordered immediately and without prior clearance with higher govern
mental authorities to report such developments to the Chinese frontier
authorities at Urga, in order to alert the Chinese government and to clear
the Russians themselves of any suspicion.
Nevelskoi, who had sailed from Kronstadt three months before the
establishment of the Amur Committee, was sent instructions to explore the
shores of the Shantarski Islands to the mouth of the Amur, and also to
investigate the northern coast of Sakhalin; he was to seek a location in

".-"

~

•
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that area,

prefe~ably

lent and useful
•

~

conven~

near the river', mouth, which it might be

occupy,

should the necessity tod.

60

arlle. All thl.

was to be done wlthout excitlng the suspiclons of the Chinese. The

f'for~

mation thus gathered would indlcate the further plan of action to be
pursued.

It wae alto decided that the Russlan-Amerlcan Company should

••ndattrading expedition overland from Ayan to make contact with the Gill

aka and to ascertain the state of their relations with the Chinese. The

.

Company·4 expenses for this were to be defrayed by government funds •

33

Instructions for Nav.lek01 were mailed to "tropavlovsk, hil first
port of call on the Sea of Okhotsk, but they would be a long time comlng,
4

sinc. the only winter mall run of the year from Okhotsk hed already de
parted when the.courier arrived there. Thls circumstance turned out to be
en insignlficant
what those

fe~tor.

inlt~ction$

since Nevelskol, who had only

a

general notion of

contained. had made up hi' minds he wrote to Muta

viev from Rio de Janeiro that he intended to explore the mouth of the Amur
whether or not he received insteuctlonl, and sought Muravlev·, tupport 1n
case this should later cause him trouble with the authorltles. 34
Nevelskol was pressed for time, slnce he wal anxious to have plenty
of leewey before the onset of freezino 1n the Sea of Okhotsk. and he made
the trip from Kronstadt to Petropavlovsk 1n eight months and twenty.three
days, although this had never before

b.e~

accomplished 1n under eleven

month8.3~ He unloaded his cargo, and on May 31, sail.d from Petropavlovak
along the eastern coast of Sakhalin. Rounding the northern tlp of the i ••
I

330. Romanov. 1n RUG.koe ~12vo. July, ~, pp. l03-1OB,cclted by
Barsukov. Ope ci\., I. p. 197.
~abanov, op. clt •• p. 129.
3'lb1d.
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land, Nevelskoi sailed down the sound between the continental shore and
the island, until he reached the Amur lagoon at the mouth of the
The Amur lagoon consists of the expanse of

~ater

between the entrance

to the river and the island of Sakhalin, a little inland sea with an area
of about twelve hundred square miles.
plored it for six weeks.

Nevelskoi and his officers ex

Then, though he had good reason to believe

that his action would be in direct defiance of the orders that were on

..

their way to him, he entered the mouth of the Amur and sailed twelve
miles up river; from there he proceeded south, and on July 22 arrived at
the spot where the continental shore approaches the western coast of Sak
<I

halin.

Here at the capes, named by him Cape Lazarez and Cape Muraviev,

instead of the isthmus imagined by Laperouse, Broughton, Krusenstern and
Gavrilov, he found a channel five miles wide and nearly thirty feet deep
~6

at the shallowest spot. w

By this time the little expedition's food sup

plies were very low, so that Nevelskoi set a northerly course. Sailing
along the coast he discovered a bay hidden by a sandbank.

This he named

the Bay of Fortune.
In the meantime, the Russian-American Company had sent a young of
ficer with two baidarkas (small sealskin-covered boats similar to Eskimo
kayak~)

from Ayan to the south; he met Nevelskoi at Cape Moukhtel and in

formed him that Muraviev was anxiously awaiting him at Ayan.

Nevelskoi

and his crew, exhausted and nearly starving, headed for Ayan.
While Nevelskoi was pursuing his explorations, without benefit of
instructions, Muraviev was making preparations for his inspection trip
to Kamchatka, in order to "see with his own eyes" what he had heard and
3gearsukov, op. cit., I, pp. 196-198.
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•
read about that land which, he believed, would one day mean much to Rus
sia.
•

Prior to setting out, he drew up a report to the Emperor seeking

possible instructions regarding his forthcoming inspection visit to the'
Iakutsk oblast, to Okhotsk and Kamchatka. and appending a note again in
viting the Emperor's attention to the gold-mining situation, the Kiakhta
trade and the likelihood of its diminution because of English competition
in Chinese coastal ports. 37 In this connection, he also brought up the
possibility that "these foreigners" might occupy the mouth of the Amur,

'"

build a fortress there and send their steamers up the Amur to Nerchinsk
or even to Chita. One of the consequences of this, he suggested, might
be that Siberia would

detach itself from Russia.

"

He offered the follow

ing observations in his reporta
I have more than once heard the fear expressed in St. Peters
burg that Siberia might sooner or later secede from Russia. Be
fore my arrival here, I considered such fears to be groundless,
since I could not imagine to myself what might be the source of
such a danger; here, Sire, I have become convinced that such a
fear is quite natural and because of reasons quite unrelated to
the concerns of the desk officers (in St. Petersburg).
I have found the entire population here to be under the in
fluence of, and, so to speak, in the hands of the rich mer
chants, manufacturers and distillers, and I have discovered
the governmental officials, almost without exception, to be
in the pay of those same wealthy people. I have undertaken,
firmly and sternly to act against this tendency, at first alone,
then with the help of a few colleagues brought into service
here by me. But all our efforts, possibly not entirely fruit
less, have, however, stirred up a struggle with the gold inter
ests dangerous for us; dangerous not in the interior of the
region, where my sternness instills fear and respect for the
37The English advantage in ocean trade was enormous. They delivered
their products to China at a fraction of what it cost the Russians to do so.
As for tea imports - - the major Chinese commodity brought in through
Kiakhta; 'one pound delivered from the interior of China to Moscow cost
40 kopeks, while from Shanghai to London it cost 3 to 5 kopeks, according to Kabanov's citation of Vestnik Promishlenosti, No.7, 1859.
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gold itself, but in the capital where it is a rare department
that is not aligned against the present administration cI East
ern Siberia •
•

•

I have dared to say this only in order to demonstrate how
faint is the hope of eliminating the influence of the wealthy
industrial and commercial class upon the entire population,
and it is within this context that I fear the concentration'
of wealth in a few hands under the present system of gold
production. The wealthy and educated class here, owing to its
origins and remoteness from the center of the Empire, has by
no means the feelings of loyalty to the Sovereign and the
Fatherland that in the interior of the Empire Is absorbed with
the mother's milk. It is indifferent to everything except its
own benefit and, with few exceptions, there is hardly any
hope of stirring up in them those noble sentiments i.n which
every Russian glories and takes pride. At the same time, they
are not only not lacking in the good sense and spirit of enter
prise natural to Russians inhabiting the interior gubernias,
but excel .in it, which is entirely natural because of the very
nature of their making a living in these enormous and wild
expanses. This good sense and enterprise makes it clear to
them that the present source of Siberian production, that all
the future prosperity of Eastern Siberia, is tied up with
assured convenient communication with the Eastern Ocean, and
that Kiakhta sooner or later will lose its meaning for them
because of English competition, and that any other trade is
insignificant and cannot assume desirable proportions without
navigation on the Amur. Outwardly, many of them express their
fears and regrets concerning this; inwardly, it is all the same
to them who opens up the Amur.
But what power and resources will be required of the government
to prevent Eastern Siberia from becoming English, when an English
fortress stands at the mouth of the Amur and English steamers
ply the Amur up to Nerchinsk and even to Chita? It follows natur
ally that without the mouth of the Amur, the English cannot carry
out their designs against China, since large navigable rivers
flow into the Amur from its right bank, flowing a thousand versts
through populated provinces of northeast China.
Of the fact that the eastern extreme of Siberia has of late
been occupying the British, there can be no doubt. Ifl instead of
an English fortress, a Russian one should stand there,~S just as
one does In Petropavlovsk, and if a flotilla sailed between them
and, for the sake of greater security, in those fortresses and
the flotilla there were garrisons, crews, and commanders supplied
from the interior of Russia, then with such moderate resources
there would be assured forever the rule of Russia over Siberia and
3S i • ee , on the coast of the eastern Siberian mainland.
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"
all its inexhaustible riches, in particular the gold,
which
has already become indispensable for her, and the even richer
veins which are to be found on the left bank of the Amur,
judging from the surest indications that 1 personally have
observed last year in t~e Nerchinsk okrug and along the
border river Gorbitsa. 8

•

"In presenting this picture to the Emperor". writes Struve, ttMuraviev did
not of course contemplate for a moment any thought of the possibility of
Siberia's secession from Russia; his object in the first place was to ex
plain within what context and under what circumstances it might be nat

"

ural for this idea to occur within certaindrcles, and secondly, he
wished palpably to portray the urgent necessity of occupying the mouth

•

of the Amur, in support of all the measures he was taking in preparation
for such action.

40

Struve's comment on Muraviev's typically long-winded dissertation
to the Tsar

pro~ides

a revealing insight into Muraviev's modus operandi.

In one sense Muraviev had many masters to whom he had to report in proper

,

bureaucratic fashion.

I

general administrative and judicial questions, to the Minister of the 1n

on external relations, to the Foreign Minister; on

teriorJ on trade and finance, to the Minister of Finance; on military and
naval problems, to the Minister of War and the Naval Minister.
could go over their heads, for he had the ear of the Tsar.

But he

He was making

the most of it, while preparing to confront his opponents with a
accompli.

!!!i

Struve's comment is particularly interesting in conjunction

with Zavalishints quotation of Muraviev to the effect thats
39Arkhiv Kniaza Volkonskogo, cited in Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 207.

4Os. V. Struve, Vospominania
1889) p. 55.

0

Sibiri, 1848-1854, (St. Petersburg,

':l'~~.~
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Nicholas! is a despot at heart and by inclination; unlimited
authority, with the consciousness of which he is filled, attests
to his insignificance. Any minister can lead him by the nose,
assuring him that he is carrying out hts wishes. They take
advantage of his conviction that nobody can hoodwink him and
in such fashion, make of the Tsar their weapon, assuring him
that everything done by them originated with him.41
Whether Muraviev ever did express himself so openly and dangerous
1y, in conversation with some of his Decembrist friends in Irkutsk, is a
matter of conjecture.

At any rate, Muraviev was obviously painting a

rather lurid canves, with the object of making the Tsar his "waapon ll •
Despite the decorations showered upon him, his rapid promotions, and
.the direct access to the Emperor that he enjoyed, Muraviev was never
reassured that sufficient confidence was accorded him.

He unburdened him

self on this score in a letter to Valerian in the spring of 1849, in which
he complained of the hostility

b~ing

encountered in St. Petersburg by his

proposals for reform of the gold mining industry.

All he sought, he de

c1ared, was an expression of confidence in him, in the form of approval of
his views and proposals.
it, would resign. 42

He could not be of usc without that, anG lacking

Here was a variation on a familiar theme that he had

been sounding since his early days in the Caucasus.
That lbJraviev did have dad icated enemies in the capital is unques
tionable.

Onp. evidence of this was "a little intrigue" reported by Struve.

He relates that Perovskii had suggested, and the Tsar had 'agreed, that.
it was 'lima to promote Muraviev to the rank of Lieutenant General.

On

4lKabanov, ~it., p. 90, citing Otdel Rukopisei Vsesoyuznoi
1m. l.entlE_~_J.1oskv~2. f. Ko!'sakovich, d. 7534 , 1.37, referred
to hereinafter bi' the abbreviation OP.BL. Zavalizhin concluded that
Muraviev 1:3:; "two-faced".
Bibliot~fd

42susukov, 9p. cit. f I, p. Xl9.
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April 3, 1849, the regular promotion list was published, but Muraviev's

-.

name was missing.
Ministry of War.

PerovskH was indignant and made inquir.1es of the
No clear explanation was forthcoming, but on April 12;

a supplementary order was issued containing Muraviev's promotion, but
without confirming his

re~ention

of his position as Governor-General,

which would have been normal procedure.

In writing to PerovskH concern

ing this matter, Muraviev disclaimed any personal concern regarding his

•

promotion, but stated that it was necessary for the

support of his author

ity, "as a mark of. confidence from the Throne". 43 The technicality of his.
confirmation as Governor-General was attended to shortly afterward •
•

Other evidences of official hostility to Muraviev are to be found
in some of the communications of his opponents.

Thus, at the time when

Muraviev was preparing to go to Kamchatka, the Minister of Finance,
Vronchenko, wrote Nesselrode, the Foreign Minister, that a colleague had
written him that Muraviev's pressure to open the Amur to navigation had
aroused the displeasure of the Chinese government. 44 This had been re
ported to the Emperor who, it appears, gave It little notice.

At this

time, too, Prince Gordhakov, Governor·General of Western Siberia, was
expressing his fears regarding the future of Siberia.

He confidentially

informed Prince Chernyshev, Minister of War, of his view that the Amur
was superflous to Russia.

He contended that the boundless wastes from

43Struve, Ope cit., pp. 55-56.
44Quested, Ope cit., p. 31, referring to Nevelskoi's expedition in
1849 and subsequent establishment of Nikolaevsk, states, "There is no
evidence in the Chinese archives that any of these events reached the
ears of the Emperor in Peking. Nicholas I and Muraviev obviously did
well ti discount Count Zakrevskii's claim that the Chinese at Maimachen
had told some Russian merchants that Muraviev's efforts to open naviga
tion on the Amur had caused murmuring and dissatisfaction in the Chinese
governme nt.
II

•

91
•
Iakutsk to Kamchatka and the Okhotsk coast in themselves constituted a
frontier needing no defense.

What was more important, these wastes iso

lated the inhabitants of Siberia from direct contact with foreigners
which could easily generate "harmful propaganda leading to disorders".
Prince Gorchakov considered the situation to be the more dangerous in
that the inhabitants of Siberia by no means felt the same attachment to
Russia that General Muraviev "flattered himself that they did".

What

would happen, he asked, if the population developed close relations with
A

the English or Americans, who might undertake the easy task of persuading
the people that it would be more convenient for them to buy English or
American merchandise with their gold, rather than to look to Russia as
their supplier?

The English or Americans, he warned, might be prepared

to support such an arrangement with force of arms.

Gorchakov was ob

viously unaware that Muraviev, too, recognized the relatively independent
attitude of the Russian settlers of Siberia - - which Muraviev used, how
ever, to buttress his recommendation that Russia strengthen, not relin
quish, her hold on the area.

Chernyshev submitted Gorchakov's letter to

the Emperor, who marginally noted on it that, "We shall keep this in mind
when Muraviev arrives for consultations".45
,
I

.

In early May of 1849, before departing for Kamchatka, Muraviev sent
a further

report to the Emperor, reiterating that decline of the Kiakhta

trade was evidence that English activities in China were contrary to
Russia's interests.

He urged the necessity of maintaining Russian influ

ence over the Chinese by making a military demonstration, both as' an indi
cation of the presence of "friendly forces", and also to strike a! little
45earsukov,

Ope

...--4;.~

cit., I, p. 204.
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wholesome fear into his neighbors.

•
He suggested that the logical place.

•

for this would be in the Transbaikal •
•

, Muraviev stressed his conviction to the Emperor that England needed
access to the mouth of the Amur and the right to navigate that river for
optimum expansion of her China trade.

~.

Were the Amur not the only river

I['

connection with the, Pacific, he observed, Russia might take an accommo

f

dating view of England's aspirations.

~

..

As matters were, however, the

Power controlling the mouth of the Amur would hold dominion over Siberia •
-- at least to

La~e

Baikal, which would amount to the same, since that

would suffice to isolate the more thickly pOpulated Siberian hinterland,
~

"flowering with agriculture and industrial production, an isolated realm
subject to the Power holding the key to the river".46
Other letters despatched before Muraviev's departure for Kamchatka
included one to "the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requesting it to instruct
the Orthodox mission in Peking to keep him informed of events in China and
urging that the mission be given no special contacts with the Chinese
Government until "major questions" became clarified.

In a latter to Fi

nance Minister Vronchenko, he pointed out the unsatisfactory condition of
the Kiakhta trade which, he said, would continue to deteriorate with each
year

~nless

Russia moved in new directions and with new undertakings. The

centuries old immobility of China, he pointed out, which in the past had
benefitted Russia, had received such a jolt from England that it
hooved Russia to adopt a mobile course.

nOW

be

He served notice on Vronchenko

that he intended to develop measures required to bring about the necessary
changes in the order of things, "with all due caution and protection of the
~'

-Barsukov, op. cit., I, p. 211.

.....
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Government's finaneial interests".47

•

On May 15, 1849, Muraviev, accompanied by his wife,. his ADC, Vasil i
Mikhailovich Muraviev (a young relative) and one,of his key officials,
B. V. Struve, left Irkutsk for his unprecedented visit to Kamchatka.

When

one considers the arduous journey undertaken by Muraviev and his small
retinue, it becomes easier to understand why none of his predecessors had
shown any inclination to inspect the administration of Kamchatka.

.

The

route, over 7,000 kilometers, traversed vast expanses almost devoid of
roads.

In variou.s states it had to be covered on horseback, in crude
48
wagons and sometimes mounted on elks domesticated by the Gil\aks.
When Muraviev reached Iakutsk he learned of the despatch of a secret
expedition to his area concerning which he had not been consulted. The
initiative for this expedition had evidently arisen within the Russian
General Staff 1n 1849, when it realized that topographic data on the area
,from the Gorbitsa River flowing into the Shilka and the Sea of Okhotsk
were practically non-existent, and that maps depicting that area were com
pletely unreliable.

Some rather uncertain

Information~

concerning this

shadowy border, vaguely referred to in Russo-Chinese treaties, had been
47B. V. Struve, "Graf N. N. Muraviev-AmurskH. lz vospominanii iz
ego deiatelnosti". Russkaia Starina, Vol. 48, p. 340.
48In "Graf N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii Epizod is ego zhizni (1849 g.),
Russkaia Starina, Vol. 40, p. 511, Struve recalls that had it not been
for the intrepid nature of the young Governor-General, the voyage might
have had to be abandoned at one point where the route was barred by a
torrential stream that had been swollen by the spring thaw. Muraviev's
companions and his native retainers were terrified at the thought of
attempting to ford it, but he unhesitatingly plunged into it on horse
back and led his group across. Afterwards, when the members of the
little band were recovering from the chilling crossing and drying them
selves out, Struve, resting on the bank of the stream with Muraviev's
wife, remarked to her: "Savez-vous, Madame, que je n'ambitionne qu'une
chose, c'est d'ecrire un jour la biographie du general" •

•
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reported by A. von Middendorf 49 folle.wing his visit to Siberia in 1843

45.

Returning from the Udsk area, he had seen four stone pillars placed

by the Chinese and had taken them for frontier markers set up on the basis
of the last article of the Treaty of Nerchinsk.
General Aide-de-Camp Prince Dolgoruki set the expedition in motion
by informing Quartermaster-General Berg that the Emperor had in mind ttthe
somewhat inaccurate delineation of the Russo-Chinese frontier", and deemed
it necessary to establish a commission of five officers of the Corps of
Engineers and the Topographic Corps to carry out a detailed survey.

The

expedition was to Itsurvey the frontier area", without, however, approaching
the Amur and was to prospect

fOl'

rare metals and minerals and prec).ous

stones in the Transbaikal. 50 Lieutenant Colonel Akhte of the General Staff
was put in command of the expedition.
Muraviev ilTJllediately issued orders that the Akhtr; expedition should
be stopped upon its arrival in Irkutsk and wrote the Emperor, pointing out

that nothing like this should be attempted while the mouth of the Amur
was being discreetly explored. 5l

Prince Chc::rnyshev and Count Vronchc:nko

were stung by thih action and bitterly complained about Muraviev's
49An eminent scholar who led an expedition ·to Siberia sponsored by
the famous naturalist, K. E. von Baer. The expedition's primary task
was to explor0 the Taimyr peninsula and Uakutia and then to investigate
the flora and fauna of the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk. (Semyonov, ~
clt.~ pp. 246-247.

50sch~~acher, 00. cit •• III, pp. 269-270. He points out that the
prohibition on approaching the Amur deprived the expedition of any signi
ficance.
5lBarsukov, pe. cit., I, p. 215. An interesting ?dmission on
Muravicv's part, considerin9 that no official sanction had been given for
such activities. Sullivan in his biography speculates on the possibility
that the Tsar and Muraviev had a tacit agreement diametrically opposed to
Nessclrode's cautious position.
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Warbitrary action", but Nicholas ordered that the matter be left pending
until Muraviev should visit St. Petersburg for consultations.
•

The frus

trated Lieutenant Colonel and his fellow officers ,were obliged to cool
their heels in Irkutsk until Muraviev's return from Kamchatka, when he
set them to surveying portions of the Transbaikal well removed from the
Amur and prospecting for minerals, tasks which appear not to have dif
fered markedly from their original

•

assignment - - except that they

were laid down by Muraviev's, not st. Petersburg's, directive •
Muraviev reached Petropavlovsk on July 25, 1849, and proceeded to
an mspection of the port and its fortifications.
was to direct

a realignment

fense of the harbor.

One of his first acts

of the artillery batteries set up for the de

He then familiarized himself with the administra

tive organization of the peninsula and decided on recommendations for a
number of changes.
While in Petropavlovsk, Muraviev met Bishop ynnokentii of the
Aleutians and Kamchatka, and, after probing that eminent cleric's mind,
decided on his choice for Governor-General of Kamchatka, V. C. Zavoiko.
Local administration of the peninsula up to this time had been organized
on a lower bureaucratic level and more directly controlled from the
land.

main~

Muraviev's decision to up-grade the administrative organization

reflected his conviction that since the Amur estuary was denied him,
Petropavlovsk, because of its geographic location and fine harbor, should
be the main strong point of Russia in the Far East, and that Kamchatka
I

should be built up into a well populated agricultural oblast,.52
On his return trip, Muraviev prepared a report to Perovskii. stating

5~abanov, op. cit., p. 95.
tan of Moscow.

Innokentii later became Metropoli

•
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that he had decided that the port of okhotsk should be abandoned and its
installations moved to Avachi Bay (Petropavlovsk) without delay because
scurvy was nBedlcssly decimating the okhotsk garrison, and because the
English had already shown ttfar too mlJch interest in the advantages of
fered by Avachi Bat'.

He proposed setting up warehouses for supplies to

be delivered to Ayan (the other Russian port on the mainland), where the
Russ ian-.I\,merican Company had its installations, and reccrr·.mended other

changes in line with his contemplated build-up of Kamchatka, including
reorganization of judicial districts and tn,rasier of the American diocese
to Petropavlovsk.

He also urged institution of steamer service connecting

Kamchatka with the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk (there was coal to be had
at Ayan and other locations on the coast) and he emphasized that attention
should be paid to thtz matter of whaling in "our Sea of Okhotsk".

He con

tended that this would offer mill ions to the nati(;nal treasury and sub
stantiated his opinion with information he had gleaned from foreign whal
ing ship skippers he had met during his voyage. 53 Only two years earlil3r,
he pointed out, foreign whalers had first entered the Sea of Okhotsk and
there were now

~Jnjreds

of them; In another five years, he warned, these

foreigners would have exhausted the Russian waters, having extracted hun
dreds of millions of rubles' worth from them, with no profit whatever to
Russia.

MlJraviev then WGnt on to reCOnlrnend annual transport of settlers to
Kamchatka.

As for the whole of Avaehi Bay (as distinct from the inlet

00

cupied by Petropavlovsk), it would have to be fortified, or el$e it would
be easy prey to any hostile squadron, even of insignificant proportions.
~')

o'"'Barcukov, 9p. cit., I, p. 217.
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Two English ships had i1ready been there, he reported; under the guise
of seeking a lost scientific expedition.

•

He extolled the virtues of

Avachi Bay, which he considered superior to any port he had seen in Rus-·
sia or western Europe.

All England would need, he speculated, would be

to force a two-week break with Russia in which to take possession of it,
then to make peace; but she would not return the Bay and even were she to
pay Russia a million pounds for it, she would get it back in no time from
~

the profits of whaling in the Sea of Okhotsk and in the Bering Sea.

And

England would not permit anybody into those waters without paying.
The balance of Muraviev's report was an impassioned plea for a dras

.

tic change from what he considered to be inert Russian policy in the Kam
chatka area.

He wrote:

In st. Petersburg, they adjudge the question of Kamchatka and
Avachi Bay in terms of times long past. But from the time of the
establishment of the French and the English in the Sandwich Is
lands, then the Chinese War, then the gold strike in California
and the whaling in the Sea of Okhotsk, not one of our strong
voiced politicians has been here, and they have even been assert
ing that I am mad to be going off to Kamchatka!
All of the affairs of Kamchatka and the Sea of Okhotsk, parti
cularly after the all-European peace settlement of 1815, posi
tively attest to the fact that during the past thirty-five years,
a hostile spirit has directed all of our activities in this
area. It would be unjust to blame my predecessors, that is,
the Governors~eneral of Eastern Siberia, but Speranskii was
the sinner, for he who was preparing to rule over the tempo
rary administration could not have failed to understand the
importance of the Eastern Ocean. To keep silent on this before
his Sovereign, knowing the spirit and resources of Siberia,
was a crime, natural of course, to Speranskii,.who loved his'
~ more than his Sovereigns and Fatherland. 04
54sarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 222. The reasons for Muraviev's ani
mus toward Speranskii are obscure, but would seem to be at variance with
the facts. Speranskii was aware of the "importance of the Eastern Ocean"
and made his views known; he was also aware that foreign whalers and
seal hunters might make ever increasing incursions into "Russian waters",

98
t,)

Muravlev returned from Kamchatka via Ayan, rather than Okhotsk, in
order to inspect that port.

'

He awaited Nevelskol for some days, almost

giving him up for lost, when the "Baikal" appeared off the port on Sep
tember 3. Muraviev was delighted to receive Neve1skoi's report that sea
going vessels could enter the Amur estuary from both north and south, and
that Sakhalin was an island, not a peninsula.

Entering from the Gulf of

Tartary, ships drawing 15 feet, and from the sea of Okhotsk, drawing 12
~

feet, could sail up the river. 55 This was news that needed the most in
tense exploitation in St. Petersburg.
On the following day, Karsakov was sent to st. Petersburg to deliver
Nevelskoi's and Muraviev's recommendations on Kamchatka to Prince Menshi
kov.

Menshikov submitted these to the Bnperor, who ordered establishment

of a special committee, under Nesselrode, to examine the question of the
Amur estuary; Muraviev's proposals he warmly approved,

he was worried

about costs but noted Muraviev's assurances that his projects could be
carried out in large part with local resources. 56
and that this could eventually become a threat to the power and security
of the Russian Empire in Siberia; he made no secret of his apprehensions,
as is made clear in Marc Raeff's, Speransky and the Siberian Reforms of
~, (Seattle, 1959) pp. 42-43.
"

5~,

-~abanov,

.

Ope cit., p. 131.

56aarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 237. Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 133, cites
Neve1skoi, p. 102, as pointing out that Petropavlovsk was far from ideal
as a naval base because it was extremely isolated and difficult to sup
ply, while Kamchatka itself was a barren land, difficult to settle. The
road from Iakutsk to Ayan t furthermore, would be very difficult to im
prove and Ayan itself, Neve1skoi believed, was useless as a port. Nev
elskoi deemed it far preferable to devote the scarce resources available
to occupying the mouth of the Amur, investigating the surrounding area
and surveying and settling routes from the Transbaikal to the Amur es
tuary. Nevelskoi states that Muraviev fully shared these views, but felt
that in view of Nesselrode's obdurate opposition, the Kamchatka build-up
was the only alternative.

.
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In December, 1849,

Mur~l'Jiev

received oIders to transfer the port of

Okhotsk to Petl'opavlovsk, which was to be the main fortified Russi.an port
on the Pacific.
Kronstadt.

Troops, materials and armament were to be delivered frem

Zavoiko was named govornor of Kamchatka, which was to be a

separate oblas'l!..

Twenty-five peasant famities were to be sent there each

year in order t.o dev€!lop

an agricul tur,ll base.

The Ayan road was to be

completed and the Ayan trading post of the Russian-American Company was to
bo transformed into a goverrunent port.

Agricultural settlements would be

made along the river Maiai and betwoen Nelkan and Ayan, in order to supply
the port.

All Russian naval vasscls in Okhotsk and

under Muravicv's command, as the Siberian flot illa.
police the Sea of Okhotsk

\~re

K~mchatka

were placed

Naval c]1Jisers to

to be despatched from Kronstadt and placed

under M'Jraviev's command. 57
In January,

l8~')O,

Muraviev sent Nevelskoi to St. Peter-sburg in order

to present all his logs and maps to Menshikov, to submit his, Muraviev's,
urgent

reco~mendations

for

i~~ediate

occupation of the mouth of the

Amu~

with a detail of seventy men, and to deliver a letter to Perovskli.
In his laUe::- to Perovskii, Muraviev expressed the view that had not
"poor Tf€ s kin

lt

been removed, Eastern Siberia would already have

the degree of development that was needed in Russia's interests.

reached
With

each passing day Murdviev was convinced of the good that Treskin had
wrought in Eastern Siberia and of the ill done by rperanskii "with his in
stitutions".

More than once he had had occasion to deplorQ the unfortu

nate effects on the area caused by Speranskii' s "umJise law-making exploits

5719~d.
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•
based solely on theory".58 In this letter Muraviev also reported on the
creation of an advisory board for Eastern Siberian development. The weal
•

thy 'merchant Kuznetsov had donated two and a half. million rubles Dr this
cause and was pledged to underwrite steamship construction for navigation
on the Amur. Others, too, were offering material support for the economic
growth of the

area. 59 Further in his letter Muraviev pointed to various

significant economies he had effected in his administration; he pressed

.

for more stations on the Iakutsk post road and proposed measures to pre
vent the flow of gold to china, since smuggled gold was displacing ex
port of Russian goods and was thus draining rather than feeding Russia's
•
economy.
During the winter of 1850, Nevelskoi's report and Muraviev's recom
mendations concerning the Amur estuary were taken up by Nesselrode's
committee. The·committee by majority vote reprimanded Nevelskoi for hav
ing surveyed the Amur's mouth without imperial sanction, and expressed
doubt regarding his data since they were at "variance with the opinions
of European authorities".

They also scoffed at the idea of occupying the

mouth of the Amur with such an insignific'ant mrce as was

proposed by

Muraviev, when it was "known" from reports of the Russian ecclesiastical
mission in Peking that the river "was protected by Chinese military forces".
58earsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 240.
59Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 241. Muraviev fought the privileges of
the merchant class and made many enemies among them, but some of the more
enlightened ones perceived that it might be in their self-interest to sup
port the reforming Governor-General; Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 92, points out
that the middle layer and comparatively few among the upper layer (Kuz
netsov in Irkutsk, Belogolovy in Kaikhta), were drawn to him despite his
haughty ,ways and disdain for money-grubbing, but the rest, who had de
pended on Rupert, were his bitter enemies.

-...-~
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The Committee did agree

•
to establishing permanent quarters for trade on

the southeast coast of the Sea of Okhotsk, but not in the,Amur estuary.
Tlhe 'Emperor approved the sending of twenty-five

~ailors

the area for this purpose, under Nevelskoi's command.

and cossacks to'
Prince Menshikov,

the Naval Minister, and Count Perovskii, the Minister of the Interior,
were the two staunchest supporters of this plan and even urged initiation

.

of cruising the Afflur estuary and in the Gulf of Tartary, but the majority
demurred. 60
While Nevelskoi was pursuing his commander's objectives in St.
Petersburg, Muraviev continued writing to Perovskii and others in the gov

•

ernment regarding the needs of his area.

He put forth initial plans for

raising troops from among the local population and stressed what he con
sidered to be the continuing English threat, reporting on movements in
the Amur estuary area of the British sloop "Herald", the schooner,
"Nancy" and the steamers "Investigator" and "Enterprise".

He argued that

Kamchatka and the Sea of Okhotsk could be held under Russian dominion
only if they were supplied via the Amur.

The only way to assure securi

ty of Russian interests, he argued, was to send frigates and transports
from Kronstadt to the Sea of Okhotsk, to raise a military force in the
Transbaikal, sending it arms and artIllery, to order two steam engines
from Ekaterinburg for ships on the Shilka - - and to occupy the mouth of
the Amur with as little delay
Muraviev also

as possible. 6l

reported to Nesselrode on the favorable development

of Russian relations with the Giliaks and stated that he had ordered the
66Kabanov, op. cit., p. 132•
, 61

Barsukov, op. cit., I, p. 259.
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•
expulsion from their area of foreign traders (Manchurians?) who were un
duly exploiting them.
•

As for the Foreign Ministry's oft-repeated exhor

tat ions to caution and discretion, he observed that the

~ea

of Okhotsk was

so full of whaling ships of all nations, as well as of British men-of-war,
that the modest Russian dealings with the Giliaks could hardly be expected
to attract any Chinese attention - - unless the English should arouse the
Chinese, as they had done at Shanghai, where a vessel of the Russian-Ameri

.

can Company had been forbidden to put in. 62
On March 11,,1850, Muraviev wrote Perovskii regarding reports of the,
death of the Chinese Emperor, whose heir was an eighteen year old youth.
He remarked regretfully that the personnel of the Orthodox Mission in Pe
king was disreputable and incompetent, which was particularly unfortunate
at this time, when it was important to have reliable people there.

If

the report of the Emperor's death was true, then this was the time to
clear up the matter of the Russo-Chinese frontier.

He expressed the view

that he should have authority to deal with the Chinese on the spot, and
that this problem should not be entrusted solely to the Foreign Ministry,
62sarsukov, OR. cit., I, pp. 260-261. It appears that Muraviev and
the Russian authorities in general were mistaken about this incident.
Quested, op. cit., pp. 32-33, cites Chinese and British archives regard
ing the visit to Shanghai of the 'tKniaz' Menshikov", a vessel of the
Russian-American Company, in the summer of 1848. These state that the
ship came there and renewed the request to trade that had been made
there forty years earlier by the "Nadezhda" and the "Neva". A memorial
from Chinese officials in Shanghai reached the Chinese Emperor onSep
tember 17, 1848, reporting that the Russians had been introduced by the
British Consul, but that the Shanghai Commissioner had ordered them to
leave the port under military escort, although their cargoes consisted
only of fox skins and wheat, both unprohibited items. The Foreign Office
archives reveal that the British consul had explained the Russians'
request to the Commts5.ioner and that as a result the Commissioner had al
lowed the Russians to unload their cargo and It even after the Viceroy of
Kiangsu and Kiangsi had ordered the ship to leave, would have been will
ing to let him sell the cargo, could buyers have been found".

,.~"
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•
but should be considered by the Asia Committee of the Government. This
was the time, he argued, to take measures that would bring ,the most bene
•

ficial results; on the other hand, the eventual outcome could bepreju- '
diced for a long time if Russia was too cautious and lacked determination.
He concluded this letter with recommendations for creation of a separate
Transbaikal oblastI, establishment there of a Cossack Force and the desig
nation for the Transbaikal of a military-governor-ataman. 63 Two weeks

•

'later he wrote a "Most Secret" letter for the eyes of the Emperor regard
ing his concern over the English in China and the need for the Russians
to look to their frontiers on thcAmur.

He reported on this to Perovsk1i

•

and pointed out that tea passing through Kiakhta amounted to one-third of
what it had been, thanks to British competition.

The British threat, he

wrote, was increasing, since in order to expand their trade throughout
northern China, they would need to navigate the Amur; he complained that
it was impossible to convince Nesselrode, Seniavin or Chernyshev of
this. 64
Nevelskoi returned to Eastern Siberia in the spring of 1850 and
gathering his 25-man command in Ayan, sailed to the Bay of Fortune.

Here

he and Lieutenant Orlov, who had preceded him, chose a location on the Bay
for the setting up of permanent quarters, named Petrovskii Post, in honor
of Peter the Great. 65
The Petrovskii Post met the requirements laid down by the governmen
tal directive but in no wise provided the advantages sought by Nevelskoi
63Barsukov, op. cit., I, pp. 261-262.
tain or hetman.

An ataman is a Cossack chief

64 Ibid., I, p. 264.
6~abanov, op. cit., p. 132.
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•

and his commander, Muraviev, for the achievement of their objectives.

~~

I

.

It

was impossible to keep watch on the mouth of the Amur from the Post, or on
the'coastal territory leading up to it from the

~outh,

whence foreign fn

truders could make their way into the river before any effective action
could be mounted by the Russians.
in until the month of July.

The Bay of Fortune, moreover, was iced

These were the deficiencies of location that

Nevelskoi later submitted as justification for the action on which he was

..

now to embark - - action which, irrespective of the characteristics of
the Petrovskii Post, he was in any case determined to take. 66 On this
score, he had made his intentions clear while still in Ayan, whence he
wrote to Korsakov on June 7, 1850, stating that Itlf permission from the
general (Muraviev) does not catch up with me, then we will issue our own
orders in the name of Allah himself· - boldness, speed and movement".67
On July 12, 1850, Nevelskoi, with a half dozen armed sailors and
two interpreters, entered the mouth of the Amur in a little sloop armed
with a one-pound falconet and sailed up the river to a distance of 120
kilometers, reaching a native settlement named Tyr.

Here he encountered

a group of Manchurian traders, one of whom attempted to incite the native
Giliaks to attack the Russians.

Nevelskoi drew a double barreled pistol

and pointed it at the Manchurian, while his sailors jumped out of the
sloop with their arms at the ready.

The Manchurians' truculence vanished

and with many apologies they explained that they had entered the area on
their own responsibility, that no Chinese officials were to be found there
66Kabanov,

Ope

i
ct.,
p. 134.

670rbl ., s. Korsakovykh, d. 41/42, 124, cited by Kabanov,
.

p. 135.

, ..'d'!;:.;;,...
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cit.,

•

lO~

•

and that the native inhabitants rendered no iassak to, nor were subjects

-.

of, the Chinese government.

Nevelskoi thereupon announced.to the Manchur

ians ·that the coastline of the Gulf of Tartary and, the entire coastal re:
gion down to the Korean frontier, as well as the island of Sakhalin, were
Russian possessions.

He instructed the natives so to inform the crews of

any foreign vessels which, the natives reported, often visited the area,
and announced that a series of military posts would be established to de

..

fend these Russian possessions. 68
Control of the Amur estuary was Nevelskoi's first concern.

Accord

ingly, on August 1, 1850, at Kouegda Bay, commanding an excellent view of
the river's mouth, amid salutes fired by the one-pounder falconet and his
sailors' rifles, he raised the Russian military banner on the site of the
post he named Nikolaevsk.
house for trading supplies.

Huts were built for barracks and a small ware
Then, in defiance of the directive issued to

him, he detailed a ten-man garrison and one officer to hold the post and
hastened back to Ayan, whence he sent a report on his action to Muraviev
and proceeded to Irkutsk in order personally to confer with him.

Mura

viev, however, having received Nevelskoi's report, had already departed for
consultations in St. Petersburg, leaving instructions for Nevelskoi to
follow him there. 69
In November, 1850, Muraviev arrived in St. Petersburg and was re
ceived at Tsarskoe Selo by the Emperor, who listened with interest.and
approval to his report on Nevelskoi's actions and ordered him to. prepare
a memorandum setting forth his views concerning the Amur.
6Bsarsukov, op. cit., II, pp. 72-75.
69Kabanov, op. cit., p. 137.
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completed this on November 20. The Emperor thereupon ordered the estab
lishment of the "Gi1iak Committee", composed of Nesse1rode as Chairman;
•

Prince Chernyshev,'Minister of War; Vronchenko, the Finance Minister,
Prince Menshikov, the Naval Minister; Count Perovskii, Minister of the
Interior, Count Berg, Quartermaster-General; Privy Counselor Seniavin;
70
and Muraviev.
At this time, too, Nicholas I conferred on Muraviev the
Order of St. Ann, First Class, and the Order of St. George, Fourth Class,

.

a mark of imperial favor that might perhaps have been meant to give a hint
to Muraviev's opponents regarding the direction of the Tsar's sympathies.
in the matter of Eastern Siberian policy.

•

Nesselrode's ruling objective wi thin the "Giliak Committee" was to
prevent the occupation of the mouth of the Amur.

He argued that to under

take construction of Russian posts in Giliak territory was premature and
dangerous.

As

~o

Nikolaevsk, he believed its establishment would alarm

the Chinese and that it should be vacated.

Who could give assurances, he

asked, that the Chinese would not arrive there in force, dislodge the lit
t1e Russian detachment and, before the eyes of the Giliaks, destroy the
Russian barracks and trample on the imperial flag1 71 Muraviev insisted on
maintaining Nikolaevsk in order to prevent occupation of the Amur's mouth
by foreigners.

Seniavin and Chernyshev stoutly supported Nesselrode;

Chernyshev, unwittingly by way of being a prophet, went so far as to

I
,.~}
rr,

70 '
Russki Arkhiv, 1878. Bk. II, pp. 262-264.
71Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 281, Quested, Ope cit., p. 32,i comments,
"This showed him (Nesse1rode) to be living a century or two in the past,
for he apparently did not envisage that such an attack would come as a
result of British influence - - the only remotely possible bogey - ~ but
genuinely believed the Manchus to be still capable of independent vigorous
action on the Amur. 1I

I
i
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accuse Muraviev of wishing "to erect a monument to him;elf t • • 72 A major
ity of the committee, furthermore, adjudged Nevelskoi's conduct
•

insubordinate and meriting reduction to the ranks.

•

as

His action, they

con~

tended, flouted the Imperial will and carried potentially dangerous conse
quences.

They recommended that Nikolaevsk be abandoned, while trade with

the Giliaks

sho~ld

be continued from the Petrovskii Post and that the Amur

and areas adjacent to it should be avoided. 73
The meeting broke up with no formal decision, but Perovskii remarked

.

to Muraviev, on leaving, that the minutes would probably not be favorable
to occupation of the Amur.

Nor were they, but when a copy was delivered to

.

Muraviev in the evening for his signature, he declined and wrote a dis
sent.

Prince Chernishev was indignant and so indicated to Muravlev, but

the minutes, nevertheless, were submitted, with Muraviev's dissent, to
the Emperor. 74 N,icholas thereupon ttinvited" the committee to reconvene
but, this time, under the chairmanship of the heir to the throne, the
Grand Duke Alexander, in orde,r to reconsider the problem.

At the same

i."

time, he observed that "where once the Russian flag has been raised it
must never be 10wered".75
Muraviev thoroughly briefed the Grand Duke Alexander who, at the
next meeting of the committee, on January 19, 1851, overruled Nesselrode,
72earsukov, op.cit., It p. 281.

7~abanov, Ope cit., p. 137.
7~

I

'Harsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 282; Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 137, states,
without citing his source, that Muraviev also obtained an audience with
the Tsar and eloquently defended Nevelskoi's action, as well as his own
position regarding the need to occupy the Amur.
75Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 137.
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Chernyshev, Seniavin and Vronchenko.

•
It was agreed that the post of

Nikolaevsk should be maintained but with the proviso that it should take
•

the guise of a trading post of the Russian-American Company.

It was also

stipulated that no new localities within the lower reaches of the:\Amur
should be occupied.

At this meeting, too, the Committee established the
\

"Amur Expedition" headed by Captain First Class Nevelskoi.

Its responsi

bility was defined as building appropriate quarters, guarding outposts

..

and maintaining surveillance over the coastline.
to be attached to it during the summer season.

A seagoing ¥essel was
On February 5, the Senate

sent the Chinese Tribunal a communication announcing this action and des.
cribing it as

a precaution

•

against intrusion by foreigners, "which could

not be permitted without approval of the Chinese and Russian governments". 76
Muraviev;had won his first formal skirmish with Nesselrode.

The

opening wedge had-been made; it was to serve as an exceedingly signifi
cant support for subsequent actions by Muraviev and his lieutenants.
76.earsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 283.

•

•
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CHAPTER IV
UNTYING THE AMUR KNOT
I.

WAR IN THE WEST SHAPES POLICY IN THE EAST

Muravlev attended to a number of other matters during his period

"

of consultation in St. Petersburg. The first of these was the passage
of regulations governing the sale of spirits, an aspect of internal ad

•

ministration that Muraviev had found to be particularly vexing.

This was

now placed on a more competitive basis and henceforth could be only in
the form of bottled liquor to be taken home, thus eliminating the evil
gin mills that ate up all of the workers' wages. l
A development with significant implications for further external
policy that Muravlev pursued during his sojourn in the capital was his
project for a Transbaikal Cossack Force.

The four line battalions in

Eastern Siberia, all that Muraviev had at his disposal, were manifestly
inadequate as a military prop for imperial expansion, but they were all
the regular forces that he could expect to receive from a government sore
ly preoccupied with politico-military problems in western Europe and the
Near East.

Always mindful of the exhortation of his wise advisor, Perov

skii, to mobilize local resources for the pursuit of his objectives, Mura
viev determined upon raising a substantial force from the manpower existing
in his own area.

He met much opposition, running into the familiar argu

lBarsukov, op. cit., I, p. 284 •
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.-±:~~"

110

ment about alarming the chinese.

He countered this by pointing out that

the Chinese had long been used to seeing the Russian military in the
•

border areas; he observed that the Russian frontier chief at Kaikhta was
always referred to by the Chinese as "Major", and that when that offi
cial visited them at Miamachen he was always accompanied by a military
escort.

He also argued, perhaps with tongue in cheek, that the Chinese

would welcome the security offered by strong friendly forces in the vici

..

nity.

He pointed to the

2,OOO-~

frontier with China and insisted

that such a force would be even more necessary if the Amur question was
not satisfactorily resolved.
baikal Cossack Force:

1)

baikal city regiment; 3)
ments; 4)

all existing frontier Cossacks; 2) the Trans
all native levies - - Tungus and Buryat regi

all Cossacks of the military-agricultural settlements in the

Transbaikal; and, 5)
tration.

His proposal was to include in the Trans

all the peasants of the Nerchinsk Mining Adminis

Those in the first four categories would form cavalry units,

while the fifth would be infantry.

The people in this last_ category

numbered well over 20,000 and Muraviev envisioned transforming them in
to twelve battalions of Cossack settlers.

Their transformation would

constitute a veritable emancipation, greatly improving their lot.

Their

condition, in the mines, was actually worse than that of the Siberian
convicts, for even the most criminal of the latter, having served the
maximum term of twenty years, became free men, as did their children.
The mine

~rkers,

however, people guilty of no crime, were put to work,

starting at the age of twelve, at the same level as the

convic~s,

and,

no matter how many years they worked, never received more than twenty
five days a year of free time.

And for this they received, in bread

and money, less than two rubles a month.

Since this did not suffice to

~~,.

•

III

•
live, they were constantly in debt, either to their employer, the Govern
ment, or the tradesmen who exploited them.

•

Under these circumstances a

good many of them eventually did commit crimes of, one sort or another, of
ten for the sole purpose of attaining the status of convict, which, after
a given number of years gave them and their progeny the position of free
settlers. 2
The Transbaikal Cossack proposal was the subject of long debates

...

within the government, but finally on April 27, 1851, a special committee
consented to all aspects of it, including the most controversial one con
cerning the Nerchinsk peasants, which was one of some sensitivity, since
it affected mines that were the personal property of the Imperial family.
The Emperor approved the minutes of the committee; Muraviev had convinced
him of the need to establish respectable forces contiguous to China, a
significant step toward ruling the Amur.
Now the bureaucratic brakes in st. Petersburg were weakening and
Nesselrode·s opposition was faltering, if only temporarily.

Developments

in Eastern Siberia were accelerating in the direction desired by Mura
viev.

Following authorization of the Transbaikal Cossack Force, .the

Transbaikal and Iakutsk oblast were separated from Irkutsk and these
forgotten borderlands were given autonomous status as gubernias.

Reor

ganization of Kiakhta followed, with the appointment of a single head of
muniCipal administration which, ih addition to bringing order into what
had been a somewhat chaotic situation, also

served to impress the Chi

nese with Russian intentions. 3 A further step, of real importance to
2sarsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 286.

3~., I, p. 288.
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MUl'aviev, was the opening of a branch of the Imperial Geographic Society
in Irkutsk.

The Society was under the presidency of the Grand Duke Con

stantine, who now began to exhlbit a lively and increasingly influential
interest in Muraviev' s work. 4

In October, 1851, on the eve of the young

Grand Duke's departure for a long stay in Venice, he wrote Muraviev in
Irkutsk, asking that he be kept regularly informed regarding events in
Eastern 5 iberia and the unfolding of Muravievts plans. 5 Thus was begun
a regulaI' exchange of views between the two regarding the Amur question;

henceforth Muravia" found in Constantine an invaluable supporter of the
development of his grand design.
Soon after Muraviev's return from St. Petersburg, he toured the
Transbaikal, inspecting the civil administration, the Cossack Force 1n
the process of formation, and the gold mines.

At the same time, he formed

his estimate of the area's logistical capabilities fur organizing an expe
dition that might proceed down the AmUl'.

Following this tour, ha wrotE)

to Perovskii, decrying the inefficiency of the Mining Administration and
remarking that the loss of some 2D,OOO employees, who were being absorbed
in the Transbaikal C05!:iack FOl'ce t would simply

result in substantial cuts

in the bureaucracy which had nothing to do in any case. 6

In a further letter to Perovskli, Muraviev reported that the Chlr.ese
authorities were delighted with the new administrative arrangements in
Kiakhta, see ing in them the possi.bility of closer ccoperation with the
Russians at a higher official level.
4Struvc, pp. cit., pp. 114-116.
5aarsukov, .£'20 cit.., r, p. 292.
6Ibid ., I, p. 293.

He also stated that he had complained
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to Nesselrode that messages from the Chinese Tribunal·passed through his
office sealed and went on to St.
--.

Petersburg, so that he learned of their

contents only some "three or four months later.

He would not try further

to communicate with Nesselrode for fear of "being misinterpreted", but
pointed out that disorders in China might result in a Chinese request for
Russian assistance.

He wondered what course to take were the Chinese

authorities to address themselves to him or his officials and surmised

.

that his reply should be that Russia was prepared to support the legal
Chinese government.

He suggested that the Foreign Ministry should provide.

him with guidance. 7
Meanwhile, in November, 1851, Muraviev reported to the Grand Duke
Constantine that the four regular line battalions of Eastern Siberia had
been transferred to the Transbaikal and that 20,000 Nerchinsk miners were
being transformed into Cossacks, thus providing twelve additional infantry
battalions.

He

pointed out that, "contrary to reports in foreign news"

papers", the strengthening of Russian forces in the border area were making
no inroads on Russia's military posture in the west, furthermore, it was
putting Russia in position to be of assistance, if need be, to "the
friendly Chinese Court".

In this connection, he mentioned that the Chin

ese with whom his officials dealt were not at all upset at the news of the
founding of Nikolaevsk.

At this time, too, Muraviev wrote Menshikov, the

Naval Minister, that the Manchu Emperor would welcome the arrival of Rus"
sian forces as a bulwark against the insurgents. 8 Whether this was a tac
7Sarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 296. There is no available evidence that
such guidance was provided.
8I bid., I, p. 299l
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f

tic designed to advance his own plans or whether he actually believed that

I

the Chinese were eager for closer political ties with Russia would be
difficul t to determine.

:-

Russo-Chinese relations on the local plane were'

quite friendly and this may have influenced his judgment. 9
During the first half of 1851, Muraviev had prepared measures to
strengthen the Amur Expedition under Nevelskoi.

The proposals included

detailing additional naval personnel to it, as well as a priest, doctor,

..

medical aides from the Kamchatka hospital and fifty cossacks.
that this be given priority.
Company be relieved of any

He urged

He also recommended that the Russian-American

responslblli~y

for the expedition and that its

status as an official governmental enterprise be openly acknowledged.
Nesselrode had his way this time, however, and the only element of the pro
gram that was approved was that entailing the priest. lO This was a dis
piriting setback. for Muraviev, who wrote a discouraged letter to his
kinsman, General Muraviev-Karskii, who replied sympathetically and urged
him to "keep up the good fight... ll
In early February, 1852, Muraviev wrote again to the Grand Duke
Constantine, reporting that the situation in China was going from bad to
worse.

By this time he was receiving useful information f rom the

. 9Quested, Ope cit., p. 32, comments: "The hope was always at the
back of his mind that the Chinese Government could be brought under some
sort of general Russian influence •••struve describes how at that time
(at Kiakhta) the old suspicion between the races had largely gone, and
although the Chinese normally did not leave their own town, in early
January, Russians, chinese, and Mongols circulated freely and jointly
celebrated the Mongol· festival of Tsagansara (called by the Russians
'Bely Mesiats'). Even at other times Chinese entertained Russians in
the Chinese town."
lORusski Arkhiv, Vol. III, 1878, pp. 264-266.
llSarsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 304.
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Orthodox Mission in Peking, the new

head of which was an outstanding

Sinologist, N. N. Kafarov, the Archimandrite Pa11adii.

Palladii had

earlier spent ten years in China as a member of the Mission, and unlike
his colleagues who at best were indolent, and at worst, debauched drunk
ards, he had put his tim(> to good use.

He was the inventol' of the system

of translating Chines"'.! into Cyrillic letters, still used by the Russians
today and bearing his name.

Under his direction the Mislion published an

annual volufIl0 of articles, some of which were translated into Germun.

12

Palladii was fluent not only in Chinese, but alsc spoke English and
French.

He was thus well qualified for the role of

and, in fact, so

indll~trious

offici~l

observer,

was he in this sphere t.hat he was criti

cized, by implication, in the official hostory of the Mission for

th~

great volume of his political reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the paucity of his purely pastoral reports. 13 Thus Palladii kept

Muravie'l reasonably au courant regarding events ir. Chir,u, both with l'e
gard to trade matters and the political situation, including the
of the Ta iping rebe11 ion.

progr~s3

Early in the year he had reported on mountin9

disorders in the south, where armed bands of insurgents were organizing
under the slogan "salvation to the poor, plunder the rich":

The movement

had originated in Hunan but had quickly spread to the south and south
east; in Palladii's opinion, depending upon the

developmen~

of their or

ganization and coordination, there was no telling how far it would go.14

l~uested, op. clt., p. 28.
13.i\.ratkuia isotria l'usskol pravo3J.aynoi mi.ss it v Pp.kin.a, cited by

Quested,

OPe

cit., p. 29.

14Russk.i Arkh.l.y, 1914, Vol. 2, pp. 41)6 - ~99.
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The spreading rebellion was taking on an anti-dynastic hue.

Pirates

were menacing the coast and there was pillage even in the, Peking region,
•

while tribes on the western borders were taking advantage of the govern~
ment's disarray to press attacks on remote regions of the Middle Kingdom. 15
On these matters - - and regarding his bete-noire, the English, "prowl
ing around the coast" - - Muravlev expounded at length to the Grand Duke
and stressed

.

~at

for the good of the country the

Gov~rnor-General

of

Eastern Siberia should enjoy greater confidence of the authorities,

in

cluding the Foreign Ministry.l6
Muraviev wrote once again to constantine at the end of February,
~

1852.

He pointed out that initially his main concern in Eastern Siberia

had been the welfare of the people which had so long been neglected.
Now, however, his basic concern was with the natural frontiers of the
Enpire, something to which, he contended, neither Speranskii nor his
predecessors and successors had given any serious attention.

True, st.

Petersburg was now giving some consideration to Kamchatka, the Pacific,
the Sea of Okhotsk, the mouth of the Amur and the entire river and the
contiguous Transbaikal oblast as well - - but not to the degree necessary,
in view of the interest in these waters manifested by foreign powers.
He hijd already mentioned England's intentions; soon, judging from what he
had been reading, the Americans would be mounting a political and commer
cial offensive in the islands of the North Pacific and in Manchuria, nego
tiating with "independent rulers of Sakhalin", angling for navigation
rights on the Amur, etc..
15sarsukov,

Ope

Forty years earlier, one of Russia's most

cit., I, p. 306.

l6t.oc. cit.
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distinguished navigators 17 had drawn the Russian's attention
to Japan

but that country was now lost to the Russians.
•

There was no doubt,

however, that if Russia should control navigation

~n

yet salvage a secondary position on the Pacific.

But, given the distur

the Amur, she could'

bances in China and the rapidity of current events, there was no telling
who would be controlling that navigation within a few months. 18
At the beginning of the summer, 1852, Muraviev again visited the

•

Transbaikal, inspecting its factories, mines and agriculture and pro
ceeded up the Shilka as far as Gorbitsa.

On the return trip, he left one

of his assistants, M. S. Volkonskii,19 at the Nerchinsk factory, naming
him a member of an investigative commission looking into irregularities
in the mining administration - - and, in the process, creating new
enemies for himself.

At Petrovskii Zavod, he observed progress in the

construction of the steamer 'lArgun", destined to ply the as yet unauth
orized Amur route.

He also looked into Buryat affairs and issued in

structions for improvements .in their schools and for support in their ag
ricultural enterprises.

He

appointed three trusted assistants ,to insure
the carrying out of these orders. 20
At the end of his inspection trip, Muraviev wrote the Grand Duke

Constantine reporting on the highly satisfactory state of training of the
Transbaikal Cossack Force.

Constantine replied on August 14, expressing

his gratification and reporting that he was now serving on the intra
17

Krusenstern.

ISsarsukov, op. cit., 1, p. 309.
19Son of the Decembrist
20sarsukov, op. cit., 1, p. 311.
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governmental Siberian Committee. 2l

Al though Muraviev had failed in hi.s attempt to improve the status
of Nevelskoi's little band, the "Amur
highly useful activities.

Expedition'~,

it continued its

Life at Petrovskii Post and at Nikolaevsk,

tiny settlements bounded on one side by the icy seas and on the other by
the limitless bleak wastes of the taiga, was rigorous indeed; yet these
hardy people doggedly carried out wide-ranging investigations and surveys
in pursuit of two main objectives.

The first of these was to become

&

fairly familiar with the territory which, in accordance with Article I
of the Treaty of Nerchinsk was undemarcated - • and to determine what
4

territory adjacent to the lower reaches of the Amur and to the coastline
did not come under Chinese sovereignty and could, by right of prior dis.
covery and settlement, be annexed to Russia.

The second objective was

to obtain a detailed knowledge of the entire coastline, including the
most convenient harbors, their degree of accessibility, navigational
periods at various points on the coast, characteristics of the terrain,
natural resources, lines of communication and the like.

The expedition

pursued its investigations throughout the years 1851 and 1852.

As a

result of its findings, Nevelskoi concluded that "for the further survey·
ing of the area, with a view to a definitive solution of the maritime
problem" • • • it would be necessary to establish posts at a number of
addItional points.

These included the village of Kizi, at the mouth of

the Ussuri, Sakhalin and the continental coastline at de Castries Bay;
in addition, at the very least, two harbors to the south of the Bay should
2l~., I, p. 313.
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be occupied. 22
Muraviev proposed to St. Petersburg that Kizl and de-Castries Bay,
providing good bases for maintaining surveillance over foreign shipping
when the Amur estuary was frozen over, be occupied by Russian forces ..
Nessclrode's cautious counsels prevailed again, however. and Muraviev's
proposal was rejected.

He was instructed to

pl'o~eed

with extremg dis

cretion and without haste. 23 During this period, the fall and winter of

1852, Muraviev lea:rucd from Perovskii, his staunch supportsl in St.
Petersburg, that the latter was giving up his post as Minister of the In
terior in order to take up less demanding tasks in the Department of
Impedal Domaines.

This news, on top of his latest frustration adminis

tered by Nesselrode's clique, plunged Muravlev into deep gloom, relieved
only

by the knowledge that he had

~other

highly placed defender in St.

Peter:";buI'g in the person of the Grand Duke Constantine.

Muraviev felt,

too, that he could look for support from the Heir, the Grand D;Jke Alf.'x
ander.

His

disc~lJragement,

At a period when it

nevertheless, was profound.

seem~d

once again that Muravievrs plans v'IOuld

come to naught, politico-military developments thousands of miles away
provided him with a reprieve.

As early as 1n the beginning of 1852,

relations botween Russia and Turkey had become so strained that war was

momentarily expected.

This situation undoubtedly accounted in large

measure for the negative reaction In St. Petersburg to Muraviev's ad
venturesome proposals.

Now, however, since it was clear that England

and France were backing Turkey, the prospect of an Anglo-French attack

22Ncvelskoi, .Q..Q.:cit., p. 176, cib~d by Kabanov, 9p. ctt., p. 142.
23sal'SlJkov, .£2.0 cit., I, p. 315.
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on Kamchatka or the Amur estuary, of which Muraviev had repeatedly

.

warned, became
,

a real possibility. Thus, In February, 1853" Muraviev

'

was recalled to St. Petersburg for consultations.

When he left Irkutsk,

he told his faithful assistant, Struve, that since he (Muraviev) appar
ently did not enjoy the confidence of the government, he would probably
not return,24 a threat which anyone who had known him since his early
days in the Caucasus would have found tiresomely familiar.
Muraviev arrived in St. Petersburg in March, 1853, and submitted

•

a memorandum to the Tsar in which he outlined the strategic significance
of the Amur, with particular reference to the war that was on the hori
•

zone

In his characteristically prolix style, Muraviev set forth a geo

political concept that subsequently proved to be realistic, and essentially
accurate.

As one writer has put it, albeit with some oversimplification,

this concept formed the basis of Russian policy in the Far East until the
fall of the Tsarist regime and, indeed, right up to the present. 25 Anoth
er points to tithe hand of the dead RaguzinskU" as being plainly visible
in the shaping of this policy. 26
Muraviev, in his memorandum,27 warned of British incursions ,into the
Far East and urged that the time had come to abandon Russia's Itimmobility"
in that, area, where "nothing had been done since 1812".

He pointed out

24Struve, Ope cit., p. 152.
25Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 261.
26W• Gurian, Soviet Imperialism, Its Origins and Tactics, (Notre
Dame, Ind., 1953) p. 116.
27The exact official text of this memorandum has not been available
to any of the sources consulted; the substance, as summarized on the fol
lowing pages, has been taken from B. v. Struve's Vospominania 0 Sibiri
1848 - 1854, (St. Petersburg, 1889) pp. 152-156.
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that it would not be enough to limit Russian action to seeking to estab
lish the near-west western communications with China, "leaving the entire
•

eastern frontier of some 6,000 versts •• to that political orientation
and order that has obtained for the last 150 years".

Unless Russia now

took "special measures" on the Pacific, he warned, the result of England's
war with China and the spreading of her naval power in neighboring waters
would have irreversibly bad effects, not only for Russian trade with China,

..

. but for Russia's very position in the far off lands of East Asia, which
could "finish all

~ussian

prospects there

foreve~'.

It was a matter of

Imperial importance, Muraviev insisted, that there should be a settlement
~

of the border with China in the Far East.

This, he pointed out, because

of the great distance from the area involved to St. Petersburg, could
hardly be settled in all details by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He

recommended, the:refore, that the "commander-in-chief" in Eastern Siberia
be authorized independently to enter into contact regarding this question
with the Chinese Tribunal and with the Russian Orthodox Mission in Peking_
Muraviev then went on to expound his recommended policy;
,

Twenty-five years ago, the Russian-American Company requested
the Government to authorize the occupation of California, which
at that time was controlled by hardly anyone, expressing at that
time its apprehension that this region would soon become a
possession of the United States of America. This apprehension
was not shared in St. Petersburg, where it was asserted that
this could happen only in a hundred years. The Company maintained
that it would happen in twenty-five years, and now it has al- .
ready been over a year that California constitutes one of the
North American States. One could not help foresee the rapid
extension of the North American states' dominion in North Am
erica, nor could one help foresee that these States, once
established on the Pacific Ocean, would soon take precedence
over all other naval powers there, and that they would require
the whole northwestern shore of America. The sovereignty of
the North American States in all of North America is so
natural that we should not regret very much that we did not

~',:.£~
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.

consolidate't>ur pos! tion in California twenty-five' years ago 
- sooneror1iater we would have had to yield it; but, yielding
it peacefully, we could have received from the Americans other
benefits in exchange. Now, furthermore, with the invention and
development of railroads, one must become convinced, even more
than before, that the North American states will, without fail,
spread over all of North America, and we cannot fail to keep in
mind that sooner or later we shall have to yield them our Nor~h
American possessions. Neither, however, can one fail to bear
in mind, in this connection, that it is highly natural also
for Russia, if not to possess all of Eastern Asia, then to
rule over the entire Asian littoral of the Pacific Ocean. 28
Owing to various circumstances, we allowed the intrusion into
this part of Asia by the English, who, very naturally to the
detriment and reproach of all of Europe, disturbing the peace
and well-being of other nations, prescribe from their little
island their own laws in other parts of the world, including
America; laws not in the least aimed at the benefit of man
kind, but only at the satisfaction of,the commercial interests
6f Great Britain. But this situation can still be saved by a
close tie on our part with the North American States. Eng
land exerts all efforts not. to permit this bond; her agents
everywhere try with all means to estrange America from Russia.
In this connection, England·s most essential conditions must
include, gaining possession of Kamchatka, or leaving it
waste, and ruling over the Pacific shores of China and Japan.
thus, so to speak, cutting off Russia from the Pacific Ocean.
There is no doubt that this system must also include the
acquisition of Sakhalin and the Amur estuary. In order to
prepare, in view of the above-mentioned considerations, a
firm and convenient domain for our American Company, in place
of the North American shore on one hand, and, on the other
hand, in order to develop more quickly and certainly our sway
over the shore of the Pacific Ocean belonging to us, it is
essential to permit the Russian-American Company immediately
to establish itself on Sakhalin, whence her trade will inevit
ably develop with Japan and Korea.
Muraviev·s memorandum convinced Nicholas 1 that the Amur Expedition.
heretofore under the cloak of the Russian-American Company, should be
come an official governmental enterprise.

The next step, warmly supported

by Grand Duke Constantine, was to authorize the Company to occupy Sakhalin.
28If·taken literally, and discarding a presumption that what Mura
viev meant was the north Asian littoral, this would imply the eventual
conquest of a good deal more than Manchuria.
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denying it to any foreign intruders. The Sakhalin expedition was to re
port directly to Muraviev.

These decisions were taken on April 11, 1853.

Eleven days later, Muraviev presented his report to Nicholas I, in the
presence of the heir to the throne, Alexander, the Grand Duke Constantine,
Nesselrode, and the other ministers who had consistently opposed him.
With maps and survey data prepared by Colonel Akhte, Muraviev illustrated
the impreciseness of the Treaty of Nerchinsk and pointed out that Chi

"

nese sovereignty did not exist on the left bank of the lower Amur, nor on
either bank at the estuary. It was then decided to occupy de Castries
29
Bay and Kizi.
The Emperor, pointing to the map and referring to the
maritime area stretching from the Bureia River to the sea, thereupon ex
claimed,

"So that belongs to us!"

Turning to the Minister of War, he

said, "Inform the Chinese accordingly."

Then, in reply to Muraviev's ob

servations about'fortifying the mouth of the Amur, he commented, "That is
all very well," and, pointing to the mouth of the Amur, remarked, "but I
shall have to defend this from Kronstadt."

Muraviev replied, lilt would

not se.em to be necessary, Sire, to do that from such a distance. 1I

Point

ing to the course of the Amur from the Transbaikal, he said, "reinforce
ments can be sent from here".

The Tsar put his hand on Muraviev's head
I

and exclaimed, "Ekh, Muraviev, truly one of these days you will lose
your reason over the Amur!"

Then, slapping him on the shoulder, he said,

"Well, then, let circumstances lead to that; we shall wait.,,30
On the following day, Muraviev received a citation "for his exem
plary and untiring efforts for the development and well-being of the vast
29Struve, Ope cit., p. 157.
3OSarsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 325.
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area within his responsibility", and was made a Knight of the Imperial
Order of the White Eagle.
•

He was then granted leave to go ,abroad on

holid'ay and for medical treatment.
It was not until Muraviev had left the country that the Foreign Min
istry proceeded, in its own way, to carry out the Tsar's orders regarding
notification to the Chinese of the decisions taken on April 22.

The Note

that was despatched was couched in such language as to create difficulties

.

for Muraviev later on (see below).3l

At the same time, a special commis

sion was established to examine Muraviev's proposals for building up
supplies, munitions, troop formations, and making various other logisti
•

cal preparations for sailing down the Amur.
Meanwhile, Nevelskoi had continued to act according to

h~s

motto,

"daring, speed and movement'·, and to make his way, as he put it, "without
instructions".

Thus, though aware of the governmental position against

occupying any additional points on the Gulf of Tartary, he proceeded to
put into effect the government's new decisions - - some time before they
had been made.

In February, 1853, he sent out Lieutenant N. K. Boshniak

with orders to establish a post at de Castries Bay. On March 15, he re
ceived confirmation from the young officer that the Russian flag had been
raised. there; the local inhabitants had been put on notice that this was
now Russian territory, and a building was under construction.
time, one of Boshniak's assistants had set up a post at Kizi.

At the same
32

At de Castries Bay, Boshniak learned from the Giliaks that to the
south there was a big bay.

Boshniak proceeded there on May 2, w th three

31Russki Arkhiv, 1878, bk. III, p. 274.,
34Kabanov,

Ope

,.,,"~-:

cit., p. 147.
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men in a Gi1iak boat and at the 49th parallel arrived at the bay, which he
named the Bay of Emperor Nicholas I.
•

The local inhabitants here told him

that twelve days' journey to the south, a large ~iver'emptied into that'
bay, while its headwaters were near the Ussuri, and that there were good
harbors down the coast.

The natives also told Boshniak that they were

free men owing no allegiance to the Chinese.

He thereupon gathered them

together at Imperatorskaia Gavan 33 and proclaimed that this whole country
&

down to the Korean frontier was Russian, and that its inhabitants now
came under the protection of Russia.

He then put up a cross bearing the

.

legend "Discovered and named Bay of Emperor Nicholas I, May 23, 1853, N. K•
Boshniak".

At the same time, he gave the local inhabitants a written

proclamation to this effect in the Russian, German and French languages,
with instructions that they display it to any visiting foreigners. 34
Then, his provisions being exhausted, he returned to de Castries Bay,
where on July 12, the transport "Baikal" delivered him orders to occupy
Sakhalin as well as de Castries and Kizi, the latter two of which were a1
ready flying the Russian flag.
In the late. summer of 1853, Nevelskoi proceeded to Sakhalin and on
September 22, landed at Anniwa Bay where, in addition to the native in
habitants, he encountered a number of Japanese, who periodically visited
this point and maintained a small supply depot there.

The natives warmly

welcomed the Russians, but the Japanese appeared frightened until Nevelskoi
assured them that

he

would not interfere with their

33ftImperial Harbor", on the newly discovered bay.
Sovetskaia Gavant.
34Kabanov, op. cit., p. 148.

~~>t,"._

trade on the island
It is now

•
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nor with tbeir fishing, and that their Itjustlf interests would be protect
ed.

The Russian flag was raised, cannon were }anded on the beach, and

Nevelskoi

explained that they would be permanently emplaced in order to

protect the people and the land, which were

~~

Russian.~o

Thus was established the Muravievskii Post, the main Russian settle
ment on Sakhalin.

Major Busse

Kabanov, on Nevelskoi's part.

was put in command, a mistake, cOIJ'Jn<:mts
According to Kabanov, this officer was in

decisive, lacked initiative, was fearful of a possible invasion by the
Japanese and was simply not. up to the task of mt:int<lining this Russian post
at a time when war was approaching.
of the Crimean
adjacsllt

~ar

~aters,

And, in truth, follo·tJjng the outbreak

and the attendant increased Japanese activity in the

he managed to persuade Admiral Putiatin, visiting him en

route to Japan, to agree to evacuation of the pvst. 36
Putiatin, evidently, did not need
Russia's giving up her foothold on the

~uch

persuading in the matter of

sDuther~ co~st

of Sakhalin.

When

Nevelskoi returned to winter quarters at Petrovskii in October, 1852, he
learned that Captain Rimski-Korsakov, commander of the

~.choontJr

"Vostok",

had visited Petroyskii and had reported that Vice-Admiral Puliatin was
resolutely opposed to any occupation of the area and to any designs on
the Amur:

he had forbidden

Rim~ki-Korsakov

to enter the river, since tlit

belongQd to China", and he had protested against the occupation of Sakha
lin, insisting that this would prejudice negotiations he was about to
undel'take 't'iith the Japanese.

"Ness(,lrode's influence was obvious", com

ments Barsukov. 37
35yoenno-Morskoi Arkhiv f. kanz.1..elik!'9c KniazL1_Konst.:.ntina Niko
1aev,5.,cp:;" d. 154, cited by K<lbar.ov, 22. d:,., p. 148.
36Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 150.
37

Barsukov,

•

£2~.,

I, p. 332.
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Nevelskoi was unperturbed by Putiatin's antagonism.

•

With singleminded

ness as firm as that of his master, Muraviev, he had in two short years

•

obtained a firm grip on the mouth of the Amur

an~

had discovered that the

river, 300 versts above its mouth, came very near to de Castries Bay
which was why he had occupied Kizi and obtained what might be termed a
second mouth of the Amur. a way station essential for ships entering the
Amur from the south.
•

At the same time, he had found a fine harbor, the

Bay of Emperor Nicholas I.

He had, moreover. obtained useful informa

tion regarding the autonomous status of the natives of the continental
coastline and of Sakhalin. as well as data regarding the connection of the
Ussuri River to ice-free harbors on the Manchurian coast.
Nevelskoi's achievements, carried out with Muraviev' s:"encouragement
and support. prepared the way for the important events of the next three
years. 38 They ~rovided Muraviev with a plausible pretext for large-scale
Russian military expeditions down the Amur, and for establishment of Rus
sian settlements along its .left bank.

By 1856. the discomfited Chinese

3~abanov makes an eloquent argument that Nevelskoi was never ac
corded the degree of recognition that was due him, and that he .was over
shadowed by Muraviev. In this connection, incidentai1y, those who con
demned Muraviev for "using" people had a plausible example in the case
of the relationship between these two. By 1854, Muraviev was reprimand
ing Neve1skoi for the latter's discourtesy to the managers of the Russian
American Company, and in the following year he was complaining to Karsakov
about Neve1skoi's failing to follow his instructions in the matter of
battery emplacements at Nikolaevesk. At this time, Muraviev recalled
Neve1skoi to Irkutsk to serve as his chief of staff, but under such condi
tions that he would have little or nothing to do. Muraviev also wrote the
Grand Duke Constantine that "Neve1skoi is now needed neither on the Amur
nor in Irkutsk, and I therefore take the liberty of recommending that he
be relieved". It would be difficult to decide now whether Nevelskoi's
long service under hard conditions had had It an unfavorable effect" on him,
as Muraviev put it, or whether, being as independent and self-opinionated
as Muraviev, he was doomed to clash with his commander. (See Kabanov, ~
cit., pp. 120-128, and Barsukov, Ope cit., Vol. I, p. 396.
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would thereby be placed in a position from which they could not extri

•

cate themselves and Muraviev would accomplish de facto what it would
•

take another

several years to regularize de jure.

II. THE INITIAL CAMPAIGN "WITH NO SMELL OF GUNPOWDER"
After a four-month vacation in Marienbad, Paris, Valencia, Tou
louse and Brussels, Muraviev returned to St. Petersburg near the end of

•

1853, for a two-month period of consultation.

While there, he wrote the

new Minister of Finance, P. F. Brok, on the subject of the Kiakhta trade.

39

He urged that it be opened to all in the same manner as the rest
of the
,
Empire's commerce, i.e., with payment to be made in coin rather than on
the basis of barter; he recommended the exclusion of bank-notes, gold
dust or ingots.
believed, would
end.

40

Only by doing away with the archaic ,barter system, he
~muggling

and the draining of Russian gold be put to an

A special commission composed of representatives of the Ministries

of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Interior, was set up to study Asian com
merce in general and Muraviev's recommendation on the Kiakhta trade in
particular.

Struve comments that the Minister of Finance, however, "was
in no hurry to deal with this matter".4 1
Once again, in St. Petersburg, Muraviev was plunged into a fit of

depression.

It seemed to him that highly placed bureaucrats were deter

39vronchenko, previous Minister of Finance, who had been a leading
exponent of the policy of rigidly controlled barter trade at Kiakhta,
had recently died, and Muraviev hoped for a more sympathetic hearing from
his successor.
40a. B. Struve,nGraf N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii. Iz Vospominanii
deiatolnoste," Russkaka Starina, Vol. 48, pp. 341-2.
41B• V. Struve, Vospominaniia

"
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Sibiri, 1848-1854, p. 161.
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..
mined to frustrate his every attempt to advance Russian interests in
Eastern Siberia.
•

..

He did not lack evidence of hostility directed at him
•

personally, at any rate, since this was unmistakably confirmed to him
while he was in the capital.

When Muraviev returned to st. Petersburg, he hastened to the Foreign
Ministry and asked Seniavin, Head of the Asiatic Department, whether he
should return to Siberia immediately in order to deal with the Chinese.

•

Senlavin's reply was that there were no particular dealings

with~the

Chi

nese in view, and that from the standpoint of his department there was no
need whatever for Muraviev to hurry back to Irkutsk.

Thus

reas~ured,

Mura

viev took his time, since he had other matters, such as the Kiakhta trade,
to pursue, and was content to remain until they were settled.
in December, an urgent
In response to a note

courier

Suddenly,

from Irkutsk brought him startling news.

from the Russian Government, Chinese

plenipoten~

tiaries were gathering in Urga, and would soon be in Maimachen, near
Kiakhta, for negotiations on Amur matters.

Muraviev indignantly confront

ed Seniavin, who acknowledged that there had been a note, to which a reply
had already been received from Peking, and that he, the Governor-General,
would be responsible for the negotiations. 42
Muraviev had learned to maintain a certain sang-froid in the face
of the continuing opposition offered him by the Ministry of Foreign Af
fairs; this latest ploy, however,

he regarded as intolerable.

It

threat~

ened completely to undermine his position, since it proposed the placing of
frontier markers on the

~

bank of the Amur.

As for delimiting the bor

der to the east, the Note treated that of secondary importance.
42Russ ki Arkhiv, 1878, III, p. 275 •
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•

was the Note that had been sent allegedly in accordance with the deci
sions of April 22, 1853, when Muraviev had found himself in the ascen
•

dancy over Nesselrode and the anti-Amur faction •. Its despatch had been'
delayed until June 16, when Muraviev had departed for his four-months'
leave in Europe. 43
The Chinese received the Russian Note at the end of August, and
took action with unaccustomed speed.

.

Ying-lung, General of Heilung

chiang, was ordered to review the text of the Treaties of Nerchinsk and
Kiakhta, and to proceed immediately to an investigation of the frontier.
He reported that there should be no objection to the delimitation, and
the Emperor, I-ting, decreed that procedures should be discussed with the
Russians in the following spring. 44 In the meantime, officials were sent
out to place boundary markers on the left bank of the Amur, beginning at
the Gorbitsa, and the Tribunal sent an invitation to the Russian Ministry
45
of Foreign Affairs to send officials to join them.. At the same time,
the Chinese sent a commission to Kiakhta, which arrived there in November,
1853.

Rehbinder, Russian city-governor of Kiakhta, having had no advance

notice of these developments, immediately reported on this to Irkutsk, re
questing full information, plans, documents, and other pertinent data.
Muraviev would have none of this.

He immediately wrote

~ehbinder

sternly enjoining him to abstain from any negotiations, and to tell the
43

Ibid., 1878, Bk. III, p. 276.

44Ch -ou Pan I Wu Shih Mo, 7, p. lB, cited by Quested, op.: cit.,
p. 39. This, the Chinese archive published in the 193:)'s, is the source
drawn upon most extensively by Quested. Hereinafter it is referred to
by the abbreviation, IWSM.
4~usski Arkhiv, 1878, Bk. III, p. 276.
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•

Chinese that he could do nothing, having received no instructions from
his superiors, and to fix no date for any meeting.
--.

He further instructed

Rehbinder to let the Chinese know through unofficial channels that in
order to proceed with any discussions about the border, it would be necess
ary for them to address themselves to General Muraviev, who was prepared
to consider a proposal for a meeting at Irkutsk, or some other place in
the Transbaikal.

•

Rehbinder was to make clear to his Chinese counterparts

that there was a Governor-General in command of all land and sea forces in
the area, from the distant western frontier to the Pacific, and that mat
46
ters of high moment had to be referred to him.
Available sources offer no explanation for the fact that Muraviev's
action, which could be construed as countermanding the Tsar's orders (for
Nesselrode had talked the Tsar into agreeing to the content of the Note to
the Chinese) apparently elicited no rebuke whatever.

It is possible, of

course, that he had consulted one of his highly placed supporters, perhaps
even the heir to the throne, before issuing his orders to Rehbinderl that,
however, is speculation.

It is a fact, however, that he did write the

Emperor himself, pointing out what he considered to be the Foreign Minis
try's double dealing and reporting the counteraction that he had already
taken. 47
While Nesselrode's plans were being foiled by the resolute GovernorGeneral, activities in the Transbaikal, on the River shilka, and the
Petrovskii iron works were proceeding apace.

At Muraviev's insistance,

P. V. Kazakevich was engaged in constructing a flat-bottomed steamer,
46 Ibid •
47 Ib1d ., p. 277.
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•

financed by a donation from the millionaire merchant, E. A. Kuznetsov,
to be called the "Argun ll •
•

This was in anticipation of the,Imperial per

mission to sail down the Amur. A steam engine for, the "Argunlt was being'
built at Petrovskii Zavod. 48 Muraviev had earlier initiated this in St.
Petersburg, and had succeeded in having all necessary materials and equip
ment for such construction sent to Ekaterinburg.

Thus began a ship

building industry in Eastern Siberia which later withered away for lack

•

of support •
Muraviey, adjudging the Amur question to be one of Imperial import
ance, had hoped that central governmental resources would be allocated
to
,
support its resolution.

He awaited the eventual allocation for this pur

pose of some percentage of the gold being mined in his area.
verely disappointed, however.

He was se

The maritime authorities made it plain

that he would have to continue this type of development solely on the
basis of local resources. He resigned himself to this, realizing that it
would temporarily have an unfavorable effect on other sectors of the econo
my, but rationalizing this within the context of the great goals to be
49
achieved later.
With the onset of the Crimean War, Muraviev became increasingly
concerned over Russian defenses on the Pacific coast.

In St. Petersburg,

this initially was given no heed, understandably enough, since the govern
ment was facing a conflict in the west with powerful enemies.

English and

48A year later, officers of the frigate, "Diana", which had put in
at Nikolaevsk, were amazed to see this steamboat, which had been built
entirely, It even to the engine", at the headwaters of the Amur. (See N.
G. Shilling, "Iz Vospomiananii Starogo Moriaka", Russki Arkhiv (1880),
III, p. 145).
49

Barsukov, 9.p. cit., p. 344.
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•
French naval forces were perilously close to Eastern Siberia,
however,
and the defense of the coastline and Kamchatka, Muraviev knew, depended
•

entirely on navigation of the Amur.

Only thus could the military estab-'

1ishment on the Okhotsk coast and in Kamchatka be provided with reinforce
ments, supplies and munitions; overland communications would be fatally
slow, if not utterly impossible.

Even before first departing for Siberia,

during Muraviev's final imperial audience, the Tsar had remarked to him,

•

!tWe1l, they'll take Kamchatka away from you and you will learn of it only
six months later". 50
This was the historic moment for Russia to move in the East.
viev grasped it.

Mura

In a long letter, on November 29, he urged on the Grand

Duke constantine the immediate necessity to send troops via the Amur for
the defense of the mouth of the river and of Kamchatka.

Since the central

government's resources could not be diverted for this task, he requested
permission to draw on all remaining balances of government revenues gen
erated in Eastern Siberia.

He pointed to the parlous condition of the

Chinese Government, which had expended its strength and "no longer ruled
over half of its realm", and urged that it be informed that it should
"address itself to, and deal with the Chief administrator and commander
of troops in Eastern Siberia, to whom the Government has given appropriate
instructions for all contingencies tt • 51
EVen as Muraviev was writing his letter to Constantine, the Special
Amur Committee that had been studying proposals earlier submitted by
5OSarsukov, op. cit., I, p. 344.
5l~., II, pp. 104-109. My translation of this letter is at
Appendix III.
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Muraviev, made a favorable report to the Tsar.

On Ja~uary 11, he con

firmed that Muraviev should be authorized to deal directly with the
j -.

•

Chinese Tribunal on all matters concerning the
Siberia and China.

fr~ntier

of Eastern

The Chinese were duly notified, and a diplomatic

secretary and an interpreter were assigned to Muraviev.

His request re

garding allocation of revenue balances for support of activities on the
Amur was also approved:
Tsar.

he would be accountable for these only to the

Finally, after a number of heated debates, it was decided to navi

6

gate the Amur.

This was to take place even in the absence of any reply

to a note that would be sent to the Chinese Government proposing despatch
of military reinforcements and supplies via the Amur to the coast and
Kamchatka.

In confirming this decision, the Tsar added the caution that

"there must be no smell of gunpowder". 52
The Tsar's. approval of the establishment of Nikolaevsk on the Amur
had been Muraviev's first victory over the Nesselrode faction; here was
his second.

His repeated warnings of hostile British intentions had

taken on added significance, now that war was erupting; the Tsar was as
loathe to leave the mouth of the Amur to the British as was his Eastern
Siberian proconsul.

The Tsar had not yet acceded to Muraviev's desire

to force a showdown on the frontier problem, but he had gone a long way'
in that direction.

Implicit in the decision to navigate the Amur and to

delegate powers to Muraviev regarding frontier questions, was a willing
ness to fling down the gauntlet before the distraught Chinese govern
mente
Following his triumph in St. Petersburg, Muraviev arrived in
52Russki Arkhiv, 1878, Bk. III, p. 277.
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Krasnoiarsk at the end of February, 1854.

From there he wrote to Con

stantine regarding the success of Nevelskoi's occupation of Sakhalin,
and requested promotions and decorations for him and his men.
reported his receipt of a letter from Putiatin in Nagasaki.

He also
The admiral,

who had been echoing Nesselrodels line, had now reversed himself.

His

observation of the Americans in Japan had convinced him that "it would be
prudent to concentrate Russian influence in Sakhalin and on the Amur". 53
At Krasnoiarsk, too, Muraviev received a progress report from Lieutenant
f

I

I

Colonel Karsakov, indicating that the expedition down the Amur could take
place as soon as the spring thaw set in. 54
News of the forthcoming Amur expedition stirred great enthusiasm
throughout Eastern Siberia.

The wealthy merchants, who were well aware

of Muraviev's poor opinion of most of them, nevertheless now saw in him
the champion of their own material interests, and pledged substantial
sums for the expedition.

And for the first time since his arrival in

Siberia, Muraviev dined with the Merchant SOCiety of Irkutsk. 55
Muraviev proceeded to Kiakhta on April 26, planning to stay there
until May, in anticipaHon of a communication from the Chinese, whether
or not it was received, he would set out on the Amur.

The Chinese sent

no word and on May 7, he was at Shilkinskii Zavod, where the steamer
"Argun" was at anchor, together with a flotilla of river boats, barges
and rafts.

Here, too, was fue bivouac of a composite battalion with

53sarsukov, gp. cit., Vol. I, p. 350. He had not yet learned of
Nevelskoi's occupation of Anniwa Bay.

--

54 Ibid •

50Struve, 2p.

ci~.,

p. 174.
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artillery that had been mustered for the expedition. •Muraviev's mili
tary commanders from outlying areas and civil notables were
•

see him off in gala' manner.
salt

gathered to

May 9 was a holiday marked by the bread and'

ceremony and fireworks, grandiloquent speeches, versifying, and

symbolic statues.

On May 14, the expedition was blessed with the Madonna

of Albazin, and amid shouts of "ourah" from the population on the banks,
the expedition moved out with Muraviev's craft in the lead. 56 On the

•

evening of May 17, the expedition approached Ust'-Strelka, where the
Shllka joins the Amur, and on the following day, with bands playing "God
Save the Tsar", the expedition entered the Amur.

On May 20, they were at

.

Albazin, and on the 28th, they reached the mouth of the Zeia.
Muraviev had sent messengers overland to inform the Chinese governor
of Aigun of the expedition's impending arrival.
lyzed with fright.

That official was para

He had had no word from his government concerning the

expedition, and no instructions of any sort, but he attempted to explain
to Muraviev why it would be impossible to permit him to proceed down the
river.

The sight of the steamer, which they had never before beheld, and

of the rest of the flotilla and the soldiery, so frightened the Manchurian
officials that they wished for nothing but the departure of the Russians
who, to their relief, did not tarry.57
The passage through Aigun had been the critical point of the expe
dition, for Aigun was the only Chinese strongpoint of any significance
on the Arnur; if there had been any intention on the part of the Chinese to
offer armed resistance to the Russians, it would have taken place there.

5~arsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 368.

57J..Q1Q.., I, p. 370.
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That such resistance was out of the question must have been abundantly
clear to Muraviev when he saw the ludicrous Aigum garrison ,drawn up on
•

the

~hore

of the river.

It consisted of some 1,000 shabbily clad pea

sants, "armed" with sharp ended poles and bows and arrows, with here and
there among them an occasional antiquated matchlock. 58 There is 900d
reason to believe, however, that the Chinese Government was taken com
pletely by surprise.

"

It will be recalled that Muraviev was authorized

in 3anuary of 1854, to deal directly with the Chinese Government on all
matters concerning the Amur.

At that time, when the decision to go ahead

with the expedition was taken, it was decided to communicate that deci
sion to the Chinese Government.

Muraviev waited until April to send the

Government of China a Note from Irkutsk, informing it that he proposed
to take troops down the Amur to the Pacific coast, as a preventive mea
sure against hostile powers. 59 The Chinese did not receive this mes
sage until 3uly, so that the first that the Manchu Emperor, I-Ting,
learned of the expedition was when the Generals of Heilungchiang and
Kirin memorialized that it had passed Aigun. 60 I-Ting, in reply to his
generals, observed that the Russian claim that their expedition was meant
to counter the British threat "cannot entirely be believed", but that if
the Russians really created no disturbances, "it seems unworthy to put
obstacles in their way".

The commander at Aigun was ordered to alert his
61
troops - - but no mention was made of sending him any reinforcements.

5~avensteint oR. cit., p. 119.
59sarsukov, oR. cit., Vol. II, pp. 114-115.
60 IWSM, 8, p. 4 B, cited by Quested, oR. cit., p. 46.
61 Quested, op. cit., p. 46.
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Only on July 24, 1854, did Archimandrite Pa11adi! complete a trans
,.
1ation of Muraviev's note that had been passed to him by the Secretariat
of the Chinese Grand Council.

It is possible that Muraviev had de1iber-,

ate1y dispatched it so late that it would be impossible for the Chinese
to prepare to take measures to oppose him; or it may simply have been de
layed by the

vagaries of the postal service in Mongolia. 62

From Aigun onwards the banks of the river were deserted, with the
exception of occasional sparse settlements of a few huts.
"

The inhabi

tants of these little villages as far down the river as its confluence
with the Ussuri, fled at the approach of the Russians, for they had been
instructed by the Chinese authorities at Tstitsigar to avoid encounters
with the Russians, not to hire themselves out as guides and, signifi
cantly, to avoid the left bank of the Amur. 63
Murav:1:ev's .expedition proceeded serenely down the river to the
Bureia confluence and past the mouths of the Sungari and the Ussuri, with
no untoward incident.

Two hundred versts below the Ussuri, a storm came

up that was so violent as to result in the foundering of a barge laden
with supplies.
river.

These were recovered and dried out on an island in the

It was at this point in its progress that the expedition, on

June 10, met with a small boat

carrying a Russian naval officer, Ensign

Zagradskii, who informed them that they were still some 500 versts from
Marinskii Post.

Neve1skoi had sent a message with him requesting a de

62IWSM , p. 25A, cited by Quested, who also cites Russki Arkhiv,
Vol. 2, 1914, recording that some new instructions awaited by Pa11adii
took from March 18 to July 5 to go from Kiakhta to Peking in that same
year.

63~aeiski Sibiri, otd. RGO, t. III, (Irkutsk, 1857), pp. 63-64,
cited by Kabanov, 0e. cit., p. 162.
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tachment of

a hundred cossacks from the expedition for stationing at

the mouth of the Khutari River, for maintenance of communications with
•

Imperatorskaia Gavan' ,-Emperor's Harbor_7.

Muraviev complied with this

request, and on June 14, arrived at Marinskii Post at the mouth of the
Amur.
From Marinskii, Muraviev sent 350 troops to Petropavlovsk on the
transports, tlDvina", and

.

Nikolaevsk.

tI

Irtysh", and sent the rest via the Amur to

He also detailed a sub-lieutenant and two hundred men to

build a road through a virgin forest of lOO-year old trees from Marinskii
Post to de Castries Bay, as a line of communication and supply for Russian
"
vessels at de Castries. It was a brutal task for the detachment, with
inadequate equipment and short rations.

The young officer and his ex

hausted men were more than once tempted to give up and return, but the
knowledge that Muravievts wrath would face them if they did so spurred
64
them on to the completion of their task.
Muraviev sent Karsakov to st. Petersburg to report on the success
ful conclusion of the expedition, and then proceeded to de Castries Bay.
Here he took the scooner, "Vostok", to Imperatorskaia Gavan', where
Admiral Putiatin was awaiting him to confer on orders from St. Peters
burg to bring Russian shipping from Japan to safe haven at the mouth
of the Amur.

Muraviev then reconnoitered the adjacent posts and other

points on the Amur estuary, and issued orders for defensive deployments
and fortifications.
When Karsakov arrived in St. Petersburg with the tidings of the
first expedition down the Amur, he was met by an emissary of the Officer
64Istoricheskii Vestnik, t. XXXVI, 1889, pp. 647-648, cited by
Ibid., p. 164.

•

140

•

of the Day at General Headquarters, who insisted that there was no time
for him to take a brief rest, to bathe and
•

m change

from his shabby

traveling clothes; Dolgoruki, the Minister of War" was impatiently await':'
ing an immediate briefing.

Accordingly, Karsakov proceeded directly to

the Ministry of War and there delivered Muraviev's written report to
Dolgoruki, who thereupon sent Karsakov to report to the Grand Duke Alex
ander at Tsarskoe selo, and to the Grand Duke Constantine in Strelna. 65

.

ttso now", said the Tsarevich, reading the end of Muraviev's report,
ttwe have a firm foothold on the Amur!"

And then, reading Muraviev's

comment that all the credit belonged to Nevelskoi, Kazakevich and Karsa
kov, he exclaimed, !tDid Muraviev forget himself?
credit:

He should have all the

Tomorrow morning I shall present you to the Emperor. n66 On the

following morning, he Tsar greeted Karsakov with an enthusiastic em
brace, and issued' orders that all members of the expedition be promoted,
decorated, or otherwise rewarded.

Karsakov was promoted to colonel,

Nevelskoi to rear admiral, and Kazakevich to captain first class.

Simi

lar promotions went to lower-ranking officers, and the troops received
67
three silver rubles per man.
In a happy letter to his brother, Valer
ian, Muraviev wrote that everything was finally on the right track, but
that the

way would still be hard, because there were many in St. Peters

burg who were against him.

He also wrote Karsakov to tell him that there

was so much to be attended to in Irkutsk that he could not spare the time
to go to st. Petersburg personally to receive citations, etc ••• for the
Amur exploit.

He added that his presence in Siberia would probably be

65sarsu'kov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 384.

66Ibid.

O~arsukov,

Ope cit., I, p. 386.
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required for another six years, and that he was prepared to make this
sacrifice for Russia. 68
III. PAHALYS!S OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
Muraviev had evidently taken the measure of the Chinese Government
much more accurately than had Nesselrode.

This might have been due, in

part, to the useful intelligence being provided by Archimandrite Palladii
of the Orthodox Mission in Peking, though why it did not equally impress
the nervous Nesselrode, to whom it was also available, is not clear.
Some of Palladiifs earlier reporting has already been noted.

Now,

on July 9, 1854, this priest-turned-political-analyst and agent, report
ed that there had been a meeting of the Grand Council to consider rela
tions with Russia.

At this meeting, the Emperor's younger brother had

taken a pro-Russian stance, pointing to the peace that had existed with
Russia since 1689, and to the fact that the Tsar had placed a ban on the
export of opium to China.

Palladii expressed the opinion that the Chi

nese would maintain a passive attitude in the face of Russiats designs
69
on the Amur.
The Archimandrite was also not above indulging in a little psycho
10cical warfare on his own.

During the

su~mer

of 1854, he worked hard at

spreading the belief - - which already existed in some Chinese governmen
tal quarters - - that the British were supporting the Taiping rebels,
while the Russian

Gover~~ent

stood behind the Manchus.

There was a mea

sure of truth in the latter part of this contention, at least insofar as
68Barsukov, op_ cit., I, pp. 386-387.

69R!:ls~Js,i...6.rkptv,

Vol. 3, 1914, p. 16.
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Muraviev was concerned, for 1n the spring of the year he ,had formed a
project to offer Russian military assistance against the rebels.

In pur

• suit of.this idea, he had attempted to send a staff officer, Colonel A.
I. Zaborinskii via the Amur and Sungari across Manchuria to Peking for the
purpose of initiating negotiations, as well as for the purpose of re
connoitering the Sungari area. 70 ..He had sent a Note to the Tribunal re
questing it to accept his emissary, and Palladii had followed this up,

..

but to no avail.

In one of his reports to Muraviev concerning his ef

forts, Palladii added that foreign relations in Peking were being conduct
ed so secretively that even the Tribunal, the normal agency for the con
duct of foreign affairs, was being kept in the dark by the Grand Council.
He

also reported that Shanghai and the entire southern portion of the

Middle Kingdom was in the hands of the insurgents.
Manchu regime was ,clearly rapidly deteriorating.

The position of the
At the same time, the

Chinese Government, so ignorant of the outside world, was fearfully
handicapped by its attempts to assess the degree of the Russian threat
and of Russian capabilities. Thus, Palladii reported, in the summer of
1854, a rumor had spread throughout the capital that a Russian flotilla
of 120 (:) vessels had smashed the British naval forces in the China
71
Sea.
While the Russians had hardly any naval forces worth mentioning,
either in the China Sea or elsewhere, they did have their defenses at
Petropav10vsk, organized and reinforced by Muraviev.
70A. 1. ZaborinskH, "Graf Muraviev-AmurskH, v.
Russkaia Starina, v. 38, p. 626.
71'
Russki Arkhiv, Vol. 3, 1914, p. 17.
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a Russian victory in this remote theater of the Crimean·War.

French squadron of seven vessels anchored on August 18, 1854, at the

!

"

f-

An Ang10

• entranee to the Gulf 'of Avacha. Following a four-day bombardment by the •
ships' 204 guns against 57 Russian ones, the allies disembarked some 100
men.

The Russian coastal batteries had been silenced, but their field

pieces supported a garrison, including temporarily enlisted civilians, of
something under a thousand men.

.

A fierce battle ensued culminating in a

bayonet charge by Muraviev's newly created Transbaika1 Cossacks, which
drove the enemy back to the sea.

Under cover of their ships' guns, the

British and French escaped in their landing boats, leaving four officers
and thirty-four enlisted men dead on the field.

Four men and a British

flag were captured; the Russians had lost thirty-one dead and eightyfour wounded.

The Anglo-French force made no further attempt to land,
72
and three days 1at.er sailed for the open sea.
Shortly after the victory, Muraviev learned from St. Petersburg
that there was a popular outcry in England and France, demanding that
another attempt be made to take the port.

He thereupon ordered the evac

uation of Petropav10vsk, presumably because there was no prospect of
quickly replacing the

destroyed coastal batteries and of sending suffi
cient munitions and supplies there. 73
On October 30, 1854, Muraviev sent a Note to the Chinese Government
72Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 279. Ravenstein gives a good description
of the battle and detailed accounts are to be found in A. P. Arbuzovts
"0borona Petropav10vskago Port' a v godu 1854 protiv Anglo-Frantsuzkoi
eskadry", Russkaia Starin.!, Vol. I, pp. 298-313, and in P. V. Shumacher's
"0borona Kamchatki i Vostochnoi Sibiri protiv Anglo-Frantsuzov v 1854
i 1855 godakh", in Russki Arkhiv (1878), Vol. II, pp. 393-425.
73aarsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 387.
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informing it of the successful conclusion of the
tion down the Amur.

-

firs~

Russian expedi

commented that "This note lacked sincerity", and expressed his conviction
that "the Russian barbarians have some intentions of which they do not
speak open1y".74

In that month, too, the Li-fan-yuan sent a Note denying

Muraviev's request to send Zaborinskii to Peking, whereupon Muraviev
dropped the matter. 75

.

In this same note, the Chinese requested that Rus·

sian representatives be sent to Urga to undertake a delimitation of the
frontier.

A month later, the Chinese Governor at Urga, Prince Te-1e-k'e

tuo-er-chi, unaware of the Note, informed Rehbinder, the Russian citygovernor of Kiakhta, that Chinese representatives wished to meet the Rus
sians on the Gorbitsa River for the de1imitation. 76
At this point, Muraviev obviously decided to take advantage of the
confusion and hesitancy within the Chinese Government evinced by these
conflicting communications.

Of primary concern to him now was the fur

ther consolidation of the Russian position on the AmurJ negotiations
could wait upon a stronger fait accompli.

He thereupon sent a Note on

February 18, 1855, as follows:
The English in the summer of the past year descended with
six (sic) vessels on our Kamchatka, but were repulsed and sent
away. Our great Lord and Emperor, concerned not only with
his realms and his people, but desirous of preserving the
welfare of the neighboring Dai-Tsing power, with whom we
have had friendly relations for over 200 years, in a recent
ly issued ukaz, has ordered me, as Governor-General of
Eastern Siberia, to take a 'sufficient number of troops,
74 IWSM, p. 12 B, cited by Quested, ob. cit., p. 49.
75 Ibid., p. 13 A.
7~usski Arkhiv, 1878, Vol. III, p. 279 •
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In an edict of January, 1855, the Manchu Emperor
I

l4!)
a

•

heavy and light artillery and other supplies and munitions and,
as soon as the River opens, to proceed to the sea and destroy
the crafty, selfish English. Fulfilling the will of my Sover·
eign, I am obliged to undertake an expedition to the mouth
of the Amur; if it suits the Tribunal to send a reply to this
communication to the mouth of the Amur, I s9al1'be happy to
take up delimitation of the frontier there. 7
On March 16, Muraviev's Note reached the Manchu Emperor, who replied with
a note in early April, asking Muraviev to go to Urga and from there, with
the Chinese delegates, to proceed to the Gorbitsa. 78

..

The Chinese made no preparations to offer resistance to Muraviev's
second expedition. "Indeed, the enfeebled Chinese regime could do nothing
to oppose it - - but it could not quite bring itself to lose face even
with its own officials.

Thus, when the new General of Heilungchiang,

I-ko, reported on the first Russian expedition down the Amur and sought
instructions for dealing with any repetition, the Emperor gave him the
following edict:
Russia in its communications with other nations, should, of
course, take the outer sea route and cannot be permitted to go
through the interior of our country. But during the ,fifth
month of the year, (1854), the vessels of the said country
were given passage. If their return should be blocked, they
would have a pretext for raising further complications. I-ko
is hereby ordered to keep a constant inspection and watch.
Should those vessels of the said country, which lately made
the passage, sail back along the Heilung River, they are to
be allowed to return without hindrance, provided no distur
bance is created in the regions they pass through. If there
should be more vessels coming down and they are not those
which made the passage previously, they should be told that
the rivers in the interior of our country cannot be used for
passage of foreign vessels, and that they decidedly shall not j
navigate on the Heilung River, so as not to engender misunder
standings. 79
77Barsukov,
78Quested,
79 Ibid •

Ope
Ope

cit., Vol. II, pp. 123-124.
cit., p. 50.
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• at the disposal
Quested points out the meagreness of the resources
of the Chinese in the area of Muraviev·s activities, by citing a memorial
•

from ,the General of Kirin, Ching-shun, which reached the throne in the
spring of 1855.

It reported that the total force to be put out for the

frontier delimitation from Heilungchiang and Kirin provinces, and from
Urga, would consist of some 400 men, but that their food, equipment, and

.

pay would have to be covered by borrowing from reserve funds; otherwise,
it would be impossible to keep them in field conditions. 80 Muraviev was
undoubtedly aware of the general situation that this reflected.

In a

letter of Mareh 23, 1855, Palladi! had informed him that the Taiping
rebels were tightening their hold in the south, that Hankow, Nanking,
and Shanghai were in their hands and that they had cut the government's
line of communications in central China.

He had also reported the Chi
nese Governmentts continuing and mounting financial distress. 8l
Muraviev replied to the Chinese Note of April with one on

~,~ay

8,

stating that because of the military situation, he would prefer to meet
the Chinese representatives for preliminary discussions at the mouth of
the Amur, where he would be until September.

He expressed agreement as
to the undesirability of delaying the matter. 82
.80 IWSM 10, p. 24 B, cited by Quested,
81Russki Arkhiv, 1914, p. 22.
82aarsukov,

Ope

cit., I,

p. 420.

Ope

cit., p. 51.
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CHAPTER V
THE ACTIVATION OF RUSSIAN POLICY
I. THE ROUT OF NESSELRODE

..

As Muraviev set out on the second expedition down the Amur, the
Chinese Government sent out a protest

against his activities.

It was

couched in cautious terms similar to those employed in the Emperorts
~

edict to the General of Heilungchiang, and avoided any threatening
statements.

At the end of May, 1855, the Chinese Emperor, having re

ceived Muravievts Note sent on the eve of his second expedition, replied
with a further and even more cautious protest.

This one stated that

Russian navigation of the Amur could be allowed only by mutual arrange
ment with the Russian Senate,and the Li-fan-yuan - - an important con
cession of principle. l I-ting also sent instructions to the Generals of
Kirin and Heilungchiang ordering them not to resist the Russian vessels,
but Umerely to instruct them not to cause a disturbance". 2 In a letter
to Muraviev at this time, Palladii hastened to point out the progress
ively milder tone of the Chinese Notes which, in any case, could not
have been lost on Muraviev. 3 Matters were now proceeding entirely to
his satisfaction.
1IWSM, 10, p. 37 B, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 52.

2IWSM, 10, p. 37 A, cited in IQ1£., p. 52.

Snusski Arkhiv, 1914, p. 504.
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The second Amur expedition was organized in three echelons.

The

first consisted of twenty-six vessels under Muraviev's personal command •

•

The second included sixty-four barges under Colonel Nazimov, with the
15th line battalion of infantry_

The third was made up of thirty-five

barges under the command of Colonel Korsakov.

It included additional

regular infantry and cossacks, as well as 'heavy fortress artillery for
the strengthening of the Nikolaevsk defenses.

These guns, brought fY.em

Ekaterinburg, had presented a tremendous overland transportation problem,
to

requiring up to sixty horses each.

Their weight occasionally broke

through the bottoms of the barges, causing them to sink; in portions of

.

the river where there were no trees on the banks, the problem of raising
them presented agonizing difficulties.
These three echelons represented a military force of some 2,500
men. 4 The third ~chelon of the expedition also contained the first group
of scientists on the Amur, made up of members of the Siberian branch of
the Imperial Geographic Society, whose expenses were being financed by:'
18 pounds of gold contributed by the merchant, Stepan Soloviev.

In

cluded too, under the care of Muraviev's special assistant, Volkonskii,
were the first settlers from Irkutsk and the Transbaikal, peasants who
would be making their homes in Mariinsk and Nikolaevsk.

Muraviev had

arranged for their recruitment by offering them a number of privileges.
These included freedom from obligatory military service, movement of their
household goods at government expense, provision of free government ra
tions for two years and "6f fifty rubles' worth of tools and agricultural
4Quested,

Ope

cit., p. 51, citing Nevelskoi.
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implements per family.

•

5

The settlers, four hundred and eighty-one men, women and children,
•

traveled on twelve barges, with accompanying barges carrying their cat- .
tle.

Additional barges were loaded with fodder, needed because there

was to be no stopping for pasturage.
The Amur pioneers suffered considerable hardship.

The rapid cur

rent of the Shilka made it impossible to tranfer fodder to the barges

..

transporting the cattle, with the result that by the time Albazin was
reached almost three hundred of them had died.
tacked the unfortunate peasants

7

••

A greater misery then at

typhus spread among them despite
.:

the "most favorable hygienic conditions, mild spring weather, covered
barges, hot meals with meat, fresh vegetables,

tea and a daily ration of

vodka".6 Despite these tribulations, on arrival at Marinskii Post there
were only two dead, while there had been four births en route.

Nevelskoi

had picked out a number of locations for settlement, but Volkonskii in
sisted on inspecting them first, together with some of the peasant el
ders.

Only one of the initially chosen sites turned out to be satisfac

tory, and eventually five locations were picked:

Irkutskoe, Bogorodskoe,

Mihailovskoe, Nov-Mihailovskoe and Sergeivskoe. Of these, four were on
the right bank of the Amur.

Despite ample food supplies and decent living

conditions in general, typhUS raged through these settlements throughout
the following winter, abating only with the onset of spring weather.
This, ramarks Barsukov, illustrated the widely held contention, "even in
England", that the first generation of settlers always suffers casualties
5sarsukov, Ope cit., I, pp. 417-418.
6I bid., I, p. 419.
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j

and it is only the second that obtains the full benefits of colonisation.
While proceeding by the Kumarskii ,Post on the Amuron May 12, the
•

expedition encountered four junks bearing the Chinese officials who had'
been sent to Gorbitsa for the setting up of boundary markers and frontier
negotiations.

Muraviev explained to them that it was essential for him

to reach the mouth of the river without delay and suggested that they
return to their base at Sakhalin-Ula-Khoton and await further instructions

.

from Peking.

They replied that they dared not fail to carry out the

orders of their Emperor.

Muraviev thereupon gave them protective passes
8
to be shown to his military commanders and proceeded down the river •

•

On May 15, Muravievts officials sent a Note to the Chinese gover
nor of Sakhalin-Ula announcing that Governor-General Muraviev was on his
way to the Eastern Ocean in order to defend the mouth of the Amur against
the English'f that accompanying him were one hundred and four 9 vessels,
including a steamerJ that three steamers would shortly be sailing back up
the Amur; and that the expedition was comprised of over 8,000 men, wo
men and children.

The vessels, the Note stated, bore cannon, other arms,

gunpowder and all manner of war materials.
not be held up.

It was requested that they

10

Muraviev, following his meeting with the Chinese officials at
skU

Kumar~

Post, stopped at Aigun to call on the Chinese commander there.

In

a subsequent report to Emperor Alexander II, he communicated his impress
ion that the Chinese Government had obviously ordered the commander at
7Barsukov, op.cit., I, p. 419.
~usski Arkhiv, 1878, Vol. III, p. 280.

9sarsukov's account, supra, indicated a total of one hundred and
twenty-five; the reason for the discr~pancy is not clear.
10

Barsukov, Ope cit., Vol. 1, p. 423.
~_,t4",~
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Aigun to permit free passage for the Russian vessels.• The commander
had also intimated that future navigation on the Amur "would not be al
•

lowed without special permission from the Chinese. Emperor".

Muraviev

further reported that he had parted from the Aigun commander on the
friendliest terms and had assured him that nothing would be um ertaken
without the consent of the Chinese Emperor, toward whom the Russian Em
peror's friendship remained unchanged.

..

On leaving, Muraviev had given

valuable presents to the Aigun commander and his officials. ll
Count Nesselrode now saw that the Amur question was passing beyond
his control.

He nevertheless made one last effort. On May 31, he wrote
.,
Grand Duke Constantine that he doubted that the Chinese would give up
the left bank of the Amur without going to war12•••this in the face
of the abundant evidence of Chinese impotence!

Muraviev, however, had

made a firm decision that if the Chinese, on the basis of the Foreign
Ministry's Note of June 16, 1853, should demand the setting up of the
boundary markers from the Gorbitsa, he would refuse.

He would state

that he had no orders to this &fect from the Tsar, that there was no
point in doing so, since the Amur constituted a natural boundary and
that he had so reported to the Tsar.

He would then tell the Chinese that

he was awaiting orders to undertake such negotiations as might prove pos
sible and convenient to both parties, keeping particularly in mind the
13
defense of the river from the enemy.
Muravievts unremitting arguments and efforts were finally bearing
11Barsukov, Ope cit., II, p. 130.
12aarsukov, op_ cit., I, p. 424.
13Schumacher, in Russki Arkhiv, 1878, Vol. III, p. 280.
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fruit.

In July, Grand Duke Constantine wrote him that • the Tsar had

reached the decision that in the interests of the development of Siberia,
Russia must have the entire left bank of the Amur',as well as the right'
to free trade in the northern regions of the Chinese Empire. 14 Mura
viev was to be entrusted with negotiating a treaty with China.
II. THE PRIAMUR IS TAKEN

•

The Emperor I-ting, having learned that Muraviev had gone on to
Marinskii Post without carrying out the frontier delimitation from the
Gorbitsa, ordered his officials to hasten down the river after him. 15 On

.

the following day the lfirst negotiations on the Amur commenced.

Muraviev,

who was not well, delegated responsibility to Rear-Admiral Zavoiko, who
informed the Chinese delegates

~at

the Russian Government was determin

ed to organize the defense of the Amur against foreigners, in order to
insure the security of the Eastern Siberian hinterland.

The lower rea

ches of the Amur, he announced, were occupied by the Russians and were
Russian possessions, while the lands lying east of the Amur were still
unde! imi ted.
Zavoiko went on to say that the Russian Emperor had ordered Mura
vied to establish a force of upwards of 100,000 troops16 in the region
entrusted to him, in view, on the one hand, of the necessity of preserv
ing and defending

the Amur, and, on the other, of the disorders that had.

recently arisen in the Chinese Empire.

He also served notice that the

14 Ibid., p. 281.
15IWSM , 11, p. 1 B et seg., cited by Quested, 0p. cit., p. 53.
16Muraviev was obviously convinced of the gullibility of the Chi
nese and of the non-existence of their intelligence services.

~_2.0~.
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defense of the Amur, entailing enormous outlays by Russia, could not be

•

merely a temporary measure. 17
•

On the following day, Muraviev spelled out Zavoiko's initially
stated position by stating that all places occupied by the Russians for
the purpose of defending the mouth of the Amur - - and the entire Amur,
maritime area, should remain permanently in Russiats possession and that
the Russians would need permanent settlements all along the .:river' s left

•

bank.

He demanded, too, that the Chinese recognize the'lright of the

Russians to

naviga~e

the Amur and suggested that the Fei-ya-ha and cer

tain other tribes owing allegiance to the chinese and inhabiting the
•
area claimed by Russia could be re-settled elsewhere in China. 18 The
Chinese representatives replied on September 11 that they had no author
ity to negotiate these points; they then read out the contents of the
Russian Note of

~une

16, 1853, which, they pointed out, clearly indica

ted that the Russian Government wished to preserve the frontier of 1689.
Muraviev's rejoinder was that similtaneously with the sending of that
communication, the Tsar had ordered him first to hold discussions on the
undelimited areas and only a fterwards to proceed to the actual boundary
demarcations. 19 He concluded by asking the Chinese delegation to inform
its Government that the main purpose of the RUssian Government was the
preservation of peace between Russia and China for all time.
17Barsukov,

Ope

He then

cit., I, p. 428.

l~bW.

19Ibid • There is no available record to indicate that Muraviev in
fact had received such instructionsJ it seems that he resorted to this
line as the most convenient way to counter the effect of the Note of
June 16, 1853, which, as has been noted, was sent by the Foreign Minis
try during his absence abroad.
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put the

Chines~.representatives

on notice that since •it was wartime, he

was obliged to send a third expedition down the Amur in the following
•

spring, in order further to strengthen the Russia,n defenses and to 1m '
prove communications with the interior. 20 Following this meeting, Mura
viev sent a Note to the Tribunal covering these points.

At the same time,

he wrote the Grand Duke Constantine, requesting him to have the Russian
senate address the Tribunal in similar terms, so that it would be quite
•

plain that he was acting on orders from the highest authority; otherwise,
in view of the Note of June 16, 1853, the Chinese might conclude that the
Russian Senate saw things differently from the way Muraviev did. 21
The Emperor I-ting, having received a report of the abortive dis
cuss ions at Marinskii Post, sent instructions to his representatives to
refuse Moraviev's demands, with the exception that they might consent to
temporary continuation of Russian operations at Marinskii Post while the
Russians defended the area against the English.

At the same time, he

expressed the opinion that the "Russians' hearts are unfathomable and
we fear that their nature is like that of dogs and sheep (bestial), so
that it will be difficult to talk reasonably with them".22 Shortly after
wards, the Chinese Emperor received a report from the Kirin General,
Ching-shun, to the effect that the Russians had erected "nearly a hun
dred" buildings at Marinskii Post, and that earthworks, palisades and
gun emplacements had been built; Ching-shun concluded his report by
stating that it was obvious that the Russians intended to seize the
20
1.lli,., p. 429.
21 Ib i d., p. 43:).
22 IWSM, 12, p. 9 B, cited by Quested, op. ct.,
i
p. 53.
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area. 23

In early December, 1855, the Emperor repeated that the left

bank of the Amur could not be yielded to Russia, and ordered his three
Northern Frontier generals, Te-le-kte-tuo-er-chi, I-ko, and Ching-shun, ,
to send Muraviev a joint Note so stating, for transmission to the Russian
Senate.

The generals were instructed to state in this Note that they

dared not transmit Muraviev's claims to the Emperor in Peking, apparent
ly a ploy meant to impress the Russian Government that China might react
violently "if such claims were presented to the Emperortt • 24
"

Ouring the fall of 1855, Muraviev had been continuing to take mea
sures to strengthen the Russian position at the mouth of the Amur. 25 He
had buildings constructed for the 47th Fleet Equipage, had additional
batteries set up at several locations, and expanded his troops' winter
quarters.

Nikolaevsk, which two years earlier had been little more than

an empty space in the wilderness, was now the center of Russian forces
on the Pacific.

Three separate forts were being constructed there, with
26
fifty-three pieces of artillery.
The need for these precautions was
23quested, op. cit., p. 54.
24 Ibid •

25At this time, too, Russo-Chinese relations were furthercompli
cated by an incident in Sinkiang. Some five to six hundred "vagrants",
subje"cts of the Chinese Emperor, plundered and burnt down a Russian
warehouse in the town of Tarbagatai. Six hundred Chinese and Manchu
troops were sent to the area and later reported that the ringleaders
had been captured and sentenced to 100 strokes of the heavy bamboo
cane, followed by exile if they survived". The Russian Government
demanded compensation for the losses suffered by its subjects, but the
nearly bankrupt chinese Government refused to pay. Correspondence be
tween the two governments continued for almost five years on this matter,
which became a factor of some importance in eventual treaty negotiations
between them. (See Quested, op. cit., p. 55).
26
Barsukov, op. cit., I, p. 433.
It
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evinced

by the presence in the Sea of Okhotsk of some twenty-two

French and thirty-four English vessels.

These, however, failed to deal

any serious blow to the Russians during this period, beyond capturing the
Russian-American Company's mail ship, the "Sitka tl , and setting fire to a
fish warehouse in Petropavlovsk. 27 The Chinese were now aware of the im
pressive Russian build-up, bJt could do nothing, as Muraviev learned
from Palladii, who reported that one of the Emperor's ministers had
stated that Russian fortifications on the Amur would be intolerable
but that at the same time, it would be impossible to enter into active
hostilities with Russia on such a pretext. 28
On October 30, 1855, while en route back from Ayan to Irkutsk, Mura
vlev wrote to his commander in the Transbaikal, Colonel Zaborinskii, tellIng him to commence preparations for the third expedition down the Amur.
He added that should the Chinese object to the expedition, it would be
necessary to demonstrate Russian power and readiness to move into Mongol
ia and Manchuria. 29 What probably prompted this observation - - in the
face of Palladii's reports from Peking - - was the continuing rumor,
being spread by Chinese merchants, that the Chinese Government was deter
mined to resist another Russian expedition and was sending troops for that
30
purpose from the south to the Amur region.
As a countermove in this
psychological warfare, Muraviev sent his assistant, Volkonskii, to Urga
ostensibly as a "courier tl , but in fact to bring an oral message to the
27 Ibid ., p. 436.

2~usski .\rkhiv, t-Jo. 10, 1914.
29Barsukov, op. cit.• , I, p. 438.
30Jbi1 ., I, p. 441.
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there, expressing Muraviev's appreciation for the cooperation of

the Aigun commander during the passage of the second Amur expedition.
•

He

was to state, if the conversation gave him an appropriate opening, that
Muraviev was calling in enormous forces from all parts of Eastern Siber
ia, since he considered that the enemy would be strengthening his own;
VolkonskH was then to deliver expressions of the highest este'em and
sentiments of friendliness for the Chinese Government.

.

He was also to

remark that Muraviev was prepared to help China against anyone, English
or French, should the Chinese Government request such help from his Gov
ernment.

Volkonskii was instructed, furthermore, to sound out the Chi

nese on their opinion and understandings about the current war, about the
Russians and Russia1s enemies, and to instill suspicion of the English,
who had seized India, Ita land no less great than China".

He was also to

inform the amban that Muraviev was departing briefly from Eastern Siber
ia, for a personal meeting with the Tsar in st. Petersburg, where Vol
konskii was shortly to join him.

Finally, he was to determine the accur

acy of the rumours that China intended to oppose the third Amur expedi
tion and was concentrating military forces to that end.
out these instructions jwith the utmost speed,

n even

He was to carry

at the cost of ignor

ing established rules of Chinese etiquette", and then to travel directly
to st. Petersburg, where Muraviev was now proceeding. 31
VolkonskiPs mission to Urga, where he was assisted by extremely
friendly Mongolian and Manchurian officials, revealed that no Chinese
military preparations were being made to resist another Russian move down
31!Q1£., p. 442-443.
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the Amur.

32

•
How correct his information was 1s revealed by a memorial to

the throne by the Kirin General, Ching-shun, received by the Chinese Em
•

peror on February "2, 1856.

Ching-shun reported that he could not as- ,

certain whether the British and French had been attacking the Russians
on the coast, since the area in question was "too far away from"our
military posts".

Except for the Lower Amur, where the Fei-ya-ha and

He-che tribes lived, the area was a remote wilderness, with "places where

..

no one has been".

Apart from the Marinskii Post, he was not certain

what points were occupied by the Russians.

On the military situation,

Ching-shun reported that "the troops in Heilungchiang Province are cer
tainly not many and provisions are scarce lt •
sions and the soldiers there were few.

Kirin, too, had few provi

There were 800 soldiers at San

hsing, Ninguta and Hunchun respectively; the allotted number of troops fer
Kirin Province was 10,105, but 7,000 had been transferred to other parts
of China, and of these only 800 had returned.

Ching-shun urgently re

quested 2,000 men to reinforce the garrisons at sanhsing, Ninguta and
Hunchun, but the Emperor, preoccupied with the rebellion in the south,
declined to send them. 33
Shortly before Muravievts arrival in St. Petersburg, the Russian
Foreign Ministry received the Note from the Governors of Kirin, Heil
ungchiang, and Urga that the Emperor, I-Ting, had ordered them to send.
(See above, p. 155). Referring to the Foreign Ministry's Note of June 16,
1853, (the one to which Muraviev had taken such violent exception),
Note

stated:

"We sent out officials, but

34sarsukov,

Ope

your Governor-General, for

cit., I, p. 444.

33IWSM, 12, p. 24 A, cited by Quested,

the

Ope

cit., p. 58 •
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•
purposes of defense against attacks by the English fleet, occupied sev

eral towns and settlements on the Sungari River which have been paying
•

tribute to our Emperor.

Muraviev is definitely nO,t concerned with main-'

taining the friendly agreement and peace of two

h~ndred

years' standing,

and we therefore request that you explain matters to Muraviev. H34 The
Note also contained the statement (in accordance with the instructions of
the Chinese Emperor) that the Governors "did not dare" memorialize Mura

.

viev's demands to the Emperor.

This evidently did succeed in causing

some concern within the Foreign Ministry, which decided that Russian
claims should be limited to free navigation on the Amur only.35 Alex

•

ander II ordered postponement of any reply to the Chinese Note until re
ceipt of a reply to a Russian Note claiming compensation for the Tarbagatai
ware-house that had been sent on December 14, 1855.

Muraviev, however, on

arriving in st. Retersburg, convinced the Tsar that the Foreign Ministry's decision should be rejected irrespective of the Chinese position on
the Tarbagatai incident.

He ,obtained full authority to negotiate a

treaty with the Chinese Government.
The Tsar ordered that navigation on the Amur be continued, and that
artillery and arms be offered the Chinese as compensation.

He cautioned

that resort to force be avoided, or at least that it be employed only
in order to free any Russian prisoners who might be seized by the Chi
nese, he pointed out that under such circumstances, "rapid and decisive
measures" would be preferable to becoming involved in lengthy correspon
dence which, by Chinese custom, would be dragged out for years. 36
34nusski Arkhiv, 1878, Vol. III, p. 284.
35~.
3~

v~arsukov, Ope

cit., I, p. 446.
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•

MUraviev immediately sent instructions to Irkutsk to organize for
the next expedition.

Following detailed instructions concerning various

aspects of the preparations, including the use of a small steamer de
livered from America, he clearly spelled out the need for firmness

in

the face of any objections that might be voiced by Chinese officials,
and instructed his staff to explain to them that the Russian Senate had
sent a written communication regarding the expedition to the Tribunal.

•

They were, furthermore, to point out that Russian navigation on the Amur
would be an annual event, despite the conclusion of the Crimean War.

37

Muraviev prolonged his stay in st. Petersburg in order to obtain
•
full particulars on the peace settlement, and to gather information on the
important changes in the upper echelons of the Government that were ex
pected following the end of the war.

He knew that Nesselrode, Oolgo

rouki and Brok would be replaced, and was anxious to learn with whom he
would be dealing in the future.

The third expedition, therefore, would

be proceeding down the Amur.without him, under the command of

Lieuten~nt

Colonel Busse, while Muraviev would depart for Marienbad to take the
waters, since his health was again failing him.

Before leaving st.

Petersburg, he ordered the despatch from Irkutsk of two Notes to the
Chinese.

The first, which reached I-Ting on February 26, asserted that

if Russian troops remained in the Amur area they would be "very strict

ly controlled"; the second firmly announced that a new expedition was to
take place. 38 Upon receipt of Muraviev's second Note, I-Ting issued two
edicts, one stating

that the Russian expedition could not be permitted,

37Ibid., pp. 447-448.

38 IWSM 12, p. 27 Band IWSM 13, p. 7 B, cited by Quested,
p. 59.

Ope

cit.,
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•
the other ordering Te-l-k'e-tuo-er-chi to take "strict precautionary
•

•

measures", and not to allow the Russians "to cause trouble", if they did
come again in force. 39
Prior to embarkation of the third expedition, Karsakov came to
Aigun and was met by Chinese officials, who offered him their hospitali
ty, but said they had no instructions regarding permission for navigation
of the river. They said they would nevertheless interpose no objection,
even though this might cause trouble with their Government.
however, that there. be no stations established on the way.

They asked,
Karsakov re

plied that he had to establish such stations on Muravievts orders, and

n

suggested that for their self-protection, they inform the Chinese Govern
ment of this. 40
The communications from Muraviev preparing the Chinese for the
third Amur expedition, the Chinese Emperor's edicts and the bearing of
the Chinese officials at Aigun were all clearly the components of an
elaborate little play in which the Russians were asserting their will,
while at the same time discreetly helping the
to save

face.

tottering Chinese regime

Muraviev must have been reasonably certain that the Chi

nese Emperor's resistance to his policy was that of a "paper tiger",
and that, in fact, if the Russians did not actually invade Chinese ter
ritory south of the Amur, they would run into no physical opposition.
It was shortly before Busse took the third Russian expedition down
the Amur that Palladii reported to Muraviev on the replacement of I-ko,
the General of Heilungchiang, who was ill, by I-Shan, a member of the
39

IWSM, 13, p. 8 A, cited by Quested,

40Barsukov,

Ope

-__._ ..
..

OPe

cit., p. 59.

cit., I, p. 452.
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Imperial family.

I-Shan had been unsuccessful in resisting the English

in Kwantung in 1842.
--.

Failing to lift the seige of Canton in 1843, he

had been sentenced to death, then pardoned and made General of Ili in
1845.

There, he had concluded the Kul-dja Treaty, excluding the Russians
from Kashgar, and had redeemed himself before his Government. 4l Palladii,

on April 22, 1856, reported to Muraviev that he knew that I-shan had
accepted his new appointment very unwillingly, and had delayed his de
parture from Peking for some time, hoping that the new Russian

•

down the Amur would go by before he assumed his new post.

~pedition

In the same

report, Palladii expressed the opinion that the Peking Cabinet was vaci
llating in its policy on the Amur and was, furthermore, much concerned
over the Tarbagatai incident which, it feared, might give the Russians
a pretext for drastic action.
a quandary,

His analysis was that the Chinese were in

they,feared the collapse of the regime and wished to avoid

any action that would speed the dissolution of the Empire, but they also
dreaded retaliation by the English, should they take steps favorable to
Russia.

Under the circumstances, Palladii concluded, the Chinese Govern

ment fervently wished that its domestic disorders and its difficulties
with the Russians on the Amur could be hidden from the outside world. 42
Muraviev's confidence, which permitted him to go to Europe, leaving
I

the third Amur expedition in the hands of a lieutenant colonel, was amply
justified.

The expedition, including 1,660 troops, arrived off Aigun on

May 21, 1856, and was well received by the Chinese officials.

They stated

41 A• W. Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Dynasty (Wash
ington, 1943-1944), cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 60.
42Russki Arkhiv, Vol. 3, 1914.
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that they had no authority to let the Russians pass, but would do so.
"because of the friendship between their two countriestr.

•

They also

·made some pro forma objections to Bussests declared intention to estab
lish additional bases and stockpiles on the lower Amur, and requested
him not to let his troops do injury to Chinese subjects; they also asked
to be kept informed of the numbers of Russian troops in the
told
6

re~ion..

Busse

them there were some 10,000 on the Arnur estuary, and that 5,000

more would be added. 43
As the Russians.proceeded down the river, they set up stations at
Kamarskii Post (at the mouth of the Kamar River), Zeiskii Post (at the
mouth of the River Zeia) and Khinganskii Post (near the little Katin Ri
ver).

The triumvirate of Chinese frontier governors were left nonplussed,

and the expedition triumphantly proceeded to the mouth of the Amur, se
cure in the knowledge that the Chinese Government was powerless. 44 Dur
ing the summer and early fall of 1856, Russians sailed up and down the
Amur, and traveled on the left bank as it suited them, while the Chinese
authorities merely sent in reports on estimated numbers of Russian troops
and ships that they observed. 45
One of the Russian troop movements during this period ended in
disaster, and was seized upon by Muraviev's detractors as "evidence" of
his incompetence.

Upon confirmation of the Peace of Paris, Muraviev, be

fore going abroad on leave, ordered a large number of his troops to re
'turn up the Amur from its mouth.

The movement was poorly planned and

43Ibid ., pp. 285-286.
44garsukov, Ope cit., p. 452.
45
IWSM 13 and 14, cited by Quested,

Ope

cit., p. 62.
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initiated too late in the season.

Insufficient supplies, anQ ice 1n the

river which immobilized their boats, resulted in the death of some two
hundred unfortunate soldiers who were returning to be demobilized.

With

Muraviev in Europe, his deputy, Karsakov, was of course responsible, but
individuals like Zavalishin preferred to

write in outraged towns about

Muraviev's Itbungling".46
Muraviev returned to Russia at the end of the summer of 1856, going

to Moscow for the coronation of Alexander II.

He wrote to Karsakov from

there, mentioning that his sight and hearing were beginning to fail him
and telling him to prepare for a visit to Irkutsk by Americans interested
47
in trade with Eastern Siberia.
During the coronation, political prisoners in Siberia, including the
Decembrists, weI'e pardoned and allowed to return from exile, and Muraviev
sent Prince volkonskii, who had joined him in Moscow, to Siberia to bear
these glad tidings.

It was at the coronation, too, that Muraviev re

ceived yet another decoration, the Order of Alexander Nevskii.
nevertheless, was low.

His morale,

He was piqued at what he regarded as the insigni

ficant role he was assigned in the coronation ceremonies, and was

con~

vinced that he had enemies close to the throne who were doing everything
possible ,to deprecate the importance of his achievements in Eastern Si
beria. 48 What particularly wounded his pride was the elevation of Prince
Bariatinskii to the rank of full general, though that close confident of
46Zapiski Priamura, otd. ROO, t.V, b. III, p. 26, cited by Kaba
nov, and Russki Arkhiv, Vol. 16, 1878, pp. 420-425.
'
47Barsukov,

Ope

48 Ibid., p. 470.

cit., I, p. 469.
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the Tsar was junior to him in terms of military service.

He and Prince

Suvorov, also senior to Bariatinskii, went so far as to submit their
• resignations from the army, but these were not accepted by Alexander II. 49
During his stay in St. Petersburg, during the fall and iwinter of
1856, Muraviev vigorously pursued tmur matters.

What particularly pre

occupied him now was the need to settle the Amur area, to provision the
troops at the mouth of the river, and to deploy detachments of "hunter

• cossacks" at stragegic points at the mouths of the Zeia, at Ust-Stre1ka,
the mouth of the Bureia, opposite the Sungari and the Ussuri, and one
near Marinskii Post, the Amur Regiment.

He also hoped for assignment

of additional regular infantry and cavalry, and of cossack artillery,
'tfor tt , he wrote to Karsakov, "the Chinese Government is by no means sta
b1e, and it might easily happen that we shall have to move into China
• 50

h e land route."
vat
i

In another letter to Karsakov on December 1, 1856, Muraviev wrote
that finally, not only the Emperor and the Grand Duke Constantine, but
all the Ministers (including Prince A. M. Gorchakov, Nesse1rode's able
successor), had been won over to his view regarding the Amur question,
which, he said, would be henceforth "handled in such a way as to recom
51
pense Russia for all that she had suffered at the hands of the west".
Thanks to the unanimous support that Muraviev now enjoyed, he was
able to bring about an administrative reorganization in keeping with
the progress made in occupying and settling the Amur.
49Russkaia Starina, 1882, p. 525.
5OSarsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 475.

51 Ibid., I, p. 479.
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He obtained the
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Tsar's approval of the establishment of the Maritime Region of Eastern
Siberia, encompassing Kamchatka, and the Ud and Priamur districts.
Headquarters for the region were established in Nikolaevsk, by that
time a flourishing little town.

Its streets were full of shops, in-

eluding those of Americans and other foreign traders.
available there, at a price.

Everything was

A shipyard was turning out sloops built

of fine virgin oak from the surrounding forests, and "better than any
thing made in Kronstadt".

A handsome church was nearing completion,

and the town already boasted a clubhouse as a center for the social life
of the local merchants, officials and visiting sea captains. 52
Thus, by the end of the year, 1856, official action had been taken
to confirm that the mouth of the Amur was a Russian dependency, and that
the Priamur was a part of Russia's possessions in Asia.

Muraviev's

exertions in pursuit of his obsession, assisted by the British threat
occasioned by the Crimean War, had finally made the annexation of the
AmuI' region an accomplished fact.
III. THE ARROi'] WAR SPEEDS FINAL SOLUIIONS
The Crimean War had been a significant factor in untying Mura
viev's hands and permitting him to reach a de facto solution of the Amur
52Arkhiv Bestuzhevich, f. 6:)4, cited by Kabanov, OPe cit., p. 174.
See also, Pisma ob Amurskom Kraye, Russki Arkhiv (1895), Vol. I, p. 374,
an article attribu-l;.ed to Engineer-Colonel Dmitri Ivanovich Romanov, in
which Admiral Putiatin, en route to Japan, is depicted as being enthus
iastic at the changes wrought in the two years that had passed since
his initial visit there - - dinners of a quality "hard to exceed in
Paris", fine buildings, an excellent ship yard, etc ••• Putiatin, in a
report from there, urged the Government to provide at least 600 pieces
of artillery for the area's defense, twenty river steamers and a tele
graph line. He pressed the Government to repose unlimited confidence
in Muraviev, and to make generous prOVision of funds at his disposal.
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question.

•

His successful expeditions down the river, his annexation of

the Amur delta, and the defense of Petropavlovsk, contrasted with Rus
•

siat's defeat in the crimea, moreover, forced the authorities in St.
Petersburg to give greater weight to Far Eastern matters and to take more
account of Muraviev's activities and plans.

England, furthermore, whose

actions had smoothed the way for Russian occupation of the Amur, was now
taking further action in china that would give Muraviev a splendid oppor

•

tunity to obtain legal sanction of that occupation •
The treaty extracted from China by England in 1842, had become all
53
but inoperative by the early l850 t s.
That treaty, as well as a,imilar

•

ones obtained in subsequent years by the French, the Americans, Belgians
and Swedes, was unsatisfactory to both the Chinese and to the foreigners.
The five open ports, Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai, were
the only locations in which the foreigners were allowed to reside; they
were not allowed·to travel in the interior and had no diplomatic access
to the Government in Peking.

The Chinese had promised to undertake re

vision of the treaties within twelve years (with the implication that
restrictions would be relaxed), but they had no desire to do so; the
treaties had been forced on them, and they were determined to comply with
them only to the extent that they were compelled to do so.

The British,

moreover, continued to ply their trade in opium, a circumstance that
heightened the tension between the sullen Chinese and their unwelcome
"barbarian" guests.

Thus, following conclusion of the Crimean War, Eng

land prepared to send her envoy, Lord Elgin, supported by strong armed
53A detailed analysis of the factors contributing to the break
down of the Treaty System is contained in John K. Fairbank, Trade and
Diplomacy on the China Coast, 1842-1854 (Harvard University Press,
1953), pp. 267-368 •
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•
forces, to China to wring new concessions from the hapless Celestial
Empire.

•

In this venture, she was being joined by her junior partner,

France.
Muraviev sensed that the time had come to consolidate his gains.

In

January, 1857, he wrote the Foreign Ministry requesting speedy permission
to transport cossack settlers down the Amur.

On February 9, Prince A. M.

Gorchakov, the Foreign Minister, wrote Muraviev that no time should be
lost in settling outstanding questions between Russia and China, but he

"
demurred at Muraviev's proposal to move substantial numbers of cossacks '
to the left bank of the Amur.

Grand Duke Constantine overrode Gorcha

kov, however, and at the end of that month, permission to settle three
hundred men of the Amur Cossack Regiment was granted by Alexander 11. 54
In the following spring, these men and their families, as well as two
hundred families from Ust f -Stre1ka and Gorbitsa, some twenty-four hun
dred people in all, were sent down the Amur. 55 By the end of the year
1857, there were approximately three thousand Russian settlers and sol
diers at fifteen stations along the left bank of the Amur, eKc1usive of
the estuary itse1f. 56
Even while the English were making final preparations for sending
Lord Elgin to china, they were presented with a pretext for forcible
intervention.

On October 8, Chinese authorities in Canton seized the

vessel "Arrow", under the British flag, that was carrying "contraband"
(opium?).

The Governor-General of canton refused to return the ship,

54sarsukov, Ope cit., II, pp. 148-150.
55zapiski Priamura, ots. ROO, V, v. III, p. 31, cited by Kabanov,
Ope cit., p. 173.

56Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 173.
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and on October 28, the English bombarded Canton.

•

Chinese reprisals took

the form of a boycott of English goods, destruction of English mer
•

chants' warehouses ~ and murder of BriUsh subject,s by gangs rioting in '
the streets of the city.

The English thereupon seized Shanghai.

Thus

began the "Arrow War", and another defeat of China.
Prince Gorchakov quickly perceived that the new turn of events in
China opened the way for "activation" of Russian policy in the East.

..

This was the time to put pressure on the Chinese and to obtain their
formal agreement to Muraviev's actions on the Amur. 57 Admiral Putiatin,
~a-dog

the old

turned diplomat, set forth Gorchakov's views in a meet

ing with Grand Duke Constantine, who was traveling abroad at the end of
the year 1856.

The new Foreign Minister urged early negotiations with

the Chinese before the English, French and Pmericans took Peking, and
"included the Amur among the rivers on which they would have free navi
gation

lt

•

58

A few

weeks later, E. P. Kovaleskii, a Mongolian expert

and Director of the Foreign Ministry's Asiatic Department, wrote Gorcha
kov, stating that while he considered it impossible for Russia to join
the Anglo-French expedition against China, it was also impossible for
Russia to remain entirely aloof from the developing situation.

For, wrote

he,
The taking of Peking by the Europeans, just as the ,taking of
Herat by the English, would be a matter of equal sensitivity
to us, and one to which we could under no circumstances re
main indifferent. The former would paralyze all that we are
undertaking on the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Amur,
57Krasny Arkhiv, Vol. ,XXI, 1926, p. 189.
58VMA, f. 410, d. 1159, 1.370, cited by Kabanov, op. cit.,
p. 178. Putiatin was Naval Attache in London at this time.

•

•
the latter would bring the English to power in Central Asia. 59
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Gorc,hakov concurred in Kovalcvskii 'fs analysis, and sent it to the Tsar on •
January 22, 1857.

In this month, too, Grand Duke Constantine wrote Gor

chakov from Hanover, endorsing the view that no time should be lost in
sending a Russian plenipotentiary to China in order to reach formal agree
ment on the frontier question, and to preclude, if possible, the pre
sence in Peking of English and French Residents.

He subsequently wrote

~

to Muraviev concerning British and French plans to send additional
naval forces into Chinese waters, and informed him that Putiatin would
60
probably be sent to negotiate with the Chinese.
Putiatin was designated as Russia's envoy to china in February,
1857.

A Note from St. Petersburg was sent to Peking to inform the Em

peror I-ting tha,t the admiral held plenipotentiary powers to negotiate
on all matters outstanding between Russia and China.

The Note added

that Russia did not wish that China's external and internal difficul
ties should lead to trouble on her own frontiers. 6l

The ~ at Urga,

through which town the Note was despatched, wrote in a covering memo
rial to the throne that, "unless we first receive written authorization
from the Li-fan-yuan, it will be impossible to allow them to cross the
frontier'·. On this memorial I-ting simply wrote, "Noted". 62
Putiatin's mission was not at all to Muraviev's liking.

He feared

59
Krasny Arkhiv, vol. XXI, 1926, pp. 188-189.
60sarsukov, op. cit., I, p. 483.
61 Schumacher, op. cit., pp. 286-287, and Krasny Arkhiv, Vol.
XXI, 1926, p. 189.
62
.
IVJSM, 15, p. 7 A, cited by Quested, op. cit., p. 72.
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that it would hobble his own progress just at the time• that the Chinese
government was showing signs of giving in to Russian pressure.

-.

become increasingly convinced that there was nothing to

He had

be gained from'

lengthy discussions with the Chinese, and that the time had come br
imposing Russia's will in the matter of "recovering" the "Russian River
Amur".

He was mindful of the late Emperor Nicholas' remark to him in

1853 that "the Chinese must accede to our just demands, and if they
don't wish to do so, you now have the troops and we can force them to.,,63
'"

Having returned to Irkutsk in early 1857, Muraviev proceeded to
take precautions to deal with the situation, should Putiatin's mission
~

fail.

He wrote the Ministry of War requesting the bringing up to strength

of three of his line battalions of regular troops.

He also wrote Karsa

kov, in the Transbaika1, of his detailed plans to move in the fall,
should the need arise, with the line battalions and with cavalry, against
the Chinese •. For at this point, Muraviev was envisioning the eventual
separation of Manchuria and Mongolia from China, as two princedoms under
Russian protectorate. 64
In March, 1857, Muraviev wrote Grand Duke Constantine expressing
his reservations about Putiatin's mission.

He pointed out that there was

a good chance that the Chinese would refuse to make any formal concess
ion regarding the frontier, not only because of "their well-known stub
bornness", but also out of fear of having then to make similar concess
ions to the British and French.

He informed him, too, of his preparations

to take the field, should developments indicate that to be necessary; he
63Schumacher, Ope cit., p. 288.
64Barsukov, Ope cit., I, pp. 485-486.
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added that the Russian position at the mouth of the Amur was now very
solid, indeed, no less so than at Kronstadt, in comparison with the
forces that the enemy could direct at either p1ace. 65
Muraviev made impressive preparations for meeting Putiatin, and
for escorting him with pomp and elaborate protocol to Kiakhta with Cos
sack cavalry, artillery, etc•• "The more noise and showy ceremony there
is for the meeting with Putiatin, the more will our silly neighbors be
impressed", he wrote to Karsakov. 66 "On the day of his arrival in
Kiakhta, the town must be illuminated.

He will be received at his quar

ters by an infantry company with the flag, music and two batteries of
artillery; at the customs house there must be a
with two batteries."

sotni~

of Cossacks, also

In another letter to Karsakov, Muraviev remarked

that "Putiatin is not a bad sort, but it is unfortunate that he is be
coming involved in the Amur question, which

he may harm.,,67

65 Ibid., I, p. 488.
.
66 Ibid ., I, p. 493.
67lli.Q.., Muraviev was obviously chagl'ined at Putiatin's assignment
to the resolution of a problem for which he, Muraviev, had earlier had
full responsibility. And, in truth, this procedure could have led to
all sorts of malcoordination and confusion. As for Putiatin's qualifi
cations, however, Muraviev's objectivity could be questioned. Born in
1803, Putiatin had begun his naval career by sailing around the world
under M. P. Lazarez, from 1822 to 1825. He h ad continued on active
service for seventeen more years, participating in many naval engage
ments, including the battle of Kavarino. Then, in 1842, he had headed
an armed diplomatic mission to Persia, establishing diplomatic rela
tions and trade cocnlllunications between Persia and Russia. In the fol
lowing year, he had proposed that the Russian Governr.1ent equip an
exped ition for the establishment of maritime trade with China, as well
as for demarcation of the Russo-Chinese frontier and for the location
of new ports on the coast of northeast Aiia. This had been SUCCQSS
fully opposed by the Minister of Finance, Kantrin, who feared unfav
orable repercussions on the Kiakhta trade. Between 1852 and 1855,
Puti~tin again circumnavigated the globe and concluded the Treaty of
Shlmoda, establishing dip10m3tic and commercial relations between

173

•

Putiatin's primary task was to obtain recognition of Russia's po
session of the left bank of the Amur, and, her right to free navigation
•

on the river.

He was also

~arged

with securing agreement to establish-'

ment of a diplomatic mission in Peking, to obtain the right for Russia
to trade in the five treaty ports, and to send caravans to Peking, as
had been done in the past, and to maintain warehouses .at various loca
tions in western china, together with a courier service connecting them

..

through Mongolia with Russian territory.

In return,

he could offer

withdrawal of Russian claims for compensation for the Tarbagatai inci
dent, as well as of Russian claims for tax payments by the nomads of the
Urianghai-Dvoedants area of Mongolia and Sinkiang, contiguous to Ieni
seisk and Tomsk provinces.

He could also offer Russian cooperation in

assuring that these tribes paid tribute to china.

Russia would also

agree that caravans proceeding to western areas of China would not go
beyond Urga, if other caravans were allowed to go to Peking.

Putiatin

was empowered, furthermore, to offer Russian arms and military instruc
tors to help China defend Manchuria, if Peking requested such help, and
on the prior condition that the Amur question and other problems were
satisfactorily resolved. 68
Russia and Japan. It was during this expedition, too, that he surveyed
the eastern shores of Korea and the islands adjacent to it. For his
success in opening up Japan to Russian diplomacy and commerce, he was
made a count in December, 1855. (See Entsiklopedicheski Slovar, Vol. 50,
pp. 817-818.
68Krasny Arkhi v, Vol. XXI, p. 191, and VMA f .410, d. 1159,:' 11,
400-410, cited by Kabanov, who points out that the arms offer was mean
ingless, since, if the Taiping rebels got to Manchuria, the Ch'ing
regime would be finished. (Kabanov, op. cit., p.l80)
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Putiatin's instructions made it clear that Russia would intervene
militarily in inhabited areas of the Chinese Empire only with great
reluctance and

as a last resort.

As for cooperation with

the Western

Powers, he was told that, "If the course of your negotiations shows defi
nitely that they can be expected to succeed, you may undertake coopera
tion with the western Powers, as an extreme measure, extending, however,
moral influence only and never promising material support".69
Strict secrecy surrounded the objectives of Putiatin's mission;

t.

the public, as well as foreign diplomatic missions in st. Petersburg,
were informed that he was departing to "seek a harbor in the Amur re
gion".70
When it became apparent that no Chinese answer to the Note an
nouncing Putiatin's appointment would be forthcoming, Muraviev sent
two of his officers and an interpreter to Urga to explain the reasons
for Putiatin's mission.

A Note was also sent to the amban of Urga, Te-le

k'e-tuo-er-chi, announcing that Putiatin's arrival in Kiakhta was
mente

The

~

sent a memorial to the Emperor reporting that:

Through Tatarinov (the interpreter), I questioned the Rus
sian adjutant in detail as to what business he had to trans-:
mit. He said that they had heard that the English, in league
with the French barbarians, were proceeding from Shanghai to
Tientsin to invade our territory, and that they were consid
ering how the defenses of our two countries could be carried
out. That is why they are sending an envoy to meet the
princes and high officials in our capital, and to confer with
them. 7l
69Krasny Arkhiv, Vol. XXI, p. 192.
7OSarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 484.
7l IWSM , 15, p. llA, cited by Quested, OPe cit., p. 73.
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•

He expressed suspicion of the Russians, as well as his opinion that

.•

Putiatin should be refused entry.

The Emperor I-ting's COmment on this,

in an' edict to his Grand Councillors, was as follows:
The Russians' nature is very crafty. As for their state
ment that the English barbarians are banding together with
all the nations and want to come to Tientsin, and they
therefore wish to send someone to the capital for secret
talks, it cannot be but that they are seizing the oppor
tunity to inspire us with panic. They want to seize the
territory beyond the Hei1ungchiang. Also, they intend
72
to demand compansation for the Tarbagatai warehouse goods. .

0\

I

I-ting ordered the Li-fan-yuan to send a Note to Russia stating that
there was no pUI'pose in sending a high official to his capital: The
Note

added that, "WhEm:the English barbarians caused trouble before,

China undertook to defend herself and did not ask help from other coun
tries.

When other countries quarreled amongst themselves, China never

paid any attention.

Moreover, there are no secret and important mat

ters to be discussed with Russia, since Russia is very sincere in main
73
taining good relations".
I-ting's officials were instructed to stop
the Russians from sending an ambassador "by reasoning", if they snll
persisted after receiving the Li-fan-yuan's Note.

Further exchanges of

Notes, in which Putiatin and Muraviev both participated, brought no
satisfaction to Putiatin, who thereupon served notice on the Chi~ese
that if they did not agree by May 10 to his passage to Peking through
Mongolia, he would proceed to China via the Amur and the sea.
tin received an unsatisfactory reply from the
.72 IWSM, 15, p. 12 B, cited by Quested,

~

Ope

Putia

of Urga, and on

cit., p. 74.

73Ibid., 15, p. 13 B, cited in ibid.
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May 16, he and

•

Mu~aviev

left Kiahkta and with two battalions of infan
try and a division of artillery, sailed down the Amur • 74

•

Before leaving Kiakhta, Putiatin wrote Gorchakov, proposing that
in view of China's intransigence regarding his mission, Russian forces
should seize the town of Aigun.

He expressed the view to Muraviev that
75
this should be done even without permission from St. Petersburg. d~ura-

viev did not agree, although he had earlier been contemplating the even
~

tual invasion of Manchuria and Mongolia.
undertake other, less agressive, measures.

He was, however, prepared to
Gorchakov had earlier writ

ten him that no time should be lost in resolving outstanding differences
with China, and that if efforts to achieve this by agreement ran into
76
obstacles, "decisive measures of some sort should be undertaken.
Muraviev had proposed large-scale settlement of cossacks on the left
bank of the Amur; 'Gorchakov had deemed this to be premature, but he had
been overriden by Grand Duke Constantine.

Thus, while Putiatin took

ship from Nikolaevsk for the Gulf of Peche1ii, Muraviev remained in
Ust-Zeisk, directing resumption of further settlement of the left bank
of the.·.Amul'.

Four hundred and fifty cossack families were deployed

from Ust'-Strelka to the foothills of the Lesser Hingan, while a bat
talion ·of regular infantry, and a division of light artillery made camp
at Ust-Zeisk.

In writing to Kova1evskii regarding his action, Muraviev

commented that since the Chinese had refused Putiatin passage through
Mongolia, such settlement should proceed, not only for political reasons,
74garsukov, op. cit., I, p. 493.
75
~., I, p. 494.
7~rasny Arkhiv, Vol. XXI, 1926, p. 189.
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..
but in order to establish winter communications between the detachment
at Ust-Zeya and the Transbaika1.
•

"Thus", wrote he, "we shall have

turned Chinese stubborness to our advantage and will build a fortifi
cation directly opposite 1\19un.77 Muraviev also took care, at this time,
of

~e

dearth of women in Niko1aevski •. He ordered the despatch there

of sixty

..

female convicts, who were married en masse to male settlers

going there on barges down the Amur. This practice he followed for
78
some years after,
which naturally earned him the shocked disapproval of
individuals dedicated to besmirching his reputation.
Concerning the expanded settlement

~tivities,

one of Muravievts
~

staff officers wrote Karsakov that:
the (Chinese) people know nothing of our ambassadorial
mission and the Chinese refusal to receive it has been kept
secret. The people know nothing of it, and all are aston
ished that the Russians have dared to move along the Amur t
and that .they are settling and building towns. The Chinese
dare not oppose it because they are weak and afraid. The
government is on the brink of bankruptcy. They fear Mura
viev like fire, and say that the General will do anything
he jwishes and that if he should get the idea of doing them
harm it will be difficult for them to save themselves.
The state of their morale 1s much 1n our favor. 79
Clearly, Muraviev was assessing the situation accurately.

The Chinese

authorities, confronted with a fait accompli, could do nothing, but des
perately evaded any formal agreement, fearing the reaction of their own
people.

Muraviev felt free to proceed as he had planned, since he had

the forces to back him up.

He instructed his officers to maintain
i

I

friendly relations with the Chinese authorities in the vicinity 'and with
77Barsukov,

Ope

cit., I, p. 495.

78 Ibid •

79 Ibid •

","·:-:.~w~
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the population in general.

•

However, they were to warn those who did not

wish to live under Russian rule to move to the right bank,of the Amur;
•

in the event of any hostile demonstrations by the, Chinese at Aigun,

Rus~

sian forces were immediately to cross the river, disarm the Chinese and
occupy the town. 80
The deployment of settlers proceeded without incident, and on July
7, 1857, Muraviev wrote to Gorchakov that a member of the Orthodox mis

..

sion in Peking delivering letters to him had recommended

that, "with

the present Chinese Government we should not negotiate about anything,
and, in particular, not correspond about

anyt~ing".

Muraviev commented

that this was precisely the basis on which he was operating.

..

He was

"preserving all friendship", and declaring only to the nearest Chinese
authorities what he was doing or what he needed.

They lIin just as

friendly a way" .fulfilled his suggestions, "themselves fearing all cor
respondence,,~8l

He

reported that he sought free trade with the local

inhabitants and that "this wish has already been fulfilled in part in
the villages and will gradually be fulfilled in the town (Aigun)".

He

added that the people here love and respect us and believe every word
I say like law.

For this reason I do not consider it necessary to oc

cupy the town, nor even emplace a battery opposite it".82 Quested ob
serves that this picture is largely confirmed by the Chinese archives,
although they understandably do not report positive friendliness with the
80Schumacher,
81Barsukov,
82Ibid •

Ope

Ope

cit., p. 290.

cit., II, p. 155.
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Russians.

•

83

At the end of June, 1857, the Emperor I-ting recieved a memorial
from I-shan reporting that the Russians had six cannon at Hailanpao
(Ust'-Zeisk), four of them directed against the Chinese military post
of Heilungchiang.

It stated that a Manchu captain had been sent to see

Muraviev at Ustf-Zeisk and had been well received and offered presents.
Muraviev had informed him that more Russians were coming, but that they

..

would keep the peace and had asked that the Russians be allowed to trade
on the same terms as at Kiakhta.
to be at

Ust'-Zeisk~

84

This memorial reported 6,000 Russians

I-ting received two more memorials from I-shan
~

in mid-August, reporting the extensive Russian settlements on the lower
Amur, as well as the despatch of an officer to Muraviev to deliver
China's refusal of his request for trade, and to protest against Rus
sian settlement or Ust'-Zeisk.

Muraviev had refused to remove any

Russian buildings, and had suggested that the Cninese settlements on
the left bank of the Amur be ·transferred to the right bank. 85
Muraviev's attitude elicited a written protest to him from I-shan,
and a subsequent one from the Tribunal to the Russian Senate.
83Quested,

Ope

I-shan's

cit., p. 84.

84IWSM , 15, p. 34 A, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 84. This would
appear to be an exaggeration. It is not known just how many Russians
were there prior to the encampment of an infantry battalion and a divi
sion of artillery, but it could not have been much more than a detachment
of one or two sotnia's, which, added to the newcomers, could hardly have
totaled 6,000, even allowing also for agroup of settlers. Admittedly
in the realm of speculation is the possibility that I-shan was deliber
ately inflating this figure, in order to discourage his Emperor from
ordering any resolute action on his part. I-shan and the local ambans
clearly had no stomach for anything approaching open hostilities.
85IWSM , 16, p. 16 A, cited by Quested,

OPe

cit., p. 84.
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•

protest pointed out that although Muravievts navigation of the Amur was
allegedly for the purpose of repulsing the English invaders" his people
•

were settling along the banks of the river, constructing buildings, etc ••
and that this was obviously not for the purpose of defense against the
English.

I-shan observed that there did not appear to be any order from

the Russian Emperor to seize places belonging to the Middle Kingdom. 86
Muraviev replied, with what must have been restrained mirth, that the

.

local ambans evidently were unaware of the mrrespondence that had been
going on between him, and Peking and about Pekingts position to the effect
that there was nothing of moment to discuss with the Russians
of which they could not admit Putiatin via Mongolia to Peking.
viev returned I-shan's note

in view

4

Mura

with this reply and with many protestations

of friendship, asking that the Chinese frontier authorities maintain
contact on official matters with their Russian opposite numbers.

The

Tribunal thereupon sent a Note to the Russian senate asking that Mura
viev's "arbitrary acts" be brought to the attention of the Tsar. 87
Protests were obviously just about all that the Chinese felt they
could permit themselves.

During the summer of 1857, the only military

measures they were able to undertake were the increasing of the Sanhsing
garrison by 100 men and that of Aigun by 400.

This left the total Chi

nese forces in Northern Manchuria and Aigun at a level of about onethird of the 22,000 well-disciplined Russian troops on the borders of
. Mongolia and Manchuria, with an additional 1,000 poised for deployment
there. 88 One other measure, now adopted by the Chinese Emperor was
86Schumacher,

Ope

cit., p. 294.

87 Ibid •
88aarsukov, Vol. II, p. 152.
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..

permission for the establishment of new agricultural settlements in the
uninhabited Manchurian lands with people already resident in Manchuria,89
obviously a belated attempt to counter the Hussian claim that China
exercised no sovereignty there.
Muraviev remained in Ustt-Zeya until August, 1857, when he returned
via Irkutsk to st. Petersburg, whence, being in poor health, he went
abroad for treatment. 90

.

IV. NERCHINSK FORMALLY AVENGED
Putiatin's dealings with the Chinese and with the English, French,

•

and Americans need only be summarized in sufficient detail to provide
the necessary background to Muraviev's activities following his return
to Eastern Siberia. 91
The Admiral arrived in Tientsin on July 24, 1857, and was received
courteously by Chinese officials, whose instructions were to effect his
departure as early as possible.

To this end, the Emperor allowed them to

accept a Note from him with the proviso that the answer should be sent
to Kaikhta, or Muraviev at Ust'-Zeya.

Putiatin, however, refused to

leave Tientsin without an official reply to his Note, which cited the
precedent of six Russian envoys who had been admitted to Peking in earl
ier times, then expressed fear that China was not strong enough to deal
89Ta Ch'ing Li Ch'ao Shih Lu, ch. 229, p. 12 B et seg., cited
by Quested, OR. cit., p. 85.

9~arsukov, Vol. I., p. 502.
9l Quested's valuable work recounts and analyzes Putiatin's acti
vities in China in depth.
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• administration,
with the English, although she was tlgood at strategy,
and literature".
•

the question

0

The Note also stated that the time had come to settle

f the undelimited frontier area. 92

I-ting gave in, agreeing that an answer could be given to Putiatin
at Tientsin on condition that he leave and then return when it was ready.
On August

r3, Putiatin sailed for Shanghai. On September 2, he was back

in Tientsin, and three days later received the Chinese reply.

This was

to the effect that the frontier question was to be decided with I-shan
6

on the Amur, that no other points could be discussed with Putiatin, and
that if he returned to Tientsin or to any other port in China, no fur
ther correspondence could be undertaken with him.

To avoid giving of

fense, Putiatin was offered a ceremonial farewell and was also given
the following explanation as to why his reception in Peking would cause
difficulties:
All your country's tribute-bearing envoys, when they come
to the capital, carry out the rite of the three kneelings
and nine prostrations, when they present their memorials to
the throne. Then the great Ch'ing Emperor rewards them with
foodstuffs and ceremoniously sends them back to their country.
There is a different treatment for those who escort the stu
dents and lamas to the capital. Now Putiatin is not present
ing a memorial to the throne, so it is not convenient to treat
him like a tribute-bearing envoy. However, he styles him
self with the rank of nobleman, so it is impossible to treat
him like an ordinary person. It is to be feared that to do
so would be impolite and cause harm to our friendship. China
has good intentions and is in no way suspicious. 93
This oblique statement is susceptible of d!ffering interpretations.

Ques

ted points out that in later conversations with Lord Elgin and. with Baron
92IWSM, 16, p. 12 B, cited by Quested, ob. cit., p. 86.
93 IWSM , 16, p. 26 A, cited by Quested,

OPe

cit., p. 89.
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•
Gros, Putiatin claimed that it insisted on the kowtow and on tribute,
whereas in fact it could have been regarded as an invitation to Putiatin
to go to Peking in a modest way, something he was unwilling to do. 94
Putiatin told the Chinese that he must return to Russia to consult
with his Emperor, declined the proffered ceremonial farewell and sailed
for Japan.

There he concluded a commercial treaty confirming the first

Russo-Japanese agreement of 1855, and providing substantial benefits for
Russia. 95

In November, he returned to Shanghai.

Here he met with Baron

11\

Gros, who told him of the allied plans to take Canton.

This, Putiatin

told him, would be "absolutely useless"; he urged, instead, that pres

•

sure be brought directly on Peking. 96 At this time, and indeed, almost
until the conclusion of his activities in China, Putiatin made no men
tion of the Amur.

He had been doing his best to convey to his English

and French colleagues the impression that his mission was for the pur
pose of urging on the Chinese Goverrunent "the necessity of a less ex
clusive policy,,97 i.e., that the Russians were seeking the same trading
rights in Chinese ports as were being pursued by the English, French and
Americans.

Thus, he embarked upon a course of intrigue which he was to

conduct until the negotiation of the Treaty of Tientsin.
Putiatin, while hoping for more aggressive allied action" also
urged more pointed measures on the part of his Government.

He wrote

94l£id., p. 88.
95G• A. Lensen, The Russian Push Towards Japan, (Princeton, 1959),
p. 350.
96Quai d'orsay archives, Gros-Walewski, 26/11/57, cited by Quested,
Ope cit., p. 91.
97Foreign Office, 17/276, Robertson-Elgin, 1/9/57, cited by Ques
ted, Ope cit., p. 88.
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"

Gorchakov suggesting that Russia terminate trading operations at
Kiakhta, his theory being that the, Chinese Government was convinced of
• the great value that the Russians placed on that trade, and regarded it
as a lever; breaking off of the Kiakhta commerce, he believed, would dis
abuse the Chinese of that notion.

In the same letter, he deplored the

fact that he had not at his disposal some three to five million rubles
with which to bribe chinese officials to smooth his way to Peking. 98
A month later, he wrote Gorchakov recommending a blockade of the Pei-ho

"
to prevent food supply deliveries to Peking until the Chinese sent a
plenipotentiary to Tientsin to negotiate frontier matters, concessions
to Russia and the same advantages as granted to other nations.

He sug

gested, further, that should the Anglo-French forces carry their war
to the north, Russia should offer the assistance of her naval force.

99

Putiatin's bellicose views were evidently too much for Gorchakov,
for in late December, 1857, Muraviev was ordered to cut short his leave
abroad in order to attend a conference in st. Petersburg. ,The upshot of
this exercise was the despatch, on December 24, of new instructions to
Putiatin.

He was informed that Russian occupation of the left bank of

the Amur would continue, but that relations with China must not be broken
off, since their renewal uwould be most difficult and perhaps even im
possible on the basis on which they now exist, and would threaten des
truction of our mission (in Peking) and abolition of the Kiakhta trade".
Putiatin was to relinquish his ambassadorial status and assume the title
of Commander of the Russian naval squadron and Imperial Commissioner to
9~rasny Arkhiv, Vol. XXI, 1926, pp.

99Schumacher, op. cit., p. 29 6 •
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China.

-.

His function would be to observe the activities of the Western

Powers vis-a-vis China.

He was told that Muraviev alone would

be res

ponsible for Amur negotiations and was instructed. to obtain from the
Chinese only those concessions being given to the other nations. 100
Following Muravievts consultations in St. Petersburg, he was ap
pointed General Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor.

'.

At this time, too, the Amur

Company formed for trade in the Priamur was established by two merchants,
101
Bernardaki and Rukavishnikov.
In January, 1858, the Russian Senate despatched a Note to the Tri
bunal expressing regret that this body had seen fit to insist on negotia
tion only at the frontier.

It announced that Muraviev had been recalled

to st. Petersburg for personal conferences with the Emperor and for re
102
ceipt of instructions on negotiating.
During the winter of 1857-58, the Russian Government approved
Muraviev's recommendation to settle the Amur in much more substantial
numbers, through the transfer of an entire infantry brigade - - some
12,000 people, including families.

Uncertain relations 'with the Chinese

had delayed this project but by the end of the year, as a preparatory
measure, a winter road was opened from Nikolaevsk along the left bank of
the Amur to Ust'-Strelka.

A post road from the port to Marinskii Post

was also built, with milestones bearing the double eagle, and with station
100Nevelskoi, Ope cit., p. 388, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 94 ,
who points out that Barsukov, Vol. I, Ch. 38, does not say that Putiatin
was forbidden to deal with the Amur.
101Barsukov, Vol. I, p. 505.
102
Schumacher, Ope cit., p. 296.
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houses along the way.
103
versts.

•
These new lines of communication covered 2,000

•

.

, Meanwhile, in China, events were beginning to accelerate.

Fo1

lowing the Anglo-French seizure of Canton, Elgin and Gros wrote to
Putiatin and the American representative Reed, at the end of January,
1858, inviting them to join in sending similar Notes to the Chinese Gov
ernment, requesting it to send plenipotentiaries to Shanghai to negotiate

•

on the entry of diplomatic representatives to Peking, commercial facl1i
ties in the treaty ports, and freedom of worship for Chinese and foreign
104
ers a1ike.
This was agreed upon but, without informing his British,
'"

French and American colleagues, Putiatin attached to his note a supple
mentary document concerning the Amur.

That portion of it specifically

setting forth the Russian position on the frontier question follows:
• • • on the maps the frontier between our two countries
starts at the Lesser Pin1ing Range, and stops at the A-er
kuan-shi-1e-ke River, and beyond this, the terrain is un
known. It had always been considered that the country from
the Hsingan to the Eastern Sea would be investigated at some
later date and that then the frontier would be delimited.
Now we know that the Hsingan do not reach all the way to the
Eastern Sea. This range divides into two not far from that
place. One arm passes through our Huo-ssu-k'e region and
already belonged to us before the Treaty of Kaikhta. Moreover,
this branch does not pass beyond the Amur to the Sungari. It
only reaches to the Amur area. The other arm of the range
reaches into Manchuria along the right bank of the Amur. That
is why the Hsingan cannot be considered as the frontier of our
two countries. The Amur should be taken as the frontier. Since
Russia already has people living on the left bank, the left
bank of the P~ur should be taken as the Russian frontier. As
for the Manchu homesteads near the town of Heilungchiang
(Aigun), no matter how many they may be, let them all be
101Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 205.
104Correspondence Relating to the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China,
1859-60, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 97.

187

.

•

..

moved to the right bank. Apart from the cost of their re
moval, which will be paid by Rus~ia, there can be compensation
in money or kind. It is important that this matter shall be
cleared up. Further, since there are no Machu or Chinese
people living on the lower Ussuri, and no vessels go there,
the right bank of the Ussuri should be taken as the frontier.
Moreover, not far from the source of this river, there are
rivers and creeks flowing into the sea which may be used to
divide up the sea coast. Russia already has people setting
up military posts and building towns in the empty places on
this coast. All the area from the Lesser Pinling to A-er
kuan-shih-le-k'e should be mapped and de!b~ited and the
frontier in the Ili area also delimited •
Putiatin's Note was the first formal declaration to the Chinese of com
plete Russian territorial claims in Mongolia and Manchuria.

It was
4

submitted under the f our-Power covering Note accompanying the other
separate but similar notes of each envoy.

Such an action, Quested ob

serves, was an invocation of English, French, rod American backing for
Russia's territorial claims - - of which the Western representatives
were ignorant.. The Russian Note, together with the supplement parti
ally quoted above, was enclosed in the same envelope as the American
one and was delivered to the Chinese at Soochow, on February 13, 1858,
by Lord Elgin's secretary.
ambassadors. 106

It had been examined by none of the other

Following despatch of his Note, Putiatin traveled to Canton,

.

Amoy, Foochow and Ningpo before proceeding to Shanghai, where he

ar~

rived on March 11. 107 There he received his new instructions from St.
105 IWSM 18, pp. 32 A - 33 B, cited by Quested,
106Quested,

Ope

Ope

cit., p.i98.

cit., p. 99.

107 W• B. Reed, The Private Diary of, ( 2 Vols., Mss. Dept., Li
bnary of Congress, unpublished, diary entry of 25/3/58. Cited by
Quested, OPe cit., p. 102.
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Petersburg, whereupon he sent all but two vessels in his squadron to
Japan and the Amur; he also informed the other three representativos of
his new orders.
The four envoys received replies to their Notes in Shanghai at
the end of March.

Putiatin's communication, having been sent under the

same cover as .heedts, was not replied to separately; the Chinese reply
to Reed included the statement that, "Russia has never had any commerCial
relations in the five ports, and last year an Imperial decree ordered
a high official to go to the tvnur to discuss the frontier question with
Putiatin tt .108 This mention of the Amur evidently did not particularly
excite the American representative's interest.

Reed was also requested

to tell Putiatin that a letter would be sent to him by the Li-fan-yuan
and that all the problems the Russians wished to discuss should be
dealt with in writing.
The four representatives

proce~ded

to Tientsin in April, and for

the next seven weeks engaged in continuous negotiations with representa
tives of the Peking Government.

The Chinese temporized on the occasion

of each meeting and attempted to persuade the Russians and the Americans
to moderate the demands of the B)ritish, and the Americans to reduce Russian
demands.

Quested gives a succinct summary of Putiatin's policy during

this period: 109 to make the Chinese accept all his demands and such of
108Senate Executive Document 30 (36.1), cited by Quested,

Ope

cit.,

p. 102.

109Quested, op. cit., p. 106, added that, "His success in this
peri10uE game was, however, not wholly due to his personal skill; for
the Chinese would seek no help from the English, whom they chiefly de
tested; Lord Elgin ~as preoccupied with his own problems and made no
great effort to probe Putiatin's activities, whilst the attitude of
Baron Gros and Reed was complacent ••• Under these circumstances, the
Russians were able to keep Putiatin's Arnur negotiations at Tientsin a
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•
the other Ministers' as would not result in the Peking Government's
falling under British influence.

He pressed for rapid granting of the

allied requests for more treaty ports and occasional diplomatic repre
sentation in Peking, and he endeavored to win the goodwill of the Chinese
by mediating for them, so that they might cede the Amur and Maritime
territory as a reward.

Russian territorial claims on the Northeast

frontier he pressed upon the Chinese in complete secrecy, concealing
to

from Elgin and Gros, and apparently from Reed,

that he had ever serious

ly raised this issue.
Although Putiatin hoped, by playing his double game,110 to attain
all of Russia's objectives, while limiting the realization of allied,
particularly British, aims, he placed his ultimate hope in an attack,
if necessary, by the British and French expeditionary forces to bring
about China's general capitulation.
At the beginning of April, a Note from the Tribunal was received
in St. Petersburg.

It complained that Putiatin had not gone to the Amur

for frontier negotiations, but instead was proceeding to Shanghai and
becoming 'involved in the affairs of other governments and thereby viola
ting the rules of mutual good relations.

It stated that the only matter

requiring negotiation between Russia and China was the question of delimi
tat ion of the Amur frontier, and that for that purpose a Chinese pleni
potentiary had been sent to the Amur.

It requested the Russian Government

secret from the western world for many years, and indeed this appears
to be the first time, to date, that they have been mentioned in print
in a Western European language."
llothe details of this game are set forth in Quested, 0p. cit.,
pp. 106-112.
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to instruct Putiatin not to tarry in Shanghai at the cost of the friend
111
ship of the two Empires.
'While events in China were mOl ing toward a crisis, Muraviev was
taking his own steps for a final solution of the Amur problem.

During the

spring of 1858, he made preparations for a fourth expedition down the Amur,
which would transport more settlers, troops and fortress artillery to the
delta.

In early March,

he sent the Kiakhta frontier commissar, A. I.

Despot-Zenovich, to Urga with a Note to the Tribunal.

Despot-Zenovich

~

told the amban, Te-le-k'e-tuo-er-chi of the fall of Canton and asked that
the unsettled areas on the tight bank of the Amur be ceded to Russia.
~ought

He

a guarantee that the new Orthodox mission would be able to live

unmolested in Peking, and suggested that Te-le-k'e-tuo-er-chi should deco
rate Muraviev with the Peacock feather ard receive some Russian decoration
in return. 112 Despot-Zenovich then went on to stress Putiatin's readi;
ness to act as an intermediary between the Chinese, and the English and
French, and concluded by announcing that the Russians would continue to
establish settlements on the Amur and the Ussuri, but that this activity
had no hostile aspect, but, on the contrary, was for the mutual benefit
of both governments. 113 The amban's retort was to the effect that China
had never needed help from foreign countries, that he could receive no
decoration without Imperial permission and that, as for the mission, "We
already informed them last year that for a long time past there has not
111

Schumacher,

Ope

cit., p. 296.

112IWSM , 19, p. 25 B, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 96, who points
out that neither Barsukov nor Schumacher mention the Peacock Feather.
l13Schumacher, loco cit.
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been the slighte

incident concerning the students in the capital, but

whether they now proceed there vias up to them to decide".

Peking ap

proved the p.mban's reply and informed him that, "we have never decorated
a (Russian) Governor-General with the Peacock Feather and even if one of
our officials were to receive a row of decorations from them (the Rus
sians), it would be impossible to give it to him.114
Before going dovm the Amur, Muraviev sent another emissary to the
Chinese at Aigun with the news that he would be on the river as soon as
the thaw set in, but that if the amban wished to discuss boundary mat
ters with him, it

wou~d

on the return trip.
twofold:

be more convenient to do

so

when Muraviev was

Muraviev's purpose in sending such a message was

he hoped that news from Putiatin would

b~

awaiting him at

and he also wished to make it plain to the Chinese that he
115
was in no p3rticular hurry to undertake negotiations.
~ikolaevsk,

As far as Muraviev was concerned, the Amur question, irrespective
of the niceties of international formalities which were still pending,
was in fact resolved.

At the same time, he was very much aware of the

related question of logistics and financing for development of Russia's
newly acquired territory.

Before taking the fourth expedition down the

river, he wrote his brother Valerian as follows:

"In a few days I shall

depart for the Amur for some four months ••• my sole concern now con
sists of 'settling the Amur, developing na'J>igation and trade on it, es
tablis~ing

towns and an archepiscopal cathedral, and discovering gold,

which is essential for all this, the more so since at the mouth of the
11 4 IVlSrv: , 19, p. 25 B, cited by
11""'Barsukov, Vol. I, p. '::JJ7.

~uested, OPe

cit., p. 96.
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Amur and on the adjacent coast, it is necessary to build fortified ports
and railroad communications with them.,,1l6

At this time, too, in a

letter to Karsakov, he observed that establishment of a postal service on
the Amur would be costly - - 80,000 silver roubles a year, "which no one
will furnish".ll?
Muraviev's lofty tone in his message to Aigun galvanized the Chi
nese.

Before he reached the confluence of the Zeya, he was met by a junk

carryin;! Chinese officials who urged him to await their cornmander-in
chief, I-shan, who was arriving from Tsitsigar.

hluraviev continued on to

Ust'-Zeya where, on May 6, Chi-la-ming-a, amban of Aigun, came to tell
him that I-shan was requesting Muraviev to delay if only for a few days
in order to discuss demarcation of the frontier.

Chi-la-ming-a hinted

that he would ttmanage everything and do everything lt • 1l8
En route to Aigun, Muraviev stopped at Ust'Zcisk, where he dedi
cated a cathedral and renamed the town Blagoveschensk. 119 He then went
on to Aigun where he and his suite were received as honored guests on
May 9.

Mural/iev declined to enter into negotiations on that day, and

the Russian delegation was given dinner by I-shan at Chi-la-ming-a's
house, with "gay, polite conversation".120
l16 Ibid ., p. 508.
l1?Ibid., p. 509.
118Nevelskoi, op. cit., Ch. 31, cited by Q1.lested, op. cit., p. 146.
Chi-la-ming-a's cooperative policy was to cost him dear.
119l1Good Tidings". Curiously enough, despite the religious conno
tation, the Soviet Government has not changed the name.
l20Nevelskoi, 92. cit., Ch. 31, cited by Quested, op. cit., p. 146.
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On May 10,

121

negotiations began at chi-la-ming-a's house.

Mura

viev opened the proceedings with an historical survey, including a
justification of Russian actions on the Amur, and asserted that the AmuT
should be the frontier "in the interests of both nations".

Later in the

day, I-shan and his numerous subordinates boarded Muraviev's ship, were
given refI'eshments and entertained by the Irkutsk Cavalry Choir.

On the

following day, the Chinese delegation was presented with a draft treaty
consisting of the following points:

1) The border between the two em

pires to be the Amur River, with the left bank belonging to Russia, and
the right bank to the Ussuri belonging to China, whose border would
then follow the Ussuri to its sources and thence to the Korean peninsula;
2) Navigation on the rivers constituting the boundary would be permitted
only to vessels of the two empires;
along these rivers;

3)

Free trade would be permitted

4) Chinese subjects living on the left bank of the

Arnur to be re-settled within three years;122 5) Previous treatjes to be
reviewed for establishment of new regulations regarding all questions
affecting the welfare and reputation of both empires, this to be accom
plished by individuals specially designated by both parties, who would
deal with details concerning trade and commerce at Peking, despatch of
missions, envoys and couriers, "for the greater benefit and glory of
the two friendly countries".

The Chinese delegation refusad to accept

the draft; Ai-shen-t-ai, I-shan's principal deputy, particularly objected
l2l 0n this same day, Quested, p. 116, mentions that in Shanghai
the Chinese were imploring the Americans to int~rcede with the Russians
about the Amur frontier.
1

year' •

arsukov, Vol. I, pp. 510-511; Nevelskoits version says ·one
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to the concluding phrase of the last item, pointing out t-hat the Ch ring
Empire h3d so much glory that it could wish for no more. 123
On May 13, Muraviev's r·.:anchu interpreter, Shishmarev, presented a
revised draft to I-shan's assistants.
agreed to point 4.

This omitted point 5; the Chinese

In the evening, Ai-shen-t'ai boarded Muraviev's ves

sel and with tears in his eyes begged Shishmarev to abandon claim to the
Ussuri area, threatening that otherwise he would drown himself imme
diately.124

He then implored Muraviev in the same vein.

Muraviev de

cided that it was time to "give a definite and firm turn to eve:ntstt,
and on the next day, May 14, went ashore and presented his demands as an
125
ultimatum.
He pointed out that the Chinese were obliged to the mag
nanimity of the Russian Emperor for the preservation of friendly rela
tions between the two Empires at a time when Chinese actions over the
past few years had giver. the Russians every right to act differently.
It was fruitless for them to fall back on the previous treaties for
determination of frontiers to the east from the Gorbitsa and in places
year the Ud, since during the conclusion of the treaty of 1689, they
had acted in bad faith; Peking had written at that time that their
plenipotentiaries would be few, but in fact they had sent a whole army
to the negotiation site, whereas the Russian representative had limited
himself to the smallest necessary entourage.

Finally, the Chinese

l23que s ted, 012. cit., p. 147.
l24]bid., Quested remarks that actually Ai-shen-t'ai was still
alive at the end of 1860.
l25Barsukov has it that Piotr Perovskii, Muraviev's chief aide and
a Councilor of the Foreign Ministry presented the ultimatum. See pp.
510-511.
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themselves had violated the treaty first, by exacting tribute from the
inhabitants of the undemarcated areas to which they had no right, and
secondly, by refusing to receive the ambassador sent by the Russian Em
peror with greetings to their Bogdikhan; such circumstances between en
lightened nations generally resulted in a rputure of relaUons and hos",:
tilities.

The Chinese, furthermore, had instigated yet another un

pleasant affair, the burning and looting of the Russian warehouse at
Tarbagatai.
The Chinese attempted to rebut Muravievts declaration by assert
ing their right to the Amur and Ussuri areas, contending that they col
lected tribute from those areas, where they had always had watch-posts
indicative of their rights there, and that the country from the Ussuri
to the sea was the homeland of the ruling dynasty, so that it would be
treachery to cede it to Russia.

Muraviev hotly denied these arguments,

declaring that the aborigines of the Amur and Ussuri regions had never
rendered iassak to China, that Russia had defended the area from the
English in 1854-55 with no help from China, and that the homeland of the
Ch'ing dynasty was in the Ninguta region.

Following further brief de

bate, Muraviev put on a shm'i of anger and gave the Chinese till next
morning to accept his demands.

Of this final scene I-shan reported:

"Muraviev suddenly fell into a great rage and behaved like a madman,
shouting tremendously to his deputy (actually, the interpreter, Shish
marev).

~uraviev

Manchu crol",ds."

then left for his

ship, glaring angrily at

the

I-shan sent an official to him later in the day to

inquire as to the reason for his anger, and to promise that "in future
they (th~ Chinese) ~ould behave so that the General would not be

·".

~';I{)

angry" .126
During the night of May 15, I-shan reported, "lights burnt bright
lyon board Muraviev's ship, and there were incessant reports of guns and
canno~'.

Chi-la-ming-a was sent early in the morning to investigate, and

informed I-shan that Muraviev had ordered the firing to alarm the Manchus.
He added that two other ships accompanying Muraviev had on board tlLDO or
3JO barbarians fully armed with guns and cannon ll ; he feared there were

more men and ships nearby and that a Russian attack would create a
"difficult

Inhabitants of the left bank of the river came to

situatio~t.

Chi-la-ming-a to beg protection against the Russians.

Ai-shen-tai was

sent to Muraviev on the following morning and was told by Mm that un
less the treaty was signed the next day, he would not allow the settle
ments and homesteads on the left bank to remain. 127 The Chinese gave way,
and on

1.~ay

16, 1854, the Treaty of Aigun was concluded.

It gave the left

bank of the Arnur from the River Argun to the mouth, to 'the Russian Em
pire, and stated that the right bank of the Amur to the mouth of the Us
suri belonged to the Chinese Empire.
the sea was to be the

The land between the Ussuri and

co~~on

property of both empires, until the estab

lisment of the border there.

In addition, it stipulated that only Rus

sian and Chinese vessels should be allowed to navigate the rivers Amur,
Sungar-i and Ussuri.

It also provided that subjects of both empires should

be permitted to trade, and that both governments should protect merchants
and precisely observe all the provisions of the treaty forever. 128
l26ques t e d , po.

"..I.
Cl~.,

p. 148 •

l27 Ibid ., p. 149.
l28My translation of th€ text is at Appendix
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CHli.PTER VI

TRIUMPH'S AFTEHWATH

I. EXPANDIKG THE

COK~UEST

The news of Muraviev ' s success was greeted with tremendous en
thusiasm in Siberia, particularly among the merchant class in Irkutsk
and Kiakhta, where the "unexpected and extraordinarily advantageous"
resolution of the Amur question waE the occasion for widespread cele
bration.

The area's leading tycoons donated large

mental projects in the newly acquired territory.

SUlllS

for develop

Kuznetsov contributed

3 million rubles, Rukavishnikov, 2 hundred thousand silver rubles,
toward construction of a hoped-for Amur railway.l
St. Petersburg, too, reacted to the news with great satisfaction,
as well as relief.

E. K. Biutsov, sent to the capital by :--;uraviev with

a copy of the Treaty, reported that Alexander II, who received him in
his study, 1t'Jas visibl y overjoyed.

The Bnperor said to him, "Here we

believed that the Chinese were at war with us; the papers have been re
porting that they attacked and defeated us, and to think that they have
now sent us this treaty on the !.mur!"2
Nmv Muravie'/ turned to devoting his full attention to exploiting

what he hoped would be the concrete benefits of the Treaty.
lKabanov, Ope cit., p. 190.
2 Ibid ., p. 191.

The first

'AO
l.,;!U

step would be to colonize the Priarnur region on a large scale and to make
of the Amur a great trade route for E:astern Siberia.

On May 22, he pro

ceeded down the river to select locations for settlement of the 13th In
fantry Battalion, which had been occupying the left bank with its sta
tions from the lesser Khingan to the mouth of the Ussuri.

At that

ri vel" s conn uence with the Amur, this unit founded a settlement named
OJ

Khabarovsk.~

During the month following conclusion of the Aigun negotiations,
Muraviev sought to reach agreement with the Chinese on new trade regu
lations.

The Chinese strove to limit trading, as in the past, to a

single location, to provide for officially set prices, and to place all
trade unci er the strict control of off ic ial s of both governments.
opposed this,

pointi~g

/.\uraviev

out that for trade to flourish, there should be

a free market, that the merchants should not be subjected to all manner
of constraints and supervision.

It was finally agreed that fo).: an

initial period, at eight-day intervals, there should be a seven-day
fair at Blagoveschensk and Aigun, while the inhabitants of both banks of
the Amur would be free to conduct unobstructed trade at all times along
the entire course of the river. 4
Meanwhile, Putiatin was continuing his efforts to capitalize on
the Anglo-French threat to china in order to obtain concessions for Rus
sia.

Having made no satisfactory headway with the Chinese during pro

tracted negotiations, the English and French decided to resort to armed
force.

In the morr.ing of May 8, 1858, the comman:::.ler of the British
1aarsukov,

Ope

4Ibid ., p. 516.

cit., p. SIS.
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naval forces delivered a two-hour ultimatum to the

~ommander

of the Chi

nese forts at Taku and when this expired English and French troops cap
tured the forts within a few hours. 5 Now it was the turn of the dis
traught Chinese to seek negotiations with the English, French, Americans
and Russians.

Separate treaties were concluded with each of the Western

Powers in early Junes 1858.
The essential provisions of the Russian Treaty of Tientsin were
the following:
1.

Diplomatic correspondence between Russia and China to be
conducted between the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the senior member of the Grand Councilor the Chief
Minister in Peking, on the basis of complete equality.
Russian envoys to be received in Peking, via Kiakhta,
Urga, Taku or any other open port in China.

2.

Russia to have the right to trade at seven named sea
ports, on the same terms as other countries and to have
consuls there.

3.

No limit to be placed on the number of traders and captains
employed in com,mGrce. 6

4.

Parts of the Russo-Chinese frontier not yet determined
to be examined without delay in the frontier areas
themselves.

5.

Members of the Orthodox Mission in Peking to be replaced
at any time, at the wish of the Russian Government, which
would bear all costs of maintaining the hlission.

6.

Regular monthly postal service to be established between
Peking and ~iakhta.

It will be seen from the foregoing that Muraviev was not justified
5Questedt op. cit., p. 121.

6'~'.lested, OPe cit., p. 129, summarizes this article as providing
that there should no longer be any restrictions on overlar;d trade; this
is inaccurate.

2:0

in fearing that Putiatin's involvement in the Amur question might prove
counterproductive. 7 As ~ested points out, the hio treaties were to some
extent overlapping, "for the latter, dated June 13, could be interpreted
as cancelling the provisions of the former one of May 28 (Article 9 of
the Tientsin Treaty provided that the 'undefined parts of the frontier
should be inspected by plenipotentiaries, vhose findings should be incor
porated in an additional clause t

.)

As it transpired, the Peking Govern

ment soon availed itself of this opportunity". 8
The conclusion of the Treaty of Tientsin was duly reported to

~t.

Petersburg by Putiatin, who added that the Chinese negotiators at Tientsin
had been aware of the Treaty of higun and on June 3 had informed him that
the Emperor had confirmed the agreement between Muraviev and I-Shan re
garding the demarcation of the border from the Ussuri to the seaports
and the establishment of trade on the Amur. 9
Muraviev obviously meant to lose no time in the matter of "the
demarcation of

the border from the Ussuri to the seaports".

After

presiding over the founding of Khabarovsk in early June, he led the
next Amur expedition downriver, with more troops and 200 families of cos
~)

sack settlers.

FrOQ the mouth of the Amur he took a reconnaissance

party of 100 officers and men up the Ussuri River for surveying and for
the construction of the first of a series of strongpoints that would
constitute a line of communications.

Upon his return down the Ussuri and

in the face of protests by the Chinese military, he sent another party up
7~upra, pp. 179.
8-~ues t e d , op. Cl...:..,
....
p. 15~"".

9Barsukov,

Opt

~it., I, p. 520.

"'A"'\ 1
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that river.

He then led a small force up the Sungari River and sent one

man as far up as Sanhsing to explore possibilities of establishing trade
relations.

The General of Kirin memorialized these activities to I-ting,

who ordered the ambans of Kirin and Heilungchiang to "investigate the
Russians' movements and prevent their further extension".lO Characteris
tically, the Emperor did not specify the measures to be used for such
prevention.
Having made his initial moves for establishing the Russian pre
sence in the Ussuri maritime area, Muraviev returned to Blagoveschensk
where he and I-Shan exchanged entertainment and where Chi-la-ming-a
(who had promised to "arrange everything and do everything" at Aigun) ,
met him with expansive embraces.
als, he reported, were of

Muraviev's relations wit.h these offici

the warmest friendliness. 11

A formal ~vritten

agreement was signed on July 8 permitting Manchu settlements on the left
bank of the

.~ur

to remain there.

On that same day in st.

the Tsar privately ratified the Treaty of Aigun.

No public

Pet~rsburg,
announcemen~

was made, for it was deemed prudent to keep the British and French in
ignorance of Russian aspirations and intentions in the Far East. 12

I-Shan

also pressed for agreement on a proposal for regulation of border trade
but this Muraviev declined to discuss, saying that he could do nothing
until he was notified of the Tsar's ratification of the Treaty of Aigun,
which he expected within two months.
On August 26, 1858, Alexander II addressed a glowing citation to
lOn-iSM 20, p. 3i"

cited by ~uested, op. cit., p. 155.

IlBarsukov, £E. cii., I, pp. 519-520.
12p., V. SChUi;13cher, ItKistol'rii priobretenia Amur3. (snoshenia s
Kitaem s 1848 po 1860 g.)", Russki Arkhiv, III, 1878, p. 331.
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Muraviev, conferring upon him the title of count Muraviev-Amurskii.
At the same time he was promoted to the rank of General of Infantry.13
He had accomplished the basic task embarked upon ten years earlier, but
he was to remain in Eastern Siberia for almost two additionJl years.

As

he saw it, his histrirical achievement would count for little unless he
could persuade st. Petersburg to adopt measures to solve the great pro
blems of food, transportation and communications that were essential
if large-scale colonization and economic development were to become a

reality.

Much, too, remained to be done in the way of reform of internal

institutions and administrative practices in Eastern Siberia.
Also of continuing concern to Muraviev was the actual implementation
of the Treaty of Aigun an::! the opening of all of northern China, Mongolia
and Manchuria to Russian trade. 14 The Treaty of Aigun ceded the left
bank of the Arnur to Russia but provided in rather vague terms for a con
dominium over the area between the Ussuri and the sea until such time as
the frontier there should be determined.

This situation was complicated

by the fact th3t initially there were apparently conflicting versions of
the Treaty.

Quested points out that the text cited in

~evelskoics

ac

count makes no mention of any condominium, simply designating the Ussuri
as the border bGtween the two empires.

She suggests that either Nevel

skoifs memory failed him or else that uMuraviev deliberately drew up a
Russian text which gave the Ussuri maritime area to 3ussia and fobbed
the Manchus off with a Manchu text which made confused reference to some
12Barsukov, ~it., I

J

pp. 527-528.

14Th! Treaty of Tientsin permitted limitless numbers of Russian
traders at the ports but said nothing about opening all the Chinese
borderlands to Russian merchants.

4:>3

sort of condominium".

She points out that this would have been perfect

ly possible because the Manchu negotiators at Aigun had no Russian in
terpreter and that, indeed, "it is extremely doubtful whether there
was anyone in the whole Chting Empire capable of reading Russian fluently
in 185&'.

She goes on to suggest that when Gorchakov and Alexander II

eventually examined the Russian and Manchu versions of the Treaty they
may havG decided that Eur'aviev had gone too far, and had a new Russian
text prepared which follo,,"Jed the Manchu one more closely.15

If~uested' s

conjecture is correct than tt.u1'8viev was quite disingenuous when, in a
letter of

~eptember

25 to the Grand Duke Constantine, he remarked, tilt

is strange that whereas in Peking recognition is given to the Ussuri
River as the border, in accordance with

~he

Treaty of Aigun, the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, in its article in the Journal de St. Petersbourq,
gives Rusda only the left bank of the Aillur. 16

In this same lett8r, he

added that he had received no instructions and no interpretations of the
lreaty of Tientsin and he considered that no time should be lost in im
plementing it, lest the French and the English should undertake intrigues
to

u~ermine

its provisions.

He regretted, in this connection, that

Russia had no alliance with the United States. 17
Shortly after

writing Constantine,

~ura~iev

Duke was proceeding abroad for an extended period.
news, for

~.luraviev was

learned that the Grand
This was dispiriting

now counting heavily on Constantine's support of

his proposals for generously subsidizing colonization, constructing tele
15Ques t ed, O
..
op. .C1L>,
p. le::...
~~.
1f....
. .2£.!...£!..••
° t,. .
~Barsu k ov,
.L,. ;
p.: :;J~"'4 •

17 Ihid •
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graph lines, increasing shipping on the Amur and developing the region's
industry and commerce.

He wrote again to the Gr.Jl1d Duke on October 1,

pointing out that his plans could be realized only if reviewed by Con
stantine and the Tsar.
"in cOiwrrittces

01'

\lAny examination of these proposals tt , he "VI'ote,

in the Council or the

~t.inistries

and any report to his

Majesty not coming from you, will inevitably distort my conceptions and
can vitiate the return to Russia of her Amur domains. II18 Muraviev's
letters did not reach Constantine in st. Petersburg and were forwarded
to him in Nice, whence he replied to Muraviev in courteous and encouraging
terms.
Viith Constantine out of the country, Muraviev despaired of success
in his future work in the Ar:1Ur region.

He was convinced that he could

not count on sympathetic reception of his ideas in any of the ministries
where,

he believed, he was regarded with suspicion.

was being kept out of the

ma~nstream

He feared that he

of policy development - - perhaps

Putiatinfs appointment seemed to him to be an evidencG of this - - and
for this reason he pressed for a governmental commitment to establish
ment of telegraph lines from the capital to Irkutsk, or even to Niko
laevsk.

Only thus, he believed, in view of rapidly unfolding events in

China, could St. Petersburg receive timely

reco~nendations

from him and

also give him instructions regarding the course of European affairs.

For,

if Nesselroda was gone, he wrote to Karsakov, whom he had sent to st.
Petersburg v;ith his recommendations, many HNesselrodians" were still
serving in St. Petersburg and they would be sure to underf:1ine his position.
He stressed that frontier questions with Japan (Sakhalin) and China were
18Ib1do, p. 536.
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now taking on major dimensions and that under these circumstances he
needed the unreserved confidence of the Russian Government.

He asked

Karsakov to say "to each and all who will listen that for the good of
the affair I endure all • • • remaining in grievous separation from my
family, perhaps for another year, being convinced that my presence here
is essential.

l9

But if I see that they do not have enough confidence

in me to make it possible to insure that good, then, of course, I shall
cease to sacrifice my health and my marital happiness to carry out ordel's
••
u
contrary to my convlctlons.

20

Muraviev's discouragement at the prolonged absence from the capi
tal of his most powerful supporter did not prevent him from continuing
his efforts at least to bring the political results of his years in
Eastern Siberia to fruition.

Piotr Perovskii, Councilor of the Minis

try of Foreign Affairs, who had assisted 1,:uraviev d'Jring the Aigun oe90
tiations, had been designated as the escort officer for the

ne~

Orthodox

Mission sent to Peking to replace the one under Archimandrite Pdlladii.
The Russian Governffient decided to appoint Perovskii at the same time as
its agent fox exchange of ratifications of the treaty of Tientsin.
late October,

1858~

In

hluraviev wrote to him in Peking regarding the desir

ability of obtaining agreement to free trade along the entire RussoChinese border ~ something "which had been forgotten in the Treaty of
19w.uraviev ' s wife had found it imposs ible , evidently for reasons
of health, to remain for long in Siberia.
20 Ibid ., p. 537.

::dJ6

Tientsi~I.21 He also asked him to arrange for a Chinese commission to
proceed in April, 1859, to cooperate with the Russians in demarcating
the frontier from the headwaters of the Ussuri to the sea.

He was anx

ious that this be accomplished before the arrival in Peking of the British
22
and French ambassadors.
Shortly after writing Perovskii Muraviev learned from the amb'!!} of
Aigun that Chinese officials would be sent to the mouth of the Ussuri
and the mouth of the Suifen, which emptied into the Pacific.

:Jhat Mura

viev sought, however, was a frontier to Posset Bay, some 100 versts south
of the Suifen delta.

Such a frontier would

the entire Primoria to Korea.

assure Russian rule over

In order to demarcate this frontier, he

set in motion a sizeable expedition under a Lieutenant Colonel Budogos
kii, composed of General Staff officers, topographers and supporting
personnel, some of whom were to proceed with the boundary marking while
others would carry out surveys, map the coastline and assemble other data
on the entire Ussuri maritime area.

He was anxious to proceed quickly

2lMarked expansion of Russo-Chinese trade could be achieved only
by the overland route. Russia had practically no merchant marine, so
that the most favored nation treatment guarantee1 to Russia in the Treaty
Ports was an empty concession.
Muraviev had been concerned over this
question from the beginning of his assignment to Eastern Siberia. In
1849 he had reported to st. Petersburg' "I consider that the only way
to support our trade in China is to alter it from a local to an export
trade and by navigating the Amur River to deliver the products of our
industries to all the northeastern provinces of China, which are more
remote from the present location of English economic activities and
therefore from their annihilating competition with us. 1I (Barsukov, QQ..
£11., II, pp. 47-48.) The economic advantages of seaborne vs. over
land trade brought Uuraviev's aspirations to naught.
22sarsukov, og. cit., I, p. 538 and II, p. 205. Quested refers to
this caustic 1y, commenting that in this and in his expectations as to
other favorable developments he IIseemed to have lost .::11 sense of reali
ty". This appears to be unduly harsh. It is hardly surpirsing that the
situt;tion t'hrough the eyes of a commander in the field at the time should
have looked different from what it appears to have been to a scholar over
a century 12ter.

'4)7

"lest tho English meddle with this", and he hoped also to conclu:1e dis
cussions with the Japanese regarding Sakhalin, so that "the English could
not interfere there". 23
While preoccupied with the p!oblems of trade and border demarcation,
Muraviev was also worrying about the basic needs of the Priamur.

He was

only too well aware that if this new territorial acquisition was to be

of benefit to Russia it would need people - - a rapidly growing popula
tion th8t could build up overland cornmunications, food pI'oduction and the
secOrity of the area.

Accordingly, in a report of December 15, 1858, he

urged the Siberian Committee in £t. Petersburg to adopt measures to en
courage large-scale immigration to Eastern Siberia. 24

His appeal elicited

little concrete action.
At the end of the year, Muraviev informed the Chinese Tribunal
that his expedition to the Ussuri would reach Aigun in February or the
beginning of March, 1859, to consult with the Chinese authorities there
and to prepare to begin their investigation of the frontier before the
spring.

Chi-la-ming-a, Deputy Commander of Heilungchiang, had seen the
25
courier bearing Muraviev's Note and had agreed to this procedure.
Muraviev's actions reflected his diminishing faith in Perovskiits
effectiveness.

And, indeed, the latter was experiencing considerable

frustration in Peking where, b-:cause he did not enjoy ambassadorial rank,
he was accorded scant attention by the Chinese.
complicated by the fact that,
2;3.I
.oarsucov,
op.

Cl• t _,

as

His task was further

in the case of the TI'eaty of Aigun, the

I ,p . 5~8
.j.

24Ibid ., II, pp. 220-224.

25~uested, op. cit., p. 163.
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Treaty of Tientsin also existed in differing Russian and Machu versions,
a factor that caused considerable delay in its ratification.

26

In January, 1859, the Russian Government decided to appoint Count
N. P. Ignatiev as "pol itical Agent" in Peking to

succee~i

Perovskii.

Although ohly twenty-seven years of age, he was excellently qualified for
his appointment.

Born into the nobility, he had served in the Corps of

Pages and the Life Guards, subsequently graduating from the Imperial Staff
Academy in 1851.

He then served in the Baltic provinces and as military

attache in London.

He had played an important role in the Paris Confer

ence of 1856 and had later led a mission to Khiva and Bukhara, success
fully concluding a trade treaty and freeing Russian prisoners held in
Bukhara. 27

hluraviev was pleased to learn of Ignatiev's appointment, since

by now he had become thoroughly disillusioned with Perovskii, who was not
only having difficulty in obtaining ratification of the Treaty of Tient
sin, but was also failing to gather intelligence that would have been of
~'
.
28
va 1 ue t 0 j"uraVlev.

Ignatiev was not to arrive in Peking until mid-

June of 1859, however, and in the meantime Gordhakov sent Perovskii new
instructions, in early Uarch, to conclude a treaty with China in eight
articles, giving Russia the Manchurian coast down to the Korean border,
freedom of trade at any point on the Chinese frontier, the right to have
consuls in many towns and providing for the delimitation of the frontier
WiUI China both in the east and the west. 29

Gorchakov did not know that

26!!
-II
t
ln~Q
lQ6l , ""\..
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,,,asa,,aKO
Danno, vll1na an,::l t'ne ','\',65,
0:)0-...;
.Lle CrlqlnS
TSMngli Yamen (H5rvard University Press, 1964), P?' 132-132.
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27EntsiklopedJchEski Slovar, Vol. 24, pp. 784-786.

28~uest'?d,

0Q.

ciL, p. 164.

29 I bid., p. 167.
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at this time China was preparing obliquely to repudiate the Treaty of
Aigun.
On April 7, 1859, the

Tribunal addressed a Note to the Russian

Senate without Perovskii's knowledge.

It complained about Muraviev l s

intentions regarding a survey of the Ussuri area, stating that it was
"not adjacent to the Russian frontier" and about the conduct of Russian
merchants sent by Muraviev to Sanhsing in the previous year.

It stated

that Muraviev was apparently "making pretexts to stir up trouble and
that the ruler of your country cannot have heard about it".

It expressed

the hope that Lieutenant Colonel Budogoskii's survey party would soon be
sent

ho~e

and added that, "Apart from the left bank of the Heilungchiang ••

•• you ought in general not to travel or settle anywhere".

It also con

tained a reminder that no reply had been sent to a previcu5 Note requesting
that the weapons offered by Russia be sent to Urga. 30
Muraviev intercepted the Chinese Note protesting his actions and
re-addressed it to Perovskii, at the same time sending a Note to the Chi
nese expressing surprise that the Government of China was sending Notes
over the head of the Russian envoy in Peking.

He asked that Chinese re

presentatives be sent to meet Budogoskii on the Ussuri. 31

The Emperor

I-ting had no intention of falling in with Muraviev's plans.

At the end

of April, when he received a me;norial from I-Shan urging acceptance of
free trade along the Amur, he agreed, but he ordered I-Shan to meet

~ura-

Iliev and argue hif:l out of his plans for the Ussuri area. 32 Some t\~O weeks
30 c~c h umac h er, 22.
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later I-ting ordered Chi-la-ming-a to prevent the Russians from navi
gating the Ussuri or going up the Sungari to Sanhsing; he also instructed
the Acting General of Kirin to send an officer to the border of Kirin and
Heilungchiang to watch for barbarian ships and "stop them by straight talk"
from entering Kirin. 33 At that time, too, Perovskii was informed by the
Grand Council that China considered effective the boundaries as delimited
by the Treaty of Rerchinsk and by implication denied the validity of the
Treaty of Aigun by stating that the Russians in Mariinsk and "other
coastal places on the Amur River were only temporarily allowed to live in
the wastelands".34

An edict pubUshed a month later announced that I-shan

and Chi-la-ming-a, who had been responsible for the signing of the Treaty
of Aigun, were to be punished. 35
There now ensued a complicated series of further inconclusive ex
changes of Notes between Perovskii and the Chinese Government, during
which the latter continued to insist that the Russians had no right to
penetrate into any part of the Ussuri maritime area.

Muraviev continued

to send his officials and military units up the Ussuri to badger the Chi
nese there into joining them in delimiting the new frontier.

His men

established a number of defense posts in the area and indicated that if
the Chinese refused to undertake joint demarcation they would simply
36
seize the area for themselves.
In late May of 1859, ~uraviev himself
went to Aigun and announced that he was on his way to inspect the Ussuri
33 n .SM 37, p. 14A, cited by :)uested, op. cit., p. 178.
348anno, op. cit., p. 148.
351b1d •
36 1",<:,>;
37, p. 183, cited by Quested, op. cl!., p. 181.
......HlI,

211

and Suifen Eivers.

He told the Chinese that he was afraid the English

would seize the area and showed them on a map the location (Possiet Bay)
'.vhere he would meet officinls from Kirin; he would wait there and if,
after a month, they did not appear, he would go on to Tientsin. 37 Then,
ignoring their entreaties not to do so, he proceeded down the Amur to
Nikolaevsk and thence down to the sea, sailing down the coast of Manchur
ia to the mouth of thenumen River, on the Korean border.

Lieutenant

Colonel Budogoskii, who had completed his survey of the land frontier
up to the Tiumen, met him at Possiet Bay.

Budogoskii reported to Uura

vie v that between the mouth of the Ussuri and the Tiumcn he had seen no
Chinese or Manchus.

The two men then sailed for Tientsin, arriving at

the mouth of the Pei-Ho on July 2. 38
~uraviev

was anxious to keep the Chinese in ignorance of Russian

naval weakness in the Far East; he tried to keep his presence aboard
his ship, the "Amerika", a secret and ordered the rest of his small
squadron to keep out of sight of land.

The Chinese, however, did learn

that he was there, whereupon Muraviev requested permission to send Budo
goskii to Peking with maps and letters for Ignatiev.
this request was granted. 39

After some delay

Muraviev then sailed for Japan where he

attempted to negotiate a treaty recognizing Russian soverieghty over the
entire island of Sakhalin.

In mid-August of 1859, he arrived at the Bay

of Kanagav.:a with a squadron of seven assorted steam-powered warships,
37rwSM 38, p. 11, cited by

38SchumachH, op.
39r"'s~:
III

ill

cit., p. 200.

~uested, op. cit., p. 186.

cit., pp. 305-309.

n...;, p. lA et. seg., and 41, p. 25A, cited

C;i"\

by~uested,.Q.l2..
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a force which, though modest, far exceeded the puny array of Japanese
naval vessels in the vicinity.40
Muraviev went ashore with a retinue of some forty officers and an
honor guard of three hundred al'med sailors, acconpanied by a drum and
bugle corps.

He opened negotiations with the Japanese plenipotentiaries

by delivering a statement claiming that since the ancient name of the Amur
River was the Sakhalin-Ula, the island of Sakhalin was homogeneous with
that river, which was now "again" under Russian rule, lias it hud been
one hundred and seventy years before".

It

follo~ed,

therefore, he as

serted, that the island must be recognize1 as Russian. 41

The Japanese

pointed out that, according to the Treaty of Shimoda, conclu1ed with
Putiatin, Stikhal in remained "unpartitioned between Russia and Japanll.
They initially refusEd even to draw a line of demarcation to the south of
the island.

Muraviev then resorted to a blustering claim that Putiatin

had not been enpowered to discuss Sakhalin, as this island was within
his own jurisdiction as Governor-General of Eastern Siberia.

He subse

quently rejected a Japanese compromise offer to divide the island at
latitude 50 and the negotiations came to an end. 42
Muraviev's uncompromising stand on Sakhalin reflected his fear that
if he settled for something less than Russian possession of the entire
island, that portion that might be assigned to Japan would eventually be
seized hy England. 43
40L ensen,

OPe Cl"t .,

41Barsukov,
42Lensen,

In reporting to Prince Gorchakov on his unsuccessful

~

Ope

p.

~74 •

~

"
CIt.,
II, pp. 278-279.

cit., p. 376.

42Barsukov, ~cii., p. 217.
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meetings, he explained:

"Considering that the rights of tho Japanese

are just as indeterminate as ours ••• I could nct agree to any division
(of the island) between Japan and us, particularly in consideration of
the fact of Japants weakness, any foreign power can easily take possess
ion of that part which will be recognized as Japanese, consolidate its
position there and inflict considerable damzge on us for all time to come,
especL:llly in relation to La Perouse strait, which constitutes the nearest
and, indeed, only exit for our vessels from the Tatar Strait into the
Pacific Ocean."44
Muravievfs unsuccessful attempt to browbeat the Japanese was pro
bably not so much the result of his having failed to realize that they
were of a tougher breed than the Chinese as it was a reflection of his
anxiety to return to the Amur as soon as possible.

In a letter to Karsa

kov written before the start of his negotiations, he had remarked, "I
fear the slowness of the Japanese and that I shall have to return to the
Amur very late".45 The prescience and insight into the psychology of
exotic peoples that had stood him so well in the Caucasus and in the
Chinese borderlands had not, in fact, deserted him.

Putiatin had spo

ken to him of the Japanese in enthusiastic and admiring terms and had
urged the desirability of training them in modern technology; in a
letter to Kovalevskii, reporting on his fruitless negotiations, Mura
vie..., referred to this rather sardonically, commenting, "They will learn
everything without us, particularly navigation; we had better learn
ourselves, rather than teach people who will soon surpass us. n46
44 Ibid ., pp. 276-277.
45sarsukov, oQ. cit., I, pp. 557-558.
46 Ibid ., p. 559.
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By the summer of 1859 the main arena for the final resolution of
the ."'-mur question was shift in9 to T nts in and Peking.

In June, 18:')9,

the British and French plenipotentiaries prepared to complete ratifica
tion of the Tientsin treaties and

to take up their residence in Peking.

The Chinese, however, proposed reconsideration of the treaties, whereupon
the allies attempted to force their way past the Taku forts, but were de
feated.

They withdrew, to await the arrival of reinforcements.

Ignatiev

arrived in Peking two days after this surprising coup by the Chinese
forces which made his task of enforcing Russian demands considerably
more difficult than it would have been otherwise.

He submitted a draft

treaty designed to bring the treaties of Aigun and Tientsin into align
ment and providing for a settlement of the Russo-Chinese frontier from
the confluence of the Ussuri and the lunur along the Ussuri upstream to
its confluence with the River Sung-a-cha, then up the latter to Lake
Hsing-kai, or Hanka, and the River Hun-ch'un, then along that river to the
Tiumen and along the Tiuffi~n to t~e sea. 47

All his efforts to obtain

serious consideration of his proposals were rejected throughout the sum
mer and fall of 18:')9, when he broke off negotiations until the Kew Year.
During the period of Ignatievfs initial frustrations in Peking, Mura
viev, who had returned to the Amur from Japan in the fall of 18:')9, con
tinued to expand his settlef:\ents on t.he Amur and on the Ussuri.

He '.vas

47 IWS ;'.1 39, p. 273, cited by~uested, 92. cit., p. 196, who points
out that there is no mention in this draft treaty of Sanhsing, claimed
earlier by Perovskii, a~d that this might suggest that Muraviev, not
Gorchakov, had origin2ted this claim, and that earlier Russian incursions
might have been instigated by him. In this connection she points out
that Ignatiev in his ~aterlaly records a letter Muraviev had sent him
from Yeddo stating his intention to occupy the mouth of the Sungari ani
to send vessels of all sizes up it as far as Kirin.
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evidently doing his best to place Ignatiev in a position of negotiating
from strength. On October 8, as he was approaching the confluence of
the Amur with the Ussuri, Fu-ni-yang-a, Deputy Commander in charge of
barbarian affairs, intercepted his vessel and was allowed to come aboard.
The Chinese memorial to the Emperor, reporting on this meeting, stated,
in part, that Muraviev was "arrogant and overbearing and wrathful of
speech.

He asked why the General of Kirin had not come to delimit the

frontier".

The response given by FUfni-yang-a had been that Kirin, the

Ussuri and Suifen were not contiguous to RU3sian territory and there was
no need to investigate them.

Fu-ni-yang-a had asked Muraviev to order

back his men and ships from the Ussuri but
the Russian

envoy

~uravievts

reply had been

that

was now in Peking to manage this matter and that if he

could not bring it to a conclusion, he, Muraviev, would have to negotiate
with the General of Kirin.48
Shortly after Muraviev's confrontation with Fu-ni-yang-a,

3

Manchu

officer had met lv)uraviev as he was passing along the left bank of the
in a carriage and they had stopped at a wayside building to talk.

i\ffiur

Mura

viev refused to discuss the frontier and indicated that the Chinese could
send representatives to Blagoveshchensk for that purpose.
October, 1859, the Chinese did just

that.

At the end of

Ai-shen-tai came to Blagov

eschenck and repeate:1 to Muraviev substantially what Fu-ni-yang-a had
earlier said, and in effect proposing only that there should be delimita
tion of the land "to be permitted to the Russians" around the points
they occupied on the left bank of the ,\mur and at Marinskii Post and Kizi.
The Chinese records describe Muraviev's reaction as follows:
48 I i'iSM, 44, 17.60., cited by Quested, 02 • cit., p. 213.
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When Muraviev heard this he became extremely angry and
shouted. He told the lama int8rpreter Father Avvakum to
tell Ai-shen-t'ai he was an insolent liar. These places
had always belonged to Russiu and he not merely would not
move those already theI'a, but more men and ships were coming.
He.would also build gun emplacements and houses at Lake
Hanka and at Tiumenshan. Our officer replied as before.
Muraviev becalne still angrier and his appearance was alarm
ing. He told the priest to say that without the use of gun
and cannon against them they would never be moved, and he
ordered the buildings of the (Chinese) Ussuri defense post
on the left bank of the Heilungchiang to be removed. Our
officer replied thdt that would be very hard to permit.
Muraviev replied that if it was not removed he must order
his men to destroy it, and next year he must set up a gun
emplacement and buildings opposite Heilungchiang town
(Aigun). Having said this he told Ai-shen-tlal to talk
to his artillery officer, a man of evil aspect. Our offi
cer saw that he looked extremely vain and haughty, and told
him that if it came to war, how could he suppose that China
would not defend herself? Then Ai-shen-t'ai introduced
his Major ~o-men-te-leh-ho-er. Since he was powerfully
built they all stood up and gathered round to look at
him. Even Muraviev looked round and laughed and no1ded
his head endlessly. Then ~uraviev gave them wine with
his own hands and told them all to drink'a glass with the
barbarians and get to know one another. It seemed as if
his former talk had been only play-acting.
Our officer . asked the lama to tell him that all the mat
ters mentioned should be cleared up, and he should arrange
to go to the town for a meeting. The chief (Muraviev) said
he himself had no business to discuss in Heilungchiang
town, but if our General had authority to hand over the Us
suri and Suifen he would meet him, otherwise not. 49
&:urav1ev remained at Blagoveschensk in October-r:ovember and had repeated
meetings with the Deputy-Commander of Aigun, during which he refused to
modify his stand on the Ussuri frontier. 50

He was adopting as obdurate

a stand with his counterparts as Ignatiev was encountering on the part
of the officials in Peking with whom he was attempt ion to negotiate.
He even went so far as to forbid the Chinese to navigate the Amur below
49 n:SM ~4, p. 36.3, cited by Quested, Ope elt., pp. 214-216.
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Khdbarovsk. 51
During the period when matters appeared to have reached an impasse,
Muraviey continued his Cossack settlement activities along the Arnur, as
well as his occupation of the right bank of the Ussuri, which included
the establishment of the hlo best harbors on the coast, Novgorodsk and
Vladivostok. 5'"'L
Throughout the fall of 1859, Ignatiev continued to be rebuffed in
Peking and on November 17, Gorchakov sent Mural/iev the following ins'bruc
tions:

"If you become convinced on the basis of future reports from our

plenipotentiary in Peking that the Chinese will never agree to the de
marcatiDn of the border ••• your Excellency will proceed to occupy
those frontiers on the right bank of the Ussuri and the Manchurian ports
with our ships as soon
this possible."

as

the time of yeal' and local considerations make

Until he became

EO

convinced, however, Muraviev was to

adbpt a strictly neutral posture with regard to the hostile acu'ons of
the Engl ish and French and was to undertake no aggressive troop move
ments, guarding only Russian interests. 53 These instructions were large
ly in accord with Muraviev·s own views, as contrasted to
by

Igna~ievts,

who

this time, exasperated at being denied access to the highest levels

of Government in Peking, was suggesting that Russ ian troops move on Urga,
Aigun, Sanhsing and Tsitsihar. 54 t.~uraviev alerted all his troops along the
Amur and the Ussuri and ordered construction of two additional gunboats,
all of this being done in plain view of the Chinese on the opposite banks.
5l~uested, op. cit., p. 217.

52garsukov, op_ cit., I, pp. 560-561.
53 Ibid • , pp. 562-4.

54 Ibid ., and Schumacher, op. cit., pp. 312-313.
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During the fall and winter of 1859-60, he removed a number of Chinese
military posts on the right banks of the rivers, accomplishing this with
no bloodshed, since the Chinese offered only passive resistance.

He also

spread rumors amongst the Chinese that large Russian forces would cross
the Chinese frontier2 in the spring, and that at that time sixty English
and French vessels would be arriving at Tientsin~55

Just how effective l,;iuraviev· s attempts to strengthen Ignatiev's
hand in Peking were must be a matter of conjecture.

The young envoy had

achieved little during his negotiations during the winter of 1859 though
at the end of that year he had elicited a ticit admission in writing from
two senior Chinese officials, Su-Shun and Jui-ch'ang, that Russia's poss
ession of the left bank of the Amur was at least an indisputable fait.

~ccompli.~6 But Muraviev's maneuvers had also stung the Chinese into
undertaking a certain amount of defense preparations in Manchuria.
ambush

par~y fo~

An

the Amur-Sungari confluence was despatched in the spring

of 1860 and LOO men were sent to the Niman-Ussuri confluence; eight small
observation posts were set up on the Ussuri itself and 200 men had been
sent to the Pacific coast.

The Plao-fu tribes, moreover, had been or

ganized in twelve posts in the area of the Lesser Suifen River and
eighty-four posts in the Su-cheng and hlat'ingho areas near the sea.
These irregular forces may have totaled 10,000 men. 57 How accurate Rus
sian intelligence was on these activities is not known, though in April
55Schumacher, op. cit., p. 214 and IViSH, 45, p. 178, cited by
Quested, op. cit., p. L17.
56aanno, P12' elt., p. 154.
57 n~3t;; :0, p. lOA, dted by Que3ted, Ope ..£it., p. 223.
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they had received various rumors of Chinese mobilization and reports that
2,000 muskets and five cart-loads of cannon had been sent to Aigun. 58
Muraviev was clearly tinpertuI'bed, in any event, being confident that he
had sufficiently superior forces to deal with any eventuality.

He recom

mended to Gorchakov that Ignatiev collaborate with the English and the
French and that in

t~e

event that the Chfing regime should collapse, Mon

golia and Manchuria should be taken under Russian protectorate. 59
In January of 1860 the Russian Government, in agreement with Mura
viev's view, decided that Ignatiev should join the English, French and
American envoys or. the coast and attempt to play the role that had been
filled by Putiatin.

The Anglo-French teinforcements were arriving in

Chinese waters and it was evident that the decisive campaign of the "Ar
row 'ilar" was approaching.
Muraviev's role in the Russo-Chinese confrontation was new largely
one of consolidating his hold on both thE: Ahrur and Ussuri areas without
resorting to any large-scale hostile action, ar.d of encournging the local
inhabi tants to enter into expan::!ed trade relations ,iwi th the Russians.
The ultimate success of the Anglo-French military operations wae a fore
gone conclusion, though he mistakenly believed that
the continuing

t~ose

operations and

Rebellion might bring about the collapse of the
Chting dynasty as early as in r:.ay, 18CC. 60
Tai~ing

As for Ignatiev,

~uested

as set forth in his own report:

sUfi:..rnarizes the policy he was follovlling,
He was to exacerbate the Anglo-Chinese

58schumacher, op.cit., pp. 324-326.
59Barsukov, QP~

6~6c. cit.

cit., I,

p. 571.
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quanel sufficiently for the English and Chinese not to come to terms
before China had been thoroughly defeated, even to the extent of letting
the British actually overthrow

th~

Ch'ing dynasty, for no other regime

could be worse disposed tOAards the RUEsians than were the high Manchu
dignitaries.

He

WeE

to make himself an indispensable adviser to the

allies, but induce the Chinese, too, to regard him as a friend and to
grant Russia everything she demanded.

With regard to the French, 19na

tiev's task was to irritate their relati6ns with the British and gain
their support in defending Russian interests in the Far East against the
latter.

Finally, the attention of all the Western ministers had to be

distracted from Russia's "unfinished business with China, and they must
be prevented from meddling in it even indirectly".6l
WhilE a'lIIaiting the denouement, Muraviev continued his efforts at

administrative improvements in Eastern Siberia.

In the spring of 1860,

he recommended to st. Petersburg that his domain be divided into three
parts,

the Primoria, the Irkutsk Gubernia and the Eniseisk Gubernia.

The latter he proposed transferring to Western Siberia. 62 As for cor
rupt bureaucrats and grasping exploiters, his efforts of twelve years
.had not succeeded in entirely eliminating them from the scene.

In July

of 18EO, he was writing to Karsakov, on leave in Russia, complaining
about

the "intrigues" of the Ministry of Finance.

sult of his recomm€ndations,

Although, as a re

the government monopoly on gold mining

(and its attendant evils) tad been substantially diminished by 1egis
lation in 1851, that portion of it which had been
61Q ues t e d ,
6?Barsukov,

r··t

illL~"
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cit., I, pp. 576-581.
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private sector had soon become yet another field for bribery, collu
sion and injustice.

Thus it appeared that the Ministry of Finance was

now planning to relieve a private operator of his fields in Novomariinsk
in order to turn them over to another, more favored, private operator. 63
In another letter to

Karsakov in the summer of 1860, Muraviev re

ported that all vIas well on the Amur and the Ussuri.

The Russians 'were

doing as they saw f it and, although some of his firebrand officers were
all for a little shooting to encourage the Chinese to legalize what they
had agreed to, he had forbidden it, "not only because of official in
structions" (which he

was not loathe to disregard or exceed on

sion) but out of his personal conviction

tI

••

occa

here our guns would kill

only the common people who are not our enemies, while the mandarins would
escape."

In any case, he pointed out, the Chinese authorities were con

tenting themselves with issuing "absurd proclamations and making empty
threats, to which no one paid any attention".64
Even while marking time, Muraviev continued to press the Chinese to
agree to demal'cation of the frontier.

During the sun:mer he sent an offi

cer to Aigun for that purpose - - as well as to state that the Russian
military alert that was everywhere so evident was only in preparation for
occupying territories ceded to Russia by treaty; he also warned the affi0an
that any disorders created by Chinese subjects, or any attempt to send
Chinese troops down the Sungari would be met by force. 65
The English and French, having failed to obtain the concessions they
63 Ibid ., p. 594.
64 I bid., p. 597.
65Schu~acher,

Ope

cit., p. 327.
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sought

by negotiation, mounted a successful assault on the Taku forts

and proceeded to fight their way to Peking.

In 1ete September, they

sacked the Swr.mer Palace and laid siege to the capital.
1860, the Manchus

On October 7,

capitulated to the allies t ultimatum, thus averting

the sacking of Peking, largely as a result of Ignatiev's mediation.
The British and French Conventions with China were concluded on
October 10 and 11 and the Russian Treaty of

Peking was finally negotia

ted by Ignatiev and ratified on t!ovember 2.

It unconditionally ceded all

territory on the left bank of the Amur to Russia, as well as the entire
Ussuri maritime area to the Korean frontier.
was

thu~

Final legal confirmation

accorded to Muraviev's historic achievement of acquiring for

Russia some 360,000 square miles of new territory in the Far East.
II. SHELVING OF AN EMPIHE BUILDER

Muraviev's twelve years in Eastern Siberia had worn down his health
and energy.

~:ith

his major task accomplished,

he prepared to turn over

his responsibil ities to Karsakov, whom he was recomnlencl ing as his suc"
cessor.
ting

In the meantime he worked at the unceasing problem of popula

the new territories at a sufficient rate to create a base for pro

fitable economic development out of an area that he realized was as yet
only a drain on ilussia itself.

By the end of 1860 there were some 100

settlements along the Amur, totaling a population of approximately
15,000.

Such, cornments Kabano'!, were the results of Muraviev's pol icy of

colonization, results of very little significance which, however, had
placed a considerable strain on the resources of Eastern Siberia.

The

movement of these colonists, moreover, was accompanied by much hardship
and suffering, which could have been

avoided had f.luraviev been in a
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position to provide them with adequate financial and logistical support.

66

In February, 1861, Muraviev, having returned to St. Petersburg, was
decorated with the Order of St. Vladimir, First Class, granted

a

per-sion

of 15,000 roubles annually, and made a member of the Imperial Council. 67
The Emperor upheld his

recoli~endation

of Karsakov as his successor - 

over the votes of all 6f the members of the Council (which had also
voted by a large majority against emancipation of the serfs, only to be

overruled by their sovereign).68 At this time, too, in response to Mura
viev's pleas, the Kerchinsk miners were finally granted the same rights
that were enjoyed by all factory ,.'Vorkers. 69

His reco(mnendations for re

organization of the Eastern Siberian administration, however, were
shelved - - whether for reasons of economy or other considerations is not
clear.
Muraviev, at the relatively early age of fifty-two, found that his
departure from the scene of his triumph had effectively terminated his
career.

Ir. St. Petersburg he participated in meetings of the Imperial

Council, particularly when they concerned matters affecting the adminis
tration of his old dOffiJin.

Here, he succeeded in putting through one of

his projects, the transfer of the Kiakhta custom? to Irkutsk, the junction
70
Such
of the most important cOmfllunication routes in Eastern Siberia.
66,.
Ka b anov, Ope
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68 Ibid ., p. 619. The majority in the Council had supported Putiatin
as Muraviev's successor.

69B~rsukov, o~. cit., I, p. 624.
70 Ibid ., p. 623.
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occasional work sessions, however, compared to the activities that had
engrossed him when he was at the peak of his boiling energy in Irkutsk
or on extended travels throughout his vast territory, were a frustrating
anti-climax.
For a time there were rumors in the capital that he was to be namej
Viceroy of the Caucasus, or of Poland.

It appears that he was in fact

seriously considered for eppointment to one or another of these posts
but,

as had happened 2.t a much earlier stage in his c3reer, those who

opposed him prevail

A contemporary of (,turavievts relates that in

discussing with some of his intimates the possibility of his becoming
ViCGIOY of Poland, r,:uravi8v said, "Let thcm first tell me, what does the
Govermlent desire in 'Narsaw;
order?

sincere peace or police-imposed calm and

Concessions to the Poles or their pacification?"

The writer

points out thJt at the time the Government was vacillating in its poli
cy, but

, "Thank God that this question was resolved ard that

when it became evident that the views of Nicholas iakolaevich and the
Government were completely at vari~nce, he escaped that fate.,,7l
Prince Bal'iatir:skii, former intimate of

~acholJs

counsels of Alexander II, advised the EmpGror
to the Caucasus.

I and high in the

ins{ appointing

~uravi€v

He acknowledged Muraviev's outstanding qualifications

but urged the Emperor to fill such a high position with an individual
who, even if mediocre in comparison with the Count of the Amur, was more
"loyal" to the throne. 72
71M• I. Veniukov, ~Graf Nikolai ~ikolaevich Muraviev-Amurskii",
~~~~~~~~) Vol. 33, p. 525.

7~usski Arkhiv,

1289, Vol. 6, pp. 282-283.
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A new period of reaction, after the brief
death of Nicholas I, was setting in at high

ntha~'

following the

govern~ental

levels.

The

liberation of the serfs, which Muraviev had advocated while in Tula,
had earned Alexander II criticism and hostility both from vested interests
that had opposed the measure and from many others who were disappointed
by its compromising aspects.

The beginning of freer conditions had

whetted the appetites of liberals, reformers and radicals who proceeded
to demand more relaxation of governmental controls.

Student disorders

began to assume serious proportions after the Liberation.

From London,

Alexander Herzen was urging fraternization between Russian radicals and
Polish patriots.

Socialist propaganda was "flooding the military schools,

from the Corps of Pages to the Artillery Academy, where Professor Lavrov
combined mathematical instruction with the advocacy of social revolu
tion".73

Clandestine pub1 ications, such as Velikorus, Ko10kol and

lstorichesski Alman?ch, were widely circulated and, in May, 1862, the
most violent of them all, Molodaia Rossia, demanded measures Uto change
radically and without exception all the foundations of contemporary
society".
country.

Following its publ ication, a wave of arson spread over the
In St. Petersburg alone, a conflagration destroyed two thousand

shops and warehouses.

The insecurity and alarm created by the unrest

of 1861-2 ended the liberalizing trend that had begun with the accession
of Alexander II and profoundly altered his outlook.

Political trials

and other repressive measures, discarded at the end of the reign of
Nicholas I, were resumed.

tlIt was the beginning of the duel to the death

73v:. E. Mosse, Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia (Collier
Books, New York, 1962), pp. 106-7.
\
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between Alexander II and

the Russian revolutionary movement.,,74 At

such a time, Count Muraviev-Amurskii, a man known to be independent of
mind and ready to act on his own responsibility, was bound to be re
garded askance.
Those who were anxious to brand lv!uraviev as disloyal were not
wanting for pretexts.
known.

His predilection for the Decembrists was well

Moreover, the famous anarchist, Michael Bakunin, a relative of

Muravievts from the maternal branch, had escaped to America from Eastern
Siberia

while Muraviev had still been Governor-General there. 75 It was

widely assumed, evidently with justification that this had been accom
plished
the

with Muraviev's connivance.

w~rmly

Certainly, there can be no doubt of

sympathetic relationship that existed between these two men.

Bakunin wrote to Alexander Herzen that "Muraviev is the only man among
those who have power and influence in Russia who can and must fully and
76
without the least reservations be considered one of us ll •
Peter Kro
potkin, who came to Irkutsk shortly after Muraviev's departure, observed
that "Muraviev held advanced views and a democratic republic would not
quite have satisfied him.

In his study, the young officers and Bakunin

would discuss the possibility of establishing a United States of Siber
77
ia, federated across the Pacific with the United States of America tl •
What Kropotkin was referring to was not as outlandish and incongruous
74 Ibid., pp. 180-212.
75Russkaia Starina, Vol. 88, p. 607.
76Alexander Herzen, Polnce SObraniye Sochinenii, Vol. XIV, p. 426.
77p • Kropotkin, Memoirs of a Revolutionist, (Houghton Mifflin Co~,
1899) p. 169.
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an idea in Muraviev's time as it might appear today.

Concurrent with the

development of Russian Populism was the rise of "federalism", the yearn
ing for establishment of autonomous, or even independent, regions within
the Russian multi-national imperial state.

And in only one "historical

region" Cas contrasted to Poland) of what can rightly be called Russia,
Franco Venturi points out, was there an attempt to found a movement of
independence.

This was Siberia, the most important field of Russian

"federalismlt.

While Muraviev was still in Irkutsk, his kinsman, Bakunin,

helped two young Siberian patriots, Nicholas Yadrintsev and Grigori Po
tanin, to become university students in St. Petersburg, where they found
ed a regional political group by collecting

together the Siberians scat

tered among the various institutions of higher education in the capital.
Their aim was separation of Siberia and creation of a republic like that
of the United States of America.

Their efforts came to naught and within

a few years they were arrested.

But, Venturi points out, Siberian separa

tism was not merely firing the imagination of a couple of young students.
Even in official Siberian Circles, "such as the Corrmlittes of the Geo
graphical Society, inspired by Muraviev-Amurskii, there was talk in 1861
of Siberia's colonial status and suggestions for the separation of Siberia
from the metropolis, fas the history of all colonies teaches' ".78
Kropotkin's revelations of the conversations in the study of the

7~ranco Venturi, Roots of Revolution (New York, 1960), pp. 317
319. This concept persisted among Russian liberals and revolutionaries.
A journal published in Gen~va by "Popu1ists-Bakuninists" pleaded for the
break-up of the Empire, pointing out, among other separatist tendencies,
that Eastern Siberia, because of its economic interests, might in time
gravitate toward the United States. (See AVran Yarmolinsky, Road to
Fevo~ution (London, 1957), p. 246. The reader will note, incidentally,
that Muraviev was aware of some such possibility as early as in 1849.
(See supia, pp. 78-79.)

228

Governbr-Gcncxal

~ere

made years after

~ur2viev's

death but others

were

seizing upon reports of this sort even while Muraviev was preparing to
leave Irkutsk to seek a new appointment worthy of his accomplishments.
One such was a certain A. P. Shchapov, Siberian patriot and inspirer
of Yadrintsev and Potanin.
the Tsar, much

In prison as a politic;.>l suspect, he wrote

as had the disgruntled Piatnitzkii, years earlier, alleg

ing that Muravie\! vilas quietly contemplating the possibility of becoming
Tsar of Siberia.

Shchapov's letter reached the Emperor just at the time

that hluraviev was being considered as his possible viceroy in the Cauca
sus or in Poland. 79

Piatnizkii's letter had been ignored by Nicholas I,

the tall martinet and friend of l/iuraviev t s father; ShchClpov's exercise
in poison-per..manship was perhaps taken mOl'e seriously by the harel-pressed
Alexander II.

Other evidences of

i,~uravie·.Jts

"unreliability" included the

fact that while Feodor Dostoevskii, a minor political offender, was en
during the rigors of a strict prison regime in

~estern

Siberia, another

more important subversive, Nicholas Petrashevskii, exiled to Muraviev's
realm, had enjoyed the freedoms of any ordinary Russian inhabitant of
Easterr, Sibel'ia.

Another sinister indication was that I.:uraviev had freed

the numerous Polish prisoners in his charge, following the amnesty pro
claimed upon the coronation of Alexander 11. 80
The many manifestations of Muraviev's fundamental liberalism clear
ly did not escape the notice of his opponents in St. Petersburg who, by
exploiting them, succeeded in foiling any attempt to appoint him to a
79semyonov, gp. cit., p. 278.
80semyonov, p. 279: It vias claimed that this had been done "against
the secret wishe!:. of the government in st. Petersburg".

':)")Q
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vice-regal position and managed to bring his career to a premature close.
A contemporary of Muraviev's who had known him from the early days h the
Caucasus - - and whose impressions of him were by no means those of undi
luted admiration - - met him in Europe and commented thus after reminis
cing with the

soldier-statesman:

"~nat

knew not, nor did I wish to ask him.
'red t

•

obstacles blocked his way I

It was said of him that he was a

All I can say of those who talked thus is that they distinguish

between colors very poorly.1I8l
Count Muraviev-Amurskii, Far Eastern pro-consul of the "third Rome ll ,
had not only added hundreds of thousands of square miles of

territory to

the Russian Empire; he had also reformed the administration of Eastern
Siberia - - at least for a brief period.

Kropotkin records in his mem

oirs that, "In 1862, the senior members of the Siberian bureaucracy were
far more educated and in general far better than those of any province
of European Russia".82 And a quarter of a century later, colo~ists in
Eastern Siberia told the deported writer, V. G. Korolenko, that there
had been no bribery in Muraviev's time. 83 Such a purge of the tradi
tionally corrupt regime of Eastern Siberia was a direct result of the
paradoxical mixture of Muravievts humane outlook and his sternly authori
tarian tendencies.

This combination did not endear him to those who

were influencing the decisions of the nervous and ailing Emperor.
Following a protracted visit to France, Muraviev returned to St.
Petersburg in 1863, at the time of the mounting unrest in Poland, when

8l~ski Arkhiv, 1883, p. 352.
82Kropotkin, ~cit., p. 171.
83semyonov, pp. cit., p. 280.
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he thought that his services might be needed.

He was given no special

appointment and, when his wife rejoined him from Paris, took up residence
in Tsarskoe Selo.
faction.

It was a sterile existence, affording him no satis

Apart from occasional meetings of the Imperial Council, he

was never offered any suitable new role either in the government or the
army.

In 1868, he and his Countess left st. Petersburg to live in Paris.

From his apartment on the Rue Miromesnil, Russiats

discarded empire-

builder followed events in Europe and in his homeland and maintained a
lively correspondence with his successors in Irkutsk, the Priamur and
the Primoria.

Only once, in 1878, did he return to St. Petersburg to of

fer his services in the Russo-Turkish war, but these were declined.

In

1881, he died in Paris of what was reported to be "a gangrenous infec
tion".

He was buried in the plot of his Lotharingian wife's family in

the Pere Lachaise cemetery in Montmartre. 84
II 1.

GREAT EXPECT AT IONS DASHED

AND

REVIVED

The annexation and settlement of the Amur region became the subject
of debate and polemics even before

"~uraviev's

departure from Eastern Si

beria and the controversy continued for many years.
Zavalishin's articles in
fairs in

Mur~vievts

~orskoi

It was initiated by

Sbornik which depicted the state of af

domain as being far different from what was alleged

in some official reports attesting to the growing progress and well-being

of the population thera. 85 M~ch of what Zavalishin and similar articles
on Muraviev related regarding the hardships of the settlers, inadequate
8%arsukov, gp. cit., I, p. 671
85Kabanov,
.
.
QlL'!.....fll.,
p. 196 •
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preparation for their reception, poorly chosen locations, etc ••• , was
ohly too true.

They erred, however, in ascribing all the ills that

afflicted the pioneers of Eastern Siberia to sordid motives of personal
gain which could not be imputed to Muraviev, certainly, or even to the
corruption or incompetence of some of the officials working for him.

The

mediocrity and even venality of the Eastern Siberian bureaucracy no doubt
contributed to the unhappy history of the early years following the Treaty
of Aigun.

But the slow rate of development of the area for three de

cades following Muraviev ' s departure were the result, in far greater de
gree, of a number of other, more deep seated factors.
The Amur and Ussuri settlements in Muraviev's day were similar in
principle to the military settlements that had been instituted by Count
A. A. Arakcheev in European Russia after the Napoleonic Wars, and that,
it should be noted, were being phased out of existence there by the mid
nineteenth century.

As Kabanov points out, military or para-military

colonization by its very nature stifles the sort of enterprise that is
necessary to steady rapid growth of a newly settled area. 86

It was a

poor alternative to filling the land with free, private civilians spurred
on by the kind of incentives that enticed the
westward in Ar:l.erica.

~uccessive

waves of pioneers

Under the circumstances facing him at the time, Mura

viev had no other choice.

His task, considering Eastern Siberia's limi

ted resources - - which were all he could draw upon - - was formidable.
Communications along the 3000-verst course of the Amur had to be under
taken simultaneously ••• The same was true of the 800-verst line of the
86Kabanov,

OPe

ci~., p. 197.
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Ussuri to the Korean border.

87

Muraviev recognized the deficiencies of the mode of colonization
that he was obliged to adopt.

Many years later, Governor-General Unter

berger of the Priamur called on Muraviev, living in retirement in Paris,
and discussed the reproaches and criticisms that had been directed at
his colonization methods.

Muraviev explained that, "At that time, it was

necessary first and foremost to establish reliable communications along
the deserted bank of the Amur and Ussuri with Vladivostok; for that
reason, contrary to our desire, it was necessary to sacrifice the other
needs posed by colonizing the area, calculating that these could be at
tended to in the future. 1I88 And just when that future would begin to
materialize could hardly have been clearly discernible either to Muraviev
or to the policy makers in St. Petersburg at the time of the signing of
the Treaty of Peking.

Though the Treaty was to some extent a stabili

zing factor in Russo-Chinese relations, the Taiping Rebellion had yet
to be suppressed.

Were the Ch'ing dynasty to collapse under its pres

sure, the whole picture would be radically changed.

~ruxaviev,

as has

been seen, envisaged an eventual Russian protectorate over all of Man
churia and Mongolia.

He was undoubtedly not the sole Russian official

to be aware of such a possibility.

Certainly, outside observers were.

Ravenstein, writing immediately after the Treaty of Peking, predicted
that when the Chinese Empire fell to pieces, Russia would "possess her
self of the whole of Manchuria, including the Lia-tung Peninsula".89
87,Barsukov, OQ. cit., I, p.

&l':cA

~4.

8~abanov, pp. cit., p. 198.
89Ravenstein, op. cit., p. 154.
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Such a contingency, involving potential large-scale troop movements and
various imponderables with regard to British and French reactions,
clearly could not have created a psychological climate favorable to vol
untary migration to the Amur or heavy investment there by such industri
alists as

existed in European Russia.

In the immediate

post-Aigun period, voluntary colonization of the

Amur by private individuals was at an insignificant level:
1858; 227 in 1859.

8 persons in

In 1860 the figure rose to 2,395 new settlers on the

Amur and the Ussuri.

As an historian of the Amur has sardonically pointed

out, "Voluntary settlement of the Amur region was on a small scale in
deedl it was only the government official who proceeded eagerly and gaily
to the Priamur".90 Both the unsettled political situation in the area
and bureaucratic rule there made life in Eastern Siberia unattractive
and unprofitable for ®st private individuals who, though theoretically
free persons, found their activities circumscribed by red-tape and under
mined by corruption. 9l
If bureaucratic impediments and political uncertainties stifled
free migration, the nature of the country, too, was such as to discourage
it.

The Priamur, an area much different from the rest of Siberia, pre

sented unpleasant surprises for the early settlers.

In this region, dry

strong winds from the highlands of Iakutia meet the humid winds from the
Pacific, creating what for the new arrivals from Siberia and European
Russia was a climatic freak.

The winter in the Priamur is consistently

dry, sunny and mild, with only light snowfall.

The rivers and streams

90Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 199, citing Rededei, Jstotia Priamura
(st. Petersburg, 19l3).
91Kabanov, oe. cit., p. 202.
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are shallow in the spring and at the beginning of
uPJ in the latter half of the

surr~er,

sum~er

are almost dried

however, after heavy, sometimes

torrential, rains, they reach flood stage, often

cresting their banks.

Many settlers, ignorant of climatic conditions, were ruined by unexpected
floods that wiped out their crops and homes. But when they moved to
higher ground for protection against such a calamity, they found stony
soil and

thick scrub and forests, which, after toilsome clearing, yield

ed poor harvests. 92
Muraviev was well aware of the need to provide special inducements
to encourage the rapid growth of settlement on the Amur and the Primoria.
To this end, before leaving Eastern Siberia, he drafted a proposal pro
viding that serfs coming to the Amur would become free men; it also con
tained measures making it easier for peasants to receive permission to
migrate there.

The proposal was not approved by the Government. The

regulations for migrating to Eastern Siberia, moreover, that wp,re adopted
by the Siberian Committee, provided allowances far too meagre to encour·
age such migration. 93
The slow bUild-up of the population continued, perforce, along
military lines, with conscripted peasants being sent as "cossacks" to
the Amur and the Ussuri. By 1861 the Amur line of communication had
94
sixty villages, with a population of 11,850.
But this population,
spread out over the tremendous distances of the area, was much too sparse
92 Ibid •
93,bld., p. 2JO.
94Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy~ 1881-1904 (Univer
sity of California Press, 1958), p. 2.
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and the conditions of life much too difficult to encourage additional
larger

nl~~ers

of pioneers.

This sparseness of population made it un

warrantable to establish anything approaching a regular and convenient
means of land transportation; at the same time, even had it been at
tempted, the manpower to do so would have been insufficient.

As for the

natural main line of communication, the Amur river, this freezes over
at Blagoveschensk by the end of October and does not thaw until late
April.

For some 17 to 27 days before the freeze, moreover, it is filled

with ice floes and for an equal period during the thaw it is also danger
ous.

Such frail barges and river steamers as could operate in the shal

low waters above Blagoveschensk could thus navigate on an average of
only 140 days a year.

The river also contained an unusually high pro

portion of other natural hazards, such as shoals, snags, shifting and
blind channels and bars.

Downstream navigation was reasonably safe and

rapid but the return trip was dangerous and slow.
animals moreover, limited the Amur's use as a
traditional Siberian mode.

Scarcity of draft

winter highway, in the

All of these circumstances severely handi

capped development of transportation on the river with the result that,
in Malozemoff's words, "the Amur served less as a line of communication
than as a line of limitation for Russian expansionlt • 95
Alexander Bestuzhev, after describing the perils of traveling by
barge on the Amur, and the high proportion of sinkings with attendant
heavy loss of life and supplies, recalled that in addition to such pri
mitive craft, five small steamers plied the river in 1860. One of them,
95}bid., p. 3.
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the ttKazakevich" ran from Chita to Nikolaevsk; there were few who could
afford to travel on it, however, since one individual's passage cost
300 rubles, while freight was charged for at 3 rubles per 20od. These
costs, he pointed out, were the equivalent of rates chaxged for sailing
from England to America. 96
The well capitalized Amur Company had been established for the
purpose of providing

the Amur population with food and merchandise of

good quality at reasonable prices.

Its beginnings were elaborate, with

stores and warehouses being established over a wide area and manned by
an enormous staff of employees.
outset.

Misfortune dogged the company from the

Operating expenses were high, cargoes from the seacoast some

times failed to reach their destinations safely, some of the Company's
ships sank at the river's estuary - - and employees went into trade for
themselves on company time, buying up peltry from the natives for a song
and selling it at tremendous personal profits.

Within a year, the

Company found itself selling waterlogged crusts and biscuits, rancid
butter, maggoty sausage, etc., at prohibitive prices. 97
A correspondent of the periodical, "Amur", observed that, "Trade

on the Amur despite its profitability at prices prevailing there (a 200d
of meat, 8 rubles; pound of tea, 5 rubles, etc.), nevertheless poses much
risk.

Ignorance as to the population's requirements, sparse settlement

over an enormous area, insufficient numbers of experienced boatmen, the
high prices of labor, ••• these are the difficultirs that cool one's
98
enthusiasm for going down the Amur".

96
.
Cited by Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 217.
97Kabanov, ~clt., p. 218.

98~mur, Nov. 20, 1860, cited by Kabanov,

Ope

cit., p. 218.
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It had been Muraviev's hope to attract foreign capital into.trade
and manufacturing in the Priamur.

EVen before the Treaty of Aigun, while

on consultation in St. Petersburg, he had "dazzled the American Minister,
Seymour, with a list of vast improvements that were intended to develop
Siberia and the foreign trade of the Amur".99 At a meeting in St. Peters
burg

in January, 1858, Muraviev told him that De Castries, Mariinsk and
Nikolaevsk had just been opened to foreign trade. lOO In order to en
courage foreign enterprise on the Amur, Muraviev established extremely
favorable regulations for foreign

commercial agents in those ports.

This

aroused the Siberian merchants, many of whom sent complaints to their
friends

in the capital.

These complaints - - and the Russian Govern

mentts fear of American economic and political penetration of its newly
gained possessions in Eastern Siberia - - led to the prohibition of
navigation of the Amur by foreign vessels beyond a point 300 versts '
above the estuary. This in turn excited the indignation of the Ameri
cans, who had made sizeable inve$tments in river vessels, merchandise,
and construction materials for the development of their enterprises on
the river. lOl By May of 1860, they were thoroughly disillusioned. The
young American businessman, W. W. Collins, who had envisioned railroad
and telegraph projects in the area (which he had visited in 1857-8 with
Muraviev's blessing) wrote to the State Department at that time decrying
the Russian Government's commercial policy and enclosing the translation
99perry McDonough Collins, ~ Voyage Down the Amoor, edited with
introduction by Charles Vevier (University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), p. 27.
lOOQuested, Ope cit., p. 100.
101Kabanov, pp. cit., pp. 218-219.
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of an article in the Journal de

S~.

P!'!tersbourg which said that only

thirteen vessels had visited the Amur in 1859. He wrote of the "miser
able stupidity of the management of the Amur Company both in St. Peters
burg and Irkutsk" and commented that ••• "most undertakings of this
nature are badly managed in Russia because of the want of alacrity in
commercial undertakings and the great number of employees who succeed
pretty surely in leeching the concern of nearly all vitality in a very
short period".102
As prospects of a flourishing commercial tie with the west coast
of the United States receded, there occurred

yet another development

temporarily unfavorable to the growth of the Amur region and, indeed,
of the entire Russian Far East. This was the sale of Alaska to the
United States in 1867, something that had been foreseen and advocated
by Muraviev, fourteen years earlier, when he had hoped that by so doing,
Russia would obtain "compensating advantages" from the United states.
The short-term result, however, was a reduction in the impbrtance of
the area which had provided an indispensable if uneconomic line of com
munications to Russian America.

Such was the ironic effect of Mura

viev's Amur obsession, which had undoubtedly exerted a contributory in
fluence on the decision to relinquish Alaska.
Muraviev's high hopes for overland trade with China also proved to
be illusory.

Inadequate transportation and competition of European sea

borne merchandise were fatal to the marketing in China of products of
Russian industry, which was still in an early stage of development.

Even

Russian textiles, which had earlier enjoyed wide acceptance there, proved
lO~uested,

Ope

cit., pp. 239-240.
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too costly in the face of this competition, which rose as China concluded
a series of treaties with the European Powers, beginning with the Tien
tsin conventions of 1860 with England and France and ending with the trade
convention of 1869 with Austro-Hungary.103 Tea shipped from Shanghai to
Nikolaevsk and thence via the Amur to Irkutsk and European Russia also
proved to be too costly, particularly following the decree of 1862, which
opened the frontiers of European Russia to the importation of tea; an
additional serious blow to the Amur tea route came with the opening of the
Suez Canel in 1869, when freight costs of tea sent to Russia by sea be
104
came seven to eight times cheaper than by the overland route.
More distressing from the standpoint of the economic development of
the Amur basin was the failure of attempts to turn the area into a food
producing base for Russia's Far East.

Muraviev had held high hopes in

this regard because of the abundant rainfall and luxurious vegetation
along the banks of the river.

The heavy rainfall, however, particularly

in the summer, was unfavorable to agriculture.

Cereals tended to run to

straw, yielding poor grain, which sometimes did not ripen.
ness along the coast forced settlers to abandon their farms.
vegetables and grains grew abundantly, they

~underwent

Fogs and damp
Though

some changes".

Bread made of local grains had an unpeeasant taste and when eaten induced
a state of dizziness or "intoxicationt • which caused it to be called
"drunken bread" (ptianyi khleb).

It took years of experimentation and

research to overCOOle this; in 1889 a botanical expedition finally dis
covered that this peculiar condition was caused by a microscopic parasite,
lO::t
-Malozemoff, 9p. cit •. , p. 6, and Note 42.

.104!lU4.,

p. 7.
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which was eventually eliminated. lOS Apparently abundant pasture lands
proved to be a further disappointment.

Their high-growing watery grass

provided little nourishment for cattle, which also suffered from pests,
so that herds were often decimated. 106
A brief growing season, poor climate and grain and cattle diseases
thus turned the Amur into a food importing, rather than a food exporting,
area.

Large quantities of grain had to be imported from Europe and Ameri

ca through Nikolaevsk and Vladivostok and from the Transbaikal.

Until the

end of the nineteenth century, beef cattle were imported from Korea, Man
churia, Mongolia and the Transbaikal, both for Russian settlers and
troops.10?
Despite the discouraging agricultural and

co~~ercial

prospects of

the region, efforts at populating it were continued after Muraviev's de
parture from the scene.

Following the liberation of the serfs, the first

settlement law, on April 27, 1861, opened the Amur region to both Russian
and foreign colonists.
siatines

(2~

In effect until 1882, it offered up to 100

~

acres) of land for each head of family on payment of 3

rubles per dessiatine, as well as a ten-year exemption from conscription
and a twenty-year exemption from taxes.

Although 150,000 to 200,000

peasants took advantage of this law in the 1860's, the majority of them
settled at various locations en route and only a small proportion reached
Eastern Siberia.

Additional inducements were offered by the Government

in 1866, and large numbers of religious sectarians including the Molokans,
105Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 3.
l06Kabanov, op. cit., p. 202.
107Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 3.
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and Dukhobors, settled in the Blagoveshchensk areaJ they kept to them
selves, however, and made little contribution to the development of the
Amur basin. Other measures to solve the problem of underpopulation of
the Russian Far East included further settlement, beginning in 1869, of
cossacks and of convicts, the latter mainly going to Sakhalin, but these
attempts had meager results. 108
In 1879, an important new step was taken.

This was the formation

of the Volunteer Fleet for the maintenance of regular communications be
tween the Black Sea and the ports of the Far

Ea~t.

The Fleet was composed

of five fast German merchant vessels bought by Russia during the Ang:1o
Russian crisis at the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1878.

It had been

intended to convert these into cowmerce-raiding auxiliary cruisers, but
with the passing of the

~hreat

of war with England it was decided to use

them for regular service to the Far East.

The ships began their runs

assisted by a subsidy of 36,000 rubles for each voyage, the gU,j,rantee of
large government cargoes and the cooperation of Russian merchants in ex
porting their tea to European Russia.

In 1882, the Government experimen
tally shipped 250 settlers to Eastern Siberia at no cost to them. 109 Sub
sequently, the Government followed a regular policy of subsidizing immi

grants to the Far East though charging them a portion of the costl
rubles per adult and 45 rubles per child.

90

The Volunteer Fleet operation,

while enthusiastically welcomed by inhabitants of the Primoria, had some
unfortunate effects;

it weakened the transit facilities f6r settlers

10~alozemoff, 2e. cit., p. 10.
policy on migration to Siberia during
cipation of the serfs is contained in
Siberian Migration (Princeton, 1957),

A detailed analysis of Russian
the thirty years following eman
Donald Treadgoldfs The Great
pp. 67-104.

109Malozemoff, oe. cit., pp. 11-14.
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using the land route across Siberia while, because of the partial fare
charged, it failed

to attract many settlers.

Over a period of seventeen

years, only 16,000 settlers came via the Volunteer Fleet.

A further re

sult was the weakening of the Amur River as the main line of communication
between the settled regions of Siberia and the Pacific; rather than serv
ing as the essential link to Siberia, the river became merely a local
artery for the Amur region itself. 110
Clearly, much more was needed by way of direct financial assistance
to settlers undertaking a six-thousand mile journey toithe new lands, but
until 1881, very little such assistance was forthcoming from a government
beset with recurring financial crises.
began to undergo a market change.

The Government's position then

No longer, now, was the Celestial Em

pire menaced by English and French troops, or by a powerful insurgent
movement in the southern provinces.

The Ili crisis of 1881, moreover,

had led to a truculent attitude on the part of the Chinese, in particu
lar their military leaders.

This circumstance awoke the authorities in

St. Petersburg to the woeful weakness of the Russian Far East, resulting
from the scanty population along the 3,800-verst frontier and the inade
quate lines of communication.

In addition, the influx of non-Russian

immigrants, Chinese, Korean, Manchurian and others, into the Amur and
Ussuri regions was exceeding that of Russians by a ratio of 1.43 to 1.
The Oriental settlers, with their lower standard of living and indus
trious habits, were bidding fair to take over the agriculture and com
merce of the area.

These alarming developments galvanized the Russian

Government into adopting measures to stimulate Russian immigration and
llO~bid.
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to restrict that of Orientals.

In 1881, regulations were put into ef

fect to afford Russian settlers more generous

assi~stanc't

and in January

1882, a law was passed prohibiting purchase by non-Russian subjects of
land in the Russian Far East without special permission from the GovernorGeneral.

Each Russian settler was granted fifteen dessiatines of land

with payment deferred for three years.

At the same time. settlers had

to offer proof to the officials on the Siberian frontier that they had
sufficient resources to get to their destination and ensure their sup
port for the first year.

These measures had significant effect;

before

1882, the average number of new settlers in each year was 601 persons,
while the annual average for the years 1882-1899 was 4,076. 111
Two years after the Russian Government's adoption of the 'IRussia
for Russians" policy reflected in the law of 1882, it was decided to
divide Russian possessions east of Lake Baikal into two governor-general
ships, those of Irkutsk and Priamur, the latter consisting of the Trans
baikal, Amur and Prlmorsk districts and the island of Sakhalin. 112 Thus
was vindicated Muraviev-Amurskii's contention that Eastern Siberia, ineluding the additional territories he had wrested from the Chinese, was
too vast an area to be administered by one individual.

From that time on,

the needs of the Russian Far East received increasing attention by the
authorities in St. Petersburg, particularly, comments, Malozemoff, "since
the first governor-general of the new administrative division was the
talented and energetic General A. N. Kork".113

It had been shortly after

111

Malozemoff, Ope cit., p. 11. In 1882, the Russian population on
the Amur numbered 45,000; Oriental, 15,000. (Malozemoff, Note. 94 ).
l12Ibid., p. 25.
1l3Ibid •

1:.
1)

244
the departure of that other talented and energetic Governor-General,
Nicholas Nikolaevich Muraviev-Amurskii, that a Russian official "close
to the affairs of the Siberian Committee" had commented:

"For a realm

richly endowed by nature, space and good soil, but deficient in population
and finding itself still in the beginning of its own development, the ac
quisition through expenditure of precious blood and treasure, of immense
new expanses, no matter how fertile they may be, particularly if they lie
at great distances, would be imprudence in the highest degree".ll4 Now,
the erstwhile Governor-General could observe with some satisfaction from
his apartment on the Rue Miromesnil in Paris that the policy reflected in
that statement was being modified.
It is true, of course, that events taking place years after the
retirement of Count Muraviev-Amurskii and certainly not clearly foreseen
by him, were the cause for the shift in Russian policy in the Far East.
For nearly a quarter of a century after the conclusion of the Treaties of
Aigun, Tientsin and Peking, Russia's major interests remained in the West,
the Near East and Central Asia.

It was probably for that reason that most

of Muraviev-Amurskii's successors were mediocre individuals.

No governor-

general visited Kamchatka from 1871 to 1881; only one visited Sakhalin in
twenty-five years. 115 That situation began to change, however, following
the IIi crisis of 1881, which strained Russo-Chinese relations for the next
decade. 116 Now a policy of defense against the Chinese was becoming a
necessity.
114Kabanov, op. cit., p. 224.

1l5Malozemoff, 9P' cit., p. 15.
116Ibid ., p.

2.).
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During the eighties many Russian officials and military figures
considered that war with China was inevitable.

Rising Chinese chau

vinism was manifested in a new policy of colonization of Manchuria and
increasing Chinese military preparedness there.

In 1882-90, there were

thirty times more Chinese colonists in northern Manchuria than there
were Russian colonists in the Priamur and Primorsk. By 1885, Chinese
troops in Manchuria numbered 85,000, 50,000 of them trained
ably well armed.

and reason

At this time Russian land forces in the Far East, ex

clusive of settled cossacks, numbered 15,000 men, 11,000 of
quartered in the immediate vicinity of Vladivostok.

~om

were

Siberia had no

other troops to spare, so that the nearest base for reinforcements was
European Russia, 4,000 miles away.

From there, officers of the Amur

military district calculated, it would take eighteen months for troops,
in route march, to reach the Primorsk. ll7
These distulbing developments, coupled with the realization of
Russian naval weakness in the Far East, stimulated widespread discussion
in St. Petersburg of the need for building a trans-Siberian railroad.
Baron Korff submitted numberous petitions to the Government in support
of such

a project.

In the spring of 1886, Alexander III wrote:

"I

have read many reports of the governors-general of Siberia, and I must
confess with sorrow and shame that the government has heretofore done
practically nothing to satisfy the needs of this rich but neglected re
gion.

But it is time, it has long been time".

In that year the Emperor

decreed, "Let a railroad be built across Siberia on the shortest way
possible.HU 8
117Malozemoff, Ope cit., pp. 20-24.
118Ipi~., p. 27.
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At the same

time that Russia's concern over her position in the

Far East. was rising, her differences with England in central Asia, in
particular in regard to the RU5so-Afgan frontier, were being resolved.
The protocol of July 10, 1887, put an end to further misunderstanding
there, so that Russian foreign policy makers became much less preoccupied
with central Asian affairs.

In that same year, Russia gave up her

attempts to insure the election of a pro-Russian king of Bulgaria and ac
cepted the status quo there.

These developments favored the transfer of

Russian interest to the Far East.

At this time, too, French reverses in

the Tonkin war of 1884-5 led to the re-direction of certain French finan
cial policies and led Fl'ench capital to seek profits in Russian ventures,
including foundries, mines and even government bonds.

This injection of

new funds sped Russia's recovery from the financial crisis that had been
chronic from the early l8E:O's to 1886.

This led to a drastic drop in

banker's commissions that enabled the Ministry of Finance to obtain the
first large French loan, 500,000,000 gold francs, in 1887. 119 The fi
nancing of the Trans-Siberian railroad thus became possible.

By 1891,

Russia was irrevocably committed to the building of the railroad.

Thus

was assured the creation of the most important single factor in the be
lated economic and strategic build-up of the Russian Far East, including
the Priamur and Primorsk.

The necessary measures to realize Muraviev's

vision of Russia's imperial integration were finally being put into ef
fect.
119Malozemoff,

OPe

cit., p. 38.

CHAPTEH VII

SUMMARY AND CONCL US IONS
Muravlev's family provided a typical background for a young man
entering the service of the Autocrat of Russia.

His father had been

secretary of the Emperor's personal chancellery, his mother, the daugh
ter of a prominent admiral.

In his early years Muraviev had profited

from the influential connections provided by this background.

The

intercession of Nicholas I gave him entree to the Corps of Pages; the
family friendship of a senior general served to initiate him into high
levEll staff vrork at a time when many of his contemporaries were still
proving themselves

as

junior line officers.

Muraviev made the most of

his opportunities, graduating at the top of his class from the elite
school for sons of the Russian aristocracy, then carrying out his as
sig~lents

in Bulgaria, Poland and the Caucasus with verve and marked

effectiveness.

His soldierly virtues and his adaptability to tasks of

a diplomatic nature made it easy for those interested in his advancement
to obtain

~mpressive

decoratior.s and rapid promotion for him.

His stint

at governing the province of luls helped to round out his administrative
experience and gave him added opportunity to demonstrate his imagination
and

versatility.

It seems clear, too, that the interest of another

famB y friend, Minister of the Interior Perovskii J as well as the bene

volent inclination of the Grand uuchess Elena, had a good deal to do
with l:.uraviev's appointment to the post in which he earned the title of
Qni. Arnllrskli ..

,~

'~

...... Art

"''''0
When Muraviev was named to succeed the discredited Rupert, Nicholas
I was already sufficiently impressed by the young general to agree to
a personal channel of communication with him on all matters of high im
portance.

This, considering the weight of opposition to Muraviev in

st. Petersburg, was a precious advantage.

Perovskii's constant encour

agement and mature counsel were also invaluable to him during the first
phase of his activities in Eastern

Sib~ria.

From the start of his administration, Muraviev labored under the
handicaps of a corrupt local bureaucracy and the implacable suspicion
of policy makers in'St. Petersburg.

His attempts at internal reforms

were often frustrated, his strategic concepts sometimes scorned.

Yet,

though he fulminated against his opponents and occasionally contemplated
resignation, he persevered out of his

tremendous sense of mission,

which finally brought about the Chinese capitUlation at Aigun, the
apogee of his career.
It is true that two years were to pass before the provisions of
the Treaty of :i9un receivEd juridical confirmation by the Treaty of
Peking but that circumstance, despite disparaging

com~ents

by some of

Muraviev's detractors, does not reduce the essential significance of his
achievement.

Zavalishin, probably Uuraviev's most vindictive critic,

derided the Treaty of Aigun
dem~rcation

as "nothing more than an agreement on a

line of the sort that is customarily negotiated for the sus

pension or prevention of military operations".l
littlement.

This is peevish be

The Treaty was r,luraviev's personal triumph, a dikt:'!.!. im

posed through his energy and determination.
IKabanov, 9p. cit., p. 190.

T~e

fact that the
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vaciJlating Emperor I-ting attempted to nullify it serves only to under
line its importance.

Muraviev had seized the occasion fully to exploit

the pressures of the Taiping rebellion and the menace of the Aog10
French expeditionary forces in

0

rder to acquire the AInur basin.

His

subsequent activities contributed to Igoatiev's success in obtaining
China's cession to Russia of the maritime area of Manchuria down to
the Korean border.

The Treaty of Peking complemented Muraviev's

d~eds,

without which it might well have assumed a less sweeping character.

R. K. I. Quested, in her excellent study, based largely on Chinese
archives, comments that, "From first to last, the attitude of Britain
was completely, though unintentionally, conducive to the success of Rus
sian aggrandisement.

There is a kind of fatality about the way in which

Her Majesty's Government, knowing little and caring scarcely more about
the Amur and Ussuri region, conveniently did everything at the right

rno':"

ment to facilitate the occupation and legal acquisition of the territory
by Russia."

There "was indeed a fatalityll) she goes on to say, "about

the whole Amur saga, for it was an oddity of history that this country
should have lain for so many millenia, uncolonized by the numerous nations
of the Far East, waiting century upon century

f01'

11;uraviev". 2

It is certainly true that British foreign policy, first in the Near
East, then in the Far East, was of great help to Muraviev in achieving
the goal he had before him from the day he first set foot in Siberia.
as Dr. Quested says, the Amur and Ussuri region waited for Muraviev.

But,

He

was not only quick to recognize the opportunity for Russials imperial ex-

pans ion but, when that opportunity was not sufficiently clear to the

~~estEd, £2. cit., pp. 282-3.

~

2::D

decision makers in St. Petersburg, he created the conditions to bring
it hOfile to them.
During the first phase of his administration in Irkutsk, Muraviev
was concerned with improving the government of Eastern Siberia, in right
ing injustices and in purging the administration of officials who were
lining their pockets, at the expense of the local population or of the
Government.

But even then, he was laying the groundwork for bringing

about the "return of the Russian River Amur".

The first step consisted

of establishing the fact that the river was navigable throughout its
length and could be entered by ships both from the Sea of Okhotsk and
the Gulf (more properly Strait) of Tatary.
Siberia thus had a convenient

con~ection

The revelation that Eastern
to the Sea of Japan and the

Padific Ocean offered a persuasive argument that possession of the Amur
could be of great importance to

R~ssia.

The next step was to establish

an effective r{ussian presence on the Amur estuary and to take steps to
prevent its occupation by any other nation.

This Muraviev accomplished

in collusion with Nevelskoi, against the wishes of the more cautious
Ministers in the Russian

Gover~ment.

The founding of Nikolaevsk and the

occupation of de Castries Bay and Kizi, which gave Russia a firm foothold
at the mouth of the Amur,were accomplished in defiance of Nesselrode's
cl ique and with r.:uraviev I s full backing.

The Governor-genera.! stood by

his subcrdinate, whose career had been placed in jeopardy by these ac
tions and obtained Eost factum authorization for his exploits.

Nevel

skoils fuzther incursions south along the Manchurian coast, though ex
pressly forbidden by

~t.

Petersburg, were undertaken under Muraviev's

protection and, indeed, aubsequently extended by him personally.

'I
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Once the Russian settlements at the mouth of the Amur were estab
lished, it was logical for Muraviev to urge the necessity of

~avigat-

iog the Amur as the most reliable and economical method of keeping those
settlements supplied, particularly in view of the ambitions of rival
Western Powers l.n the Far East.

It took patience and constant argument.

to persuade st. Petersburg of this.
siderable statesmanlike vision,

as

In this Muraviev displayed con
reflected, for example, in his memo

randum of MaTch, 1853, to Alexander II. 3

In this he stressed his con

viction of the danger of Russia's being cut off from the Pacific Ocean
by British seizure of Sakhalin and the hrur estuary and advocated relin
quishment of Russian possessions in Forth America for the sake of forming
a close tie with the United states as a counter to British power in the
Far East.

He followed this up in November of the same year with his

letter to the Grand Duke Constantine in which he set forth his view as to
the irruned hte need to safeguard Siberia by firmly securing Sakhal in,
Kamchatka and the mouth of the Amur, to navigate thdt river and thus to
Itestablish a firm influence on neighboring China". 4
he also pointed out that,

as a

In that lllSffiori;Wdum

result of five years' preparation, it

would be possible to achieve all this with the local resources of East
ern Siberia.

That preparation had been made by Muraviev with little,

if any, help from the central government.
The resources at

Muraviev's disposal had been pitifully meager

but while often railing at the penuriousness of st. Petersburg, he pro

fited from Perovskiits advice and made the best of a difficult situation.
3supra, pp. 125-127.
4§..!dp.!.e, pp. 138 and Appendix
,

"

~
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A lesser man might have sat back in the comfort of the gubernatorial
quarters in Irkutsk and served out his time with a minimum of exer
tion - - while perhaps accumulating a tidy fortune to supplement his
eventual pension.

But

jl,~uraviev

was a different breed of careerist.

While bringing about order out of the administrative chaos bequeathed
to him by his predecessor, he journeyed far and wide, acquainting him
self at first hand with the problems and the potential of his domains.
His visit to Kamchatka, the first ever made by a Siberian governor
general, assisted in improving the defense3 of Petropavlovsk, enab
ling it to repulse the diversionary Anglo-French attack during the Cri
mean War.

He pushed gold production (admittedly at the cost of the

"Hasgildeevschina lt ) and fostered expanded prospecting for other valua
ble minerals and precious stones in order to enhance the v2.lu€ of his
neglected
Petersburg.

territory in the eyes of the skeptical authorities in St.
He sought iron for Siberian manufacturing and modernized

the old Pebovskii Zavod irom'lorks for the building of engines to
the vessels he planned to use on the Amur.

pO:'I}~r

And at an early stage, he

recognized the importance of the Transbaikal as

Cl

base fOI' the build

up of military forces that he would need when the time came for a
critical confrontation with the Chinese.

That time came shortly after

the despatch of his memorandum to Constantine and the onset of the Cri
mean War, which gave heightened significance to his warnings of British
intentions with regard to the north Asian littoral of the Pacific.
The first Russ
risk.

n expedition down the Amur entailed a calculated

The decision to proceed could hardly have been taken had Muravie'!

resigned himself to meeting his military requirements with the four line
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battalions of regular txoops, which were all that a central government,
sufferin9 recurring financial crises, would furnish him.

The expedition

needed the backing of armed forces in numbors sufficient to impress and
intimidate the Chinese and to provide the necessary support, should
active resistance be encountered.

~:uraviev

had foreseen that need four

years earlier, when he began raising his own army, the Transbaikal Force.
When the opportunity offered by the Crimean War presented itself, he was
fully prepared to exploit it, under the pretext of the need to supply and
reinforce coastal defenses against England, the Western Power most hated
and feared by China.
o~m

By taking the tmur estuary, then by raising his

troops, Muraviev created the justification and the means for defy

ing the Chinese ban on the use of the Amur.
Of no little importance to the success of the first expedition
down the Amur - - and of his subsequent feats on that river - - was
MIJl'aviev's keen perception of the psychology and general state of mo
rale of the Chinese officials with whom he was contending.
intuitive understanding that had won

The same

him the friendship of Caucasian

chieftains like Sharvashidze and Katso-Margani and had bent the Ubich
tribesmen to his will enabled him to deal success fully with the ambans
of Heilungchiang and Kirin and to secure Prince I-Shan's compliance with
his demands.

He could be suave and gracious with them when the occasion

called for it or he could be stern, arrogant or truculent when Oriental
impassivity seemed to need sh3king.

His

blusterin~

tactics did fall

once, when he attempted to frighten the Japanese into cession of Sak
halin but the time at his disposal had been short then and he had been
anxious to return to the Amur.

He had had insufficient opportunity to

acquaint him3elf with the Japanese mentality and, trying a bluff, had
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lost.

Sakhalin, moreover, though important, yielded in r.;uraviev's

priori ties

to the Amur and Ussuri regions, always his foremost pre

occupotion.
It has been seen that Muraviev, while striving to build up Rus

sian pov:er in the Far East, was com,tantly contending with attej';lpts
from St. Petersburg to limit the scope and impact of his activities.
One such incident marits singling out.

~';hi1c

[,iuraviev was on leave

abroad in June, 1853, the Foreign Ministry despatched a Note to the
Chinese proposing that the Amur situation be "legularized ll through the
placing of frontier maI'kers on the left bank of the river.

Had Mura

viev, on his return, not learned of this, with no time to spare, the
Russian stance on the Amur question might have been
prejudiced.

inco~trovertibly

Muraviev had countermanded orders from higher authority

before and he did not

h~sitate

to do so now, by prohibiting the city

governor of Kiakhta from carrying out st. Petersburg's instructions on
the border demarcation, which was almost underway.
Muravievts hand vis-a-vis his adversaries in the capital wa£
strengthened by the successful defense of Petropavlovsk, at a time when
Russian arms

~€re

being humiliated in the crimea, and by his cowing of

the ChinesG by his first expedition down the Amur.

It was also measur

ably strengthened by Grand Duke constantine's support and by the re
placement of

~esselrode

by Gorchakov.

Further expeditions were autho

rized an1 Muraviev went about consolidating the Russian hold on the re
gion ,..ith such limited forces as he had been able to raise and by re
course to calculated bluff and intimidation of the Chinese.
the

kno~·ilejge

that the

~.:anchu

Then, in

regif.1G, beset with internal disorders and

facing the Anglo-French military threat, could hardly oppose him, he
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proceeded in May, 1858, to Aigun.
psychological warfare,

There, following some preliminary

he forced the Treaty of Aigun upon his terri

fied Chinese counterpart.
The aftermath of the Treaty of Aigun was a bitter disappointment
to -Eastern Siberian entrepreneurs and to "Muravievists" in general.
With the departure of the once indefatigable Governor-General, the Pria
mur and Pl'imorsk seemed doomed to return to the oblivion in which they
had so long lain.

The problems of immense distances, primitive communi

cations and, above all, scanty population, that had worried Muraviev
were not being solved.

This was the result only in part of the in

hospitability of some parts of the area involved.

New agricultural

methods, selection of crops better suited to the climate, remedies to
eliminate parasites that spoiled grain and destroyed cattle, and simi
lar improvements could have been introduced had the right people been
sent there for that purpose.

Improved transportation facilities and a

respectable cOlnmunications network could have been developed, had the
Government steeled itself to the necessary outlay of material and hu,'l1an
resources.

Eventually, the Government did in fact do so but only when

impelled by political and strategic considerati?ns.
The misfortunes attendant upon :,iuraviev's early colonizing ef
forts were well nigh inevitable, considering the underlying circumstances.
Military occupation, agricultural settlement, construction of defense in
stallations, all had to be undertaken simultaneously.
blem

~as

The central pro

to find the people for these purposes.

There were insufficient incentiv2s for enterprising volunteers to
come out to that little known lend to work toward an uncertain future.
Near-draconian methods therefore haj to be employed to bring pioneers
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out to the Amur Bnd Ussuri regions.

Peasants were drafted as Ifcossacks"

and sent there with their families to establish farmsteads in areas that
had not been sufficiently reconnoitered and evaluated as to their agri
cultural potential.

Once there, these people were subjected to military

and bureaucratic controls that stifled such initiative as they had.

~any

of them, moreover, had to perform duties unrelated to their eSEential
function of food production.

They were obliged to serve as postal cour

iers, to construct roads or to work on building projects in support of
the army and the bureaucracy.

These tasks took them away from their fields,

thus compounding the already severe food shortage in an area where there
were too many consumers in proportion to numbers of producers.
Such were the results of the priorities Muraviev was obliged to ob
serve.

Without a secure line of communications over thousands of miles

and without adequate coastal defenses at a time when attack by hostile
forces seemed a real possibility, all else, Muraviev reasoned, would
have been premature.

He had sought allocation of funds for railroads,

telegraph lines and other economic improvements.
generous policy of subsidizing irrunigration.

He had urged a more

But he had been put on no

tice that Eastern Siberia could look only to its own resources for the
building of its future.
any

It

True, he had been allo"ed in 1854 to retain

5u.!'plus govern.nent revenues" generated in Eastern Siberia but this

minor concession had been made out of military considerations and contri
buted little if anything to the general welfare of the people.
Once the hmur and Ussuri r!gions were acquired and Russian sover
eignty there
subsided.
the Near

~as

confirmed, the interest and enthusiasm of st. Petersburg

The Gcvernment turnd back to its major interests in the V:est,
~ast

and central Asia.

Development of the Priamur and Primorsk,
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either for its own sake or fer the purpose of building a base for further
expansion in the Far East, particularly considering thG enormous costs
that would be involved, held no attraction for the authorities in the capt
tal.

That situation was to change, but only after the IIi crisis ind the

military re-conqu8st of Chinese Turkestan by Marshal 7so-Tsung-tang.
Following the Treaty of

st.

Petersburg on Febru3ry 2, 1881, Russo

Chines! relations entered a strained period lasting more than a decade.
Aggressive chauvinism in Peking, massive Chinese colonization of Man
churia and an alarming concentration of Chinese troops there in 1385,
aVloke the Russian Empire to the precarious situation of its F:u Eastern
marches.

But on the heels of these developments came a partial relaxation

of Russian concerns else""IheI'e.

At the time of the signature of the Rein

surance Treaty with Germany in June, 1887, Russia learned of the secret
Austro-German Alliance of 1879,

ill in effEct.

This convinced her of

the hopelessness of attempting to put a pro-2ussian king upon
of Bulgaria and thereby relegated Near Eastern

affai~s

t~e

throne

to a plane of

secondc.ry importance.

In that same summer of 1887, An9lo-Russian differ-

ences over

ware reconciled by the signing of a protocol in

st.

Afghanista~

Petersburg, '.:hus reI ieving the rtussian Government of any irr.tnediate

problem in central Asia.
Russia's diplomatic situation was now such that Alexander III was
able to und€rtak€ to meet the pressing economic and strategic needs of
Eastern Siberia and to decree in 1887 that a trans-Siberian railroad
should be built.

Some years were to pass before financing methods, basi

cally those of great infusions of French capital, were devised.
early spring of 1891, the Tsarevich,
tion of a railroad thst would

h~ve

~ichclas,

more

t~an

In the

inaugurated the construc

met Muraviev's aspirations,
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by

per~onally

emptying the first wheelbarrow of ballast for the embank

ment of its eastern terminal at Vladivostok, "Ruler

of the East".

Muraviev had been called "a man ahead of his timel!, a cliche that
often lacks precision.

Was he, as implied by that term, such a man be

cause of superior vision and wisdom not properly appreciated by his con
temporaries?

Or was he an impatient careerist oblivious to circum

stances that, as a practical matter, simply made seme of his projects
premature?
Though Muraviev should be given credit for his early discernment of
the need to relinquish Alaska, his more grandiose ideas of a Russian
American 211iance against England, and its implications as to the balance
of power in the Pacific, came to naught.

Turning to considerations more

irl1'nediately rdated to his work, one can point to the fact that other
significant elements of the policy he urged were adopted only after his
retirement and, some, indeed only after his death.

These had to do with

the necessary measures to be taken for the social and economic develop
ment of Eastern Siberia.

It is evident, however, that Muraviev's views

as to the manner and pace of such development were unre2.1 istic, as were
his hopes for greatly expanded trade with ChinQ.
Muraviev apparently found it difficult to accept that the desirable
is not always immediately attainable.

As was not unnatural for an able

and energetic imperial pro-consul, once installed in Irkutsk, he began
to see all problems from a standpoint that was essentially parochial - 
if that term may be used against the background of the vast area under

his

co~n2nd.

To him, therefore, Nesselrode

WdS

not simply a mediocrity

striving to preserve the overall national interest; he was practically

a traitor.

In J',turaviev f s view, Speranskii, too, had betrayed his
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Sovereign by confinir.g himself to his assigned mission - - reform of the
administrotion of Siberia - - znd "concealing" the potential there for
imperial expansion.
Muraviev's petulance over lack of confidence reposed in him re
flects a rather unseemly degree of self-absorption; it also suggests
inability or unwillingness objectively to recognize that some of his
recornmendations were encountering a reserve only natural on the part of
high policy makers

~vho

faced an array of domestic and foreign problems

requiring constant review and judicious allocation of governmental re
sources.

Clearly, there was some justification for the jocular remark

of Nicholas I that Muraviev would !tlose his reason" over the .\mur.
So much for Muravicov I s limitations.

More important to remember

is that it was the ve:.:y intensity with ,'ihlch ri~uraviev pursued his id'ee
fixe th3t led Russia to seize the opportune occasion to nullify the
Treaty of Nerchinsk.
alone.

Certainly, the achievement was not Muraviev's

An important turning point in the affairs of E2stern Siberia was

reached with the replacement of Nesselrode by Gorchakov, assisted by the
able sinologist, Kovalevskii.

Theirs were the decisions that

per~itted

Muraviev to proceed as he did during the climactic years of his adminis
tration.

But to say this is simply to say that the pORers in St.

Peters~

burg, vieAing the confluence of events on the international scene, recog
nized that in

~uraviev

they had the right mon at the right place at the

right time.
If it is clear tod3.Y that some of

i',~uravievr 5

concepts were somewhat

premature, it is equally clear that without his imagination and ingenuity
or his wi1lin Jness) when necessary, to flout authority, and without his
t

dedication and extraordinary stamina, Russiats annexation of almost 400,000

"",,
'"'ov

square miles of territory might never have taken place.

Russian cossack

adventurers had reached the Sea of Okhotsk in the mid-seventeenth cen
tury but Eastern Siberia continued in a relatively somnolent state for
many generations after that event.

Almost two centuries later, it took

twelve years of persevering effort by
establishing Russia as a Far Eastern

~uraviev
Po~er.

to create the basis for
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a sinister influence and sought to prevent a peaceable agreement.
"Ignatiev, N. P.", Entsiklopedicheski Slovar, Brochaus and Efron, Vol.
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purposes of the present study.
?bornik Dogovorov Rossii s Kitaem, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, st. Peters
burg, 1889.
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APPENDIX B
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT
FROM GOVERNOR-GENERAL MURAVIEV TO THE GRAND DUKE OONSI'ANTINE

November 29, 1853
In the current uncertain state of our relations with the mari
time powers it is necessary to devote some attention to the defense of
our coast and ports on the Eastern Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk.
Your Imperial Highness has already consented to take the basic
measures for that purpose with the dispatch to the area of naval ves
sels for which your permission was granted for the build-up of the
46th fleet equipage and with the assignment to the mouth of the Amur
of a cossack sotnyia from the Transbaikal forces. In addition, the
transport "Dvina should already have del i vered armaments this autumn
necessary in the first instance for Petropavlovsk, but in order that
all these resources be in place in good time and put to good use, cer
tain prior orders and authorizations from high levels of the government
will be essential.
tt

The coming revolt in China, on the other hand, requires special
attention. Eastern Siberia, thanks to the foresight of the Government,
is now supplied with significant military resources. In the Transbaikal
region, there are some 16,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry under armsJ
of this number, 13,000 infantry and cavalry with twenty field pieces
can easily and freely be moved across the frontier and, in case of need,
the latter figure can be increased to 16,000. But with these forces
we must defend our territory from Kamchatka to Charatsia (?) along a
border extending on land and sea for 10,000 versts.
May Your Highness diign to note to what degree these places and
expanses, (important to) the future of Russia, deserve our attention
and protection. I shall only take the liberty to state that no matter
how important the events taking shape to the south and the west of
our European borders, no matter how disquieting would appear to us the
prospect of waging war with Turkey, England and Frence, Russia is so
strong with her unity of thought and unconditional loyalty to the Em
peror, that no danger can threaten her from that side - - and her
internal material strength and resources are so stable and great that
the more drawn out were the war, the more terrible she would become to
her enemies, particularly England, even though they might be able to
wreak some harm en our littoral cities in Europe: but in our Far East
the situation is different: the Bay of Avachinsk in Kamchatka, the
mouth of the Amur (Sungari) and navigation upon that river can be
wrested away from Russia by force. Neighboring populous China, now
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powerless through its ignorance, can easily become dangerous for us
under the influence and direction of the English and French and then
Siberia will cease to be Russian; but in Siberia, important to us,
in addition to gold, are her expanses, sufficient for all of the
surplus agricultural population of European Russia for a whole century;
the loss of these expanses cannot be compensated for by any victories
and conquests in Europe; and in order to safeguard Siberia it is essential
to protect and firmly secure Kamchatka, Sakhalin, the mouth of and
navigation upon the Amur and to establish a firm influence on neigh
boring China. It is now possible for us to achieve all this with the
local resources of Eastern Siberia, which in the course of five years,
have gradually been built up; but it is necessary to permit and auth
orize the chief administrator of Eastern Siberia to take appropriate
action, taking into account local circumstances, for in such a remote
land and over such distances it will be too late to give him his in
structions in every particular event, and most of all there is the
necessity for preliminary orders and decisions regarding the defense
of the coast and ports against the English. Their sea communications
with the most remote maritime stations makes it possible for them ex
tremely rapidly to give their squadrons the orders to take action against
us in the Eastern Ocean, following declaration of war in Europe, news of
which, via the customary route through Siberia, will reach Kamchatka much
later. In the light of all these considerations, I would propose that:
Admiral Putiatin's squadron, now menaced by the English, should proceed
without delay to the port newly discovered by Nevelskoi, which becomes
ice-free in February, and, upon arriving there, come under the immediate
command of the Siberian administration, to which can be entrusted at a
convenient time the completion of the task assigned to Admiral Putiatin
in Japan, if such task is not yet completed. For the Siberian ports
and rapidity of communication among them under present conditions, it
will be absolutely necessary to have the steam schooner uVostok" of the
46th Fleet equipage.
The Commander-in-Chief of Eastern Siberia, in pursuance of these
measures, should open communications by the shortest route, with the
mouth of the Amur and should send there a portion of the reinforcements
designated for the 46th Fleet equipage; also both platoons of mountain
artillery attached to the troops assigned to him and two or three engi
neer officers from st. Petersburg for the fortification of the coast
and ports at the mouth of the Amur and in Kamchatka. Only through the
above indicated measures shall we be able in good time to prepare to
repulse the English who can make their appearance there at the end of
June or the beginning of July, and our squadron of three frigates and
two corvettes prudently dispatched along our coasts and islands in the
Sea of Okhotsk and Kamchatka will force the enemy, in no matter what
strength, to conduct his attacking movements with great caution.
Furthermore, for necessary rapid communications between the Trans
baikal region and the mouth of the Amur and thence to Kamchatka, and
for the necessary supplying of these points with troops, rations and
other necessities, there should be instituted regular steamship communi
cation throughout the suw~er between the mouth of the Amur and the port
'of Petrpavlovsk by the schooner "Vostok" and for (such communication)
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of Nerchinsk with the mouth of the Amur, by the ttArgun", newly built
on the Shilka, and by fishing vessels. Keeping in mind that the Eng
lish, even with the greatest effort, cannot bring many landing troops
to such remote lands and that throughout the Chinese war they had, for
crews and landing parties on their vessels and steamships only three
thousand men; that in Kamchatka and the surrounding little-known area
the difficulties of providing landing forces will be even greater, and
that, finally, the English will not even deem it necessary to employ
large forces against places which they believe to be unoccupied, !
consider that it should suffice for us in the first instance to have
500 men in mobile order of battle, and on the shores of the Amur a
flying detachment, with four mountain pieces,in the same strength, in
case our ships should be unable successfully to resist their attack on sea
and permitted them to make a landing but if, contrary to expectations,
these forces were insufficient to repel them and if the land forces
were obliged to retreat in Kamchatka to the interior of the peninsula
and to Bolshoresk on the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk, and, at the mouth
of the Amur t to the settlement of Kizi and the post of Nikolaevsk, then
with the above mentioned steamship communication it would be possible
in the same summer to send two battalions dow.n the Amur and several
hundred mounted cossacks with attached artillery and to chase the enemy
from the Amur coast and the Gulf of Tartary, and then, by those same
steamer communications, to transfer enough forces over the Sea of
Okhotsk to Bolsheretsk, without coming out into the Eastern Ocean, and
to chase the enemy from the port of Petropavlovsk, too.
Opening of navigation on the Amur in this imminent exigency is in
any case necessary and justified; but the current civil war in China pre
sents a completely favorable situation for it and the success and
security of our three years of activity at the mouth of the Amur (Sun
gari) serves as a sure guarantee of further successes. There is no
doubt that when we sail on the Amur in considerable numbers and openly,
there will be oral objections voiced by the Manchurian authorities and
later, perhaps, written protests from the Tribunal to our Senate, but to
the one and the other it is possible and necessary to give a firm reply,
setting forth the necessity for such navigation not only for our bene
fit and defense but for that of Manchpria itself, and there, I daresay
with conviction, that will be the end of the matter.
Moreover, in the current situation of the Chinese government,
which has expended its strength and does not rule over half of its
realm with which it can be said for this reason that the Kiakhta trade
has stopped, and which cannot render us any cooperation for the restora
tion of that trade, it behooves us to alter the very form of our rela
tions and to inform the Tribunal; that it should address itself to and
deal with the chief administrator and commander of troops in Eastern
Siberia, to whom the government has given appropriate instructions for
all contingencies.
This arrangement will obviate many harmful misunderstandings in
the current situation, which would inevitably arise by reason of the
distances and slow co~~unications from this area to st. Petersburg,
and at the same time will show the Chinese government that we are not
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deluding ourselves about its position and are adopting appropriate
measures. This form of relations will be the more correct and decent
since it will probably soon become necessary to deal not with the
Chinese Empire but with several separate provinces. This chief ad
ministrator of Eastern Siberia should therefore have assigned to him
a special official from the Ministry of~Foreign Affairs and he should
be given instructions only on a general basis for every sort of contin
gency.
With regard to preliminary military measures on our frontier with
Mongolia, the following should be done: two camps should be set up by
the cossacks' mustering date (May 25 of next year), the first near
Kiakhta, made up of the 12th and 13th line battalions, the requisite
battery of artillery and the 1st, 5th and 6th horse regiments of the
Transbaikal cossack forces; the second, between the settlement of
Olegaya and the Vouronkhoiorievsky Fortress, of the 1st and 2nd bri
gades of cossack infantry and three horse regiments with their light
batteries.
Mustering in these places will give the cossacks no great diffi
culties in their economic affairs and will require very little expendi
ture of government revenue; at the same time, with this demonstration
and with negotiations, at the right time, directly with the chief ad
ministrator of Eastern Siberia, we shall undoubtedly succeed in all
those dispositions and demands that the government will deem it neces
sary to lay down in connection with the i~minent changes in China.
The 14th and 15th line battalions ~11 remain in their areas of
deployment on the Ingod and Shilka Rivers whence, in case of need, they
can easily be transported down the Amur; the 3rd Cossack Infantry Bri
gade, deployed on those same rivers, would have summer mustering of
its battalion staffs, also in case of need to strengthen our forces
at the mouth of the Amur.
During bivouac period a general reckoning of forces in the event
of movement aCross the border will take place at the following levels:
From the 6 Cossack horse regiments, 5 to be brought
up to full strength. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4,400
From the 12 Cossack infantry battalions, 6 to be
brought up to full strength • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6,200
From the 4 line battalions, 2 to be brought up
to full strength. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 2,000
Two batteries of artillery. • • • • • • • • • • ••
Total

400

13,000

Regarding financial means to meet all possible contingencies which
might require extraordinary expenditures for the military and naval
departments, it is necessary to permit the chief administrator of
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Eastern Siberia to borrow from the various funds and capital of Eastern Siberia, not excluding charities, with the understanding that pay
ment of such loans is to be made at a time more convenient for the
government, that is, after termination of the war in Europe, or from new
sources of revenue that may be found in Eastern Siberia. The estimated
allocation, including the right to alter the actual sums involved and
of course with the requirement of reporting all such dispositions to the
highest governmental levels.
All of the above presents the possibility, with local resources
of Eastern Siberia, with the addition only of vessels in the Eastern
Ocean en route there, not only of defending our ancient territories
there but of securing them and establishing the necessary influence over
neighboring countries, and indicates at the same time the need now to
assign to Eastern Siberia a chief administrator enjoying the special
confidence of the Sovereign Emperor and the rights and authority cor
responding to that confidence.

~

Note on Treaty Texts
The text of the Treaty of Nerchinsk is that contained in
?bornik Dogovorov Rossi! s.Kitaem, 1689-1881 (Collection of Treaties
of Russia with China, 1689-1881), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, St.
Petersburg, 1889.. The translation from the Russian is by Dr. Basil
Dmytryshyn and is included in his Medieval Russia. A Source Book,
900-1700, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1967. The texts of the Treaties
of Kiakhta and Tientsin are those used by Dr. J. L. Sullivan in his
doctoral dissertation, Count N. N.. Muravlev-Amursky, Harvard University,
1955, and are taken from Treaties Conventions etc ... Between China and
Foreign States, 2 v. Shanghai, 1917. The texts of the Treatiea of
Aigun and Peking are from the Sborni~. Dogovorov gtc ••• cited above.
Translation from the Russian is mine. Muraviev's Confidential Memoran
dum to Grand Duke Constantine is contained in Barsukov, v. II, pp.
104-109; translation is mine.
E. E. O.

APPENDIX C
I. TREATY OF NERCHINSK
Article 1
A river called Gorbitsa, which near the Amur River joins the
Shi1ka River from the left side, shall fOl~ a boundary for both states.
This boundary shall then proceed from the headwaters of the Gorbitsa
River along the peaks of the Kamennyi Mountains, which begin at the
headwaters of said river, and which extend all the way to the Sea (of
Okhotsk). All rivers, be they big or small, which flow sooth from
these mountains and empty into the Amur River, shall be under the
suzerainty of the Chinese state; all rivers which flow the opposite
direction from these mountains shall be undar the suzerainty of the
Russian state.
All other rivers which are between the Rivr.r Ddi and said moun
tains and are under Russian suzerainty, and those rivers which are close
to the Amur and flow to the Sea (of Okhotsk) and are under Chinese
suzerainty, as well as all territories which lie between the said River
Udi and the mountains, shal.l continue undecided because the great
plenipotentiary ambassadors are not empowered to settle their dispo
sition; this condition will remain to until the plenipotentiary am
bassadors of both China and Russia, upon their return home, shall
receive from their sovereigns proper instructions to solve this problem
through ambassadors or through correspondence.
Then the fate of these undecided territories will be decided in
a peaceful. dignified manner either by letters or ambassadors.
Article :2
Moreover. the River Argun, which empties into the Amur shall form
a boundary (between China and Russia). All lands which are on its
left bank, all the way to the mountains, shall be under Chinese suzer
ainty. The right bank with all its territories ~ill be part of the
Russian state. (The Russians) are to transfer all of their buildings
from the southern bank of the Argun River to its northern side.
Article 3
The city of Albazin, which the Russians built, should be destroyed
completely, and all the people who now dwell there, with all the military
and other provisions, should be transferred to Russian territory. They
should leave behind neither property no~ any of their small possessions.
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Article 4
All Russian fugitives, who at the conclusion of this peace treaty
are in China, and all Chinese fugitives who are in Russia, shall re
main w~ere they are. Those fugitives who, following the signing of
this treaty, shall flee, each side shall return promptly to frontier
official5.
Article 5

On the basis of the present treaty of friendship, all persons,
regardless of their position, may COffie and go reciprocally, with full
liberty, provided they have passports and buy and sell whatever they
need.
Article 6
All former discords that have occurred between frontier inhabi
tants {of both states} prior to the signing of this peace treaty, shall
be forgotten and shall not be avenged. And should, following the
signing of this peace, some hunters come and pillage or kill, such
people, when apprehended, should be handed over to border officials
of their native country. And such individuals should be punished
severely. And should pillages (or other crimes) be committed by a
group of individuals, those w11lful individuals, when appt'ehended,
should be handed over to border officials to be executed for their
crimes. Neithor side will either declare a war or shed blood on ac
count of the actions of its frontier population. Each side will make
a report of such discords to the respective governT.ents, and such dis
agreements should be resolved peacefully through diplomatic correspon
dence.
Chinese authorities reserve for themselves the right to install
along the frontiers, which have been outlined in the present treaty,
markings of their choice in order to know the exact position (of the
frontier).

II. TREATY OF KHIAKTA (1727)
Article 1
The present treaty has been concluded for the eternal preserva
tion of peace between the two empires. It is therefore agreed that
from this day forth, each empire must govern and watch over its sub
jects. In respect for the concluded peace, each shall maintain and
guard rigorbusly its own subjects, in order to prevent whatever might
give rise to disputes.
Article 2
This present treaty of peace, renewed and concluded between the
two empires shall not be interpreted to apply to that which has hither
to taken place between the two empires.
Request for former fugitives shall not be made, and they shall
remain in the empire where they are; but those who shall henceforth
cross the frontier shall not, under any circumstance, be held. It shall
be necessary, on the contrary, to seek them out ~ithout delaYt in order
to tako them and return them to the authorities of the respective fron
tiers.
Articlo 3
The high officials of the Middle Kingdom and the IllYlian Count
Sava Vladislavich, ambassador of the Russian Empire, judged that the
main object of their work was the fixing of the frontier of the two
empires, but that it would be impossible to regulate it with accur
acy, if it was not carefully inspected on the spot. For this purpose:
The Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, ambassador of the Russian
Empire, betook himself to the frontier in person, with Tserin, adju
tant general of the Middle Kingdom, viceroy of several Mongolian tribes
and son-in-law of the Emperor, Bosygoe, commander of the imperial
guard, and Tuleshinym, vice president of the Ministry of War.
They came to an agreement in the following way on the places
where the frontier was to pass. The country situated between the out
post of the Russian Empire near the Kiakhta River and the Obo (stone
marker) of the Middle Kingdom, located on the summit of the mountain
Orogoitu, should be equally divided, and that another Obo should be
erected there which shall serve as the sign of the frontier. In the
same spot, a co~~arcial depot shall also be established, and com
missioners shall be sent there.
From this place to the east, the frontier passes over the crest
of Burgutei, as far as the outpost of Kiran. After the outpos~ of
Kiran, there are Tsiktei, Ara-Khidou and Ara-Khadazen; the frontier pro
ceeds by these four outposts in a straight line, along the River
Chikolu. Ara-Khadazan, as far as the Mongol outpost Tsagan-Ula. The
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desert, between the country inhabited by the subjects of the Russian
Empire and between the frontier markers of the Mongol outposts of the
Middle Kingdom will be shared equally as at Kiakhta. Where there are
in the neighborhood of the country inhabited by the subjects of the
Russian Empire t mountains, su~~its of mountains, and rivers, they shall
serve to mark the frontier; and where the mountains and rivers are in
the neighborhood of the Mongol outposts, they shall equally serve to
mark the frontier. But where there are only vast plains without moun
tains or rivers, the al'eas shall be divided equally, and sign posts to
mark the frontier have been erected in the middle; the frontier has
thus been established from the marker of the outpost of Tsagan-Ula to
the banks of the Argun River.
The envoys of the two empires in order to inspect the areas situa
ted beyond the Mongol outpost of the Tsagan-Ula agreed to draw thefron·
tier from the two markers of the middle, erected at Kiakhta and on the
mountain Orogoitu on the west, Orogoitu, Tymen, etc. l
The middle of this chain of mountains equally divided was ack
nowledged as the frontier. Where there are mountains and rivers along
the frontier line, they have been equally shared, in such a way that
at prescnt, from the Shabina as far as the banks of the Argun River,
all which is on the south side belongs to the Middle Kingdom and the
farther side belongs to the Russian Empire.
After having finished the division of the country and after
having drawn up a description and an exact map, the two parties ex
changed these descriptions. They submitted them to the high officials
of the two empires. The subJ~cts of the two States who found them
selves without permission beyond the determined frontier, and who had
there cstablish~d their homes, were sought out and brought back to
their own country. The same was done for vagabonds, in such a way that
the frontier has been entirely cleaned up.
The Uriankhl of the two sides, who paid five zlbelines of tri
bute remained with their former masters; but those who up to theln had
contributed only one zibel1ne, were exempted for the future and from
the day of the conclusion of this Treaty. For 'conformity, a proces
verbal was drawn up on both sides, which was mutually exchanged.
Article 4
Now that the determination of the frontier of the two empires is
settled, and now that no fugitive may be admitted any more, it is agreed
with the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavlch, ambassador of the Russian
Empire, to establish a free corrmerce between the two States.
The number of merchants who may go to Pekin every three years
must not exceed 200, as was earlier determined. As long as they are
lHere follows a considerable list of Manchu or Mongol place names,
now largely obsolete.
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only merchants: they shall not be treated as formerly; but no tax or
impost shall be required either of the seller or of the buyer.
rlhen these merchants arrive at the frontier, they-shall give
written warning. After the reception of this warning, an officer shall
be scnt to receive them and to accompany them 1n their business. If
they purchase during the trip camels, horses, and victuals, or if they
hire servants, they must pay for them at their own expense. The mer
chants shall remain under the orders of a chief designated to supervise
their affairs; and if there arise differences among them, this chief
will rule on them. If this chief of the merchants is a man of high
rank, he will be received and treated according to his rank. All types
of merchandise may be sold, except those which the laws of the two em·
pires forbid. No one shall be permitted to remain in secret and with
out the permission of his chief in the foreign country. If anyone dies,
all his goods, or whatever nature they may be, shall be returned to his
fellow-countrymen, as was agreed with the Russian ambassador, the
Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich. In addition to the trade carried on
by the caravans of the two empires, there shall be erected also on the
mutual frontiers near Kiakhta, Selengi, and Norchlnsk trading posts,
which, as is judged necessary, shall be surrounded by hedges and pali
sades. Those who betake themselves to these places to tarry on trade,
must go by direct route. If anyone fails to follow the direct route,
all his merchandise Ghall bo confiscated to the benefit of the govern
ment. There shall be installed on each side an equal nurr~er of offi
cers, placed under the orders of chiefs of equal rank,. and charged with
protecting these places. Differences shall be arbitrated in the man
ner agreed upon with the ambassador of the Russian Empire, the Illyri~n
Count Sava Vladislavich.
Article 5
The dwelling of the Russians in the capital shall serve hence
forth to lodge Russian travellers. On the request of the Illyrian Count
Sava Vladislavich, ambassador of the Russian Empire, and with the agree
ment of the high officials of the Middle Kingdom who are responsible
for relations with the Russians, a temple has been constructed near this
dwelling. The priest who resides in the capital shall dwall there with
three other priests to assist him. ~fuen these latter shall arrive,
they shall be received like their predecessors and employed at the said
temple. It shall be permitted to the Russians to practice their cult
with all its ceremonies and to recite their prayers. Four young Rus
sians, knowing the Russian and Latin language and writing, and two
others, older, that the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, ambassador of
the Russian Empire has left in the capital to learn the Chinese lan
guage, must remain in this same spot. Their upkeep shall be paid by the
government; and when they have completed their studies, they shall
return to their own country.
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Article 6
As to correspondence between the two empires, it is very es
sential that letters be affixed with a seal. The tribunal of frontier
provincial affairs is responsible for sending to the tribunal of the
Russian senate letters from the Middle Kingdom for the Russian Empire,
after the seal has been affixed. Letters of the Russian Empire for the
Middle Kingdom must be sent to the tribunal of the frontier provinces,
sealed with the seal of the Russian Empire or with the stamp of the
governor of the city of Tobolsk. All papers relating to the frontier
or to the trading posts, and conc~rning deserters or thieveries, must
be signed and sealed by the Tushetukhan Ovan, dzhan torzhi and the Ovan
tanzhin torzhiu if they come out of the Middle Kingdom, and by the com
mandants of the frontier towns if they come from the Russian Emplre.
The mutual correspondence between the Tushetukhan Ovan dzhan torzhi
and the Ovan tanzhin torzhiu with the Russians must be done by men
sent expressly and only by the Kiakhta route. However, it is permitted
them to take the shortest route if it is a question of an affair of
great importance. In cases of contravention of this rule, the Ovan
of the frontier and the commander of the Russian towns must be immed
iately informed, and after an investigation of the charge has been made,
the guilty parties shall be punished by the appropriate official.
Article 7
As to the frontir.rs, near the River Ud and others, they have
already been the object of negotiations ~tween the head cf the interior,
Sungutou and Fodor Alexevich Golovin. These areas shall remain at
present undetermined between the two parties; but they shall be regu
lated ultimately by ambassadors or by correspondence. On this occasion,
the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, a~bassador of the Russian Em
pire, was told: "Since you have been sent as pler.ipotentiary of your
Empress to regulate all affairs, we must also draw up somethir.g on
this point. At the present tinlc, your subjects are passing across the
frontier often to go into the country called Khimkon Tugurnik, and if,
as a result, we do not make a decision thereupon during these talks,
it is to be feared that tho situation may result in differences among
the frontier subjects. Such differencos being'opposed to what is con
tained 1n thG Treaty of Peace between the two empires, we must arrange
this matter right now." The ambassador of the Russian Empire, the
Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, replied, ItMy Empress has not empowered
me to negotiate on the al'cas situated to the east. We do not have
a precise enough knowledge of these countries,;' it is necessary therefore
that all remain as has been heretofore agreed; but in order to pre
vent anyone from among our subjects from crossing the frontier, I
shall forbid it for the future." Our men replied: "If your Empress
has not empo'Nel'ed you to discuss the areas of the east, we shall
speak no more of that, and it will be necessary to leave things as
they are. But, after your return, forbid your subjects to cross the
frontier; for If anyone was seized by our men for coming onto our
territory, we should punish him. In such a case, you could not say
that we had violated the Treaty of Peace. If, on the other hand, on~
of our subjects crosses your frontier, you will have equally the right to
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punish him; finally because nothing is decided about the River Ud and
the cantons which abut upon it, they shall remain as heretofore; but
your subjects are not to establish themselves any closer than they arc
at present.
~As soon as the ambassador of the Russian Empire, the Illyrian
Count Sava Vladislavich, shall be home again, he will exphin all
thl$ to his Empress. It will be necessary then to send men who have
knowledge of local affairs in these areas to inspect them; for it would
be well to be able to reach a decision thereupon, it being understood,
that if this matter, of small importance in itself, was not decided, it
might become harmful to the good understanding between the two empires.
In addition, a proc~s-verbal on this subject was drawn up, and has been
sent to your senate. 1t

Article 8
The co~~andants
according to tha laws
if they drag them out
them according to its

of tho frontiers of the two empires must decide,
of justice, and without delay, all disputes; and
for their own interest" each empire must punish
own laws.
Article 9

If from one side or the other, important or petty chargos
are sent, they f,lust betake themselves first to the frontier.
and give warning of their mission and of their rank. They must not be
retained long on the frontier, and some ona must be sent to roceive them.
After the reception of a letter of invitation, they shall be given re
freshments at each stop, and they shall be received with respect. At
their arrival, th~y shall be lodged and ~td for; if they come in a year
when co~~erce is not permitted, they may not bring merchandise.

!~affair~]

If. for some important matters, one or two couriers are sent,
they must present their papers to the frontier officers who shall fur
nish them with horses in relays, guides. and food, without their having
had to give advance warning; all this has been agreed with the Russian
ambassador, the Illyrlan Count Sava Vladislavich.
Correspondence by letter and messengers between the two empires,
being of the highest importance, must not be allowed to suffer any
delay_ If then, in the future, letters are not answered, and if mes
sengers are detained unnecessarily, it shall be considered contrary to
what is contained in the Treaty of Peace. In such cases, neither am
bassadors nor nngotiators shall be received until such difficulties shall
be terminated; then only will they be permitted passage.
Article 10
The subjects of the two empires who shall flee henceforth shall
be punished with death at the very spot where they shall have been ar
rested. 'Armed subjects who cross the frontier without committing assassi
nations or brigandage, but without passports, shall likewise be punished
in conformity with their crime. Soldiers \'1ho desert and steal from their
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leadnrs shall have thoir heads cut off, if they are subjects of the
Middle Kingdom: if they are of the HU$sian Empire, they shall be
strangled, and the stolen things shall be returned to the commandant or
to his government. Those who cross the frontier and steal camels or
othgr beasts shall be returned to their natural judges, who shall con
denm them to pay ten times the value of the stolen objects; 1n case of
a second offense, twenty times as much; and at the third offense, they
shall be punished with death. He who crosses the frontier to hunt
for his own benefit in the environs shall be punished in conformity
with the offense, and his booty returned to the government. Peasants
who cross the frontier without pasSpolt shall be punished likewise, as
has been agreed with the Russian ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava
Vladislavich.
Article 11
This Treaty of Peace concluded between the two empires has been
exchanged in the following manner; The ambassador of the Russian Em
pire, the Illyrian Count Sa va Vladislavich, has remitted a copy in the
Russian and Latin languages, furnishad and confirmed with a seal to the
high officials of the Middle Kingdom; and the high officials of the
Middle Kingdom have reu.itted to the Illyrian Count Sava Bladlsiavich,
aIr.bassador of the Russian Empire, another copy in Manchu, Russian and
latin. This Treaty has been accurately printed and distributed to all
those engaged in frontier affairs, in order that its contents be
generally known.
The seventh day of the seventh moon of the fifth year of Perpe
tual Rectitude.
Supplement to the Treaty of Kiakhta (1768)
Although the 11 Articles of the Treaty of Peace must be maintained
eternally unchanged, it has been found necessary to remove the Russian
frontier markers from the neighborhood of Mount Burgutei to Ubitsiktu,
Khoshou, and other places, in order to draw the line of the frontier
along the ridge of the mountains; but all shall remain as was formerly
planned near the two corr~ercial depots of Kiakhta and Tsurukhaitou,
where no fee for entry is required. Errors having slipped into the Rus
sian and Latin texts of the Treaty of Peace, and several essential
points having been forgotten, it has been judged desirable to correct
and rectify them. Furthermore, any disagreenlents which have hereto
fore taken place between the two powers shall be forgotten, and no re
quest shall be made for fo~er fugitives. What was decreed by the tenth
Article of the preceding Convention concerning the way to prevent
stealing and desertion alnong the respective frontier subjects appeeIe1
too equivocal and indeterminate. The tenth Article of the Convention
has therefore been entirely rejected. and it has been drawn up again
and elevated into law, which must be observed in place of the former
one. According to the present Convention, each party must supervise
henceforth its own subjects, in order that such things may happen no
more. If, at the new assembly which is to take place on the frontier,
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evidence is produced of tampering L~ith the markcr~7 or other such inci
dents, the corr~andants of the frontier shall be required to examine it
without delay and with loyalty. If, on the contrary, led on by their
own interest, they neglect their duty, each party must punish them ac
cording to its own laws. As to the search and arrest of brigands and
as to the punishment of those who cross the frontier illegally, the
following clauses have been drawn up and determined on.
Article 10
Armed men who cross the frontier near one of the outposts to en
gage in brigandage, whether or not they have killed anyone, must be
arrested and guarded rigorously until they have confessed from what
outpost they came and if they were alone or with others. After they
have undergone a rigorous interrogation at the outpost itself, the names
of the still free brigands must be written down, and each outpost noti
fied, and especially the first superior officer of the Chinese and the
commandants of the Russians. lhesa officials must immediately betake
themselves to the actual spot to look scrupulously into the affair with
those concerned, and to make without delay a report, which must be sent
to the place where frontier affairs are decided. From there it shall
be required that a . distinguished loyal man be sent to the outpost,
who shall meet with the officials there to look into the matter in ques
tion; after which he shall send his report to the place where frontier
questions are decided. The subjects of the Middle Kingdom who have
committed brigandage shall be handed over, without distinction of per
sons, to the tribunal which governs the frontier provinces, to be put
to death, and the Russian subjects shall be handed over to the senate
to sui fer the samG punishment. Murderers shall be conducted to the
frontier to be publicly executed. The horse, saddle, arms, and all
the equipment of the thief shall be given, as reward, to whoever ar
rested him. Those who steal horses, animals, and other property, for
the first time shall be condemned to pay ten times the value of the
stolen articles. If the thief is not caught, the commandants of both
outposts must meet together to look into the crime, to examine any
wounds, the hody of any who have been killed, and a proces-verbal shall
be drawn up. The comToandant of the outpost shall be expected to arrest
the thieves, at the latest, within a month. If. the thief has not been
apprehanded within this time, a report must be sent to both the frontier
headquarters. Then the commandants of the outposts and the soldiers
who have not done their duty in the search for the horses and the stolen
articles shall be punish~d themselves by paying ten times the value of
the stolen goods. If unarmed men are arrested who have crossed the
frontier to commit robb~ry secretly, they shall be punished, according
to the law, with one hundred lashes. The horse of the thief with the
saddle shall be given, as reward, to those who arrested him. The stolen
goods shall be returned. The first time, thn thief shall pay five times
the value of the goods; the second, ten times; and the third time, he
shall be treated as a brigand. If such thieves are not arrested, an
authentic praces-verbal must be drawn up fOl' the outpost near which the
cl'ime has been corruni tted and th~ cOlnmandant and the soldiers of the out
post must be ordered to arrest the criminal within the space of one month.
~ban he has been caught, he shall roceive publicly one hundred lashes,
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and the horses and other goods stolen shall be restored without d~lay.
If the commandants of the outposts and the soldiers do not find and
within the prescribed time arrest the unarmed thieves, the vaue of the
horses and of th~ stolen goods must be paid five times over by these
cor.mandants and these soldiers who have not fulfilled their duty.
When horses and other stray animals which have crossed the fron
tier are found, they shall immediately be returned to the nearest out
post; if they are not found, a proces-verbal shall be drawn up, in which
they shall be precisely described. The horses and stray animals shall
then be returned within the space of five days. This length of time
having passed, if they have been found and not returned, or If they have
been hidden anywhere and the place where any of these horses and stray
animals are is known, the commandants of the mutual outposts must prepare
a report about it and send it to ths frontier headquarters a In recom
pense for these objects, double the number must be restored.
Armed people, not furnished with passports, who cross the frontier
Their
horses, saddles and equipment shall be given as reward to those who ar
rested them. If such persons have crossed the frontier to hunt, they
shall, according to the law, be publicly punished with one hundr'ed lashes.
The booty, their arms, horses and equipment shall be given, likewise, as
reward to those who arrested them. If unarmed people, who have crossed
the frontier, are arrested, the commandant of the outpost must interro
gate them scrupulously. If they have mistaken the road, they must be
released without delay and returned, as soon as possible to the outpost
on the other side. If peoplo are founa hidden in the forests and in the
inaccessible mountains, and if they are arrested, they shall, according
to the law, be publicly punished with one hundred lashes; theiT horses,
saddles and equipment shall be given, as a deserved reward to those who
arrested them.
wi thout committing either thieving or kill ings, must be arrested.

All the criminals of the Middle Kingdom condemned to corporal
shall be whipped, and those of the Russian Empire shall be
beaten with the knout.

punish~ent

The convention herewith concludGd has been exchanged in the follow
ing manner. the high officials of the Middle Kingdom handed over a copy
in Manchu and Mongol languages furnished with a seal, to the Co~missioner
Plenipotentiary of the Russians; and the latter handed over to the high
officials of the Middle Kingdom another copy in the Russian language
likewise furnished with a seal.
In order to see that it be generally known, printed copies of this
agreement shall be distributed to the frontier subjects on both sides.
The 33rd year of Khi 9nglung, the 19th day of the 9th moon (18
October, 1768).
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III. TREAIY OF AIGUN
(Ceremonial Preamble Omitted)
Article 1
The left bank of the Amur River, from the Argun River southward
to the mouth of the Amur, shall be under the sovereignty of the Russian
Empire, while the right bank, as far as the Ussuxi River, shall be
under the sovereignty of the Oai-Ising Empire; the lands and places
situated between the Ussuri River and the sea shall, as heretofore,
constitute a joint dominion of the Oai-Tsing and Russian Empires, until
such time as the frontier between the two Empires in this area is de
termined. Vessels only of the Oai-Ising and Russian Empires may navi
gate the Amur, Sungari and Ussuri; navigation of those rivers is for
bidden to vessels of any other states. Manchu inhabitants of the left
bank of the Arnur River, from the Zeia River southward to the village
of Khormoldzin shall be left in perpetuity in the prior locations of
their residence, under the jurisdiction of the Manchu Government, in
order that Russian inhabitants might not injure or oppress them.
Article 2
In the interest of mutual friendship of the subjects of both
states, reciprocal trade is permitted to the subjects of both Empires
who live along the Ussuri, Arnur and Sungari Rivers, and the authorities
must reciprocally protect the trading people of both states on both
banks.
Article 3
The stipulations laid down by mutual agreement of the plenipo
tentiary cf the Russian Empire, Governor-Gen~ral Muraviev, and the
plenipotentiary of the Oai-Ising Empire, Commander-in-Chief of the Amur,
I-Shan, shall be carried out preCisely and inviolably in perpetuity;
to this effect, Governor-General Muraviev, for the Russian Empire, has
remitted a copy of the present treaty, written in the Russian and Mznchu
languages, to the Cotr.mander-in-ChieI. I-Shan, for the Oai-Ising Empire,
and the Cowmander-in-Chief, I-Shan, for the Dai-Tsing Empire, has re
mitted a copy of the present treaty, written in the Manchu and Mongol
languages, to Govcrnol'-Genel'al Muraviev, for the Russian Empire. All
provisions contained herein shall bl) published for the information of
the frontier inhabitants of both Empires.
Signed, May 16, 1858, in the town of Aigun*
Nikolai Muravlev
Piotr Perovsld i
I-Shan
Dzlraminga
*Ceremonial recitation of plenipotentiary cl'edentials omitted, as are
counter-signatures.

IV. TREATY OF TIENTSIN (June, 1858)
His Majesty the Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias and His
Majesty the Emperor of China judging it of prime necessity to outline
clearly the mutual relations of Russia and China, and to draw up new
rules for the interest of the two States, have appointed for this purpose
their Plenipotentiaries, na~ely,
His Majesty tne Emperor of All the Russias, his Aide-de-camp
General, Vice-Admiral Count Evfimy Putiatin, Imperial Commissioner in
China, and Commander-in-chief of the Russian squadron in the Pacific
Ocean;
And His Majesty the Emperor of China, from his Empire the
Dakhilushi of the Eastern section, Director-in-chief of the Tribunal of
Criminal Justice, the high functionary Kui-leang, and from his Empire
the President of the Tribunal of Inspection, Chief of the Division of
heavy lnfantry of the blue fringed flag, his high functionary Khurashan.
The said Plenipotentiaries, in virtue of the powers which they
have received from their respective Governments have a9re~d upon the
following Articles, and have drawn them up as follows,
Article 1
Th~ prescnt Treaty confirms again the Peace and Friendship which
have existed for many years between his Majesty the Emperor of All the
Russlas and His Majesty the Emperor of China, and between their respec
tive subjects.

Russian subjects who reside in China and Chinese subjects who are
in Russia shall continue to enjoy the prot~ction of the Gove~nments of
the two empires, both for their persons and for their property.
Article 2
Henceforth communications between the Supreme Government of Russia
and the Supreme Govarr~cnt of China, will not be effected as has been
done heretofore by the Senate on the one side and the Tribunal Li-fan
yuan on the other, but it shall be the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Russia who shall communicate with the Senior Member of the Council of
State or with the chief Minister at Pekin. They shall communicate on
terms of absolute equality_
l'he ordinary corre;spondence between the persons above-mentioned
shall be transmitted by the frontier authorities. Cowmunications of
high importance shall be brought by an emissary nominated AQ hQ£, who
can make verbal ~xp1anations to the Members of th~ Council of state and
th~ chi.ef Minister. At his arrival he shall present d!!spatches with the
President of the Tribunal of Rites acting as intermediary.
Equality shall be observed likewise in the correspondence and the
interviews of Envoys and Ministers Plenipotentiary of Russia, with the
Memb!rs of the Council of State, the Ministers of the Court of Pekin,
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and the Governors-General of the frontier and maritime provinces; and
in the relations among the Governors-General and other frontier authori
ties of the two Stateso
If the Russian Government should judge it necessary to name a
Minister Plenipotentiary to reside in one of the open ports of China,
he shall d3al in his personal relations and in his correspondence with
the local Chinese authorities and with the Minizters at Pekin, according
to the general rules agreed upon now by all foreign states.
Envoys of Russia may go to Pekin, either by way of Kiakhta and
Urga, or by Taku at the mouth of the Pei Ho, or by any other city or
open port of China. After an advance notice, the Chinese goyernment
shall see that tIle necessary arrangements are undertaken in order that
the trip of the Envoy and of his suite may be prompt and convenient.
The reception in the capital shall take place with the honors due his
rank; appropriate lodging shall b~ prepared and he shall be provided
with all n~cessities.
All the expenses occasioned by the sending of Russian Diplomatic
Missions into China shall be discharged by tho Russian Government, and
shall in no case become the responsibility of the Chinese Government.
Article 3
Henceforth commerce betwGen Russia and China shall take place
not only in the places determined along the frontiers, but also by sea.
Russian merchant vessels shall be permitted to trad~ in ths following
ports a Shanghai, Ning-po, Foo-chow-ioo, Canton, Taiwan foo, on the
Island of Foro,ose, Kiung chow, ,on the Island of Hainan.
Al'ticle 4
In the future no limit shall be placed by either Government on the
number of traders and captains employed in commerce.
In maritime co~~erce and in all the details which concern it,
namely the declarations on imported merchandise, the payment of rights
of anchorage and of duties according to the present tariff, etc., Russian
subjects shall conforrn to the g~neral rules established for foreign
commerce in the Chinese ports.
Any illegal coromerce carried on by Russians shall be punished by
the confiscation, to the prof:t of the Chinese Gov~rnment, of any mer·
chandise which has been unloaded.
Article 5
The Russian Government shall be freo to name Consuls in the ports
open to commerce.
The Russian Government may send out war ships to maintain order
among the Russian subjects and to give support to the authority of the
Consul.
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Ihe relations between the Consul and local authorities, the con
cession of a suitable area for the construction of churches, of houses
and of stores, the purchase by the Russians of lands from the Chinese,
and all the transactions which are under the jurisdiction of the Consul,
shall take place according to the general rules observed by the Chinese
GoveI'nment in its dealing with foreigners.
Article 6

If a Russian war vessel or merchant ship should be in trouble
on the shore, the nearest Chinese authority should immediately bring aid
to the ship, and take the necessary meCl.sures for the rescue of the ship
and the cargo. It shall also assist in the transportation of the crew
and the cargo to the nearest port where there is a Russian Consul or the
agent of a nation friendly to Russia, or to the frontier, if the ship
wreck has taken place near the frontier. The Russian Government shall
cover the expenses resulting f~om the rescue of the crew and the cargo.
In cases where Russian war vessels or merchant ships are in need
of making repairs, or providing themselves with ,vater, and with fresh
provisions, they shall be allowed to enter on their course into ports
not open to cornmerce, and to buy what they need at prices agreed upon,
and without the local 8Jthorities makin'3 objections.
Article 7
All disputes between Russian and Chinese fubjects in the ports
and opon cities shall be examined by the Chinese authorities in concert
with the aussian Consul or with the agent who represents the authority
of ihef;usslan Government in that place.
Russian subject.s guilty of any crime or misdemeanor shall be
judged according to the Russian laws. Likewise, Chinese subjects, for
any crime or attempt against the life or the property of a Russian
shall be judged and punished according to the laws of their country.
If Russian subjects should penetrate into the interior of China
and there commit some crime or misdemeanor, they shall be conducted to
the frontier, or into one of the open ports where a Russian Consul re
sides in order to be judged and punished acccrdirig to Russian laws.
Article 8
The Chinese Government having recognized that the Christian
doctrine facilitates the establishment of order and peace among men,
promis~s ~ot to persecute its Christi~n subjects for the practicing of
the duties of their religion; they shall enjoy the protection accorded
to all tho~e who profess the other beliefs tolerated in the Empire.
The Chinose Government considering the Christian missionaries
men of good wUl who are not seeking material advantag~5, shall permit
them to propogate the Christian faith among its subjects, anj shall not
prevent them froro mOiling about freely in the interior of the Empire.
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A fixed number of missionaries leaving the cities or open ports
shall be furnished with passports signed by the Russian authorities.
Article 9
Those parts of the frontier between China and Russia not as yet
determined shall be examined without delay 1n the frontier areas them
selves.
The two Gover~~ents shall name for this purpose delegates who
shall fix the line of demarcation and shall conclude thereupon a Con
vention, which shall be added as a Separate Article to the present
Treaty.
Maps and detailed descriptions of the frontier shall then be drawn
up and shall serve as definitive documents for the future.
Article 10
There shall no longer be any fixed term for the stay of the Russian
Ecclesiastical Mission in Pekin; the members of this mission may, with
the authorization of their Gover~ment, return to their own country at
any time. The vacant place may then be occupied by a new me~her.
The Chinese Government shall no longer defray any expenses for the
maintenance of the mission; all exp~nses shall be the responsibility of
the Russian Government.
The travelling expenses of the member of the mission, couriers,
and other porsons whom the Russian Government shall send from Kiakhta
and the open ports of China, and vice-versa, shall be paid by the Russian
Goverrunent; the local Chin~se authorities shall be obliged, on their
side, to take necessary measures to insure that the jouosy of all such
above-mentioned persons shall be prompt and convenient.
Article 11
A regular postal service Ehall be established between Kiakhta and
Pekin for communications between the two Governments, as well as for
the needs of the Ecclosiastical Russian Mission at Pekin.
The Chinese couriers shall be sent on an appointed day once a month
from Pekin and from Kiakhta, and shall, in the time of 15 days or less,
bring official packages and letters to the place of their destination.
Furthermore, every 3 mOI~ths, or 4 times per year, -a convoy shall
be sent from Kiakhta to Pekin, an1 vice versa, for the transportation
of all types of goods and belongings. This convoy shall make the trip
i~ the course of one month.
All the expenses arising from the estab
lisr~ent and the maintenanc~ of these communications shall be paid half
and half by the two Governments.
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Article 12
All the political, com.'llercial, and other privileges which might
in the future be acquired by the most favored N~tion$ from the Chinese
Government, shall be extended at the same time to Russia without the
necessity of any preliminary negotiations.
This Treaty shall be ratified i~'llediately by the Emperor of China,
and after it shall have beGn ratified by the Emperor of Russia, the ex
change of ratifications shall take place at Pekin within a year, or
earlier if possible.
Copies in the Russian, Manchu, and Chinese languages, complete
with the signatures and the seals of the Plenipotentiaries of the two
States, shall be exchanged now, and the Manchu text shall serve as the
basis for the interpretation of all the Articles of the Treaty, which
shall be observed by the two High Contracting Parties, faithfully and
inviolably.
Done and signed in the city of Tientsin on the first day of June
of the year 1858 after the .birth of Jesus Christ, and in the 4th year of
the reign of His Alajesty the Emperor AlexandGr II.
Count livfimy Putlatin
Kui-leang
Khurashan
Supplementary Treaty
Concluded November 2, 1860, in Peking
Following an attentive examination and ansideration of existing treaties
betwoen Russia and China. His Majesty, the Emperor and Autocrat of all
the Russias and His Majesty, the Bogdikhan of the Chinese Empire, wishing
to bind more close;y the ties of reciprocal friendship between the tViO
Empires, to develop coromercla1 relations and to p~event any misunder
standing, have resolved to draw up some adcitional articles, and for this
purpose, have named as their Plenipotentiaries:
For the Russian Emplre t Major General Nikolai Ignatiev, of the
Suite of His Imperial Majesty and Chevalier of various Orders;
For the Dei-Tsing Empire, the Prince Kung, Prince of the First
Class, who bears the name I-Sing.
The said Plenipotentiaries, after having made known their full
powers, having found them sufficient. have agreed on the following:
Article 1
To' confirm and to c1arif¥ ArtIcle 1 of the Treaty concluded in the
town of Aigun on May 16, 1858 (Eighth Year of Sien Fang, 21st day of the
Fourth Moon). and in execution of Article 9 of1he~Treaty concluded on June
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1 of the same year (third day of the Fifth Moon), In the
Tientsin, it Is established that:

~own
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Henceforth, the Eastern Frontier of the two Empires, beginning with
the confluence of the~iRivers Shilka and Argun, shall descend along the
course of the Aw~r River to the confluence of the latter river with the
River Ussuri. The lands lying along the left bank (on the north) of
the River Amur belong to the Russian Empire, while the lands lying along
the right bank (on the south) to the mouth of the River Ussuri, belong
to the Chinese Empire. Further, from the mouth of the Ruver Ussuri to
Lake Khinkai, the frontier line lol1ows the Ussuri and Sungacha Rivers.
The lands lying along the Eastern (right) banks of those rivers belong
to the Russian Empire and those on the West (left) banks, to the Chinese
Empire. Thereupon, the frontier line between the two Empires, from the
source of the River Sungacha, cuts across Lake Khinkai and follows the
River Belen-khe (Tur); from the mouth of the latter, it follows the crest
of the mountains to the mouth of the River Khubitu (Khubtu) and from
there along the mountains lying between the River Khunchun and the sea as
far as the River Tu-min-dzi-m. Here, likewise, the lands lying on the
East belong to the Russian Empire and on the West to the Chinese. The
frontier line lies along the River Tu-min-dzian at 20 versts (Ii) from
its mouth.
Furthermore, in execution of the same Article 9 of the Treaty of
Tientsin, there is confirmed a rna? drawn up on which the frontier line,
for greater clarity, is indicated in red and its direction ma~ked with
the letters of the Russian alphabet
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This map is signed by the Plenipotentiaries of both Empires and
is validatod by their seals.
Should there be, in the above-mentioned places, settlements of
Chinese subjects, the Russian Government obligates itself to leave them
there and to permit them, as in the past, to pursue their fishing and
hunting occupations.
After the frontier markers have been placed, the frontier lines
shall remain forever unchanged.
Article 2
The frontier line on the west, up to now undetermined, must hence
forth follow the direction of the mountains, the courses of the great
rivers, and of the existing line of Chinese pickets. From the last
outpost, named Shabindaga, established in 1728, upon conclusion of the
Treaty of Kilakhta of 1728, (Sixth Year of Yun9 Ching), it shall proceed
southwest to Lake Tsai-san and from there to the mountains lying to the
south of Laka Issykul, called Tengcrishn or Kirgisnysh alatau, otherwise
known as Tsian-Shan-Onan-lu (southern extension of the Celestial Moun
tains) and along these mountains to the Kokand dominion.
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Articlo 3
Henceforth all treaty questions which may in future arise, must be
settled on the basis set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of this Treaty, and
for the placing of frontier markers on the East from Lake Khinkai to the
River Tu-min-dzian and on the west from the outpost Shabindaga to the
Kokand dominion, the Russian and Chinese Governments shall name reliable
persons (Comnlission~rs). For the inspection of the Eastern frontier,
the Commissioners shall meat at the mouth of tha Ussuri River during
April of next year (lith Year of Sien-Fong, Third Moon). For the inspec
tion of the western frontier, the meeting of the commissioners shall
take place at Iarbagatai but the time is not set.
On the basis of the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the present
treaty the authorized officials (Colmnissioners) who are despatched are
to prepare maps and detailed descriptions of the frontier line in four
copies - t.wo in th(; Russian, and two in the Chinese or Manchu language.
The maps and descriptions are to be validated by the signatures and
seals of the Commissioners, following which two copies of them, one in the
Russian, and one in the Chinese or Manchu languages - shall be remitted
to the Russian Gover~~ent and two such copies to the Chinese Gover~~ent,
for safekeeping.
For the exchanging of maps descriptions of the frontier line, there
shall be drawn up a protocol corroborated by the signing and placing of
seals of the Co~~issioners and it shall be considered as an additional
Article of the present Treaty.
Article

4

All along the frontier line established by Article 1 of the present
Treaty, free trade without tariffs is authorized between the subjects of
the two states. The local border commanders must give their special
protection to this trade and to the people engaged in it.

J
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At the same time, all stipulations concerning trade established
in Article 2 of the Treaty of Aigun are confirmed.
Article 5
To Russian merchants there is extended, over and above the existing
trade at Kiakhta, their former right to travel on commercial matters
from Kiakhta to Peking. En route, they shall be permitted to trade
also at Urga and Kalgan, without opening up wholesale commerce. The
Russian GovernL'Tlent is authorized to have a Consul (Lin-shl-guan) at
Urga, accompanied by several persons and at its expense to construct a
dwelling for him there. As to the concession of land for this dwelling,
as well as the size of the latter, and as to thG concession of pastu=age,
there must be an understanding with the authorities at Urga.
Chinese merchunts are equally authorized to proceed to nussia to
trade if they so desire.

":,
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Russian merchants have the right to travel on business to China
at all times, only there should be no more (in one party) than two
hundred persons at one time in one place; moreover, they must have
tickets from the Russian frontier authority indicating the name of the
head of the caravan, th~ number of persons composing the caravan and
the place of its destination. Dering the voyage, the merchants are
permitted to buy and sellas they wish. All expenses of the road are to
be borne by tho merchants themselves.
Article 6
Experimentally, commerce is to be opened at Kashgar on the same
basis as at Ili and Tarbagatai. At Kashgar, the Chinese Government shall
cede £ufficient land for construction of a trading post with all build
ings necessary for dwellings, warehouses for storing of merchandise,
etc., as well as for a cenetery and a pasture, at IIi and Tarbagatai.
Orders will be given i~~ediately to the Administrator of Kadhgar for the
cession of areas for the above-mentioned needs.
The Chinese Gover~~ent shall not be responsible for thefts from
Russian merchants in cases where such thefts have been co~nitted by people
who have intruded frcm beyond the linos of the Chinese outposts.
Article 7
Russians in China, just as Chines£ in Russia, in places open to
trade, may move about freely in their cOrP.mercial activities without any
rp.straint on the part of the local authorities; they may fre~uent with
the same freedom and at all times the market places and houses of local
mel'chants and may sell and buy all manner of melchandise wholesale or
retail, for cash or for barter, and may grant and receive credit as
their mutual confidence permits.
The duration of the stay of nerchants in places where trade is
carried on is not to be limited but depends on their own desires.
Article 8
Russian merchants in China and Chinese merchants in Russia are
placed under the special protection of both Governments. ' In order to
supervise the merchants and to prevent misunderstandings that may arise
between them and the local inhabitants, the Russian Government may
immediately name Consuls at Kashgar and Urga, on th~ basis of rules
adopted for Ili and Tarbagatai. The Chinese Gover~~lent may equally,
should it so desire, name Consuls in the capitals and other cities of
the Russian Empire.
The Consuls of both Powers are to be lodged in houses constructed
at the expense of their respective Governments. However, it is not for
bidden them to rent, if they so desire, lodgings from the local inhabi
tants.
In their lclations with the local authorities, the Consuls of both
states, on the basis of Article 2 of the Treaty of Tientsin, are to
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observe perfect equality. All matters concerning the merchants of one
or the other state are to be examined by them on the basis of mutual
consent. Misdemeanors and crimes must be judged, as stip~lated in Arti
cle 7 of the Treaty of Tientsin, in accordance with the laws of the State
of which the guilty party is a subject.
Disputes, lawsuits and disagreements of a similar nature arising
among merchants in connection with co~mercial matters are to be settled
by the merchants themselves by means of arbiters chosen from amongst
themselves; the Consuls and the local authorities may only cooperate in
bringing about conciliations, without taking any responsibllity relative
to such suitg.
In places where trade is authorized, merchants of both states may
contract written commitments for orders of merchandise, rental of shops,
houses, etc., and present them to be witnessed by the Consulate and the
local administration. In case of non-execution of written co~~itments
the Consul and local authorities are to take measures to bring (the
parties concerned) to fulfil their obligations exactly.
Matters not having to do with co~nercial affairs among merchants,
such as disputes, complaints, etc., shall be examined by the Consul and
the local authorities, by mutual consent; delinquents shall be punished
according to the laws of their own country.
In case vf concealment of a Russian subject among the Chinese,
or of his flight into the interior of the country, the local authority,
upon being informed by the Russian Consul, shall without delay take
measures to seek out the fugitive and upon discovering him, shall imme
diately turn him over to the Russian Consulate. The same procedure shall
be equally followed relative to any Chinese s~bject hiding among the
Russians or fleeing into Russia.
In case of serious crimes, such as murder, brigandage VJith ser fous
bodily injury, attack upon a person's life, premeditated arson, etc •• ,
after an inquiry, if the g~ilty party is Russian he shall be sent to
Russia to be treated according to the la'l'I$ of his country, and if he is
Chinese his punishment shall be infl ieted either by the authority of the
place where the crime was co~~itted or, if the laws of the State require
it, the guilty party shall be sent to another city or another province
there to receive his punisr~ent.
In cases of crimes, whether they be serious or minor, the Consul
and the local a~thority may take necessary measures only against a guilty
party of his own country but neither one has the right to detain or
independently to judge, much le3s to p~nish, an individual who is nut a
subject of his Government.
Article 9
The present extent of commercial relations between the subjects of
the two states and the fixing of new frontier lines render inapplicable
the old rules laid down in the treaties concluded in Nerchinsk and
Kiakhta and in Agreements supplenentary to them; by the same token, the
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relations of the frontier authorities and the rules for examining
frontier matters do not correspond to the prosent circumstances; conse
quently, in place of these rules the following procedures are established:
Henceforth, besides the relations being carried on - on the eastern
frontier through Urga and Kiakhta, between the civil governor of Kiakhta
and the authorities at Urga t and on the western frontier between the
Governor-General of Western Siberia and the Administration of Ili - there
shall also be frontier relations between the military governors of the
Priamur and Primorsk provinces and the Commanders-in-Chief of Heilung
chiang and Kirin and between the Frontier Commissioner of Kiakhta and
the- Tsargucheiu (Boy-yuan), in the sense of Al-ticle 8 of the present
Treaty.
On the basis of Article 2 of the Treaty of Tientsin, the above
mentioned Military-Governors and Co:nmanders-in-Chief (Dzian-dzhungs)
must observe complete equality in their relations and must carry them
out exclusively in connection with matters in which their ad~inistration
is directly concerned.
In case of particularly important matters, the Governor-General of
Eastern Siberia is authorized to enter into written relations - eithe!
with the Supreme Council (Dzhun-tzi-chou) or with the Ministry of Ex
ternal Relations (Li-fan-yuan), as the principal authority in charge of
relations and administration along the frontiers.
Article 10
In investigations and decisions concerning frontier affairs, either
major or minor, the frontier authorities shall be guided by the rules
set forth in Article 8 of the present Treaty; as to investigattons con
cerning subjects of one or the other Empire, and punishments to be
inflicted on them, they shall be carried out, as stated in the Treaty
of Tientsin, accordigg to the laws of the country to which the guilty
party belongs.
In case of passage, leading away or theft of cattle across the
frontier, the local authorities, inmediately upon being informed and as
soon as evidence is delivered to the head of the nearest outpost, shall
send men to conduct a search. The cattle when found shall be restored
promptly to the owner and if any are missing, monetary restitution is to
be made according to the law; but in such a case the payment must not
be raised to £everal times the value of the missing cattle (as has been
the practice heretofore).
In case of the flight of a person across the frontier,- at the first
notification, measures shall be taken itrmediately to find the fugitive.
The apprehended fugitive is to be turned over without delay with all of
his possessions to the frontier authority. Inve~tigation of the reasons
for the flight and the trial itself shall be carried out by the nearest
local authority of the country to which the fugitive belongs. Through
out the time of his stay across the frontier t from his apprehension to
his return to the appropriate authorities, the fugitive is to be given
necessary food and drink and, if needed, clothing; the guard accompanying
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him must treat him humanely and must not indulge in arbitrary acts
against him. The same applies to a fugitive about whom there has beer.
no advance notification.
Article 11
Written communications between the superior frontier authorities
of either State shall be carried out through the nearest frontier offi
cials, to whom despatches are to be delivered under written rec~ipts.
The Governor-General of Eastern Siberia and the Civil Governor
of Kiakhta shall send their despatches to the Kiakhta Frontier Com
missioner, who shall send them to the Tsargucheiu (Boy-yuan); the ad
ministrators at Urga shall send their despatches to the Tsargucheiu
(Boy-yuan), who shall transmit them to the Kiakhta Frontier Commissioner.
The Military Governor of the Amur Province shall send his des
patches through the assistant to the Co~mander-in-Chief (Dzian-dzhun) in
the town ofo,Aigun through whom the Commanders-in-Chief of Heilungchiang
and Kirin likewise shall transmit their despatches to the Military uover
nor 6f:the Amur Province.
The Military Governor of the Primorsk Province and the Ccmmander
in-Chief of Kirin shall send their despatches through the chiefs of their
frontIer posts on the Ussuri and Khun-chun Rivers.
The transmittal of correspondence between the Governor-General of
western Siberia and the Main Administration" of the COIT'Jnander-in-Chlef
of IIi shall be effected through the Russian Consul in the town of IIi.
In case of a matter of particular importance reqUIrIng verbal
explanations, the superior authorities of the frontiers of the two Em
pires may send their despatches to each other by reliable Russian offi
cials.
Article 12
In conformity with Article 11 of the Treaty of Tientsin, letters
and parcel post sent for official purposes from Kiakhta to Peking and
return will leave at the following times; letter mail, once a month
from each of the two points - parcel post, once every two months from
Kiakhta to Peking and once every three months from Peking to Kiakhta.
Letters must arrive at their destinaticn within no more than
days - parcel post, within no more than 40.
On each trip the parcel post must be composed of no more than
cases each welghing not more than 120 Chinase pounds or four poods.
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Letter mail must depart the same day it is received; in cases of
delay there shall be investigations and severe penalties.
The postillion despatched with letters and parcels, while passing
through Urga, must stop in at the Russian Consulate, deliver there
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lotters and parc~ls addressed to persons residing 1n that city and at
the same time, pi~k up letters and parcels addressed by them.
In the sending of parcel post, the cases in which it is packed
must be accompanied by way-bills; fl'om Kiakhta, the way-bills, vtith
charges indicated, must be sent to Urga to the Administrator there and
from Peking, likewise with charges indicated, to the Ministry of External
Relations (Li-fan-yuan).
The way-bills shall indicate exactly: the date of despatch, the
number of cases and their total weight. The separate weight of each
case shall be written on the outside of that case, in Russian figures
and with a translation into Mongolian or Chinese weight.
If the Russian merchunts find it necessary for their commercial
affairs to establish, at their own expense, a postal service for let
ters or for ~ransport of their wares, permission shall be granted to
ttem in order to lighten the load of the Statn malls. In case of the
establishment of such postal cOQrounications the merchants need only noti
fy the local aut!writies in advance, in order to obtain their agreem6nt.
Article 13
Ordinary corr~spondence of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Af
fairs for the Supreme Council (Dzhun-tzi-chou) of the Dai-Tsing Empire,
as well as that of the Governor~en~ral of Eastern Siberia for that
same Councilor for the Ministry of External Relations (Li-fan-yuan)
shall be scnt in the usual wa~ by post but without being limited to thG
fixed timns of departure of the post; 1n the case of matters of special
importance, despatches from the above-mentioned individuals may be sent
with a Russian courier.
During the stay of Russian env~ys at Peking, despatches of special
importance may likewise be sent via Russian officials expressly named
for this purpose.
Russian couriers must not be detained by anyone anywhere en route.
The courier assigned to deliver despatches must, without exception,
be a Russian subject.
The sending of a courier is to be announced 24 hours in advance at
Kiakhta by the Commissioner to the Tsargucheiu (aoy-yuan) and at Peking
by the Russian mission to the War Ministry.
Article 14
When, with the passags of time, any aspect of the stipUlations
regarding overland trade laid down in the present Treaty presents
difficulties to one or the other Party, the Governor-General of E~stern
Siberia is authorized to enter into an agreement with the frontier offi
cials of the Dai-Tsing Empire and to draw up supplen.entary condltio:'1s,
in conformity in all cases with the above-stated principles.

Z()4

Article 12 of the Treaty of Tientsin is hereby
not be altered.

confirm~d

and may

Article 15
Having affirmed in this fashion all of the foregoing, by mutual
agreement, the Plenipotentiaries of the Russian end Chinese Empires have
signed with their ov.n hands and sealed with their own seals two copies
of the Russian text of the Treaty and two copies of its translation
into the Chineselsnguage and have exchanged one copy of each.
The Articles of the present Treaty hav~ legal force from the day
of this exchange betwoen the Plenipotentiaries of each Empire and are as
if they had been inserted word for word in th$ Treaty of Tientsin, and
must be forever strictly and inviolably carried out.
After ratification by the Sovereign5 of the two Empires, this
treaty wIll be promulgated in each of the two States for th~ infor,ila
tion and guidance of those who must observe it.
Concludrd and signed in the capital city of Peking, the 2nd./14th.
of November, 1860 A.D., and in the 6th year of the reign of Emperor

Alexander II and the 2nd day of the 10th Moon of tha loth Year of Sien
fong.
Nikolai Ignaticv
Kung
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